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 This dissertation examines the post-9/11 American fear narrative across media 
and genre. First, it proposes the concepts of the fear narrative, the primary fear theme, 
and the secondary fear theme. Second, it proposes that the fear narrative has a long 
tradition in American culture, in which its themes have adapted and evolved in 
historically sedimented layers of development. Third, it proposes that American fear 
themes change depending on its historical context of production, its cultural regime, its 
genre, and the form of media in which it is expressed. To help uncover the political 
unconsciousness of the American fear narrative, it employs the methodology of Fredric 
Jameson’s three horizons of interpretation. At the first horizon, this methodology 
interprets a text by focusing on a formal contradiction in the narrative as a symbolic 
resolution to an irresolvable real-world contradiction. At the second horizon, this 
contradiction is re-interpreted as a social conflict between two different ideological 
positions in the text. At the third horizon, this is re-interpreted as a contradiction 
between sedimented layers of genres, and at this point the text can be interpreted as 
expressing both oppressive and Utopian ideological content.  
 To analyze the post-9/11 American fear narrative, this study turns to a variety of 
genres in several media forms. First, it examines the genre of the 9/11 novel. Here, it is 
 
 
noted how fear narratives use the ten primary fear themes this study has identified to 
access their contradictions and that these narratives seem to have either ambiguous or 
hopeful endings. Second, it analyzes the zombie narrative, noting the role of five 
secondary fear themes that are more specific to this genre. Third, it examines the 
science fiction fear narrative to note how these texts after 9/11 often explored the 
secondary fear theme of the hybrid character, expressing an intertwining of anxiety and 
hope as cultures such as the East and West intermix after the terrorist attacks. This 
study notes an ongoing discourse among post-9/11 American fear narratives on how 
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Here we go again, the world is coming to an end 
Engage the fear machine and collect the dividends 
……………………………………………. 
Keep your eyes on the bright and shiny 
Just for you, a brand new-and-improved catastrophe. (“Engage the Fear 
Machine,” Lamb of God) 
 
This study investigates the political unconscious of the post-9/11 American fear 
narrative as a distinct and most-current period in the longstanding American fear 
narrative tradition that extends across genre and media forms. In doing so, I propose 
the post-9/11 American fear narrative as a new object of study. This narrative form has 
two distinct characteristics: first, and most obviously, it is a narrative that focuses on 
depicting and evoking fears related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the fallout 
therefrom; second, it is part of a fear narrative tradition with a long history in American 
culture and beyond that over time has developed and historically sedimented a number 
of persistent but evolving fear themes. In this way, fear has embodied itself in the 
narrative as a series of ever changing, evolving, and adapting fear themes that I have 
identified as stretching throughout American history. Within narratives, these themes 
are essentially reoccurring elements of content that are highly reactive to historic, 
cultural, and economic events, and span an intertextual network that crystallizes them 
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into formal elements within particular genres and within their different media 
expressions. I use the term “theme” in describing these cultural phenomena, as 
opposed to the more commonly used terms of conventions or tropes, largely in an effort 
to differentiate this intergeneric concept from the more established intrageneric 
academic terminology that I will use when I discuss aspects occurring within particular 
genres. This study argues that while the themes of American fear at different historical 
points circulate common content, how these fears formally represent themselves within 
a cultural text depends on its historical context of production, its cultural regime, its 
genre (or the genre regime that it inhabits), and the form of media in which it is 
expressed. 
Specifically, this study will attempt to delineate and trace these threads through 
literary fiction, horror, and science fiction as they appear in post-9/11 American 
literature, film, and television. I will focus on fictional narratives in particular, since this 
frame provides texts that borrow and build upon each other intertextually across media 
and genres. By stating that these narratives are “fictional,” I am utilizing Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer’s pragmatic definition of the term, in which “factual narrative advances claims 
of referential truthfulness whereas fictional narrative advances no such claims.”1  While 
non-narrative and factual narrative genres certainly produce and transmit fear themes 
as well, narrowing my scope to fictional narratives provides a common focus and point 
of reference. At the same time, it also allows the measure of breadth that this study 
needs to observe the way that cultural themes transmit and modulate across 
 
1 See Schaeffer’s “Fictional vs. Factual Narration” on The Living Handbook of Narratology for additional definitions 
used to distinguish fictional from factual narration. Also, this focus on fictional narratives in this study omits 
numerous genres of fear narratives that fully deserve studies of their own as fear narratives, such as slave 
narratives and captivity narratives that make claims to referential truthfulness. 
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contemporary American culture, thus avoiding the cultural myopia and constraints of 
only focusing on a particular genre or media. Overall, this study will explore a trans-
medial, trans-generic, and multi-cultural array of post-9/11 American fear narratives to 
explore how content, form, and ideology transmit and modulate in today’s complex 
media environment. 
In part, this dissertation is an investigation into the “fear machine” mentioned in 
the opening quote of this chapter from the song “Engage the Fear Machine” by metal 
band Lamb of God. If the emotion of fear is used within culture for instrumental reasons, 
as this song and other texts assert, how does this politicization of fear work and to what 
ends? Is it just a means to generate profit, or is there more to it? If fear is used to 
manipulate consumers, how can we better understand its ideological and formal 
workings in order to raise our consciousness of this phenomenon so that we can resist 
or redirect its efforts? While fear is often seen as operating in this way in news media 
and politics, how does fear operate in the fictional narrative? How do different genres 
and media forms alter this use of fear in the narrative, perhaps at the formal or 
ideological levels? Does fear only work in this illusory, Adorno-esque fashion, or can it 
also be utilized for other ends, perhaps ends more Utopic in nature? These are the 
questions that have motivated my research and work on this project, something that I 
have experienced as a felt urge to uncover and discover the workings of fear in the 
narrative not only in its detrimental and manipulative potentialities but also how it is 
used in American culture in ways that might be generative and valuable as we progress 
into the future. Even further, this project asks how fear changes within a given culture 
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through history, and how a fearful situation, such as the attacks of 9/11, might affect the 
cultural experience of fear? 
A wide array of work has been done surrounding these questions, but none has 
put all the pieces together into an interpretation of the uses of fear in American culture 
after 9/11. Barry Glassner’s The Culture of Fear offers a pre-9/11 sociological 
perspective of how fear is used by politicians, advocacy groups, and the media to 
manipulate, but it mentions little about fear in the fictional narrative. On the other hand, 
Brian Massumi’s anthology Politics of Everyday Fear provides a pre-9/11 understanding 
of the emotion of fear and its relation to affect. Affect theory itself has grown in 
popularity after 9/11, but seminal texts in this field since 9/11 have tended to pursue 
aspects of affect other than fear, such as Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings, Eugine 
Brinkema’s The Forms of the Affects, and Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism. Other 
studies have begun the investigation into the formal and ideological aspects of the post-
9/11 narrative in various media, such as Arin Keeble’s The 9/11 Novel: Trauma, Politics, 
and Identity and Wheeler Winston Dixon’s anthology Film and Television after 9/11. 
While these works at times address post-9/11 texts and their discussion of fearful 
situations or experiences, they do not go as far as to analyze the fear in these 
narratives at the level of its formal and ideological manifestations. This project advances 
the critical conversations in the study of American fear, affect theory, and post-9/11 
narratives by bringing them together with considerations of class ideology and 
narratology so that we can identify how the fictional narrative use of fear has evolved in 
the past two decades and what ideological articulations it is forming today. Perhaps 
most importantly, the study of the post-9/11 American fear narrative remains relevant 
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today because, as we will see in this study, after 9/11, fear became both personalized 
and politicized in terms of nation, religion, and geography in ways that we still live within 
today. Conducting symptomatic readings of the cultural texts of this time reveals how 
9/11 changed the nature of American fear and the narrative ideologies surrounding 
these culturally and historically contingent expressions of fear, changes that contribute 
to the underlying roots of American fear and culture at work today. 
This gap in our understanding of the fear narrative is one that desperately needs 
to be filled, as can be seen by the recent concern in American culture over “fake news,” 
“alternative facts,” and “truthiness” in which the ideological operations of texts, 
especially narratives, have become increasingly difficult to identify, and this murkiness 
has seeped into the American imaginary and the narratives it produces. “Fake news” 
and its ilk have most frequently been deployed to elicit or ideologically form and direct 
fear, especially after 9/11, such as directing our attention to false threats or creating 
threats where there may be none. By researching the way that fear operates in the post-
9/11 narrative, we can develop a critical awareness of how the “facts” and “truth” 
expressed in these texts have been manipulated to serve particular ends. By exposing 
these fearful manipulations, and uncovering Utopic uses of fear as well, we can come to 
a better grasp of how to resist, alter, and change the way fear works in contemporary 
American culture, steering us away from fears of things that might not really exist and 
placing our energies behind more productive urgencies. 
To help examine the transmission of the thematic threads of fear through the 
intertextual fabric of American culture and into my central focus, the post-9/11 “era,” I 
will turn to the Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson’s three horizon methodology of 
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interpretation. Through this lens, these elements of content and their formal 
manifestations are symbolic acts of the American political unconscious, at once 
registering and intervening within the political, social, and historical issues underlying a 
particular historically situated understanding of American fear. My next chapter 
discusses Jameson’s methodology in more detail, but in very simple terms, he proposes 
at the first horizon to analyze how the formal creativity of any narrative acts ideologically 
by inventing an imaginary solution to real world contradictions, at the second horizon to 
analyze how a text’s formal ideology registers actual class conflicts rife in its own time, 
and at the third horizon to analyze how any narrative text at once repurposes the 
ideologies of previous texts and genres and looks forward to new narrative forms and 
ideologies. This study will use this Jamesonian methodology to focus on the way that 
the thematic threads of American fear manifest themselves in American cultural 
productions created after 9/11 to allow a better understanding of their transmission, 
circulation, and formation across genres and media, and to better understand their 
political, social, and historical meanings in these particular and situated cultural 
manifestations. 
I have selected Jameson’s three horizons method as the central methodology of 
this study because it understands narrative form from a political and historical 
perspective salient for my subject and both uncovers oppressive ideologies hidden in 
seemingly progressive texts and recovers Utopian aspects of seemingly oppressive 
texts, a double hermeneutic that seems apt to the ideological complexities of fear 
narratives after 9/11. However, in the past decade, this Jamesonian methodology has 
been the topic of numerous criticisms. Joseph North places Jameson’s The Political 
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Unconscious, the originating source of the three horizons methodology, as the 
beginning of what he calls the almost Kuhnian “historicist/contextualist paradigm” that 
he argues has dominated literary studies since its publication in 1981 (1). He asserts 
that this brand of criticism has pushed literary studies into creating cultural studies that 
merely depict history rather than intervene to effect cultural and political change (2-3). 
As he argues, contrary to popular sentiments in the field, the dominance of this brand of 
scholarship has not been a triumph of the left, but rather a move to political passivity 
and “depoliticization” that has served the political right, as “for its explicit commitments 
to politicization, [it] has left us with a discipline of cultural analysis alone,” in which “even 
those whose explicit goal is to intervene in the culture seek to do so by providing further 
and better analyses” (12). He states that in the political history of literary studies, this 
historicist/contextualist paradigm has been “symptomatic of the wider retreat of the left 
in the neoliberal period and was thus a small part of the more general victory of the 
right” (3). 
Rita Felski also argues that Jamesonian symptomatic reading should not be the 
singular and dominant perspective in literary theory, borrowing from philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur to call this form of critique the “hermeneutics of suspicion” (The Limits 1). This 
hermeneutics creates what she calls a “critical mood” in which “[a] certain disposition 
takes shape: guardedness rather than openness, aggression rather than submission, 
irony rather than reverence, exposure rather than tact” (20-1). Elizabeth S. Anker and 
Felski describe critique as having a “diagnostic quality” that treats interpretation as the 
work of a lone expert who scrutinizes “an object in order to decode certain defects or 
flaws that are not readily or automatically apparent to a nonspecialist perspective” (4). In 
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an anthology co-edited by Felski, Christopher Castiglia places critique in the context of 
political history: “Like the ever-wary Cold War citizen, critics operating within the 
hermeneutics of suspicion treat the text’s surface as a deceptive cover below which 
they discover and reveal dangerous ideological complicities in which critics themselves 
are unimplicated” (215). In response, Felski calls for the creation of alternatives to 
critique that she calls postcritique (The Limits 173). Overall, though, Felski states, “To 
ask what comes after the hermeneutics of suspicion is not to demolish but to decenter 
it, to decline to see it as the be-all and end-all of interpretation” (9). In short, Felski looks 
to destabilize the present binary in literary studies that if you are not being critical you 
“must therefore be uncritical” (“Introduction” 215). In proposing alternatives to critique, 
Felski has presented curating, conveying, criticizing, and composing as four possible 
actions of the humanities that we can use to broaden our studies and justify the 
continuance of our discipline (217).   
It is important to note here that neither North nor Felski call for the elimination of 
Jamesonian symptomatic readings or critique, nor do they think we should stop using 
this form of analysis in either literary studies or the humanities. As North states, “We will 
of course continue to need trenchant historicist/contextualist analyses of culture through 
a radical lens, such as those that are now provided by those on the left of the discipline” 
(211). His point is, and I would concur, that we need to supplement critique by finding 
new ways to more effectively and actively intervene and change culture (211). Similarly, 
Felski states, “postcritical can hardly be taken to mean that we are no longer influenced 
by the ideas of Marx or Foucault” (“Response” 386), nor is it “about hauling the 
intellectual giants of modern thought before a firing squad” (387). Further, she states, 
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“we cannot entirely forego suspicion (what has been learned cannot be unlearned); this, 
presumably, is the salient distinction between the postcritical and the noncritical” (389). 
These recent, much-needed examinations of Jamesonian-style of critique have 
prompted the discipline to look for new alternatives to critique in order to broaden our 
capacities as academics2, and I would argue that these moves will be vital to the future 
of the discipline, moves that I would like to pursue in the future as well. However, these 
calls also note the importance of the continuance of critique alongside these new 
alternatives, and this dissertation aims to further this effort. 
In response to North, though, I would argue that, while historicist/contextualist 
critique admittedly has limited power to make social change under the present 
dominance of neoliberal culture, it does have some power. This circuit of power can be 
found in Felski’s actions of the humanities, particularly in curating and conveying. While 
I acknowledge that cultural studies such as this will likely only be read by a select 
audience of academics in the field, and will thus, likely, be “preaching to the choir,” 
these same academics tend to teach courses, and in these courses we convey our 
ideas from these academic studies to our students, who then go out into the world to 
spread these ideas, albeit often in partial, translated, or distorted forms, to others by 
word of mouth and online. Overall, it is hard to dispute that some political gains have 
been made under the historicist/contextualist paradigm. As Bruce Robbins states in 
response to postcriticism and to defend the ability of critique to affect political change: 
“The present backlash in the United States against decades of struggle for the rights of 
 
2 For examples of alternatives to critique, see William Jeffrey on the new modesty in literary criticism; Stephen Best 
and Sharon Marcus in their call for the reading methods of “surface reading,” (9); and, Heather Love in her 





women and minorities can be read dialectically as a backhanded recognition that such 
struggles have in fact accomplished something” (373-4). Yet, I also agree with both 
North and Felski that we need to find new ways to expand our ability to engage with and 
enact political change, as I believe developments in these efforts can only benefit our 
discipline. 
One valuable service that North and Felski’s critiques provide is that they offer a 
much-needed analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of critique. One advantage I 
find in symptomatic reading is that it provides the interpreter with surprises, in that texts 
that seem progressive often turn out to contain oppressive ideologies as well. Likewise, 
oppressive texts can also be reclaimed as containing aspects that are Utopian. As 
Jameson’s third horizon asserts, all texts are inherently and simultaneously ideological 
and Utopian, and, even while this can often be a bitter pill to take when reading texts 
that we enjoy, it is a realization that I have found to be beneficial to both the critic and 
their readers. Last, I would also question the view of critique as a diagnostic 
implemented by the lone expert. In writing this dissertation, I may have been a critic 
diagnosing the symptoms of my texts, but I was never alone. All of the interpretations in 
this study resulted in conversation with a multitude of other academic voices, narratives, 
and philosophical perspectives who have left their marks as the source material that 
supplement my analyses. I may have synthesized their voices and added my own to the 
chorus, but criticism, at least as it has taken shape in this study, has been anything but 
a lone act of an insulated individual asserting my authority over the clueless masses. 
On numerous occasions, these voices challenged my own sense of “expertise,” 
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diffusing it in ways that have enriched this study and can only be described as 
collective. 
As another alternative to Jameson, Paul Saint-Amour presents the concept of 
weak theory, which draws from “feminism, queer theory, and disability studies” (439) in 
which “the various loads borne by weakness can productively decenter what they 
encounter” and can “make theory and modernism strange to themselves” (438). Yet, as 
Margaret Konkol writes concerning the field of modernism, the issue is not whether 
strong or weak theories are “better”: “Rather, it’s that strong theory had needed to play 
itself out in the field, first. The viability of surface reading does not presuppose that 
symptomatic or deep readings are invalid.” Unlike the field of modernism, in which the 
objects of study and the boundaries of the field have previously been established and 
are currently in need of weakening in order to be subject to revision, I intentionally adopt 
the strong theories of Jameson to stake out the intellectual territory of my new object of 
study, the post-9/11 American fear narrative. This said, however, I eagerly invite future 
studies, by myself and others, that adopt weak theories in order to question, 
problematize, and destabilize the concepts I present in this dissertation. These efforts 
can only advance our understanding of the fear narrative, energizing the conversation 
that I aim to create in this study on fear and the American narrative.  
With these criticisms in mind, I focus on the emotion of fear in this study, as 
opposed to other emotions, because the aspects of a text that direct us to fear 
something or to be afraid of a particular situation point the critic toward moments of 
conflict and contradiction that are particularly salient within post-9/11 culture. Further, I 
focus on fear because it is central to understanding post-9/11 American narratives and 
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culture and because in Jamesonian terms it is an emotion that particularly registers 
underlying social contradictions and historical tensions. These moments of narrative 
fear can be seen as the sites of tension brought about by dialectical contradiction 
occurring on political, social, or ideological levels. These are the anxious moments 
when the inherent contradiction between two social or material forces are still in 
contentious negotiation, when the outcome is still ambiguous, so the tension between 
these two forces in the throes of dialectic synthesis—and all of the desperate struggles 
for power and legitimacy this entails, the violence and discourse, the maneuvers and 
tactics of enacting and spreading ideological perspectives of our experience of reality—
creates anxiety in the text over the uncertainty of the shape and the potential social 
hierarchy of the future to come. In short, looking at fear in a text is one way to help 
direct us toward the conflicts that are of interest to a cultural critic. These moments of 
fear in a text are conjunctions of sociocultural contention: the conflict of the status quo 
with the new, moments of potential change. Of course, there are certainly other ways to 
access these contradictions in a text but focusing on the elicitation and depiction of fear 
offers a fruitful heuristic toward the interpretation of these points of conflict as felt by 
their contemporaneous and intended audiences. 
For example, if a text directs us to be afraid of an external enemy, who has a 
habit of contaminating our understanding of what defines our social in-group, then it is 
often the case that we are symbolically being directed toward the fear of a competing 
ideology, one that is coming from an out-group source but has the potential to convert 
those of our in-group to its ways. In post-9/11 American fear narratives, the ideological 
and symbolic unconscious of such fears are especially potent and pervasive. For 
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instance, in post-9/11 zombie films the contagious nature of the zombie turning who we 
thought were friends into enemies often symbolically directs us to the fear that terrorists 
themselves or their ideologies will convert those we thought to be red-blooded 
Americans into an enemy, a concern often felt in the American imaginary toward the 
possibility of sleeper cells living among us and domestically grown terrorists joining 
Jihadist causes. Further, during the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, contradictions between the 
efforts of American imperialism and Middle Eastern anti-colonial insurgencies can be 
captured and pinpointed in the fear elements of the post-9/11 narrative in stories of 
invasion and colonization, such as in James Cameron’s film Avatar (2009), which 
identifies with the colonized aliens who rise up against the imperial power of the human 
characters. This also occurs in other historical American eras in different ways and 
directed toward different objects of fear, such as in the 1950s when many were afraid of 
the conformity inspired by the McCarthy trials, and we could explore these feelings 
through narratives wherein the external threat contaminates our in-group, such as in 
Don Siegel’s film The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), a film that could be seen 
either as expressing a fear of McCarthyism or the fear of being converted to a soulless 
or totalitarian sense of Stalinist socialism. These examples highlight how fear, even 
within a single text, is often amorphous and can be directed toward multiple targets 
simultaneously, allowing for a complex cultural analysis from multiple perspectives. 
Overall, the three horizon approach to fear as a socially symbolic act allows for a 
multivalenced discussion of numerous fears acting on a culture at a particular historical 
moment. Even more, it especially allows for the discussion of how fear narratives pull us 
into the cutting edge of the concerns and the formation of a culture, in the path of what 
14 
 
is directly to come, the nascent shapes of future articulations of power, into what 
Williams would call the structures of feeling, these “pre-emergent” or, in other terms, 
affective impulses that have yet to be articulated into the structures of power and 
hegemonic culture (132).  In short, focusing on fear narratives, especially in the post-
9/11 era, is one way to see the culture-in-progress, to see it in negotiation, before the 
conclusion of the contradiction becomes a crystallized, structured formation in which the 
threat to the status quo is neutralized. 
In constructing this study, I made a number of limitations in its scope. First, of 
course, this study only looks at fear narratives that originate from American sources, 
more specifically excavating the American reactions of fear after 9/11. This limits the 
project to only texts by American authors, directors, or creators. I use the term 
“American” loosely as all authors, directors, or creators living in America during the time 
of the production of the text. Yet, the category of “American” is one that has been 
fraught with contention. Like all national divisions, it is a moving boundary that often 
evokes a sense of inclusiveness at its ideological core, yet has often been used as a 
shifting exclusionary border in historical practice, often cutting along racial, ethnic, or 
religious lines, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and President Trump’s 
Muslim travel ban in 2017 that was expanded in 2020. Limiting this study to American 
narratives excludes a wide range of fear narratives from other countries or those that 
have a hybrid nationality of origin, such as an author born in America who moved to 
another country or texts with multiple sources of origination. This can be a surprisingly 
difficult line of division to follow when considering contemporary film and television texts, 
which typically enlist the contribution of many people from across the world. For the 
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purposes of this study, then, I resolved to only look at the nationality of the director 
and/or the “show runner” of screen media to determine their eligibility for this study. 
Establishing this limitation allows us to focus on narrative crystallizations of American 
fear, as opposed to narrative fear in other nations or cultures, and avoids having to pull 
from an even larger corpus of international fear narratives, which in its sheer mass 
would only multiply and dilute the generalizations that even focusing on only American 
fear narratives necessitates. Further, the complications of geopolitics mean that every 
country has a different relation and level of concern over the event of 9/11 on which this 
study focuses. Expanding this study to the analysis of world fear narratives would not 
reliably reveal much about any one culture’s emotional reaction to 9/11, nor would it 
make 9/11 an appropriate event on which to focus.  
Second, as this study looks only at post-9/11 texts, I limited my focus to those 
texts that were largely created after September 11, 2001. This means that novels 
published only a year or two after 9/11 have been excluded to allow for the event to 
influence the production of the concepts behind their narratives, as novels often require 
at least two to three years to make, a “time lag” that Appelbaum and Paknadal found in 
their research on terrorist novels (396). As they state, “novels published in 2002 and 
2003 and even later may have been conceived and written before 9/11 and are often 
indistinguishable in kind from earlier efforts” (396). While some novels published within 
this time lag may notably react to 9/11, excluding these years removes a gray area of 
cultural transition in the history of the novel that can muddy the distinctions we make 
between novels conceived before 9/11 from those conceived afterward. However, I do 
not place this limitation on films and television narratives selected for this study, as their 
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production times are often much quicker than those of novels, and drastic conceptual 
re-writes in light of current events happen frequently. Texts that have long histories of 
development (e.g., the 2007 film The Mist that was originally a novella written in 1980 
by Stephen King) have, for the most part, been excluded to help rule out historical 
influences more characteristic of previous eras that might only have peripheral relations 
to the post-9/11 imaginary and geopolitics. Third, this project restricts the texts it 
analyzes to narratives in the 9/11 novel subgenre of literary fiction, the horror genre, 
and the science fiction genre, and to those in the media forms of literature, film, and 
television, to help create a sense of focus and framing in my argument and because 
post-9/11 fear narratives are common within these genres and media platforms.  
Although my overarching project is a three-horizons Jamesonian interpretation of 
the post-9/11 American fear narrative, this study also draws on and contributes to many 
other fields of study. By adopting a transmedial approach, this cultural study both draws 
on and expands upon the contemporary academic understanding of the post-9/11 novel 
and the considerable research done on the emerging themes and forms prevalent in 
novels of this era, such as Kristiaan Versluys’s Out of the Blue (2009), Richard Gray’s 
After the Fall: American Literature Since 9/11 (2011), and Arin Keeble’s The 9/11 Novel: 
Trauma Politics and Identity (2014), among the numerous articles and works by Micheal 
Rothberg, Bimbisar Irom, and John Duvall. In terms of method, within the overarching 
three-horizons approach, I draw on formal reading and narratology, and an 
understanding of the narrative based on the narratological concepts of “possible worlds 
theory” and “fictionality,” or the “qualities and affordances of fictional genres” (Zetterberg 
Gjerlevsen). This study also acts to intervene in the field of science fiction studies, 
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building of the works of Darko Suvin, Gary K. Wolfe, Fredric Jameson, and others in 
order to update the field to post-9/11 historical and cultural developments. Likewise, it 
acts to add to the conversation of zombie studies, building off the work of Gerry 
Canavan, John Browning, and Kyle William Bishop in order to bring the discussion into 
what I am calling the present “post-zombie” phase and to place the recent boom in 
zombie narrative popularity in context with other narrative movements since 9/11. In 
less direct but persistent ways, this study also builds on and seeks to contribute to 
various aspects of gender studies, feminism, and critical race theory.  
I ground my understanding of emotion on a reconsideration of Brian Massumi’s 
branch of affect theory, that sees emotion as an ideological interpretation of affect, 
which is itself a felt intensity caused by external stimuli. As Gregory J. Seigworth and 
Melissa Gregg note, “there are two dominant vectors of affect study in the humanities,” 
one based on the works of Silvan Tomkins and Eve Sedgwick, and the other Gilles 
Deleuze’s Spinozist concepts as forwarded by Massumi (5), and these two vectors exist 
among the eight main approaches that they outline toward the study of affect in 
contemporary research today (6-8). They state that the Tomkins/Sedgwick approach is 
a more “human-centered” set of theories that utilizes research from psychobiology and 
psychoanalysis that tend toward “a relatively unabashed biologism” (7). For the 
purposes of this study, in which I aim to chart the transmission of cultural themes as 
they move across genres, media, and history, this approach offers limited value, as my 
study focuses on both human and nonhuman actors, such as textual form. However, the 
Deleuze/Massumi approach I have adopted offers this study an angle on affect that de-
centers the role of the human, posing a “nonhumanist” philosophy in which affect moves 
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processually among both nonhuman and human actors, such as texts, readers, authors, 
critics, media, and historical events. This post-human approach can better capture the 
social and cultural relations that I seek to study concerning the post-9/11 American fear 
narrative. Yet, I encounter the limits of this approach to affect theory in my later 
discussion of trauma as a primary fear theme, in which the psychological and 
internalized affective experience of trauma benefits from the Freudian theories 
associated with the Tomkins/Sedgwick approach. 
I note that my approach to affect theory is a “reconsideration” of Massumi’s views 
on affect due to recent trenchant and enlightening critiques of his concepts. Ruth Leys 
very effectively discredits the two experiments that Massumi uses to form a theoretical 
justification for his views on affect in Parables of the Virtual, both the snowman 
experiment (450) and the half-second experiment he uses to explain the separation of 
affect and cognition (452). From these experiments she identifies a strain of anti-
intentionalist thinking in Massumi’s theories, in which affect places the body as primary 
in the determination of ideology and consciousness, and cognition comes “too late to 
intervene” (451-2). This enforces a “dualism of body and mind” (455) even as Massumi 
aims to condemn the “subject-object split” (458). Similarly, Aubrey Anable identifies how 
Massumi’s Parables of the Virtual divorces the corporeal body from the “discursive body 
(the body of signification),” fixing it into a grid of symbolic systems that ignores the role 
of “the markers of race, gender, class, and sexuality” as at least partial determinates of 
one’s “abilities to feel and act” (8-9). Yet, even as Leys states, these problems with 
Massumi’s theories do not dispel the value of describing the role of affect, biology, 
ideology, cognition, representation, and personal experience in the creation of emotion. 
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As Leys attests, “The problem here is not the idea that many bodily (and mental) 
processes take place subliminally, below the threshold of awareness. Who would dream 
of doubting that they do?” (456).  
In response to such criticisms, Eugenie Brinkema has proposed using Deleuze’s 
concept of “perpetual foldings,” in which the interior is no longer opposing the exterior, 
but folded into each other so that the outside becomes the inside of the outside and vice 
versa, to contest the linear framework Massumi advances (22). Through the concept of 
foldings, “Interiority,” she argues, “is brought to the surface, made exterior to constitute 
a new topography of the subject, the body, and knowledge in the process” (22). Though 
describing Massumi’s process appears distinctly linear, as external stimuli creates affect 
which acts on the body and is interpreted through cognitive processes into an emotion, 
we can alternately conceive of it as enfolded, for while affect may inform the body, 
cognition also informs the affectual, embodied sensations. For instance, when watching 
a scary movie, we do not simply absorb the formal stimulation of the film and react 
afterward. Instead, we ask ourselves cognitive questions that inform our later reception 
of affect. Do we like scary movies? What has been our experiences watching past scary 
movies? How does this film’s formal attempts to produce fear compare to these other 
scary movies I have seen?  
Thinking of the affectual process of emotion as enfolded destabilizes the 
mind/body binary by highlighting the influence of numerous actors in the process of 
making emotion, no longer privileging the body over the mind, and it turns the process 
into a nonlinear interaction of networked forces that build on each other in complex 
ways rather than produce a predetermined result. This enfolded version of Massumi’s 
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affect theory moreover seems apt for analyzing, as I do here, the ways textual 
representations produce and enter into affect, since even the act of reading is far more 
complex than Massumi’s original linear process of external stimuli, affect, and cognition, 
and it can work in a variety of combinations. For example, reading or viewing is a 
cognitive/bodily process that arguably precedes and produces bodily affect (spine chills, 
for example) that are often processed through cognition and ideological structures as 
we interpret the text. In answer to Anable’s objection, the Jamesonian methodology of 
this study works as a corrective for Massumi’s disconnect with representation. By 
grounding this study in affect in order to understand the emotion of fear, the three 
horizons can pull our focus back to embodied forms existing in a relational grid of 
signification with other forms in order to understand them at the ideological and 
historical levels that this method affords. This perspective places the fear narrative itself 
as a crystallization of affect, an embodied form rife with a politics of representation and 
a dynamic set of relationships to other textual forms. It is important to note, however, 
that this study uses affect as a theoretical basis for understanding emotion and its role 
in the object of study, the post-9/11 American fear narrative. It is not a study focusing on 
affect theory per se. Thus, affect often works implicitly in the pages that follow, 
underlying the discussions of this study rather than explicitly being its center of focus. 
Overall, I utilize Massumi’s theories on affect, as opposed to others, because its 
emphasis on the materiality of the interaction of affect with ideology, hegemony, and 
power mesh well with Jamesonian Marxism and because it forms the foundation of 
Deborah Gould’s understanding of the affective ontology (28), which I use to link 
Massumi’s concepts to textual interpretation and review in my next chapter. Just as 
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affect theory broadly recognizes and critiques when Marxist and other cultural critics 
analyze emotion, there is too often a retreat to idealism, of conceiving of emotion as 
disembodied abstraction divorced from materiality. It is this very kind of idealism that 
motivated much of Marx’s theorizing as a protest against the philosophers popular in his 
time such as those that he called “the Young Hegelians” and Feuerbach in particular 
(Marx 36). However, affects, as Jameson states, “are singularities and intensities, 
existences rather than essences” (Antinomies 36) that “become the organ of perception 
of the world itself, the vehicle of my being-in-the-world” (43). In short, treating affect as 
felt, bodily sensations or intensities reacting to external stimuli, or narrative forms, 
provides a materialist means of conceptualizing emotion as interpretations of affect and 
helps avoid the pitfalls of idealism that Marx railed against so vehemently. I use 
primarily Massumi and Gould because they so directly interrogate the material nexus of 
affect, emotion, and ideology. Further, this perspective allows us to distinguish between 
affect and emotion in order to study affect as a part of the process that creates 
emotions, thereby allowing this study to see emotions as culturally contingent and 
historically evolving interpretations of felt events, interpretations that interact with 
biological forces but are not determined by them alone.  
By combining the theories of these fields together, under the methodological 
umbrella of Jameson’s three-horizon analysis, this cultural study can analyze narrative 
expressions of the emotion of fear in materialist terms as formal crystallizations of affect 
that manifest in a variety of media as ideological solutions to real world problems that 
seem otherwise irresolvable. Fear in these narratives expresses the felt contradictions 
of American culture after 9/11, affective impulses interpreted by their creators and 
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embodied in narratives of fear. This project therefore also intervenes in cultural studies 
by examining the narrative form and evolution of the emotion of fear in America 
primarily after 9/11, but over the course of American history in general, examining how 
emotions change over time and for what political aims they have served or utilized. 
Overall, this project is important to cultural studies, as it presents a way to trace the 
affective transmission of fear as a cultural force that spreads across the American 
imaginary, and takes on particular forms and centrality after the fear-inducing events of 
9/11.  
These concerns matter at a fundamentally practical level, because if we can 
understand how our culture reflects and produces fear in narrative form, we can better 
understand how contemporary American culture functions ideologically and in turn 
better understand how to recognize and counter its oppressive manifestations, such as 
the role of the politics of fear in the lived experiences of contemporary Americans 
(Takacs, “Monsters” 1). We can also attend to the ways fear works to pull us closer to a 
new state of social consciousness, urging us toward the production of future Utopic 
material conditions. Overall, I will argue that the post-9/11 American fear themes have 
manifested themselves in our narrative productions, changing the dynamic of American 
culture so that it increasingly justifies policies that have compromised our real-world 
freedom, autonomy, and privacy rights. I will also argue that, as crystallizations of affect 
and ideology, these symbolic expressions expose and at times even advocate a Utopic 
desire for a more unified, collective future. 
Whereas this chapter has provided a general rationale for this study, Chapter 2 
will describe in greater detail the theoretical and methodological approaches the project 
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will use to analyze the post-9/11 American fear narrative. This will begin with an 
overview of Massumi and Gould on affect theory and how this foundation impacts our 
understanding of emotion as an interpretation of affective potentialities stimulated at a 
given point in time. From here, I will focus on the emotion of fear and its theoretical 
connection to ideology and power in not only society but its manifestations in the 
narrative as well. Last, I will overview the methodology of Jameson’s three horizons of 
interpretation. This includes the first horizon that focuses on a formal contradiction in the 
narrative as an imaginary solution to a contradiction in the real world (Jameson, The 
Political 77). At the second horizon, this is re-interpreted as a social conflict voiced in 
the narrative that highlights an “ideological confrontation between the classes” (85). 
Then, at the third horizon, this contradiction is interpreted through the genre 
sedimentation in the narrative and how this allows us to see the ways that the text is 
simultaneously oppressive and Utopic.   
 Chapter 3, entitled “The American Fear Narrative and the Fear Theme,” will 
better define what I mean by the fear narrative, the primary fear theme, and the 
secondary fear theme. I then outline ten primary fear themes that I have identified as 
being particularly prominent and most pervasively deployed in what Jameson terms 
“symbolic acts” of ideology in post-9/11 American fear contexts. These primary fear 
themes include apocalypticism, contamination, entrapment, exclusion, the external 
threat, the internal threat, paranoia, the personalization of fear, transgression, and 
trauma. My summary of these themes focuses on how they have been used post-9/11, 
but they also point to a variety of texts that exemplify their historical use in action. 
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 In Chapter 4, I trace the fear narrative historically through American history. To 
do this, I offer a genealogy of the form in seven historical periods, including the Colonial 
and Early American fear narrative, the Victorian-influenced American fear narrative, the 
Great Wars American fear narrative, the Early Cold War American fear narrative, the 
Fin-de-Siècle American fear narrative, and the Post-9/11 American fear narrative. This 
chapter argues that the primary fear themes outlined in Chapter 3 have a history and 
have developed over time in ways that reflect, build upon, and shape the particular fears 
endemic to a specific moment of production. In keeping with this historical process, 
Chapter 4 shows how these fear themes altered after 9/11 by, for instance, focusing on 
the external threat of the terrorist or allegorical representations of terrorists as a primary 
threat, enacting a preoccupation with post-9/11 trauma, depicting apocalyptic situations 
that evoke similarities to the attack on the Twin Towers, and presenting a pervading 
sense of the personalization of fear as threats to the nation or society became 
increasingly rearticulated as threats to the individual or to one’s immediate family. The 
chapter ends by illustrating this historical process of sedimentation and transformation 
by contrasting the use of fear themes in Poe’s “The Black Cat” with their form and use in 
the post-9/11 fear narrative.  
The last three chapters examine how the post-9/11 American fear narrative not 
only ideologically reconfigures historical American fear themes, but also adapts those 
themes to different genres and media. Chapter 5 focuses the 9/11 novel in literary 
fiction, Chapter 6 focuses on a novel and a film in the horror genre, and Chapter 7 
focuses a television show and a novel in the science fiction genre. This progression 
through the chapters allows an examination of the different ways genre modulates its 
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form across various media, each genre’s different ideological stances, and how each 
genre reproduces existing fears, develops new ones, or discovers imaginary solutions 
to our unresolvable political, social, or historical contradictions (Jameson, The Political 
79). Moreover, the texts selected increase in narrative and communicative channel 
complexity in each subsequent chapter. I begin by focusing on what Herman would call 
monomodal media, or “a print narrative with only a verbal information track” (Basic xii). 
This allows the study to establish a baseline of conventions and formal devices to 
compare with the succeeding chapters on specific genres and their associated 
expressions in select media. From here, I move on to multimodal films with their “filmed 
image-track and the audiorecorded sound-track” (xii), allowing two channels for 
interpretation. Last, I will explore the more complicated narrative structure of the serial 
and multimodal television show. This way, the objects of study are arranged to increase 
in, first, communicative channel complexity, then narrative complexity. This structure 
allows me to broaden my interpretations of the fear narrative as the study progresses. 
Each chapter will begin with a general discussion of the genre and then focus on the 
analysis of a few representative textual examples, chosen to highlight specific trends 
within the overall genre. To enrich the analysis, I then, trace peripheral examples to 
compare and contextualize my findings. Each chapter tries to balance these 
representative texts between canonical white male authors and authors/creators of 
marginalized social groups in order to widen the breadth of the findings. 
 Chapter 5 on “Post-9/11 American Fear Narratives in Literary Fiction” explores 
fear narratives in the 9/11 novel subgenre noting how charting their use of primary fear 
themes is integral to understanding their political unconscious. Starting with narratives 
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from 9/11 novels allows me to establish a baseline of conventions as they have been 
inspired by literary fictions operating under what film scholar Steve Neale calls an 
ideology of realism (48). This is a concept that he draws from Tzvetan Todorov’s 
understanding of realism, which “as an ideology can partly be defined by its refusal to 
recognize the reality of its own generic status, or to acknowledge its own adherence to a 
type of generic verisimilitude” (Neale 48). Starting with these monomodal texts will allow 
me to show how the conventions I find here continue and co-exist in other genres and 
media of the post-9/11 American fear narrative to be explored in the following chapters. 
In this chapter I have selected examples that each foregrounds at least two primary fear 
themes, even as other fear themes are present to a lesser extent in the narrative. First, I 
will look at Jess Walter’s The Zero (2006) through the lenses of the themes of trauma 
and entrapment. Second, I turn to Thomas Pynchon’s Bleeding Edge (2014), a novel 
that prominently features the themes of the paranoia and the personalization of fear. 
Third, I will examine Porochista Khakpour’s Sons and Other Flammable Objects (2007) 
that highlights the themes of exclusion and contamination. Lastly, I will look at Amy 
Waldman’s The Submission (2011) as an example of how the internal and external 
threats operate in the narrative.  Overall, the chapter shows how historically resonant 
fear themes crystallize in unique ways in the post-9/11 context. It also traces the 
correlation between these themes and the formal structures of literary fiction to produce 
either ambiguous or hopeful endings. 
Chapter 6 on “Post-9/11 American Fear Narratives in the Horror Genre” focuses 
on the zombie narrative, a genre that met with particular popularity after 9/11, in order to 
identify some of its common secondary fear themes. Secondary fear themes are 
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combinations of two or more primary fear themes that manifest as a narrative existent, 
either as a character or an element of setting. Since these secondary themes are more 
concrete in their depictions than the abstract primary themes, they are more specifically 
adapted to fit within a given genre and media. In the zombie narrative, I identify five 
prominent secondary fear themes, including the zombie-creature, the survival space, 
the wall, the hypermasculine character, and the survivalist. First, I analyze the 
morphology of the zombie-creature in film. Second, I turn to Colson Whitehead’s novel 
Zone One (2011) to examine the survival space and the wall. Third, I will turn to David 
Trachtenberg’s film 10 Cloverfield Lane (2016) as an example of what I call a “post-
zombie” narrative that highlights the themes of hypermasculinity and survivalism. 
Through these textual analyses, this chapter argues that secondary fear themes create 
a network of cultural associations that build from genre conventions but often add a 
touch of inventionality to keep the narrative historically resonant. 
 Chapter 7 on “Post-9/11 American Fear Narratives in the Science Fiction Genre” 
explores how elements of the secondary fear themes of the zombie narrative translate 
into science fiction, but especially how the distancing nature of the science fiction genre 
pushes the fear themes further by hybridizing the monster. To examine this fear theme, 
I first look to Ronald D. Moore’s television series Battlestar Galactica (2004-09) in which 
humans face off against robotic Cylons that blur the boundary between human and 
machine, incorporating the fear theme of transgression and thereby symbolically 
exploring America’s anxious sense of identity after the terrorist attacks. Second, I 
examine Andrea Hairston’s novel Mindscape (2006), which depicts the hybrid character 
as a source of liberatory potential that can help remove the barriers our society has 
28 
 
created between us. In this chapter, I argue that 9/11 disrupted Americans’ national 
sense of identity, momentarily challenging the sense of American exceptionalism upon 
which this identity is based and exposing our fears of integrating into the international 
arena of twenty-first century late capitalism. The anxiety over integration manifests in 
post-9/11 science fiction through the theme of the hybrid character, one often 
surrounded with complex associations with fear and hope.   
Together, these chapters present the fear narrative and many of its constituent 
themes as manifested in particular genres and media after 9/11. They trace the 
genealogy of common fear themes to examine how they crystallize within specific texts 
post-9/11, creating a variety of symbolic political acts in narrative form. By analyzing 
these American fear narratives, I hope to show how thoroughly fear shapes life in 
America. I also hope to point the way toward a more dialectical understanding of fear, 
as both potentially oppressive and potentially Utopic/Utopian. Americans must come to 
grips with the structure of fear in order to become more aware of the ways it 
manipulates them but also to understand how it can be used productively to promote 











LITERATURE REVIEW: AFFECT, IDEOLOGY, AND THE THREE HORIZONS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
 
In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical and methodological approaches I will 
use in my analysis of the post-9/11 American fear narrative. This will cover how we can 
understand emotion through affect theory, and the affective operations of fear in 
particular. I will then connect this perspective on fear to power and ideology, which 
makes Fredric Jameson’s three horizons of interpretation an ideal methodology for this 
project, allowing us to uncover the political unconscious of American fear as it takes 
form in the narrative. 
 
AN ONTOLOGY OF AFFECT: ON AFFECT, POSSIBLE WORLDS THEORY, AND 
NARRATIVE RECEPTION 
This project operates on an affective ontology (Gould 28), an understanding of 
reality that is founded on the relational and procedural flow of affective potentials. This 
ontology works under the assumption that affect interacts with and informs both 
emotions and ideology, and that these are inherently the effects of affect. As fear and its 
ideological impact through the narrative are of central importance to this project, we 
must begin by clearly establishing definitions for all of these terms and outlining their 
relationship to each other.  
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Affect has become a popular subject of discussion with academics across a 
variety of disciplines, and, as such, the precise meaning of affect is a highly contested 
issue. At times, the lack of a shared or at least explicitly stated definition dilutes and 
confuses discussions on the matter, so we will begin here by clearly establishing a 
definition of affect at the front to help dispatch with many of these occlusions, at least 
within the confines of this project. Perhaps the most critically acclaimed definition, the 
one that political theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi returns to often, is philosopher 
Baruch Spinoza’s now popular maxim that “affect is the power ‘to affect and be 
affected’” (Massumi, Politics ix). Yet, while this definition may have conceptual value, it 
lacks some of the specificity needed for the practical application of affect theory to 
textual and cultural analyses. Sociologist Deborah Gould provides a useful definition for 
these purposes, as she uses the term affect “to indicate nonconscious and unnamed, 
but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and intensity that arise in 
response to stimuli impinging on the body. Registered in that the organism senses the 
impingement and the bodily effects, but nonconscious in that the sensing is outside of 
the individual’s conscious awareness and is of intensities that are inchoate and as yet 
inarticulable” (26). In this sense, affect is the embodied sensations stirred from a piece 
of communication, situation, or event, but they are feelings before we have attempted to 
interpret them into words, concepts, or ideologies. The interpretation of an affective 
state, then, does not capture all of the potentialities and intensities it makes available, 
but crystallizes it into a particular expression, one that “diminishes potential through 
inhibition and subsequent channeling of that which is actualized” (27). This means that 
an affective relation, and its potentialities of use, is not entirely captured in any one 
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interpretation or reaction, but that alternative interpretations and actions utilizing other 
potentialities are always possible, allowing for divergent, subversive, and contesting 
interpretations to arise beside the dominant narratives of an event or text. 
 Considered within the narrative, the potentialities of affect can be better 
conceptualized through a combination of kernel theory and possible world theory. 
Seymour Chatman describes a kernel as a major event in a narrative, one that 
“advances the plot by raising and satisfying questions…[they] are narrative moments 
that give rise to cruxes in the direction taken by events” (53). As such, kernel theory 
notes the points of affective potentiality in the narrative when the character must choose 
how to interpret their stimuli into an action or a lack of action, but also when readers can 
sense diverging potential directions that the narrative could take. These moments of 
choice create branches of possibility, and as they are followed, they create a narrative 
path or kernel-skeleton that notes the narrative potentialities actualized and, by 
implication, those not. The possible but not followed paths still exist, conceptually at 
least, as alternate narratives. These paths not taken can be viewed theoretically as 
possible worlds within that fictional world. Possible worlds can also open up the relation 
between the actual world and the fictional world, giving us a philosophical foundation for 
fictionality.  
 A fictional world, in Lubomír Doležel’s terms, is a possible world that branches off 
both the author and reader of a text’s understanding of the actual world, which is our 
“real” world. There are an infinite number of possible worlds, as they are essentially any 
“world that is thinkable” (Doležel 281), and possible worlds become fictional worlds 
through the human act of composing: “By composing a written or oral text, the author 
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creates a fictional world that was not available prior to this act” (23). As such, “possibles 
are made fictional existents, possible worlds become semiotic objects” (23). When 
combined within our affective ontology, the possible world becomes an interpretation of 
actual affective stimuli that the author shapes into a fictional world, one that can deviate 
from the natural laws and affective relations of the actual world or attempt to adhere to 
them as much as possible. In accordance with this, Doležel states that these “fictional 
worlds are accessed through semiotic channels,” and that this accessibility means that 
reader and author interpretation is “a bidirectional, multifaceted, and historically 
changing commerce between the actual and the fictional” (20). In this sense, “the world 
is constructed by its author and the reader’s role is to reconstruct it” (21). This creates a 
complex web of the relation between the actual and the fictional world, one that in 
regards to the interpretation of the fictional world “relativizes the procedure and makes 
the implied meaning indeterminate” (177). The hermeneutic reception of a text becomes 
an interaction between the reader and the text: “Having reconstructed the fictional world 
as a mental image, the reader can ponder it and make it a part of his existence, just as 
he experientially appropriates the actual world. This appropriation…integrates fictional 
worlds into the reader’s reality” (21). 
Marie-Laurie Ryan provides a useful concept for understanding how we 
encounter a fictional world in relation to our actual world, what she calls the principle of 
minimal departure: “We will project upon these worlds everything we know about reality, 
and we will make only the adjustments dictated by the text” (51). Our base for 
constructing a fictional world is the actual world, until the text directs us to deviate from 
our understanding of reality, a concept that is especially useful when understanding the 
33 
 
reading of nonnatural worlds, such as science fiction, horror, and fantasy fiction. Natural 
worlds are, according to Doležel, defined as “A possible world in which the physical 
laws of the actual world are valid” (281), and therefore, speculative fiction, in which the 
possible world operates under alternate physical laws, are nonnatural worlds.  
Doležel also offers a useful concept for understanding alternate interpretations 
derived from the same text, which is similar to and intertwines with the principles of 
minimal departure: the fictional encyclopedia, which encompasses a reader’s “store of 
knowledge” (176) and “shared communal knowledge [that] varies with culture, social 
groups, historical epochs, and for this reasons relativizes the recovery of implicit 
meaning” (177). Each of us operates with an actual-world encyclopedia that is different 
depending on the accumulated knowledge and affective relations of each reader, but 
also numerous fictional encyclopedias, each of which includes “[k]nowledge about a 
possible world constructed by a fictional text” (177) and is gained by reading or viewing 
the fictional text itself (181). A fictional encyclopedia, therefore, is built in comparison 
with the actual-world encyclopedia, in a process in which the reader can “modify, 
supplement, or even discard the actual-world encyclopedia” to better understand the 
fictional world (181). Yet, in the end, this creates a variable domain of reception, in 
which, based on the extent, depth, contextual particulars, or accuracy of one’s actual-
world encyclopedia (not to mention the accuracy of our reading of the fictional text) we 
can interpret fictional texts in widely divergent ways.  
 We can turn to Stuart Hall to better understand this connection of fictional worlds 
communicated through semiotic channels—be they literature, film, television, or 
however—to the indeterminacy of their interpretation and their consequent effect on 
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reality. As he states, “Reality exists outside language, but it is constantly mediated by 
and through language: and what we can know and say has to be produced in and 
through discourse. Discursive ‘knowledge’ is the product not of the transparent 
representation of the ‘real’ in language but of the articulation of language on real 
relations and conditions. Thus, there is no intelligible discourse without the operation of 
a code” (131). Further, “Naturalism and ‘realism’—the apparent fidelity of the 
representation to the thing or concept represented—is the result, the effect, of a certain 
specific articulation of language on the ‘real.’” (132). If we connect this with a view of 
ideology as a “belief system,” we see that all language expresses such beliefs, and 
these, in turn, alter our understanding of the “real,” or as Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us 
about such language expressions within narratives, “The speaking person in the novel 
is always, to one degree or another, an ideologue, and his words are always 
ideologemes” (333). Novels, and all semiotic texts, produce ideologically and affectively 
laden messages that to one degree or another influence our understanding of reality, 
but their final interpretation can vary depending on how we decode the semiotic 
discourse. Hall explains that authors of texts, when “coding,” can attempt to “pre-fer” us 
toward one decoding position or another “constructing some of the limits of and 
parameters within which decodings will operate” (135). Of course, the articulation 
between the coding and decoding is not a natural process, but one highly influenced by 
affective potentialities that can result in unintended interpretations.  
In order for us to begin to sketch the complex possibilities of alternate reader 
receptions of a text, Hall provides three codes or positions that can be adopted by the 
receiver (decoder). First, in the dominant-hegemonic position “the viewer takes the 
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connoted meaning…full and straight, and decodes the message in terms of the 
reference code in which it has been encoded, we might say that the viewer is operating 
inside the dominant code” (136). Second, the negotiated code or position, 
“acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions…of events while reserving 
the right to make a more negotiated application to ‘local conditions,’” to create 
“particular and situated logics” (137). This code, as Hall states, is “shot through with 
contradictions” (137), as the decoder negotiates both the dominant view of reality with 
their often divergent and particular affective experience of reality and the text. Third, the 
oppositional code or position recognizes the preferred dominant interpretation, but 
“retotalize[s] the message within some alternative framework of reference” in order to 
essentially re-signify the text, finding new meaning in it when viewed under a new 
critical lens (139). As this demonstrates, the interpretation of a text is a complex 
affective and ideological interaction between the author, text, and reader, but one that 
can be grounded in the dominant code, the code that the text ostensibly is meant to be 
decoded with and represents the general interpretation of the majority of the text’s 
cultural consumers. In the course of this study, then, unless stated otherwise, we will be 
discussing texts as seen through the dominant code and hegemonic ideology. 
 
AFFECT, EMOTION, AND FEAR 
If our array of possible reactions to affect is an interpretation of felt stimuli, then 
emotion is essentially an effect of affect. As Gould states, emotion or emotions 
“describe what from the potential of bodily intensities gets actualized or concretized in 
the flow of living” (26). It is a selective interpretation of an affective experience, or as 
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Massumi states, emotion is “the expression of affect in gesture and language, its 
convention or coded expression” (Politics 32). Emotion, then, is a culturally contingent 
understanding of our affective experience. It is the coding of experience into words and 
concepts that are inherently ideological in nature, expressing a belief in what it means to 
be happy, sad, or, most important to this study, afraid. Historian Peter Stearns reminds 
us how fear, like all emotions, is an affective experience shaped by our culture. He 
states that emotions such as fear, “contain a mixture of ingrained impulse and a degree 
of cognition that evaluates and, to some degree regulates, the same impulse; and 
cognition, in turn, is shaped by cultural cues as well as the vagaries of individual 
personalities” (13). As a result, fear, like all emotions interpreted from the potentialities 
of a particular affect, is a combination of embodied, or biological, “ingrained impulses” 
interacting with evaluative cognition (such as asking, “is this an imminent threat?”) that 
is filtered through public cultural beliefs about the nature of an emotion and the 
situation, which in turn is interpreted on the personal level through the lens of individual 
experience. In all, fear, like all emotions, is a complicated, collectively overdetermined, 
but individualized interpretation of an affective reaction, making it, essentially, an effect 
of affect. 
Up to this point, though, we have discussed fear in the context of emotion in 
general, but it has its own specific attributes that deserve further explication. Fear, 
according to Massumi, “is the anticipatory reality in the present of a threatening future. It 
is the felt reality of the nonexistent, loomingly present as the affective fact of the matter” 
(“The Future” 54). This definition provides a good starting point, identifying fear as the 
belief that a future threat is imminent, but the second sentence also asserts that while 
37 
 
fear is often experienced as an affective state in reaction to an as-yet immaterial cause, 
it is real in subjective experience. From a narrative perspective, fear is typically a 
proleptic emotion, in that it is an emotion that urges the reader to think not necessarily 
of story events that are currently happening in the narrative, but what may happen next 
or in the future. However, while a prolepse or flashforward occurs when “discourse 
leaps ahead, to events subsequent to intermediate events” (Chatman 64), the proleptic 
pull of fear may point to events that will happen, but more than likely fear will direct the 
reader toward events that will not ever happen in the story and will exist only as 
hypothetical, possible threats. Yet, the feared event can be depicted, considered, or 
implied in the course of the narrative and in the reader’s own speculations. The 
temporality of fear is therefore typically future oriented toward the imminent threat, but it 
exists and is affectively experienced in the present. However, in some cases, fear points 
to an event in the past, such as in the case of trauma, in which the narrative can be 
pulled back into an analepse, or flashback, through the subject’s experience of the 
repetition compulsion, in which the subject acts out or re-experiences the past trauma 
made into a sensation felt and re-lived in the present. It is here, when fear moves into 
the psychological experience of trauma that we meet the limits of Massumi and Gould’s 
thread of affect theory, which de-centers the human experience, and we turn to the 
more psychoanalytic thread of affect theory of Tomkins/Sedgwick, which draws from 
Freud in order to understand the psychological aspects of the felt, affective experience 
of trauma. This psychoanalytic angle on affect theory meshes well with Jameson’s three 
horizons of interpretation, as this methodology utilizes Freud’s concepts of the 
unconscious and the repressed as foundational to its notion of culture. Overall, then, 
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fear is an emotion that, while not a necessary and defining trait of all narrative, has 
especially high narrativity, meaning that lends itself to narrative construction as it can 
potentially exist on all temporal levels of a narrative to act through one or more 
characters in order to motivate, influence, or alter kernel events. 
Recent advances in the biology of emotion have shown that fear, like all 
emotions, is not, despite common thought, immaterial at all but a reaction to perceived 
external stimuli that produces neurological, biochemical, and bodily reactions that are 
empirically observable, measurable, and verifiable. These findings support Massumi’s 
claim that fear is real and has immediate material consequences (“The Future” 65). 
Taking a more scientific approach to the study of fear provides further insight into this 
emotional expression, insights that both verify and develop upon Massumi’s definition. 
For instance, clinical psychopharmacologist Thierry Steimer describes the phenomena 
of emotion as having multiple aspects: “emotion implies behavior (expression) and 
feeling (experience, subjective aspects)” (232). In particular, he describes fear, and its 
emotional sibling of anxiety, as adaptive: “The main function of fear and anxiety is to act 
as a signal of danger, threat, or motivational conflict, and to trigger appropriate adaptive 
responses. For some authors, fear and anxiety are indistinguishable, whereas others 
believe that they are distinct phenomena” (233). He states that in ethology, the study of 
animal behavior, fear is defined as “a motivational state aroused by specific stimuli that 
give rise to defensive behavior or escape” (233). Defensive behavior can manifest as 
active strategies, such as fight or flight, passive coping strategies, such as 
“immobilization or freezing,” or as psychological defensive mechanisms, such as the 
displacement of anxiety (233), which in animals can be demonstrated as compulsive 
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grooming under stressful situations, but in humans could manifest as a variety of 
behaviors including projecting one’s anxieties on a perceived group of others in order to 
create a scapegoat. Indeed, all of these reactions to fear translate well from the animal 
to the human world. How often have we heard of a person momentarily freezing when a 
friend jumps out to scare them, attacking when threatened, running away from a loud 
sound, or surreptitiously smoothing and adjusting their clothes and checking their hair 
and face in the mirror before an interview?  
Other authors describe distinct differences between anxiety and fear. Anxiety, 
Steimer states, can be defined as “a generalized response to an unknown threat or 
internal conflict,” whereas “fear is focused on known external danger” (233). As he 
states, anxiety is characterized by uncertainty, and the two can be distinguished “in that 
the object of fear is ‘real’ or ‘external’ or ‘known’ or ‘objective’” (233). Yet, this clinical 
distinction and the claim to possessing the objectivity necessary to distinguish the two 
emotive states tends to fall apart in real world application and experience. Even Steimer 
states that fear and anxiety have overlapping biological components, and “anxiety may 
just be a more elaborate form of fear, which provides the individual with an increased 
capacity to adapt and plan for the future” (233). As such, if we adopt Massumi’s notion 
that “[i]f we feel a threat, there is a threat” (“The Future” 54), then the distinction 
between the objective and unknown threat melts away; each threat is real in the 
subject’s experience and each threat guides their behavior and choices equally. Even in 
popular usage, the terms often become indistinguishable. After 9/11 people did not say 
that they were anxious that another terrorist attack could happen at any moment, they 
typically said that they feared the next terrorist attack, and, as we know now, this fear 
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was real in that it had material consequences, even if the particular terrorist threat of 
this believed next attack, the objective stimulus supposedly required to qualify the 
affective state as fear rather than anxiety, never materialized. As a result, unless 
otherwise stated in this study, fear and anxiety, and their related family of emotions, 
including dread, terror, and a general sense of unease, will be considered as 
overlapping emotive states of fear itself. 
Yet, Steimer’s insights also make us further question the expressed temporality 
of Massumi’s definition of fear as it exists in objective reality and in the narrative. While 
fear is certainly an “anticipatory reality in the present of a threatening future” (Massumi, 
“The Future” 54), it also reaches into the past as well. Certainly, Massumi points in this 
direction: “If we feel a threat, such that there was a threat, then there always will have 
been a threat. Threat is once and for all, in the nonlinear time of its own causing” (54). 
This last mention of causation and etiology point to the past, into the origins of the 
imminent threat felt in the present, whether real or imagined. Yet, where this explanation 
leaves open how we come to associate fears with past events, Steimer gives us some 
direction. He states that fear is provoked by specific stimuli that can be conditioned 
(232). For instance, in ethology they have observed that “[a]fter a few pairings of a 
threatening stimulus (eg, electric shocks, the unconditional stimulus [US]) with a 
formerly neutral cue (eg, a tone or visual signal, the conditioned stimulus [CS]), animals 
will experience a state of conditioned fear when only the cue is present” (238). In human 
terms, while we normally are not conditioned by electric shocks (one would hope), 
humans learn to articulate particular meanings to different fearful stimuli, attaching 
signification to these empty or floating signifiers in a variety of ways. From this 
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perspective, Massumi’s example of the fire alarm as a performative, a Peircean 
indication or index, one that stimulates a startled sensation in a precognitive manner, is 
a stimulus that in itself has no inherent meaning, other than those that we assign to it 
(“The Future” 64). The fire alarm is an example of Steimer’s neutral cue that we have 
learned to associate with the threatening stimulus of fire. Massumi asks, “Now what 
happens when there is no fire and the alarm sounds nonetheless?” (64). Both Massumi 
and Steimer would likely agree that the conditioned response occurs with or without the 
actual threat, that once the semiotic articulation has been established between the two, 
the fear reaction occurs either way, and, as such, the “abstract force” of the 
performative “can be materially determining” (Massumi, “The Future” 65), causing us to 
spring out of bed even when no fire is present. In the context of the narrative, this 
conditioned response points toward an analepse, whether explicit or implicit in the 
narrative discourse, which can play out in the present and point toward the future in a 
hypothetical prolepse of a future potential threat. These prolepses and analepses can 
both be expressive of the reader’s conditioned reactions and in the characters’ 
conditioned reactions to threats, whether culturally ingrained or idiosyncratic to the 
individual. 
 
AFFECT, FEAR, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER 
Before analyzing fear narratives, then, it would be worthwhile to explore this 
semiotic process of the learned condition of fear, one that I argue is an ideological and 
proto-narrative response to affective, or performative, stimuli. Ideology, as I use it in this 
study, is seen in the large sense as a “belief system” that can be either oppressive and 
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illusory or liberating and Utopian, or both simultaneously. My definition of ideology 
begins with Althusser’s definition, but updates it to more recent developments in 
poststructuralism and affect theory. Althusser’s concept of ideology, as described by 
Jameson, is “a representational structure which allows the individual subject to conceive 
or imagine his or her lived relationship to transpersonal realities” (The Political 30). In 
this sense, ideology is a necessary element of human existence that expresses our 
various attempts to understand material reality, the Real that we have no direct access 
to other than through symbolic or imaginary representation and are essentially our 
beliefs about the way that reality works. Yet, the sense of structure that Jameson refers 
to in these representations is a temporary manifestation, as society is by its nature a 
continual and unfolding process. As Massumi notes, “A process is dynamic and open-
ended, composed of ongoing variations of itself” (Politics 87), and society from this 
perspective is “a dynamic process of always ongoing self-structuration” (88). This 
perspective “makes variation and change more fundamental than the reproduction of 
the same” (87), and allows for the type of constant evolution that we see in narrative 
forms and popular culture, variation that would not be possible, or even necessary, if we 
were to work under the premise of a static, mechanistic notion of a truly structuralist 
philosophy.  
From the perspective of this project’s affective ontology, affective encounters 
effect power structures, and power structures effect ideologies that attempt to reproduce 
and stabilize the structure (Massumi, Politics 93), adapting it to the contextual and 
situational necessities of the current and emergent state of society in process. 
Massumi’s concept of ideology as a means of stabilizing a power structure by 
43 
 
conditioning affective responses points us to Raymond Williams’ understanding of 
hegemony as the dominant culture in constant processual flux, a concept that is also 
highly compatible with both Althusser’s definition of ideology and Jameson’s 
methodology of the three horizons of interpretation that this study uses and will describe 
shortly. Hegemony, to Williams, “sees the relation of domination and subordination…as 
in effect a saturation of the whole process of living,” including not only culture, but also 
all of lived experience (110). Indeed, “It is a whole body of practices and expectations 
over the whole of living” and “a lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and 
constituting—which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming” (110). It is essentially the continually processual formulation of the dominant 
power structure, which creates ideology that sustains, replicates, and adapts itself to all 
challenges to its dominance.  
Power, as used in these concepts, is conceived of in the Foucauldian sense as 
productive or positive power, not oppressive in the traditional, critical sense. This sense 
of power, in the subjective, embodied experience, “doesn’t just force us down certain 
paths, it puts paths in us, so by the time we learn to follow its constraints we’re following 
ourselves. The effects of power on us are our identity” (Massumi, Politics 19). Yet, we 
should not think of this affective chain of processual causation as linear, but as a 
system of relations that have affect always as their root. In an effort to explain this 
relation, Massumi at times refers to affect not as pre-ideological or pre-cognitive, which 
“connotes time sequence,” but he associates affect with the prefix “infra-,” to connote 
that it “actively lies below” all activity, or as he states, “[a]ffect is the infra-conditioning of 
every determinate activity” (212). This sense of affect as infra-ideological best 
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expresses the place of affect in this study: when we discuss ideology or emotion, it will 
be implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that affect influences these expressions, not as 
mediated through a static causative chain, but directly as in a constant, dynamic, 
networked fashion. 
It is important to note that on the collective level of emotional experience, 
historical and geographical shifts in culture change the way we fear and what we fear.  
For instance, Stearns compares fearful situations from the twentieth century to establish 
that changes in a particular sense of American fear caused Americans to react to 9/11 
in a way that differed from the way that Americans reacted to other attacks, such as 
Pearl Harbor. According to his research, Americans after 9/11 “were over three times as 
likely to be afraid” than Americans after Pearl Harbor, and they were “much quicker to 
connect attack with personal and familial situations” (36). While the two attacks surely 
have their differences, Stearns explains this greater tendency to admit to feelings of fear 
as involving “major alterations in cultural norms” (43), in that it was culturally more 
acceptable for Americans in 2001 to admit that they were afraid than it was for 
Americans in 1941. As to the increased personalization of fear, he states that a 
decrease in political confidence after repeated political scandals since the Nixon 
administration caused more Americans to believe that the country was not aligned with 
the interests of the people, and “it was easier [at this point in history] to believe that 
threats had to be faced as individuals and as families” (42). Further, the familial focus of 
the post-9/11 personalization of fear is linked to cultural change, as “[a]nxieties about 
children [after 9/11] reflected a greater belief in the vulnerability of the young” that 
Stearns traces in intricate detail (43). Aside from the way that history affects fear, 
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Stearns also points out that different cultures around 2001 reacted in different ways 
toward fear, such as the British reacting to the 2005 bombings of the London public 
transportation system with “anger and defiance” (24), and the Israeli reaction to the 
numerous civilian bombings during the early twenty-first century revival of Intifada as 
fearful but not deserving the high levels of public anxiety that Americans felt after 9/11 
(45-6). He states, “arguably, most Israelis react to terror as a low-probability event, 
something to think about, and doubtless fear, but not productive of widespread panic” 
(46). Clearly, fearful reactions to particular events are experienced and interpreted in 
different ways in different cultures, and fear cannot be considered as a universally fixed 
emotion for all humans across the world. 
In a different light, contemporary news media affects our understanding of fear in 
ways that it did not in our recent past. Through mass communication and digital media 
in contemporary America and in that which existed during and immediately after 9/11, 
Americans experience a more unified and centralized dissemination of pre-interpreted 
experience than they did a hundred or even fifty years ago. With this channeled flow of 
information, contemporary media tends to both tell us what emotion we should have 
regarding a particular event, thereby limiting our interpretation of a particular affective 
state, and it redirects our feelings in ways that can work toward particular political and 
ideological ends. In Hall’s terms mentioned above, the mass distribution of media 
information allows for more centralized means of unifying the dominant coding of the 
media text regarding an event or issue. While everyone can participate in the 
modification and distribution of digital media, as 9/11 illustrated, media conglomerates 
control the flow of the primary source material and their commonly held ethos as 
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respected news sources make them the root if not the end determination of most 
affective interpretations. In regard to 9/11, we see this in the repeated news footage of 
the airplanes crashing into the towers, which is accompanied by the explicit affective 
interpretation of media personalities and reporters. As Wheeler Winston Dixon notes, 
“This onslaught of programming and counterprogramming scarcely gives one time to 
reflect and meditate on the true magnitude of the events of 9/11, as images of the 
collapsing twin towers are ceaselessly recycled to create ‘new’ programming” (12). This 
visual spectacle in overload often prevented critical or oppositional readings of the 
events, leaving many viewers only to passively consume the images in the dominant 
code, along with its attendant ideological baggage. This footage became so ubiquitous 
after the event that even many residents of New York watched the footage rather than 
witness it firsthand, and compulsive viewing became common for many citizens, as is 
often depicted in 9/11 narratives, such as Art Spiegelman’s graphic novel In the Shadow 
of No Towers (2004) and Jess Walter’s novel The Zero (2006), the latter of which we 
will analyze in more detail in Chapter 5.  
Even though we can participate in digital media, the majority of the time, each 
individual’s participation is grounded on the same sources coded in the dominant 
position and created by only a few media conglomerates, making the wide-spread 
distribution of a uniform ideology easy for those in positions of corporate or government 
power. As an example of how this plays out in ideology, Massumi notes how after 9/11 
the fear that our economy would collapse under “a crisis in consumer confidence” was 
countered by the notion that spending to keep the economy going was a patriotic act 
(Politics 32), thereby ideologically harnessing and re-directing the affective encounter of 
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the attack to bolster the economy and then distributing the coded message instantly to a 
world-wide audience. Through this process, “the media picks up on fear and insecurity 
and feeds it back amplified, but in a way that somehow changes its quality into pride 
and patriotism—with the proof in the purchasing” (32). Yet, this feedback loop has to be 
“fed” to survive: “You can only produce more pride and patriotism by producing more 
fear and insecurity to convert” (32). This building of affective states to be harnessed to 
the political ends of supporting the economy is something that could have happened, 
perhaps, at the time of Pearl Harbor, but the intensity, interpenetration, and transmedial 
experience of our contemporary media is a more recent development that amplifies 
affect, allowing emotional reactions such as anxiety to take a larger place in our life and 
cultural imaginary.  
As all of this demonstrates, fear is not a universal emotion, but an interpretation 
of an affective state that is culturally and even technologically contingent. Both historical 
changes and cultural changes alter the way that people react to and interpret a 
performative, fearful event, or situation, but also technological developments in mass 
communication and even transportation affect the rate of transmission and uniformity of 
particular interpretations of an event or the sense that individuals might be vulnerable to 
a threat. After all, at one time we may have thought that terrorist threats across the sea 
would not be able to travel to America, but 9/11, and its mass media distribution, 
disrupted this sense of American exceptionalism as advanced transportation technology 
in the form of airliners proved to be the means that brought foreign terrorism to the 
continent. Overall, these examples show that fear takes on particular flavors in different 
times and places, so any analysis of fear must take this in consideration to avoid gross 
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overgeneralizations and ethnocentrism. This awareness of the need for historicism in 
the understanding of fear is why this study specifies that it focuses on post-9/11 
American fear, a collection of fears that are unique to this particular time, place, and 
various media affordances, even as it recognizes these fears have evolved out of the 
sedimented genealogy of American fear that has come before. 
As implied above, the need to interpret affective states makes them especially 
vulnerable to being articulated with particular ideological purposes. In fact, under our 
definition of ideology, there is no other way to interpret affect than through ideology, 
since all action and belief is ideological in the formulations of Althusser and Jameson. 
For our purposes, there are two ways that we come to articulate ideology with a 
perceived fearful event: personal experience and social learning. We articulate fear 
through these means to an object of fear, which can be either a physical or conceptual 
focus for the feeling of fear, one that may be a real threat or a redirection away from a 
real threat. First, personal experience allows us to make our own interpretation of 
directly experienced events, but even this is mediated through our previously 
established systems of belief, which for Althusser are always already ideological. 
Personal experience, however, does allow for the generation of individual 
interpretations of events, even if these interpretations encounter the often considerable 
pressures of public or socially learned interpretations. This leads us to the second 
means of the articulation of social learning, which encompasses all of the beliefs that we 
are taught through language and everyday cultural exchanges, whether though 
parenting, education, social interaction, the media, or through narrative texts. Each of 
these sources introduce, reinforce, modify, or contradict extant ideologies and build 
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upon each other, establishing a complex and often conflicting body of beliefs that we 
use to imagine, negotiate, and understand our relation with reality, or “how the world 
works.” In part, it is through this public/private interaction of personal and social affective 
interpretation that ideologies and hegemony in general encounter the processual 
variation that forces them and their associated power structures to continuously adapt. 
As mentioned earlier, ideologies support power structures, but it is the outcomes of 
affective encounters that create those power structures. According to Massumi, these 
encounters can create relations of advantage of one party over another, and if these 
“effects stabilize into an inequality between the parties that conditions subsequent 
encounters, the structuring of an emergent power structure has occurred” (Politics 92). 
Hegemonic structures, then, “are crystallizations of tendencies that have amplified and 
settled into a self-reproducing structure” (101). The oppressive ideologies that support 
and perpetuate hegemonic power structures, then, are transmitted and taught to others 
via social and material means. However, in Williams’s terms, new, emergent affective 
potentialities can also take form and are similarly supported, marginalized, or resisted 
by other ideologies that are socially learned and transmitted or individually pieced 
together through one’s own experience.  
As a result, fear narratives teach ideology in this pedagogical fashion that can be 
either oppressive or liberatory, but possibly more often, they transmit a little of both in 
contradictory impulses. In this sense, fear narratives are performatives that teach 
complex systems of ideological interpretations of the affective states that they stimulate, 
articulating their meanings upon a variety of neutral cues that they condition into 
becoming fearful stimuli as well. This simultaneous transmission of contradiction and 
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antinomy in the text is something that my central Jamesonian methodology, which 
follows in the next section, is especially apt at capturing. Yet, before moving on, it is 
important to emphasize that ideology does not fully determine the interpretation of 
affect. As Massumi states, “no situation is ever fully predetermined by ideological 
structures or codings. Any account paying exclusive attention to that level is fatally 
incomplete” (Politics 58). Any event, such as 9/11, exists first as affect before ideology: 
“To be in effect, ideological predeterminations have to enter the event to take effect. 
They have to reassert themselves, to make themselves effectively ingredient to the 
event” (58). Therefore, for every hegemonic interpretation of an affective event that 
becomes a dominant interpretation there is the potential for counter- and alternate-
interpretations that utilize affective potentialities that were not actualized in the previous 
hegemonic interpretation. This means two things relative to this study: first, it is always 
possible to re-interpret any event, and thereby create new narratives that can be more 
productive and liberating than those supplied by the dominant discourse; and, second, 
that transmitting a particular ideological message does not guarantee that it will be 
interpreted with the same emotional reaction, or even the intended emotional reaction. 
Concerning this second point, Lauren Berlant states, “The structure of an affect has no 
inevitable relation to the penumbra of emotions that may cluster in the wake of its 
activity, nor should it” (“After the Good” 225). In some ways, this polyvalence of affect 
complicates this study considerably, as this means that formal elements of a narrative 
do not uniformly or universally produce the same affective and hence emotional 
reactions in all consumers of the text. For instance, jump scares, the sudden 
appearance of a fearful sight in the camera frame of a shot, is an affective stimuli that 
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tends to cause a bodily, felt sense of being startled, yet this affective jump can be 
interpreted the way it is probably intended in the dominant code, as eliciting fear, but it 
can also cause excitement that evokes happiness, laughter, nervousness, terror, or 
annoyance, depending on how it is interpreted. In short, Berlant reminds us that we 
must be sensitive to the individuality of personal interpretation of fearful experiences 
and realize that we may not all see the text as inspiring the same reaction. As such, this 
study will look not just to form and ideology, but also toward consumer response and 
reviews for interpretations that complicate, and balance, my personal analyses and 
reactions to texts.  
 
METHODOLOGY: THE THREE HORIZONS OF INTERPRETATION 
 To analyze my proposed post-9/11 American fear narratives, I will use 
Jameson’s three horizons of interpretation as found in his 1981 book The Political 
Unconscious, because it provides a detailed methodology that probes into ideological 
and historical meanings of narratives, while still offering the theoretical flexibility to adapt 
to the challenges I may encounter along the way in my research. His methodology 
incorporates a diverse Marxist tradition that can be especially useful when analyzing the 
post-9/11 American fear narrative on formal, cultural, political and historical levels 
through what he calls both a negative and positive Marxist hermeneutic lens (Jameson, 
The Political 285-6), which will be explained below. Further, it is also flexible enough 
that it can work within my affective ontology and I can supplement it with additional 
narratological tools, which will act as refining lenses to focus my analyses on particular 
narrative aspects and unearth formal contradictions at the first horizon of interpretation 
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in order to better uncover and historicize ideological stances. After all, Jameson’s 
“expanded Marxian framework” creates a horizon of interpretation in which “History itself 
becomes the ultimate ground as well as the untranscendable limit of our understanding 
in general and our interpretations in particular” (100). This essentially means that all 
critical theories co-exist within the purview of the analysis of History. From this 
perspective, his three horizons of interpretation methodology is innately amenable to the 
addition of other critical theories that scholars often traditionally believe to exist outside 
the concerns of, or even see as opposed to, the traditional economic base focus of 
more reductive formulations of Marxism.  
 To perform a three-horizon interpretation, “the individual work is grasped 
essentially as a symbolic act,” one analyzed through “three consecutive frameworks, 
which mark a widening out of the sense of the social ground of a text” (Jameson, The 
Political 75-6). The first is the political horizon, which focuses on a formal contradiction 
in the work. I will use this in my study to look at a text for traces of two conflicting 
aesthetic forms, sometimes genres, present in the text and note how they contend for 
dominance. Yet, in doing so, Jameson reminds us, “the individual narrative, or the 
individual formal structure, is to be grasped as the imaginary resolution of a real 
contradiction” (77). As such, he states that the text “is itself ideological, and the 
production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own 
right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal ‘solutions’ to unresolvable social 
contradiction” (79). In short, the underlying political unconsciousness of all texts seeks 
to present imaginary solutions to problems that our society is not able to solve in the 
real world. In this approach, the notion of the contradiction, or the conflict between “two 
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opposing discourses” within a shared text, characterizes each of the conceptual 
horizons of Jameson’s interpretive model, and, he would argue, is an essential 
characteristic to any true Marxist interpretation (84). At this first horizon, however, I will 
focus on considerations of the single text, but always considered within its social and 
cultural context of production, noting that the meaning of the depicted social 
contradiction “derives from the way they provide a figuration of actual social and cultural 
anxieties,” usually involving “the iniquities of entrenched social hierarchies, and in giving 
expression to them seem to resolve or at least contain them” (Buchanan 67-8). As such, 
one concern at this first horizon, as Jameson states, is to keep the historical focus 
narrow, “in which history is reduced to a series of punctual events and crises in time” 
(Jameson, The Political 76-7). At the same time, I will balance these contextual 
pressures with the concerns of praxis and human agency, as the production of a 
narrative is itself a performative “symbolic” and ideological act, not just a reductive 
reflection of the socio-cultural context of production (Butler, “Performative” 528). This 
means that narratives both produce and transmit ideology.  
The second horizon is the social horizon. From this broader perspective, “the 
individual utterance or text is grasped as a symbolic move in an essentially polemic and 
strategic ideological confrontation between the classes” (Jameson, The Political 85). He 
continues, “within this horizon class discourse—the categories in terms of which 
individual texts and cultural phenomena are now rewritten—is essentially dialogical in its 
structure” (84). The dialogical form is “an antagonistic one, and the dialogue of class 
struggle is one in which two opposing discourses fight it out within the general unity of a 
shared code” (84). As such, the second horizon is the re-description of the interpretation 
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we made at the first horizon, re-written as a social contradiction from the time of the 
production of the text. The social contradictions of the time are represented, voiced, and 
possibly produced in the text as two opposing voices of class discourse, and as 
Jameson states, “This larger class discourse can be said to be organized around 
minimal ‘units’ which we will call ideologemes” (87). Ideologemes can appear in a 
narrative as pseudoideas, “a conceptual or belief system, an abstract value, an opinion 
or prejudice,” or as a protonarrative, “a kind of ultimate class fantasy about the 
‘collective characters’ which are the classes in opposition” (87). By identifying and 
exposing these conflicting ideologemes in the narrative, whether in the form of 
characters voicing ideological stances, or through symbolic conflicts of other elements 
of the narrative, such as setting, theme, mise-en-scène, or character identification, we 
can re-describe the formal tensions of the first horizon as culturally “unconscious” 
representations of the social contradictions present in the time of the text’s production. 
At this horizon, we interpret these as ideologemes, the building blocks of larger 
ideologies present and in conflict within the text, or as an ideology present while 
omitting its oppositional discourse. As such, it is the critic’s job either to highlight this 
immanent social contradiction, or to reconstruct the marginalized and omitted 
oppositional voice that does not appear in the text in order to re-create the contradiction 
(86), allowing the reconstruction of the social contradiction that may seem to be lost 
under the hegemonic pressures of the narrative. This allows us to recreate a dialectic 
that seems invisible or reified in the text so that we can better understand the 
ideological actions of the narrative in question within its own time and social context. 
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Last, the third horizon, or the historic horizon, allows us to see the text “now 
conceived in its vastest sense of the sequence of modes of production and the 
succession and destiny of the various human social formations” (Jameson, The Political 
75). To Jameson, the sequence of the socio-economic modes of production are 
“primitive communism or tribal society (the horde), the gens or hierarchical kinship 
societies (Neolithic society), the Asiatic mode of production (so-called Oriental 
despotism), the polis or an oligarchical slaveholding society (the ancient mode of 
production), feudalism, capitalism, and communism,” noting that socialism is a highly 
debated but possible “‘transitional stage between these last” (89). However, for 
Jameson, genres are the narrative “modes of production” of symbolic actions, such that 
the socio-economic modes of production are mediated through a historicized 
understanding of the narrative’s genre, considered as “the history of the form” of the 
text’s narrative (119). As such, at this horizon we re-write the formal and social 
contradictions of the first two horizons into a generic contradiction. This means that 
neither the economic nor the narrative modes manifest in a distinct, clearly separated 
and exclusive fashion within a text, but in co-existing, sedimented layers that point to 
the genre’s layered lineage through different modes of production that remain in the text 
either as, in Williams’s terms, dominant, residual, or emergent elements (121-123). In 
accordance, to Jameson genres exist as modes of ideological production themselves, 
or, as he states, the “genre is essentially a socio-symbolic message, or…an ideology in 
its own right,” one that can “persist” and adapt formally to new “social and cultural 
contexts” (The Political 141). Genres do so to the point that the “ideology of the form 
itself, thus sedimented, persists into the later, more complex structure as a generic 
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message which coexists…with elements from later stages” (141). In the affect theory 
terms we have established above, genres are processual hegemonic power structures 
of aesthetic expression that carry weighty ideological freight from both their current 
historical context and the sedimented traces of previous contexts detectable through 
residual genres that it carries along with it, all with profound implications on the formal 
and content conventions of the text that impact the received interpretation of affect into 
emotion. As such, I will use this horizon to analyze the often conflicting and sedimented 
genealogy of the genre present within the text and show how this interaction structures 
and, to an extent, overdetermines its production and interpretation, even as these 
pressures mediate through performative human agency. Specific to this study, I will 
show how the American fear narrative’s sedimented generic traditions carry with it 
layers of ideological messages from numerous historic periods and economic modes. 
Further, under the three horizon’s approach, all texts must be seen as 
simultaneously ideological (in the narrow, hegemonic sense of promoting false 
consciousness) and Utopian. Such a stance is often only apparent from the broad 
perspective of the third horizon. This allows us to examine a text through the traditional 
negative hermeneutic of Marxism, which Jameson describes as, “[Marxism’s] 
demystifying vocation to unmask and to demonstrate the ways in which a cultural 
artifact fulfills a specific ideological mission, in legitimating a given power structure, in 
perpetuating the reproduction of the latter, and generating specific forms of false 
consciousness” (Jameson, The Political 291). However, to present the possibility of 
political praxis emerging from such an interpretation, we must also see these same 
narratives as Utopian texts. To Jameson, narratives are simultaneously ideological and 
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Utopian, because in order for a hegemonic text to control or manage potentially 
subversive impulses in the consumer, “these same impulses…are initially awakened 
within the very text that seeks to still them” (287). Essentially, a text cannot deny 
progressive stances without bringing them up, at least in part. To Jameson, the 
hegemonic process itself is “a complex strategy of rhetorical persuasion in which 
substantial incentives are offered for ideological adherence,” and these incentives “are 
necessarily Utopian in nature” (287). As such, the positive hermeneutic of Marxism 
demonstrates how a text “project[s] its simultaneously Utopian power as the symbolic 
affirmation of a specific historical and class form of collective unity” (291). According to 
Jameson, something is Utopian “only insofar as all such collectivities are themselves 
figures for the ultimate concrete collective life of an achieved Utopian or classless 
society” (291). This means a text can be hegemonic, supporting the dominance of the 
ruling class, while it also imagines a utopian collective unity, however flawed. When put 
together, this simultaneously negative and positive Marxist interpretation notes how 
texts are, under their present contexts, repressive, but also contain the seeds for 
Utopian collectivity, pointing the way to progressive change and allowing political praxis 
to move in these directions. This useful perspective provides us access to an often 
overlooked and productive level of meaning that all texts can offer. It is a balanced 
focus that reorients Marxist critics to not only demystify and deconstruct, but also to 
simultaneously engage in the productive act of constructing from a text inspiration 
toward the next historical phase of production, one reaching beyond the problems and 
limitations of our current state of late capitalism. 
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Yet, just as Jameson incorporates the theories of numerous others, including 
Althusser, Lukács, Macherey, Greimas, Marx, and Engels, to name only a few, his 
method still leaves room for the critic to bring in new theoretical tools as needed. Similar 
to the way that Robyn Warhol proposes to add the close reading of narratology to 
feminism and cultural studies (350), we can benefit similarly from adding the tools of 
narratological formal reading to the three horizons method. As David Herman states, 
narratology can be seen as the “[c]lose reading of individual stories…not a return to 
New Critical…practice, but rather a strategy for ideological demystification” 
(“Introduction” 26), an approach that aligns well with a Marxist interpretation. I will tend 
to only use these narratological tools when they can narrow my interpretive focus down 
to a particular formal contradiction in a text during the first horizon of interpretation, 
thereby highlighting a narrative element that will be a particularly useful starting point for 
my forthcoming interpretation. For instance, I might use focalization and positioning 
theory to add insight to the stance of particular characters as formal contradictions 
(Herman, Basic 55-63), and Gérard Genette’s insights into the time and order of story 
and discourse (Chatman 62-67) can be helpful in noting omissions and absences of 
class discourses. In short, these narratological tools offer the potential to supplement 
Jameson’s method, filtering my interpretation toward particularly productive elements of 
the text’s form. Overall, with these narratological additions, the three horizons of 
narrative interpretation can be used as a methodology with a solid Marxist philosophical 
tradition that can filter the examples of individual texts to systematically uncover and 
reveal the formal, ideological and historical meanings and affective interactions behind 
my particular, overall object of study, the post-9/11 American fear narrative. In addition, 
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I want to expand upon this methodology to look into the contextual interaction of texts to 
note the different ways that they work through different interpretive communities and 
reception practices, but also how the material conditions of the cultural industries 






















THE AMERICAN FEAR NARRATIVE AND THE FEAR THEME 
 
With the theoretical and methodological foundation established in the previous 
chapter, we can now build on this understanding to better grasp the fear narrative itself 
as a form that formally and ideologically codes affect into the specific and innately 
ideologically-charged emotion of fear. In this chapter, I will first establish a working 
definition of the fear narrative, the primary fear theme, and the secondary fear theme. 
With these concepts in place, I will then outline the ten primary fear themes that I have 
found to be particularly prominent in the post-9/11 American fear narrative. 
To define American fear narratives, we can note that the fear narrative, in 
general, has two distinct characteristics: fear narratives both depict and evoke fear. In 
the first sense, the narrative can depict fear through a character experiencing and 
expressing fear, and/or the text depicting a situation or event that is considered fearful 
in the dominant code. In the second sense, the semiotic composition of the narrative is 
designed to create an affective interaction with its audience that directs them to interpret 
the experience as fearful, thereby evoking fear when decoded from the dominant 
position.  Of course, it is certainly possible that this attempt to evoke fear may be 
interpreted to produce an alternative emotion, such as what happens when individuals 
laugh at what ostensibly should be a terrifying scene in a horror film. To some extent, 
then, it is the popular, common, or dominant interpretation that qualifies a text as a fear 
narrative. Alternative, negotiated, or oppositional interpretations and even 
misinterpretations of a fear narrative are always possible, but it is the popular or most 
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common interpretation that qualifies the text to participate in the genealogy that we are 
establishing here, even if these other positions may offer fruitful insights into how these 
texts operate within alternate interpretive communities. 
In my research thus far, I have identified a number of themes that unite and 
connect the tradition of the fear narrative in American cultures. However, these themes 
of fear are not themes in the sense of “[t]he statement(s), expressed or implied, that a 
text seems to be making about its subject” (Murfin and Ray 514). Instead, they are 
themes in the sense commonly used in popular cultural studies, which John G. Cawelti 
describes as “any prominent element or characteristic of a group of works which seems 
to have some relevance to a social or cultural problem” (731). As Cawelti notes, this is a 
vague definition that has been used to indicate a variety of elements in texts, and one 
that can lead to oversimplification and reductionist thinking when dealing with a body of 
texts (731). To help dispel these issues, I will further specify the particular type of theme 
that I will be focusing on in this project, and note that my interpretations utilizing these 
themes are never meant, as Cawelti states, “to deal with the total structure of the 
themes and its relationship to the story elements in the complete work” (731), but as 
targeted interpretations of the texts to help understand and illuminate them from 
particular perspectives. Themes, as I am using the term, flow across genres and media, 
creating constraints of tradition and precedent that guide the author of the text and 
influence the reader’s interpretation, processes that both carry and develop cultural 
values and interests. Similar to Williams’s description of the genre convention, themes 
are social constructs that are “historically variable,” and often become naturalized during 
a certain period (173-4), which can often make them seem nearly invisible and not even 
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worth noticing to many of its contemporaneous consumers. Also like Williams’s 
description of conventions, themes are historically situated, meaning that themes in 
stable historic periods themselves become stable “‘rules’ of a particular art” and “[i]n 
other periods the variation and indeed uncertainty of conventions [or themes] have to be 
related to changes, divisions, and conflicts in the society” (179). It could easily be 
argued that American culture after 9/11 was one of these moments of cultural 
uncertainty after many American values and beliefs became disrupted by the attacks. 
While there are strong currents of continuity with the themes of the fear narrative that 
have come before this period, there is also a flurry of change and adaptation, a struggle 
to match the historical moment through various narrative forms. As a result, the themes 
of fear that we will focus on in this study are not bound to one genre and can act much 
like floating signifiers in that they are easily articulated with new meanings in different 
texts. However, they also act as Jamesonian historical referents that carry with them 
traces of prior significations for the knowledgeable reader and author. Altering the 
typified meanings and affects associated with a theme of fear, whether in content or 
form, is something that knowledgeable consumers of the texts tend to notice and see as 
relevant in a contrastive and creative manner.  
This element of variation in each of its particular manifestations is an essential 
characteristic of the theme of fear, as it adapts to the current affective, historical, and 
ideological pressures that are always in process, thereby maintaining, in each of its 
manifestations, a sense of cultural relevance to consumers and producers during its 
moments of production, if not longer. This means that the theme of fear is an 
intertextual, intermedial, and cross-genre motif, of sorts, one that comes up repeatedly 
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within a particular culture and historical period and evolves in a sedimentary manner 
into new periods. To exist in this manner, the theme of fear must be abstract enough to 
transcend the formal constraints of individual media and the content constraints of 
individual genres. In total, the fear theme is a reoccurring aspect observable within an 
intertextual continuum pertaining to the emotion of fear that stretches across the 
narratives of a particular culture in a particular historical moment. As mentioned 
previously, the contingent historicity and processual manner of the theme of fear is the 
reason why this study is careful to specify that it is studying those found in American 
narratives produced after 9/11/2001. Themes of fear, or of other emotions, in other 
historic periods and in other cultures would be very different and would each warrant 
separate studies of their own. When considered in combination, thinking in terms of the 
themes of fear emphasizes the interconnected nature of contemporary narratives, as 
well as allowing us to conceive of vast weaves of threaded narratives connected in 
rhizomatic ways (Deleuze and Guattari 21), enabling aesthetic, ideological, and 
affective variation in cultural productions, or improvisations off of established and 
preexisting textual elements to create new narrative iterations that, in turn, develop and 
build off each other in complex and often contradictory ways. 
I have divided these themes between what I call the primary and secondary fear 
themes. Primary themes are the most abstract in nature and typically take the form of 
intermedial motifs, such as concepts or problems that are repeatedly returned to in 
narratives of a particular time and place. In the post-9/11 American fear narrative, I have 
identified ten of these primary themes, though I am sure others exist as well. Presented 
alphabetically, these include: apocalypticism, contamination, entrapment, exclusion, the 
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external threat, the internal threat, paranoia, the personalization of fear, transgression, 
and trauma. Secondary themes represent concrete narrative events or existents, which 
are “characters, [or] items of setting” (Chatman 19), that manifest primary fear themes in 
the text, either singly but more often in combination, in particular forms of media and 
genres. The survival space (Browning 43), for example, is a good example of a 
secondary theme. It is the home that is defended from zombies or the fortress besieged 
by monsters. It combines numerous primary themes, such as the external threat, 
paranoia, the personalization of fear, and entrapment, into a single setting that not only 
embodies these primary themes, but builds upon, questions, and complicates them both 
individually and in their relation to each other. 
For the remainder of the chapter, I will outline the ten primary fear themes that I 
have observed to be particularly prominent in American narratives after 9/11. Overall, 
each of these primary fear themes are ideologemes that interpret affect into the emotion 
of fear and that over time have taken shape in the American imaginary as intermedial 
and transgeneric motifs. These themes reoccur, albeit in different formations, across a 
wide variety of narratives as seemingly unresolvable problems or contradictions that 
American culture repeatedly attempts to either confront, resolve, utilize, or simply revel 
in. They form the substance of the political unconscious of narratives that aim to evoke 
the emotion of fear and that are ubiquitous in American history, even if they differ widely 






 Apocalypticism is the fear of the impending end. This end might be caused by a 
variety of means, such as a religious, nuclear, viral, natural, or human-made 
catastrophe, and is most often thought of as happening on a collective level of a nation 
or the world, but it can also occur on the personal level of the individual. Often, 
apocalypticism is a proleptic fear, looking toward a potential, prophesized, or fated 
future, culminating in an apocalyptic Event, but in post-apocalyptic narratives it can also 
be an analeptic fear reaching back to a catastrophic Event previously survived, even as 
this past event often leads toward a second event that may finish what the first had 
started (Berger 7). As James Berger notes, there are three different ways that 
apocalypses take form in the narrative: first, as “the eschaton, the actual imagined 
ending of the world”; second, “as catastrophes that resemble the imagined final 
ending…as an end of something, a way of life or thinking”; or, third, as having “an 
interpretive, explanatory function…as revelation, unveiling, uncovering” (5). In this last 
sense, the apocalypse “in its destructive moment must clarify and illuminate the true 
nature of what has been brought to an end” (5). In this way, an apocalypse in a 
narrative might be the actual ending of the storyworld, but more often than not, it is 
merely an end that leads to a new beginning, an end that opens up either dystopian or 
utopian possibilities.  
 Apocalypticism has a long, sedimented legacy in American culture. As Peter N. 
Stearns notes, “the persistence, or at least periodic recurrence, of an apocalyptic strain” 
of fear has been a characteristic feature in American fear throughout much of its history 
(63). American apocalypticism, he states, finds it origins in European Christianity, even 
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if much of its religious teachings taught its followers not to fear the apocalypse, but to 
rejoice in it, as in the Second Coming or Rapture, wherein the sinners would perish and 
the faithful would ascend into a paradise in heaven (66-67). Still, despite this focus on 
the apocalypse as having a happy ending, the sheer scale of the impending catastrophe 
took firm root in the American imaginary of fear. Within Christianity and even in many 
other religions, apocalyptic fear “was central to discipline in a dangerous modern world” 
(68), and, as such, a profound sense of anxiety found itself affixed to the end. After all, 
what if you were not good enough to ascend to heaven with the rest? To many, the 
apocalypse simply meant death, or damnation, and this clearly held fearful 
connotations. While the use of fear in European Christianity began to decrease in the 
eighteenth century, and the American Catholic emphasis on fear of the impending end 
diminished with the reforms of the 1960s, it still holds a strong place in various 
American Protestant denominations today (68).  
This religious perspective on apocalypticism has spread throughout American 
culture and provides its particular flavor to even more secular perspectives on the end, 
ranging from fears of Cold War nuclear annihilation, environmental catastrophes, and 
even “concerns about a Y2K cyber catastrophe” (Stearns 74). Many Americans are 
quick to associate these concerns, and just about any catastrophic event, as potentially 
being an apocalypse in the sense of an eschaton, while others maintain a paranoid 
vigilance toward spotting what are believed to be the potential signs of the coming of 
such an apocalypse, the coming of the Event, such as those noted in and often cited 
from the Book of Revelation. All of this has merged together to form a view and concern 
with the apocalypse that is, according to Stearns, somewhat peculiar to our nation, as 
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fears of the end can often be experienced as horrifying, but they are also often mingled 
with almost religious hopes of salvation (73). As one post-9/11 example, we see this 
admixture alive in popular culture in the zombie apocalypse bumper sticker: “Deep 
Inside We all Want a Zombie Apocalypse.” Rather than seeing the apocalypse as a 
fearful event, these stickers celebrate it as a radical form of salvation, a catastrophe as 
a form of liberation from everyday world. This bumper sticker and others like it borrow 
their sentiments from the Christian roots of American apocalypticism still active today in 
Rapture bumper stickers, such as, “What this Planet Needs is a Good, Old Fashioned 
Second Coming.”  
In contemporary American culture, Stearns notes, “It proves particularly easy to 
attach apocalyptic fervor to racial or foreign threats, real or imagined, converting certain 
kinds of international issues into battles against evil” (74). We see this repeatedly in the 
past hundred years, whether as Reagan’s labeling of the Soviet Union as the evil 
empire in 1983, or Bush calling terrorists “evil-doers” in 2001 (Bush, “Remarks”) or 
warning us of the dangers of the “axis of evil” beginning in 2002. This religiously tinged 
Manichean paradigm sees these external threats through an us/them binary of a holy 
war, turning conflicts into visions of apocalyptic wars in which we must defend our 
nation against a protean and eternal tide of evil that hopes to end our way of life, 
threatening to extinguish the American people just as surely as any nuclear threat or 
extinction-level asteroid collision. This obfuscation and re-articulation of actual events 
into exaggerated fights for our very survival distorts how America engages with the 
world, steering us away from the possibilities of peaceful resolutions in favor of war and 
imperialism. Overall, apocalypticism is a fear theme that finds its way in to a variety of 
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fear narratives, including post-apocalyptic films such as Lawrence’s I Am Legend (2007) 
and Blomkamp’s Elysium (2013), disaster films such as Maté’s When Worlds Collide 
(1951) and Haskin’s War of the Worlds (1953), and zombie narratives such as 
Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (1968) and Fleischer’s Zombieland (2009). 
 
CONTAMINATION 
The second primary fear theme we will discuss is contamination, which can be 
expressed as a fear of miscegenation, ideological contamination, or cultural change 
resulting from an outside influence that leads to a loss or change of one’s identity, 
especially when one cannot control or exert agency to prevent it. If the binary opposite 
of exclusion, in general, is inclusion, then the binary opposite of the primary fear theme 
of exclusion is the fear of contamination, and these two often work in tension with each 
other in narratives. Essentially, contamination is the fear of the transference of 
something deemed undesirable to the self or to your culture, which often leads to a 
sense of incorporation into another social group, either as an oppressive hegemonic 
overpowering or as a radical overthrow of an established norm. 
 The way that contamination is depicted depends on one’s relative position within 
established relations of power. Contamination is often a fear endemic to the hegemonic 
culture, as it depicts a threat from outside sources that might try to change its position of 
dominance. Yet, contamination can also be portrayed from a marginalized position, as a 
fear of being overpowered, of becoming completely appropriated, nullified, incorporated, 
or converted into an alternate or hegemonic culture. In either variety, the fear of 
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contamination is a fear of self/other borders collapsing either personally or culturally. 
The object of fear can be either physical or conceptual, and it can either pose a real 
threat or it can be a redirection away from a real threat. 
 In many ways, contamination is a fear of incorporation. While in theory we can 
separate contamination as the fear that external others will change you and 
incorporation as the fear that others can change you by attempting to turn you into 
them, in practice they are often two parts of one interrelated fear theme. For instance, 
cannibalism is a consummate form of incorporation, as the self becomes incorporated 
into and consumed by the object of fear. However, in the zombie narrative, a form 
extremely popular after 9/11, cannibalism merges with contamination as a zombie’s bite 
can now infect the host, turning them into the walking dead and thereby incorporating 
them into their ranks.  
Even in more realistic portrayals, the incorporation of cannibalism is first a form 
of contamination. Cannibalism begins as the bodily contact and penetration of the flesh 
from one considered external to or Other than the self, so that this form of bodily and 
personal change enacts a violation of the body’s boundaries by the Other. This violation 
contaminates the self, making it no longer pure of elements and influences formerly 
seen as existing outside of it. The contaminated individual is now impure in comparison 
with its former “untouched” state and is now infected with the Other. As an example, 
cannibalism’s violation of the body’s boundaries contaminates the body, leading to its 
literal incorporation into the Other as the self is consumed, either in part or entirely.  
As this summary of these two concepts illustrates, contamination and 
incorporation, whether on symbolic or physical levels, are really just two intertwined 
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aspects of the same theme that this study, unless specifically stated, will consider as 
grouped together as the fear theme of contamination. For instance, virus outbreak 
narratives, such as Wolfgang Peterson’s Outbreak (1995), are obviously about 
contamination, as the virus infects and then often kills the host. Yet, becoming 
contaminated changes one’s identity as they are now one of the “infected,” often losing 
much of their previous rights and power. This shift in identity alters one’s sense of 
subjectivity, effectively incorporating the individual into a new social group, a group so 
marginalized that, for instance, an individual who was once your child or father must 
now be contained or killed before they spread the virus to others. As a result, virus 
contamination changes you into one of “them,” incorporating you into an out-group. In 
most instances, contamination and incorporation become intertwined into a temporal 
process of othering. The fear of being contaminated is the first step, but once one has 
been contaminated, one encounters the fear of becoming incorporated into the Other 
and losing the established sense of self. 
 
ENTRAPMENT  
Entrapment is the fear of being confined, trapped, limited, or held against one’s 
will. It manifests in the narrative in two different varieties, depending on the subject’s 
relation to power. From a marginalized perspective, entrapment involves the oppression 
of an individual or individuals of a marginalized class by those of a dominant class, often 
taking the form of confining the characters to a culture, situation, or place that they 
cannot, or at least cannot very easily, escape. While these can take the form of 
narratives of government oppression, they also can address entrapment in patriarchal 
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society from a woman’s perspective, such as Loden’s film Wanda (1971), Joanna 
Russ’s novel The Female Man (1975) or, more recently, Hulu’s television adaptation of 
The Handmaid’s Tale (2017-Present). From a dominant perspective, entrapment 
narratives often take the perspective of a member of the dominant class entrapped, 
often physically, by individuals or actions of the marginalized classes, whether portrayed 
explicitly or metaphorically. This latter version typically communicates an often 
unconscious conservative backlash of fear toward potential real world demographic and 
power changes, whether real or imaginary, and can be found in “The Shadow over 
Innsmouth,” by H.P. Lovecraft (1931) and Robert A. Heinlein’s novel Farnham’s 
Freehold (1964).   
In either variation, entrapment has a long tradition in narrative history, but 
particularly in the American fear narrative, encompassing the fearful (if not outright 
terrifying) experiences captured in the tradition of the slave narrative, the live burial 
narratives of the Victorian-influenced period, tales involving imprisonment, narratives of 
oppression in which a character can find no way out of their predicament, and captivity 
narratives in which “heroic men save threatened women,” which Faludi aptly describes 
as compensatory masculinity tales that re-assert a myth of American masculine 
invincibility in the face of defeat or vulnerability (278-81). Entrapment often manifests as 
a central theme of many fear narratives by building on these traditions, such as in 
Tractenberg’s film 10 Cloverfield Lane (2016); the novel Invisible Man, by Ralph Ellison 






Exclusion is a fearful state which is often experienced when someone who had 
formerly belonged to a particular social group, who had belonged to the “us” side of the 
us/them binary, suddenly becomes thrust against their will into the “them” side, 
becoming an outsider to a group they once believed themselves to be a part of. This 
can result from economic causes, such as the declassement experienced by many 
Americans during the Great Depression or the Great Recession, wherein people were 
thrust against their will into different economic classes, but it can also result from social 
changes in the dynamics of race or gender, such as what occurred to Arab-Americans 
after 9/11 or Japanese Americans during WWII in internment camps. Two notable 
examples of fear narratives using this theme in this way include the novels The Great 
Gatsby, by F. Scott Fitzgerald (1925) and When the Emperor was Divine, by Julie 
Otsuka (2002).  
Exclusion and inclusion often exist in a constant state of tension, and their 
division is often mutable, especially to those from marginalized groups. In a 2004 study, 
sociologists Roxanna Harlow and Lauren Dundes note that 9/11 and America’s reaction 
to the events demonstrate this shifting nature and its division across axes of power, 
between the hegemonic and the marginalized: “Whiteness, viewed as synonymous with 
‘Americanness,’ has become the gatekeeper of the American in-group identity” (454). 
9/11, then, “highlighted the fragile nature of what many be thought of as a pseudo-
American status for nonwhite groups who may be accepted but also excluded if viewed 
as too troublesome or threatening” (454). In response to the threat of 9/11 and the 
stereotype of the Middle Eastern terrorist, “the boundaries of acceptance shifted; Arab 
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Americans were regarded with suspicion, having lost their American standing” (454). As 
a result, such a marginalized racial group experiences Du Bois’s condition of double-
consciousness, “a sense of being simultaneously part of yet excluded from a nation and 
its people” (455). It is this fear of exclusion that the fear narrative often utilizes for its 
affects, but it can be mixed with other fear themes to produce different affects as well. 
For instance, their study also shows that the sense of inclusion experienced by white 
Americans gives them a sense of ownership in the nation (455), a condition of inclusion 
that typically causes them to react to 9/11 “in a much more personalized way” (446), 
essentially creating a sense of the personalization of fear, a fear theme that we briefly 
introduced in the previous chapter, and will describe in greater detail later in this 
chapter. In contrast, those of racially excluded yet geographically included groups do 
not tend to feel this personalization of fear. The theme of exclusion, then, helps to 
highlight how differences in one’s position within power relations can affect the 
operation of other fear themes, a point that will be increasingly important as this project 
continues. 
Alternately, the fear of exclusion can also be depicted as the lived state resulting 
from exclusion, such as the experience of living life after being excluded from a 
particular society or living with another group from which you are excluded. This can 
often take form as exclusion from a society that the individual wants to be included back 
into, to be included in at all, or to at least not be threatened by. In this sense, exclusion 
can be depicted in post-apocalyptic fiction as a nostalgic longing for the world as it was 
before the disaster or the event that changed everything, but it can also include 
narratives of a social groups threatened by a more powerful group. Examples of these 
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kinds of exclusion include AMC’s The Walking Dead (2010-present); The Road, by 
Cormac McCarthy (2006); Ragona & Salkow’s film The Last Man on Earth (1964); and 
Invisible Man, by Ralph Ellison (1952).  
In all cases, exclusion is a fear that larger events, those beyond the individual’s 
control and power to change, might place them into a social grouping that excludes 
them from their previous understanding of their identity or that threatens their existence. 
This sense of identity crisis through exclusion can also take the form of the hybrid 
character’s experience of unhomeliness, especially when the character finds that they 
do not belong in any social group. In the political sense, exclusion can either be 
depicted from the perspective of a character or set of characters in a conservative 
sense as those who were excluded from their in-group and want back in, such as we 
see in The Road, or in a progressive sense as those who have become externalized 
threats to a particular social group, such as the rebellion against the Capitol in Suzanne 
Collins’s novel Mockingjay (2010, film adaptation 2014 and 2015). Overall, exclusion is 
the felt experience of being othered, while, in contrast, confronting the external threat (a 
fear theme that we will cover in more detail in the next section) can be the felt 
experience of othering. Seen from this perspective, exclusion and the external threat 
are often two sides of the same experience. If to Other is to define someone as “not one 
of us,” then exclusion is often this push outside of an in-group into an out-group against 





THE EXTERNAL THREAT 
The external threat and the internal threat are two themes that often work 
together in the fear narrative since the border standing between them, and one’s status 
as internal and external, can shift with surprising rapidity. Yet, at the analytic level, they 
deserve consideration as separate fear themes as it is not entirely uncommon that one 
of them will exist in a fear narrative alone or that one is emphasized over the other. 
Overall, the notion of the exterior and the interior refers to the relative position of various 
social groups in relation to the individual’s sense of self and the social group affiliations 
that they feel are integral to their subjecthood. The borders between self and other, of 
course, are constantly in motion and under the influence of numerous political, 
economic, material, and cultural forces, making the division fickle and often landing 
marginalized individuals as out-group members with little warning. Yet, these fear 
themes are different from exclusion as not only is the object of fear excluded from the 
social in-group, but they are also deemed by that in-group as a threat that cannot simply 
be ignored.  
The external threat is the threat that lies outside one’s accepted borders of the 
self; it is an Other that exists as an object of fear. For instance, the external threat has 
taken many popular forms in American fear narratives, such as the foreign invader 
featured in such films as John Millius’s Red Dawn (1984), in which the US is invaded by 
the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua; or, as in Dan Bradley’s 2012 remake of the film 
in which the US is invaded by North Korea. However, the external threat can also 
originate from what appear to be different sources, such as the alien threat showcased 
in films such as Guillermo del Toro’s Pacific Rim (2013), Steven Spielberg’s War of the 
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Worlds (2012), and Roland Emmerich’s Independence Day (1996). Alternately, it can 
even be the invasion of an external evil, as in Ridley Scott’s fantasy film Legend (1985). 
In all instances, the external threat is clearly depicted as an Other, but one that cannot 
be simply excluded and ignored. As Niven Kumar and Lucyna Swiatek note, “This 
Othered being lies in the peripheries…a source of fear and terror, a potential threat, and 
hence one that must be subjugated and controlled” (312). After the attacks of 9/11, the 
American imagination flared with fears of external invaders, or as Pepper states:  
The fact that US territorial borders were violated on 9/11 by foreign terrorists has 
led to the reassertion of traditional accounts of sovereignty, especially in the 
popular imaginary, pitting ‘here’ (either characterized as the United States or 
somewhere inside the state system where democracy, freedom, political 
community, and so forth are all possible) against ‘there.’” (407) 
As a result, fear of the external threat, especially after 9/11, has helped reinforce in 
popular American culture a dichotomous world view of us/them in which “you are either 
with us or against us,” either part of the in-group or part of the external threat that we 
fear is mounting at our borders, serving to reinforce, for example, the ideologeme of 
irreconcilable differences we will discuss in the next chapter in our discussion of 
Porochista Khakpour’s Sons and Other Flammable Objects (2007).  
 The external threat is not new to American culture, and has a long history dating 
back to the country’s origins and beyond. As David Campbell notes, “In the invention of 
America the confrontation between the European, Spanish, and Christian ‘self’ and the 
‘other’ of the indigenous peoples is an encounter of lasting significance for the way in 
which it brings to the New World the orientations towards difference and otherness of 
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the Old World” (111). As such, the creation of the external threat is an effort to erect a 
conceptual, if not material, border to delineate a communal and individual sense of 
identity, which distinguishes between what one considers as being part of the self and 
everything else that is excluded from that identity. Yet, Campbell’s quote is also 
instructive as it notes how, since the origins of America, one common way to draw these 
lines of identity was through racial affiliation, as Europeans became the in-group and 
the indigenous tribes the threatening out-group. As Stearns notes, American culture has 
long held a “tendency to link fear to concerns about racial others” (63). This construction 
of the racialized external threat found focus in the European immigrants’ imagining that 
Amerindians worshiped the devil since their beliefs were different (Campbell 123). The 
English “employed both the civilized/barbarian and the Christian/pagan dichotomy in 
order to firmly locate the Amerindians as so completely other that they could not aspire 
to the qualities of the self” (124). This helped to mark the boundaries of the English 
identity within the new sense of the colonial American identity in order “to attempt a 
clear distinction between themselves and those they encountered” (124). Yet, whatever 
means an in-group uses to differentiate itself from the external threat, this shared, 
communal fear functions as a social glue that helps bond the in-group, motivating them 
to work hard against the machinations of their perceived external enemy. 
 
THE INTERNAL THREAT 
The internal threat, on the other hand, is a threat that originates within the 
conceived borders of the self or homeland. Here, we find fears of the spy or the 
duplicitous neighbor that we see expressed in the popular concepts of the third column, 
78 
 
betrayal from within, sedition, disloyalty, and the post-9/11 nativist belief that Western 
Muslims are the fifth column in both Europe and America. One sense of the internal 
threat, then, is an agent of the external threat that is found to exist within the geographic 
borders of the social in-group. As such, in the popular imagination, it is believed that the 
internal threat may be identified through characteristic or stereotypical physical 
indicators of its true affiliation with the external threat, often found along the lines of 
race, gender, ethnicity, behavior, or sexuality. Through these apparently discernible 
outer appearances, it is believed that one can identify an internal threat living amongst 
our ranks. However, it may also be that the physical appearance of the internal threat is 
indistinguishable from that of the rest of the in-group, making its presence even more 
threatening. For instance, on a lesser note, we see betrayal from an interior threat in 
Speilberg’s Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull (2008), when “Mac” 
(Ray Winstone) lies to Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) about being a CIA agent when he 
is actually helping the Soviet villains track the heroes. Films in which the internal threat 
is even more central include Walter Wagner’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), 
Philip Kaufman’s remake of the film in 1978, and NBC’s television series V (1984-85), 
all of which feature internal threats that are practically indistinguishable from true social 
group members. Or, from a different angle, George A. Romero’s Day of the Dead 
(1985) is a good example as human survivors in a world overrun by zombies hide from 
this external threat in a bunker, only to find that the soldiers protecting them are actually 
a more immediate internal threat to their survival.       
 The internal threat also has a long history in American culture, often working in 
conjunction with the external threat to reinforce one another in the social construction of 
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American subjecthood. The fragile, burgeoning identity of the American Puritan was, as 
Campbell notes, founded on a strict us/them paradigm that began to “construct dangers 
from within,” which had to be purged from their societies (121-2). In order to maintain 
this border between the external threat and the internal identity of the social in-group, 
the English colonies severely punished miscegenation and living with the Amerindians 
(125-6), essentially in an effort to prevent the creation of what they saw as internal 
threats. To maintain the “fiction of civility” that the English used to differentiate their 
identity from the native peoples required a strict enforcement of the “externalization of 
barbarism” (126), and the latter became articulated with the natives to differentiate them 
as an external threat. In a similar way, accusations of witchcraft, such as in the Salem 
witch trails, have long been used to externalize, or exterminate, perceived internal 
threats or those not fitting within a society’s sense of identity. Unlike barbarism, 
Witchcraft, of course, maintained the border between in-group and out-group largely 
through the physical differentiation of gender, as “over 85 percent” of those accused 
“were women” (128). 
 This fevered maintenance of the border between the external threat and the 
social in-group, and the fear of contamination leading to the spread of internal threats, 
betrays the tenuous nature of this border of identity creation.  As Campbell states, “The 
boundary between inside and outside, self and other, is never static nor is it singular. 
There are a multitude of boundaries implicated in the construction and maintenance of 
identity, boundaries that are as much shifting gray areas as they are distinct lines” 
(128). Further, Kumar and Swiatek note that in our modern transnational world, “Such 
strict boundaries do not exist since what is pure already contains traces of that which is 
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excluded” (319). Yet, throughout American history, Campbell notes that this use of 
delineating external and internal threats in order to construct social identities initiated a 
pattern of defining the dominant male European American group against other 
marginalized groups to show what the enactment of “Americaness” was not supposed 
to include, a pattern of defining oneself in the negative that resulted in women being 
accused as unholy witches in Salem (128) and defining Africans as dependent, infantile, 
and savage slaves (129-31). Building from this interplay between external and internal 
threats, America displays “an oft-repeated tendency to interpret all threats to order and 
stability as coming from an alliance of internal and external enemies,” often linked 
together “in a subversive network” that is believed to exist even “without evidence” 
(132).  
 There are numerous and often complex processes that transition a member of an 
in-group into an internal threat, leading to their termination or exclusion as an external 
threat. In general terms, to be turned into an internal threat means that once one is 
deemed as no longer belonging to the in-group, one is then articulated with a separate, 
external group believed to be a threat to the in-group. One’s status as an internal threat 
remains as long as one continues to reside within the geographical space allotted to the 
threatened in-group, or if one somehow manages to prove themselves to once again be 
a member of the in-group. Seen in this way, the distinction between the external threat 
and the internal threat is a concern with embodied space or the violation and 
transgression of the physical boundaries between us and them. If one is expelled from 
the homeland of the in-group after being identified as an internal threat, one becomes 
an external threat. 
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Takacs directs us towards one process that can transform the subject into a 
threat, as she notes how terrorism is portrayed in popular narratives through a process 
in which it is “personalized, pathologized, and absolutized” (Terrorism TV 59). This 
process applies equally well to any group who has become articulated as a threat, 
whether internal or external, yet we will use its original application towards terrorism in 
our explanation of the process, as it has particular relevance to our post-9/11 
discussion, wherein the label of terrorist often became articulated to Muslim Americans 
when the attacks inflamed the underlying currents of Islamophobia in American culture. 
As such, to personalize involves showing that terrorism is a threat focused on the self, 
and not necessarily on the nation as a whole, a personalization of the fear that shifts the 
subject of fear from the nation to the self, depoliticizing the terrorist’s motivations. To 
pathologize the terrorist is to represent terrorism as a disease or a condition that results 
from individual deviancy, often portrayed as stemming from one’s deviant race, 
ethnicity, sexuality, or psychology (Carlsten 158-9). Takacs also discusses the process 
of ontologizing the terrorist, which is to essentialize the terrorist by determining and 
delimiting the nature of their existence or being, often in simplified formulations that 
decontextualizes and reifies them (Terrorism TV 59). Finally, to absolutize is to simplify 
the terrorist into a single thing in a way that is deemed unchangeable or immutable, 
which, especially under the Manichean rhetoric of the Bush Administration, turns the 
terrorist into an immutable incarnation of evil and destruction that the forces of good, the 
United States in this instance, must eradicate from the world, a message supported by 
many of Bush’s speeches after the attacks (cf. Bush, “Text” and “Remarks”).  
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When applied to actual terrorists, this processes of representation results in their 
depoliticization and decontextualization (Carlsten 155-6), transforming them from 
individuals or groups fighting for a political cause to individuals fighting because their 
own ontologically deviant natures have caused them to target you and your family, not a 
political institution. This also has the effect of delegitimizing the terrorist cause by 
effectively negating its existence (159). Further, pathologizing the terrorist turns them 
into a contagion that could spread to anyone, including oneself. As Takacs observes: 
“One effect of this systematic decontextualization of terrorism was to make the category 
of the terrorist flexibly expansible: it could include anyone who opposed U.S. interests of 
any sort in any way” (Terrorism TV 60). On the affective level, this depicted mutability 
and permeability of the terrorist identity further spurred anxiety and fear reactions as the 
terrorist could now be anyone, even yourself if you started to think in ways that opposed 
the policies proposed by the state, inspiring a paranoid condition of self-policing and 
community watch that further divides Americans into the us/them paradigm of either you 
are with us or against us. 
This leads us to a second sense of the internal threat, that of the internalized 
threat in which an in-group member believes or suspects that they have become a 
threat themselves. In this way, the absolutized evil threat has invaded our borders and 
threatened our inner-most levels of family by invading and turning ourselves into 
complicit agents of our own destruction. We see this symbolically explored in the post-
9/11 zombie narrative as the pathologized terrorist threat becomes the contagious 
zombie, especially when the hero/heroine becomes infected, such as at the end of Zack 
Snyder’s Dawn of the Dead (2004), when one of the main characters, Michael (Jake 
83 
 
Weber), realizes that he is contaminated, thereby internalizing the threat unwillingly, and 
chooses to sacrifice himself before he fully becomes a part of the threat. This sense of 
pathologizing the threat has led to numerous paranoid incidents in American history, 
such as McCarthyism, the Red Scare of the 20s, and even the Cold War concept of the 
domino effect in foreign relations. 
 
PARANOIA 
Paranoia is a complex primary fear theme that first deserves some clarification 
and explication. Keniston and Follansbee note that, for Freud, paranoia describes an 
“individual psychosis, but Americans have increasingly used it to describe their 
collective anxiety” caused by perceiving reality as networked and interconnected (16), 
wherein nothing happens by chance and everything is linked, typically with what is 
depicted as malevolent intention. Sianne Ngai describes paranoia as “one’s perceived 
status as a small subject in a ‘total system’” (3), and as “a species of fear based on the 
dysphoric apprehension of a holistic and all-encompassing system” (299). In short, 
paranoia typically involves feelings of persecution and conspiratorial thinking, wherein 
someone is out to get the paranoid individual. In The Geopolitical Aesthetic (1992), 
Jameson notes one narrative form of this fear theme, the conspiracy narrative, in which 
the narrative attempts to represent “the social totality itself” of its contemporaneous 
state of global capitalism, but necessarily fails under the individualist constraints of the 
narrative form (45-6). Building on this, Ngai states that the protagonists of these 
narratives “find that they are subjects caught in larger systems extending beyond their 
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comprehension and control” (299). At times, this can include “fear of unintended 
collusion with a system in which one is already inscribed” (303).  
However, Ercolino extends our understanding of paranoia in the narrative 
through what he calls the paranoid imagination, “an essentially North American 
phenomenon…that is characteristic of the contemporary imaginary in a broader sense” 
(249). Richard Hofstadter traces the roots of this imaginary as an integral part of 
American culture, dating as far back as the creation of conspiracy theories about 
Illuminism in 1798 (79), and extending through to McCarthyism (77) and the culture of 
the political right wing of his own time (82). Yet, Ercolino notes that paranoia can 
emerge in narratives in ways other than conspiracies, such as “political and religious 
terrorism…nuclear psychosis…state apparatuses and corrupt forces of 
order…compulsivity and psychotic disturbances” (250). The object of fear of the 
paranoid imagination, according to Ercolino, “is often a question of hypothetical 
threats—impossible to demonstrate and at times absolutely implausible or ridiculous—
but always and nevertheless feared and, precisely for this motive, all the more 
obsessively present and concrete” (250).  
While often seen as socially dysfunctional or psychologically pathological, 
paranoia can also be depicted as a justified and valuable instinct. Keniston and 
Follansbee state that after 9/11, paranoid thinking began to be seen as “logical and 
rational responses to contemporary life” (16). They believe novels are an especially 
good form for exploring post-9/11 paranoia since they have a particular affordance for 
describing the collective, individual, political, and domestic spheres in conjunction (16), 
thereby allowing for the discovery of interconnections across domains of social 
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experience that might provoke paranoia. Further, the narrative structure of the novel, 
especially the realist novel, tends toward one in which “contingency is eliminated and 
every action is meaningful” (16), in terms of the central plot, creating a system that can 
easily “depict paranoid constructions of reality” (16). In the post-9/11 novel, paranoia 
became increasingly seen as appropriate, useful, and often necessary for survival in a 
world of growing surveillance infrastructures and unidentifiable enemies that can turn 
out to be anyone (17), and this observation can certainly extend to other multimodal 
forms of the narrative that this study will explore in later chapters, such as film and 
television episodes. 
 
THE PERSONALIZATION OF FEAR 
The personalization of fear has a long, if somewhat unrecognized, history in 
American culture, but it experienced a resurgence in the wake of post-9/11 political 
rhetoric. In Stearns’s research comparing American reactions after Pearl Harbor to 
those after 9/11, he found that Americans after 9/11 were “much quicker to connect 
attack with personal and familial situations” rather than seeing them as directed toward 
the country or a larger community (36). This is what he calls the personalization of fear: 
“a striking aspect of the September 11 accounts involves the narrow focus, the use of 
individual and small group as primary frame of reference” (36). This first sense of the 
personalization of fear manifests when large, historic, and political events which are 
directed at a collective target, such as those made against America in general, are seen 
as personal attacks re-directed to the individual self alone, even if the individual is far 
removed from the actual threat. This phenomenon occurred after 9/11, when even 
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though the attacks were made against the WTC and the Pentagon, and their collective, 
symbolic importance as totems of American capitalism and imperialism, many 
Americans, even those who lived far from New York, felt the attacks were aimed at 
themselves directly. This establishes a felt connection between the individual and 
America as a nation, implying that if you attack America, you are attacking me, a 
perspective that results in the collective concern transforming into the individual. 
Yet, the personalization of fear can extend in two other directions as well, not just 
toward the self, but toward the immediate family and even the home itself. Takacs notes 
that the rhetoric of the Bush administration after 9/11 utilized the personalization of fear 
by its “construction of the family as a target of terror,” which “has helped to discipline the 
public to accept an increase in political and social repression for its own good” 
(“Monsters” 3). This practice has become part of the ideological arsenal used by 
politicians to justify the “violation of individual privacy rights” in the name of national 
security (16). Faludi, too, while she does not use the term, describes the personalization 
of fear at work in Bush’s speeches, noting, “The threat, according to this revised script, 
wasn’t to our commercial and governmental hubs but to our domestic hearth” (7). As 
Pease notes, “Bush endowed the state of emergency that he erected at Ground Zero 
with the responsibility to defend the Homeland because foreign aggressors had violated 
Virgin Land,” which, in effect, “exiled the people from their normative nationality so as to 
intensify their need for home” (168). Pease cites Amy Kaplan to note the unique 
understanding of home in American culture: “within the U.S. structures of feeling the 
domestic has a double meaning. It not only links the familial household to the nation but 
also imagines both in opposition to everything outside the geographical and conceptual 
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borders of the home” (168). This links any attack to America as an attack to the home, 
the center of domesticity, our sense of security, and the dwelling of our closest family, 
the atomic family structure often imaginatively excised from its larger familial relations. 
As a result, our emotional reaction is intensified considerably by this conceptual 
isolation. The personalization of fear can see threats as targeting the self, one’s 
immediate family, or towards the home. 
Overall, the personalization of fear is a fracturing fear that simplifies political 
conflict and removes the individual from a communal sense of belonging to a nation, 
state, or collective. It isolates the subject and divides the collective into individualized 
and monadic family units, thereby magnifying our feelings of vulnerability as it makes it 
appear that we and our immediate family must face the threat alone. Further, the 
personalization of fear re-directs our attention from the larger, political polities who may 
have potentially motivated such threats and to which these threats are often actually 
directed and re-articulates them against individuals who feel that they have done 
nothing to deserve the attack. Not only does this obfuscation muddle the individual’s 
ability to construct causative chains for these threats, thereby crippling their ability to 
create effective solutions, but it disguises those who may actually be to blame for 
retaliatory terrorism, making terrorism seem inscrutable, irrational, or nonsensical. 
Rather than hearing the true, political motivations of the terrorist, the personalization of 
fear re-routes Americans to ask, “Why would they want to attack me and my family?” 
while, through habitual use, conditioning Americans to ask predictive questions like 
“Who else might want to?” 
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In narrative form, we see the personalization of fear, in the first sense, manifest 
as political threats targeting the protagonist themselves rather than the nation, or, in the 
second sense, as those targeting the protagonist’s children, wife, husband, or, in the 
third sense, the physical home itself. This, of course, is also a useful tool for heightening 
dramatic tension in the narrative, as it places the protagonist and those they care most 
about in danger, making the conflict personal. Both the character and the reader, who 
has likely established a sympathetic bond with the former, then become emotionally 
invested in the resolution of the threat. Yet, the degree of the personalization of fear 
experienced by the individual may be contingent and attenuated by the level of 
belonging one feels toward the collective group targeted by the threat. Harlow and 
Dundes note that white students felt a more personalized reaction after the attacks of 
9/11 than the black students in their study (446). Their qualitative research indicates 
that this division is due to the “feelings of inclusion and exclusion from a national 
identity” often drawn along racial lines (440), but it also implies that gender (447) and 
class (453) play a role as well, combining to create varying degrees of alienation and 
marginalization that can distance an individual from the sense of the personal attack.  
Integral to the personalization of fear, in every instance, is a re-direction of the 
subjectivity of fear made through an ideological misinterpretation of the Real, and this 
re-articulation of the subject of fear makes it somewhat unique among the other primary 
fear themes described in this study. In the traditional example of the fearful situation, 
such as encountering a mountain lion in the wild, the object of fear is the mountain lion, 
and the subject of fear is you. The distinction here is that the object of fear is that which 
we are afraid of, while the subject of fear is that which we are afraid for. Typically, most 
89 
 
fear themes involve fear for the self that the audience feels by extension through one of 
the narrative’s focalized characters who functions for the audience as an emotional 
channel. However, the personalization of fear can re-direct the subject of fear in one of 
three different ways. In the first sense, what we can call the first-person sense, it re-
articulates the subject of fear from the collective target to the individual, creating a first-
person subjectivity of fear where it should be third-person subjectivity. The second 
sense, what we can think of as the second-person re-articulation, the personalization of 
fear switches the collective subject to a point external to the self as our most immediate, 
nuclear family. Last is the symbolic re-articulation, in which the personalization of fear 
moves the subject from the collective or social to the symbolic target of the home. In 
each sense, the personalization of fear acts as an ideological mystification, reducing 
threats directed toward larger, social or collective targets, into other targets that serve to 
isolate the individual and what they value most. This has the effect of breaking the 
social collective of a group into smaller units that are easier to politically manage and 
manipulate, breaking down the potential for the unification of the masses and the 
possibility for raising consciousness and organization among the working classes.  
We see the personalization of fear manifest in narratives in a number of ways. 
The first-person re-articulation often appears in conspiracy narratives with a personal 
focus and allegorical representations of collective powers aimed against the individual, 
such as Hackford’s film The Devil’s Advocate (1997) that pits the protagonist (Keanu 
Reeves) against Satan (Al Pacino), used in the film as an allegorical personification of 
the seductive powers of capitalistic greed itself. The second-person re-articulation is 
utilized almost to a cliché in action films in which the character’s family is killed or 
90 
 
abducted, and the hero must either avenge their death or rescue them, as in the Netflix 
television series Punisher (2017- ) or Winner’s film Death Wish (1974). Last, it can also 
manifest as a symbolic re-articulation of the subjectivity of fear in the form of a home 
invasion or threat to the sense of security found in the home, as in such films as Lurie’s 
Straw Dogs (2011), Bertino’s The Strangers (2008), Fincher’s Panic Room (2002), or 
Rosenberg’s The Amityville Horror (1979). 
 
TRANSGRESSION 
 Transgression is the fear of the consequences of crossing a boundary 
established by one’s society, culture, or religion. As a fear theme, it has long roots 
extending back into the mythological tales of Prometheus, Icarus, or even the Sudanese 
tale of how the hyena and the weaverbird lost humanity our immortality by disobeying 
the High God. American narratives focusing on this fear theme typically take the form of 
cautionary tales that warn of what might happen if we attempt to cross a specified 
boundary, one typically established by an authority figure, whether parental or deific. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, narratives centering on transgression can often be 
seen as revolving around disobeying various symbolic representations of the Freudian 
superego, such as in narratives that centered on breaking the law, committing a sin, or 
defying one’s parents.  
Politically, transgressive narratives in this sense are often conservative in nature, 
as they fearfully depict the dangers of breaking the rules or progressing beyond the 
status quo. As anthropologist Mary Douglas states, “the ideal order of society is 
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guarded by dangers which threaten transgressors. The danger-beliefs are as much 
threats which one man uses to coerce another as dangers which he himself fears to 
incur by his own lapses from righteousness” (3). Such transgressive fears are often 
found in science fiction narratives as many of the boundaries believed to exist between 
human experience and the purview of the natural order or God are what science 
actively pushes against. We see this in the numerous post-WWII narratives of 
punishment for the development of nuclear technology, such as the giant radioactive 
ants in Douglas’s film Them! (1954), or narratives of the consequences of finding 
terrifying alien life as we push the limits to explore outer space, as in Espinosa’s more 
recent film Life (2017), in which astronauts discover the first life form from Mars. Treated 
this way, Brian Murphy “sees the Creature as ‘the symbol of what we have to fear: it is 
not fear itself; it is the horror of what we have done, scientifically and militarily to bring 
the world to the brink of destruction’” (qtd. in Sobchack 47). Transgression also links to 
the Frankenstein formula, in which a character violates a boundary, such as the 
boundary separating what is seen as the place of humanity in relation to God, by 
creating something that ultimately leads to the character’s destruction. As this 
connection to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818/1823) 
implies, this transgressed limit often has Biblical or religious origins as established 
within Western society, but it can also extend to scientists going too far, such as the 
networked artificial intelligence in Cameron’s The Terminator (1984) or the genetically 
engineered sharks of Harlin’s film Deep Blue Sea (1999). 
 Often, transgression is embodied in the narrative through what philosopher Noël 
Carroll calls the transgressive monster. Carroll draws from Douglas, noting that “Things 
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that are interstitial, that cross the boundaries of the deep categories of a culture’s 
conceptual scheme, are impure” (“The Nature” 55), and hence elicit the reactions of fear 
and disgust that we have when faced with the monster, whether in print or on a screen. 
The four categories of the impure are interstitial, contradictory, incomplete, or formless 
(55), and a creature that exhibits one or more of these traits can be seen as a 
“categorical transgression” (56). For instance, the undead is a transgressive monster 
that can be considered a categorically contradictory impurity as they are both living and 
dead, and even haunted houses are both animate and inanimate (55). Missing body 
parts and advanced states of decay can be categorical incompleteness, and Carroll 
states that in literature, sometimes “their vague, suggestive, and at times inchoate 
description of the monsters, leaves an impression of formlessness” (56). This sense of 
categorical formlessness is often imitated in film, especially in the low budget monster 
flicks of the 1950s, in which the monster looms in the shadows, unseen, and, in a way, 
more threatening for its lack of explicit depiction. Carroll explains the theoretical 
advantages of thinking of monsters as transgressive: 
[It provides] a way in which we can account for the recurrent description of our 
impure monsters as ‘unnatural.’ They are unnatural relative to a culture’s 
conceptual scheme of nature. They do not fit the scheme; they violate it. Thus, 
monsters are not only physically threatening; they are cognitively threatening. 
They are threats to common knowledge. (56)  
The transgressive monster, then, is fearful because it defies our cultural schemes of 
categorization, our way of understanding the world. They defy our comfortable efforts to 
put things in their place, because if the sentient robots in Alex Proyas’s film I, Robot 
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(2004) are neither dead nor alive, animate nor inanimate, how do we handle them? How 
to we understand them? What rights do they have? In this way, the fear of the 
transgressive monster is often rooted in the fear of the unknown or the unresolved 
contradiction given shape and becoming something we can no longer hope to ignore. 
 
TRAUMA 
The term “trauma” has been used so much in psychology and critical theory that 
it often goes loosely defined, its meaning a seemingly established and settled definition, 
but one often just as difficult to articulate as the experience of trauma itself. Laplanche 
and Pontails, from a psychological perspective, offer a good, general definition of 
trauma from which to begin: “An event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the 
subject’s incapacity to respond adequately to it, and by the upheaval and long-lasting 
effects that it brings about in the psychical organisation” (465). From this perspective, 
traumas are events in the life of the subject, or, in our case, the collective experience of 
a society that are so disruptive that they defy affective processing and understanding, 
forcing the victim to repeatedly revisit, through a repetition compulsion, vivid flashbacks 
to the event as their mind attempts to integrate the event into the victim’s established 
sense of identity, an identity thoroughly disrupted by the seemingly incomprehensible 
nature of the trauma itself and the inability to process its affect into recognized emotion. 
On top of flashbacks, trauma can manifest numerous symptoms in an individual, 
ranging from self-destructive acts, memory repression, anxiety, emotional detachment, 
paranoia, suicidality, depression, and self-medication to a diminished sense of safety, 
agency, self-esteem, emotional stability, and ability to negotiate interpersonal 
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relationships. However, what is traumatic for one may not be traumatic for another or 
may affect individuals differently, as there are genetic, cultural, situational, and 
environmental factors that come into play. Takacs, drawing from Neil Smelser, states 
that, largely, “trauma is a socially constructed and culturally conditioned way of 
responding to events” (Terrorism TV 30).  
Building on this observation, in the theoretical framework of this study, trauma is 
an affective experience that defies either individual or collective interpretation through 
available ideologies. Without the available capacity for interpretation, the traumatic 
experience cannot be properly integrated into the identity of the subject. This means 
that, in response to a particular event, trauma may not be experienced by all or 
experienced in the same way and that all trauma does not have some universal, 
essential characteristic that makes it traumatic. However, for the purposes of this study, 
what defines trauma as a fear theme in the American fear narrative is that it is—or is 
represented to be—an affective experience that defies or at least resists available 
ideologies that could integrate it into individual or collective “American” identities. 
While most of the themes of fear that this study will discuss concern themselves 
with present or anticipated threats, trauma is more temporally complex. Psychological 
trauma theory often traces its roots back to Sigmund Freud, who, as Aimee L. Pozorski 
notes, suggested: 
Trauma is not simply a horrific event, but it is also an event that misaligns our 
perception of time. Such an event occurs too soon for consciousness to process 
it during the moment in which it occurs, so that subsequent time for the survivor 
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turns on the repetition of the key aspects of the event—with no beginning and no 
end—in search of that missed encounter with death. (71)  
As such, Pozorski states, “After a traumatic event, there appears to be neither a before 
nor after” (71). In an interview between Pozorski and Cathy Caruth, the latter a seminal 
scholar in trauma theory, Caruth states that the traumatic “moment necessarily affects 
all other moments in time” (72), leaving behind “the haunting imposition of these events 
in the lives of the survivors” (73). This haunting of the trauma, ever-present in the victim, 
re-writes their past as well as shaping and limiting the affective possibilities of their 
future. As a result, Caruth observes, “The trauma…lives in the present, and in the 
future, as much as the past that carries with it the original event” (73).  
One path to recovery from a traumatic experience, according to Versluys, is to 
integrate it “into narrative memory” (3). Significantly in the context of the subject of this 
study, these observations suggest that the political unconscious of narrative 
representations of trauma imagines a way to plot or otherwise integrate a trauma into an 
ideologically coherent narrative. Placing the trauma into a narrative series of events 
gives it “a place within one’s recollection in order to be (se)cured,” thereby escaping the 
“ceaseless imaginative reiteration of the traumatic experience” (3). This reiteration, or 
flashbacks of the event, are seen in psychoanalytic therapy as a form of acting out, an 
often unconscious refusal or inability to integrate the traumatic event as a part of one’s 
past in a narrative whole. Successfully narrativizing trauma, on the other hand, is a 
means of working through the trauma, overcoming the psychical resistances to 
integrating the event into the psyche, which frees the victim from the symptoms of 
trauma and “from the grip of mechanisms of repetition” (Laplanche and Pontails 488). 
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However, from my Jamesonian perspective on narrative, any overcoming of trauma via 
narrativization is an ideological and symbolic act that provides an imaginary solution to 
trauma’s defiance of interpretation and the class conflict trauma encodes. 
Consequently, in this study, my focus is less on how American fear narratives evoke the 
affective experience of trauma than on how they use narrative form to at once repress 
and remember class conflict as the ideological “master narrative” behind trauma. 
For collectively traumatic experiences such as 9/11 that affected both the victims 
present at the attacks and those who viewed it in a mediated form, narratives can serve 
as a form of therapy that satiates what Versluys sees as “a globalized need to 
comprehend, to explain, and to restore” (4). This aligns with Jameson’s assertion that all 
narratives—whether novels, films, or television episodes—are socially symbolic acts of 
ideology, meaning that narrativizing imposes ideological interpretation upon affective, 
pre-ideological, pre-symbolic, pre-linguistic phenomena that is based, in some manner, 
upon the Real. Specific to our study, this points to one important function of the post-
9/11 narrative, either those explicitly discussing 9/11, as in the post-9/11 novels of our 
next chapter, or those symbolically coming to terms with the cultural impact of the 
attacks as in many horror or science fiction fear narratives after 9/11. These narratives 
can help society negotiate collective or individual ideological interpretations of the 
affective potentialities of 9/11 as a traumatic event through its fictional narratives, 
exposing and concealing the class conflict behind the fear theme of trauma. Post-9/11 
narratives, then, often serve as a source of narrative trauma therapy, and many of these 
texts have dealt with the fear theme of trauma directly, thereby also directly infusing 
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particular ideological interpretations of the traumatic event into their reader’s individual 
therapeutic processes. 
Pulling this back to 9/11, Takacs reminds us that news media pre-packaged the 
attacks as traumatic events: “By framing the story of September 11 attacks in traumatic 
terms, news media primed the public to interpret the events in certain ways and to 
conveniently ‘forget’ other aspects of the story” (Terrorism TV 30-1). This pre-
interpretation of the event, in other words, limited the interpretative potentialities of the 
affect produced by the attacks, pointing it in one direction that precluded some possible 
alternatives, such as the lost chance to join the global community mourned by Judith 
Butler (Precarious xi). This initiated an essentially hegemonic process that produced 
what Takacs calls “a simplified narrative of national violation that echoed and 
legitimated the Bush administration’s call for retributive violence” (Terrorism TV 31). As 
we will see, my position is specifically that the preconditioning of 9/11 as trauma pushed  
audiences of fear narratives towards the fear themes I identify, all of which engage (if 
often in the political unconscious) with a national identity under threat. In fear narrative 
across American history, the primary fear theme of trauma often takes shape as a 
fearful condition that the characters experience to ideologically encode class conflict, as 
when we see characters trying to escape the grips of “cowardice,” such as in Stephen 
Crane’s novel The Red Badge of Courage (1895); struggling with war-induced trauma, 
such as in Michael Cimino’s film The Deer Hunter (1978); or dealing with post-9/11 




While we can discuss the ten primary fear themes that I have so far identified in 
isolation, they rarely manifest in the narrative in this manner. Instead, most fear 
narratives incorporate numerous fear themes, some as a central focus and others more 
in the thematic periphery, but their admixture often alters their meanings into new or 
variant permutations. In other words, from a Jamesonian perspective, these themes are 
akin to generic conventions that by historical and ideological acts are overlaid, admixed, 
and sedimented together in any particular fear narrative. Consequently, in the next 
chapter, we will outline the genealogy of the fear narrative to see how these primary 
fear themes have manifested, combined, and sedimented in the fear narrative 














A GENEALOGY OF THE AMERICAN FEAR NARRATIVE 
 
In the last chapter, I introduced the concept of the primary fear theme, the 
secondary fear theme, and I summarized the ten primary fear themes that I observed as 
being prominent in post-9/11 American fear narratives. These ten primary fear themes 
have a long history in American culture that I will now outline by tracing its narrative 
manifestations throughout American history and breaking its evolution down into seven 
functional if loose historical periods. I will conclude the chapter by contrasting the fear 
themes in the Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Black Cat” (1843), a Victorian-influenced fear 
narrative, with the way these fear themes tend to manifest in post-9/11 American fear 
narratives in order to highlight the way these themes have changed over time and to 
underscore the uniqueness of the post-9/11 fear narrative as a part of this tradition. 
Overall, this understanding of the historical development and change of the American 
fear narrative will allow us to better contextualize the post-9/11 American fear narratives 
that are my central focus in this study. 
To begin, Stearns identifies some inklings of these fear themes by noting that 
throughout its history American culture has had two reoccurring features: “a tendency to 
link fear to concerns of racial others” and “an apocalyptic strain” (63). Indeed, as 
Massumi states, “Fear is a staple of popular culture and politics” (“Preface” vii). Fear 
has long been a constant feature in American culture, even as it adapts and changes to 
history, altering and accumulating over time, as, what Williams would call, residual 
aspects of former fears mass into hegemonic structures of power that attempt to either 
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incorporate, alter, or dispel other emergent fears forming in response to new events. 
That the exigence for these fears arises, at least in part, from events, means that before 
we can understand the nature of American fear, we have to explore the term “event” 
itself. According to philosopher Jacques Derrida, 
The event is made up of the ‘thing’ itself (that which happens or comes) and the 
impression (itself at once ‘spontaneous’ and ‘controlled’) that is given, left, or 
made by the so-called ‘thing.’ We could say the impression is ‘informed,’ in both 
senses of the word: a predominant system gave it form, and this form then gets 
run through an organized information machine (language, communication, 
rhetoric, image, media, and so on). This informational apparatus is from the very 
outset political, technical, economic. (89)  
Derrida’s concepts work well within our framework of affect and its interpretation via 
ideology in that the impression is constructed both affectively (“spontaneous”) and 
ideologically (“controlled”) and thereby is a necessary interpretation of the real event 
itself. This process becomes especially conflicted and often ambiguous in our attempts 
to understand the sort of historic events that seem to defy our comprehension, ones we 
refer to as major events, such as the attacks of 9/11. As Derrida states, “A major event 
should be so unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept 
or essence on the basis of which we believe we recognize an event as such” (90). While 
Žižek (Welcome 16) and Baudrillard (30) may contend that we anticipated and thereby 
foresaw 9/11 in our fictions, it is this transference across the boundary between fiction 
and reality, the crossing of the border between fictional, possible, and actual worlds, 
which made the attacks, in all their disturbing, irruptive, and overwhelming reality, even 
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harder for some to believe. While many witnesses likened the attacks to films they had 
seen, such as Independence Day and Towering Inferno (Versluys 4), I doubt few would 
say that they foresaw that these fictions would ever cross over to reality. After all, we 
are taught from childhood that these “are just movies” and that they are not real. The 
uncanny familiarity of 9/11 violated this essential tenant of our ideological stance toward 
the separation of reality and fiction, which did not decrease the importance and irruptive 
nature of the event, but actually increased it for many. As such, 9/11 certainly qualifies 
as a major event under these terms, one that has left a discernible impression on our 
culture and has inspired a variety of conflicting ideological interpretations as we attempt 
to grasp its damages, implications, and consequences. 
 America’s efforts to understand and interpret our fears and anxieties surrounding 
major historical events find form in cultural artifacts, and contemporary American 
narratives offer themselves as objects of study to better understand how new 
impressions of events interact with cultural fears. As Michael Rothberg states in 
reference to terrorism and 9/11, “literature and art can become sites for exploring the 
intersections between the public and the private and for understanding the feelings that 
terrorism draws on and produces” (“Seeing Terror” 131). In essence, narratives provide 
a space for us to make sense of reality in their production and consumption, thereby 
constructing and negotiating through fiction our often fearful reactions to actual affective 
events, especially those events that we feel are incomprehensible. Through this social 
function of attempting to understand our fear, and thereby, in Jameson’s terms, to 
create imaginary solutions to fearful contradictions that seem unsolvable, the fear 
narrative has a continuous tradition in American culture, in which its primary ideological 
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messages and formal elements have adapted to changes in historical conditions. This 
malleability has allowed it to take a prominent place in our present millennial culture, 
one that, as we will see, has become dominated by the politics of fear, characterized by 
the emotional reactions of the neurotic citizen, and, at least in part, motivated by the 
personalization of fear itself. 
 We can come to better understand the Post-9/11 American fear narrative if we 
consider it as, in Jameson’s terms, a genealogical construction, in which “we begin with 
a full-blown system…in terms of which elements of the past can ‘artificially’ be isolated 
as objective preconditions” (The Political 139). Essentially, we can discern the 
composition of the Post-9/11 American fear narrative by finding its narrative and 
ideological predecessors, thereby establishing “a model of formal sedimentation” (140). 
To denote this genealogical sedimentation, we can divide the American fear narrative 
into roughly seven periods, each characterized by a major historical event or the 
cessation of an historical event, as in the sixth category. As a note, I have left the first 
three periods intentionally large, general, and schematic. By doing this I can 
simultaneously acknowledge and build from their essential role in the sedimentation of 
contemporary American fear, while still keeping my intended focus on the periods just 
prior to the post-9/11 American fear narrative, which I have elaborated in greater detail. 
The seven periods of the American fear narrative include 
1. the Colonial and Early American fear narrative,  
2. the Victorian-influenced American fear narrative,  
3. the Great Wars American fear narrative,  
4. the Early Cold War American fear narrative,  
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5. the Late Cold War American fear narrative,  
6. the Fin-de-Siècle American fear narrative, and  
7. the Post-9/11 American fear narrative.  
It is important to note that these divisions should not be seen as rigid taxonomies, but, 
at best, “fuzzy” categories, meaning that they should be thought of as divisions of 
“more-or-less rather than binary, either-or logic” that permit “borderline instances and 
hybrids or blends” (Herman, Basic Elements 100-1). I employ the divisions only as 
imposed and artificial conceptual aids to help discern the process of formal 
sedimentation, and not as defined periodizations that imply absolute changes at fixed 
historical points. Jameson notes this about genres and his concepts can easily be 
extended to efforts to erect structures of periodization as well: “all generic categories, 
even the most time-hallowed and traditional, are ultimately to be understood…as mere 
ad hoc, experimental constructs, devised for a specific textual occasion and abandoned 
like so much scaffolding when the analysis has done its work” (The Political 145). In 
short, Jameson points out how the practice of utilizing historical periods is both 
conceptually flawed but practically necessary for historical interpretation. With this in 
mind, we can utilize the periodization of the American fear narrative as conceptual and 
analytic scaffolding that can be removed as needed to note how the themes of the 
American fear narrative often overlap these bounds, oscillating and occurring unevenly 
across these periods. I readily invite future research to expand upon, complicate, and 
further divide these periods of the American fear narrative, but for the purposes of the 
current project, their proposed broad strokes of history and culture fulfill our needs. 
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The Colonial and Early American fear narrative emerges as early as the first 
European contacts with the New World, which we will simplify for this study as starting 
in 1492 and extending until the end of the eighteenth century (1492-1799). This era 
begins two primary themes of American fear: the racialized other and the apocalyptic 
strain (Stearns 63). The first took form as European, especially Protestant, settlers 
fought to delineate their emerging sense of identity as American colonists, cleaving 
distinctions between themselves and those they deemed as outsiders, including Native 
Americans, African slaves, Asian immigrants, and Hispanics (Campbell 120-131), 
creating the theme of the external threat. Simultaneously, this period also created the 
sense of the internal threat, one that can emerge from inside a society, often in the form 
of friends and relatives who turn out to be one of them. These themes were also highly 
influenced by early Catholic and Evangelistic cultures that habitually promised the end 
of the world and taught the theme of apocalypticism, the belief in the coming divine 
retribution for our sins, which plays a major role in the fear narratives of this period and 
survives in some part in all the eras to come. Some examples of these narratives, all 
novels in English, include The Power of Sympathy: or, The Triumph of Nature, by 
William Hill Brown (1789); Charlotte Temple, by Susanna Rowson (1794, American 
publication); The Coquette: Or, the History of Eliza Wharton, by Hannah Webster Foster 
(1797); and Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker, by Charles Brockden Brown 
(1799). 
The Victorian-influenced American fear narrative ranges from 1800-1901. A 
strong Victorian influence marks the attitude toward fear expressed in these narratives, 
which, while building on earlier American themes, focuses on a precursor to the 
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personalization of fear, a theme of fear that features “threats to individuals, at most to 
families or villages, not to whole societies” (Stearns 77). We can trace this theme back 
to Victorian Gothic literature, as Alison Milbank notes how something like the 
personalization of fear manifested in British texts of the time through “a new 
preoccupation with the individual psychology” and a focus on “individual injustice” (150). 
Further, Milbank states, “there is often an attempt to enter the consciousness of the 
protagonist and render his sufferings with psychological verisimilitude” (150), drawing 
the reader further into the personally oriented threat of the object of fear. This 
personalization also extends to the preoccupation with the home or dwelling, which can 
be fruitfully read as a symbolic extension of a character’s psyche. As such, the Victorian 
Gothic narrative isolates the narrative to the domestic concerns of a handful of 
characters by “emphasiz[ing] the enclosure, albeit luxurious, of the [characters],” 
wherein “the claustrophobic interior is also the central site of the urban historical fiction 
of the 1840s” (149), and its American narrative contemporaries borrow, build, and adapt 
many of these traits. As this implies, in the American narratives of the period the theme 
of entrapment became increasingly strong, including narratives of slavery, entrapment 
in patriarchal society, premature burial, and concerns of family heritage versus 
individual agency. In another adoption from Victorian Gothic literature, we also see the 
beginnings of the theme of transgression as developments in science and culture led 
some to fear that we would push beyond pre-established limits and that this could have 
negative repercussions. David Punter notes this theme occurring in Victorian Gothic 
texts that precede and co-exist with American fear narratives of this period, noting that 
one of their themes include the “transgression of the boundaries between the natural 
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and the human, the human and the divine” (17). We see this sort of transgression 
played out frequently in American fear narratives through what is commonly called the 
Frankenstein formula, in which a scientist violates the laws of nature only to make a 
creation that proves their undoing and demise. Last, the theme of the internal and 
external threat becomes increasingly intertwined with the popularity of narratives 
relating unholy temptation towards sin, which leads to the theme of contamination, a 
fear that is never far from a fear of incorporation. Some examples of fear narratives from 
this era include “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow,” by Washington Irving (1820); The Last 
of the Mohicans, by James Fenimore Cooper (1826); “Young Goodman Brown,” by 
Nathaniel Hawthorne (1835); “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839), “The Black Cat” 
(1843), and “The Cask of Amontillado” (1846), by Edgar Allen Poe; Narrative of the Life 
of Frederick Douglas, an American Slave, by Frederick Douglas (1845); Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, by Harriet Beecher Stowe (1852); Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, by Harriet 
Ann Jacobs (1861); A Long Fatal Love Chase, by Louisa May Alcott (1866); Caesar’s 
Column, by Ignatius Donnelly (1890); “The Yellow Wallpaper,” by Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman (1892); and The Red Badge of Courage, by Stephen Crane (manuscript 
completed 1894). 
The Great Wars American fear narratives occur between 1901 and 1945. This 
era focuses on the increasing threat of industrialism on former modes of life and on 
impending, occurring, and reoccurring total warfare, including concerns over the rise 
and fate of fascism. Some characteristics of this era include fears of deformity, war, the 
need for killing, and domestic or social entrapment. Apocalypticism became an 
increasingly popular theme as many texts focused on the devastation of the world as it 
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is known, the loss of home, dystopias, and the loss of financial security during the Great 
Depression with its implied sense of the failure of the American dream. This last 
concern marked an emergence of the theme of exclusion, as many feared that they 
would be pushed away from their dreams and hopes as American citizens. Some 
examples of fear narratives in literature from this era include The Scarlet Plague, by 
Jack London (1912); The Heads of Cerberus, by Francis Stevens (real name Gertrude 
Barrows Bennett) (1919); “The Rats in the Walls” (1924) and “The Shadow over 
Innsmouth” (1931), by H.P. Lovecraft; The Great Gatsby, by F. Scott Fitzgerald (1925); 
A Farewell to Arms, by Ernest Hemingway (1929); The Blacker the Berry: A Novel of 
Negro Life, by Wallace Thurman (1929); “Shambleau” by C. L. Moore; and “The 
Escape,” by John W. Campbell (1935). In film, a relatively new media of the era, some 
examples include Lois Weber and Phillips Smalley’s Suspense (1913), Winsor McCay’s 
The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918, animated film), Whale’s Frankenstein (1931), 
Browning’s Dracula (1931), and Freund’s The Mummy (1932). 
The Early Cold War American fear narrative refers to texts published from 1945-
1970 that focus on fear inspired specifically by the conditions of the Cold War, but it also 
overlaps with and, at least for our purposes, subsumes many narratives inspired by 
World War II and the Cold War proxy wars of the Vietnam and Korean Wars. As such, 
Early Cold War American fear narratives introduce, or resurrect, themes such as 
paranoia, exclusion from home, entrapment through imprisonment or oppression, and 
the apocalypticism of mutually assured destruction. They also feature such fears as 
inspired by mass deaths, war, survival, the holocaust, anti-Semitism, and conditions of 
insanity caused by trauma and war. The Cold War itself increased the use of the 
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themes of internal and external threats, whether through silent invasions of the 
homeland, fear of authoritarian governments, national security, the red threat, or secret 
military operations. These concerns over communism, authoritarianism, and new 
concerns about radiation also manifest in heavy doses of the theme of contamination. 
As such, narratives of transgression also flourish, often focusing on the dangers of 
atomic power and radiation. On its evolution from the Great Wars narrative, Sorin Radu 
Cucu states that the meaning of the Atomic Bomb, in particular, changes from the WWII 
“symbol of US military supremacy into the technological horizon of total warfare or 
Mutually Assured Destruction” in the Cold War (18), essentially from an object of 
national pride to an object inspiring profound anxiety.  
Many critics see the Early Cold War era as an important turning point for 
American fear. For instance, media scholar Nick Dyer-Witheford notes how, as a 
counterstrike to the civil rights movements of the 60s and 70s, the government switched 
from “the Planner State” to the “Crisis State,” “a regime of control by trauma in which ‘it 
is the state that plans the crisis’” (76). Similarly, Massumi sees the assassination of 
Kennedy as a crucial moment of cultural confusion and doubt that spawned a series of 
fears, creating a feeling of “imminent disaster” (“Everywhere” 10). This created a sense 
of paranoia as, “The founding event,” or the accident, “has always already happened…, 
yet persists as a possibility,” which makes, “[t]he accident as advent and threat: the pure 
past of the sudden and uncontrollable contingency, and the uncertain future of its 
recurrence” (8). This sense of continual crisis and the ever-present possibility of the 
threat looming on the future horizon instilled in Americans a sense of low-level fear, or 
“naturalized fear, ambient fear, ineradicable atmospheric fright, the discomfiting 
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affective Muzak that might come to be remembered as a trademark of the late-
twentieth-century America” (Massumi, “Preface” viii). According to Massumi, this sense 
of low-level fear is “a power mechanism for the perpetuation of domination” and is part 
of “the capitalist culture of fear” (ix). Some examples of fear narratives from the Early 
Cold War era in literature include The Naked and the Dead, by Norman Mailer (1948); 
Invisible Man, by Ralph Ellison (1952); I Am Legend, by Richard Matheson (1954); 
Fahrenheit 451, by Ray Bradbury (1954); Giovanni’s Room, by James Baldwin (1956); 
A Canticle for Leibowitz, by Walter M. Miller, Jr. (1960); Catch-22, by Joseph Heller 
(1961); and The Crying of Lot 49, by Thomas Pynchon (1965). Some examples in film 
include Wellman’s film Battleground (1949), Gordon Douglas’s Them! (1954), Don 
Siegel’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), Romero’s Night of the Living Dead 
(1968), and Barbara Loden’s Wanda (1970). 
During this era, we start to see the emergence of what social and political theorist 
Engin Isin calls the “neurotic citizen,” which we can understand from a poststructural 
perspective as a hegemonic pressure toward a particular performative embodiment of 
the American subject, one that originates from and strives toward the unobtainable 
identity ideals fundamental to neoliberal culture. Isin’s concept expands upon Foucault’s 
theories of biopower to help explain the current affective state of fear and anxiety in 
Western culture. Isin’s argument begins with what he calls the “bionic citizen,” a 
conceptually constructed but impossible to embody ideal subjectivity produced by, 
according to Isin, both liberal and neoliberal cultures as “a subject whose rational and 
calculating capacities enabled it to calibrate his conduct [sic]” (222). When the subject 
repeatedly meets with the frustration of not being able to enact this rational ideal, these 
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failures turn the subject into its double as the “neurotic citizen,” one “who governs itself 
through responses to anxieties and uncertainties” (223). To Isin, the oscillation between 
the two subjective roles begins when the bionic citizen attempts to embody the 
impossible ideals, thereby experiencing such levels of psychic conflict that they develop 
neurotic symptoms of anxiety, fear, and uncertainty, becoming a neurotic subject. To 
Isin, Western culture itself promises the subject impossible ideal states that should 
result from a life of rationality, such as absolute security, safety, the perfect body, 
tranquility, wealth, happiness, and serenity, thereby turning the desires of a subject who 
subscribes to these beliefs into the perceived rights of the neurotic citizen (232). 
However, the persistent denial of these “rights” drives the neurotic citizen further into a 
permanent state of frustration, anger, angst, and “chronic discontent” (232). As he 
states, “The formation of neurotic claims reproduces [the] illusions of the neurotic citizen 
and enables it to shift responsibility to objects outside itself with hostility” (233), 
essentially meaning that the neurotic citizen utilizes scapegoats, on which it projects the 
hostility it feels toward its own failure to perform the role of the bionic citizen. 
The neurotic citizen sees these scapegoated targets of frustration as the focuses 
of their neurotic sense of fear and paranoia, as the objects of their fear, blaming them 
for often entirely imagined threats, a process that ingrains fear and the concept of the 
imminent threat into contemporary American ideology, while often directing it toward 
irrational and unfounded threats. Last, Isin states that political practice in predominantly 
neurotic societies, what he calls “neuropolitics,” becomes that which “is neither focused 
on causes, nor cure nor care but on [the] tranquillization of anxiety understood as a 
normal way of being” (228). Within a culture dominated by the neurotic citizen and in 
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which this neurotic state becomes the new normal, interested parties can tap into this 
constant and unresolved affective state of anxiety through what Takacs calls the politics 
of fear (“Monsters” 1), a concept we will return to shortly. This is an effort not to remove 
anxieties, but to reduce their felt presence temporarily, creating a constant cycle 
motivated by fear (or neuroses) that does not fix or solve the neurotic state, but lives 
with it, much like briefly relieving the symptoms of an incurable disease with a daily pill. 
Such neuropolitics occurred after 9/11 as Bush urged us to go out shopping, using 
consumerism as a means to distract and redirect our affective tensions, thereby 
managing but not resolving our anxieties. Overall, we can turn to the concept of the 
neurotic citizen to see how fear narratives of this period both deconstruct and construct 
the hegemonic formation of the neurotic citizen as the contemporary American citizen. 
In the second half of this period, the Late Cold War American fear narrative 
becomes an emergent form from 1970-1991. While these narratives share and build 
upon many of the characteristics of the Early Cold War American fear narratives, those 
of this period seem to mark a transition away from the established Cold War ideology, 
especially as they demonstrate a budding awareness of a new perceived threat in 
terrorism. Most terrorist novels, with their tendency to center on the themes of paranoia 
and the internal/external threat, qualify as fear narratives, often by turning the threat of 
Massumi’s imminent accident into the terrorist incident. In Robert Appelbaum and Alexis 
Paknadel’s study of terrorism from 1970-2001, they find that terrorism became a 
popular topic in literature in the late 1970s, early 1980s, and then again in the mid-
1990s on, the latter focusing on “right-wing and religiously motivated terrorism” (395). In 
these novels, “Terrorist violence is often portrayed as random and anonymous” (405), 
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the discourse centers “on the terrorist/counterterrorist incident” (419), the significance of 
the violence is the “experience of victimization” and “violation” (420), and the focus on 
the violent event almost completely “disconnects it from political meaning” (422). 
Overall, the novels studied strive to legitimate the victims as innocent and portray 
terrorism as “the violence of the Other; it is illegitimate violence perpetrated from an 
illegitimate position. Legitimacy is for us” (427). As such, these novels play with the 
theme of the internal threat as they “articulate the subject position of the nonterrorist, 
who is not quite at fault, but not quite uninvolved, either” (427). From their study, we can 
generalize that the Cold War terrorist novel (and by extension other narrative texts, 
including news coverage, films, and television as well) depoliticizes the act of terrorism, 
turning it instead into an imminent threat, a looming fear forever possible and waiting on 
the horizon, rather than an act of violence that is itself a message. In addition, this 
building anxiety about the terrorist marks the beginning of a shifting of focus from 
fearing the racial other and external threat of the Russian communist to that of the 
Middle Eastern terrorist, even if many terrorists in the real world do not come from the 
Middle East. Some examples of fear narratives in literature from the Late Cold War era 
include The Forever War, by Joe Haldeman (1974); Black Sunday, by Thomas Harris 
(1975); The Word for World is Forest, by Ursula K. LeGuin (1976); Patternmaster, by 
Octavia E. Butler (1976); The Stand, by Stephen King (1978, television miniseries 
1994); The Bourne Identity, by Robert Ludlum (1980); Maus, by Art Spiegelman (1980, 
graphic novel); The Color Purple, by Alice Walker (1982); White Noise, by Don DeLillo 
(1985); and Beloved, by Toni Morrison (1987). Two examples from film and television 
include Phillip Kaufman’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1978) and NBC’s V (1984-5). 
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Yet, it is important to note that the American terrorist narrative does not tend to 
construct the terrorist or their motivations from historical records or political statements. 
Terrorist novels, according to Appelbaum and Paknadel, engage in the mythography of 
terrorism, as “terrorism is inserted into an ‘enabling fiction,’ a myth of terrorism and its 
causes, dangers, and meanings, which ends up making its own realities” (389). As they 
state, “The result…is not simply a distortion of perception; it is the replacement of the 
perception of things with a reaction to representations” so that the resulting terrorist 
narrative “both responds to this mythography and contributes to it, adding its own 
coloration to the mythic identity of terrorism” (389). This fictional construct of the Middle 
Eastern terrorist aligns well with Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, which is 
essentially the West’s fictional construction of the Oriental subject that serves as “a 
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (3). 
This construct has “less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (12). As Said 
states, “we need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict the 
Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is inaccurate but 
because it is not even trying to be accurate” (71). This is equally true of the American 
terrorist novel and film, as they have tended to feed off other fictional representations for 
information on the terrorist, depoliticizing the terrorist into a reified threat while 
expressing no attempt to understand the terrorist, but rather focusing on the subjective 
experience of the victim threatened by an inscrutable and random danger. 
This brings us to the seventh era, that of the Fin-de-Siècle American fear 
narrative, which roughly ranges from 1991-2001. Beginning after the end of the Cold 
War, this transitional period focuses on free-floating fears that are no longer anchored 
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by the historic events of the Cold War, but are increasingly redirected toward the new 
racial enemy of the Middle Eastern terrorist, apocalyptic end-of-the-millennia anxieties, 
and the various results of the expansion of transportation and communication 
technologies. It often includes dystopian futures, various ways the world could end, 
virus contamination, and the threat of wars in the Middle East, which increasingly began 
to grow in the American imaginary as terrorism begins to feel ever more real, but still 
like something that largely did not happen in the US itself. There are continued 
concerns about social collectivity as a sort of incorporating contamination, such as in 
DeLillo’s Mao II, a consummate fear narrative of this era that explores “media culture, 
mass movements, and transnational terrorism” (Cucu 11-2). Some other examples of 
the American fear narrative in literature from this era include Dreaming in Cuban, by 
Cristina García (1992); Leviathan, by Paul Auster (1992); In the Time of the Butterflies, 
by Julia Alvarez (1994); The Hot Zone, by Richard Preston (1995); Native Speaker, by 
Chang-Rae Lee (1995); Indian Killer, by Sherman Alexie (1996); Fight Club, by Chuck 
Palahniuk (1996, film adaptation in 1999); Ender’s Shadow, by Orson Scott Card 
(1998); Koolaids: The Art of War, by Rabih Alameddine (1998); and The Pillars of 
Creation, by Terry Goodkind (2001). In television and film, some examples include 
Fox’s The X-Files (1993-2002), Rusty Cundieff’s Tales from the Hood (1995), Wolfgang 
Peterson’s Outbreak (1995), Michael Bay’s Armageddon (1998), and Spike Lee’s 
Summer of Sam (1999). 
 Sociologist Barry Glassner’s notion of the culture of fear adds to our 
understanding of this era. He states that fear in America is often produced through 
“[d]isproportionate coverage in the news media” (xxi) that makes “small hazards appear 
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huge and huge hazards disappear from sight,” such as the over-enlarged Ebola virus 
scare of the 1990s, and this often happens in a way that serves to profit “businesses, 
advocacy organizations, religious sects, and political parties” (xxiii). Typical fear 
mongering strategies of media outlets that he observes include “the use of poignant 
anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, 
[and] depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous” (208). In addition, 
fear campaigns and scares often “enable criticism of disliked groups and institutions” by 
others in power (xxvi). Overall, the reason why he believes that so many often baseless 
fears have emerged in American culture is because “immense power and money await 
those who tap into our moral insecurities and supply us with symbolic substitutes” for 
our own guilt and anxieties (xxvii). If we put together what we have discussed so far, the 
culture of fear is the result of the lived, affective experience of the neurotic citizen and 
its management through the politics of fear.  
Massumi also notes two important shifts in the fear narrative during the Fin-de-
Siècle era. First, Massumi observes the resurfacing and dominance in the American 
cultural imaginary of the concern for internal threats rather than external ones: “Today, 
conspiracy theories for both the JFK and King assassinations favor a domestic culprit, 
the CIA…The enemy is no longer outside. Increasingly, the enemy is no longer even 
clearly identifiable as such. Ever-present dangers blend together, barely distinguishable 
in their sheer numbers” (“Everywhere” 10). This marks a resurgence of a predominant 
theme of American fear, the internal threat, as domestic threats increasingly seemed to 
be everywhere. Second, he states that the Cold War notion of deterrence has evolved 
into a state of constant paranoia that manifests as “a permanent state of emergency 
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against a multifarious threat as much in us as outside,” and “the now unspecified enemy 
is infinite. Infinitely small or infinitely large: viral or environmental. The communist as the 
quintessential enemy has been superseded by the double figure of AIDS and global 
warming” (10-1). In short, Massumi’s findings illustrate the formal sedimentation of fear 
accumulating from the anxieties of former eras of the American fear narrative, evolving 
into new ideological constructs that respond to the perceived threats of the time. 
Last, all of these layers of formal inheritance lead to the current era of the Post-
9/11 American fear narrative. This period ranges from 2001 to the present, yet, as 
Appelbaum and Paknadel note, its manifestations in literature typically require two to 
three years to begin responding to 9/11, due to the typical time it takes to write and 
publish a reaction (396). In this period, the fear narrative focuses on the fears inspired 
by the 9/11 attacks and the events that followed, such as the War on Terror. This 
includes the increased presence of the survival space (Browning 44), a general state of 
paranoia that texts often portray as justified (Keniston and Follansbee 16-7), post-9/11 
trauma, metaphoric fears of contamination by zombie hordes, Islamic fears of exclusion 
from American culture, the solidification of the Middle Eastern terrorist as the racial 
other and national enemy (whether external or internal), and the transformation of some 
apocalyptic concerns from end-of-the-millennia flavored fears to the terrorist allegory of 
the zombie apocalypse, manifesting in numerous apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic 
narratives. As Gary K. Wolfe notes, the post-apocalyptic narrative, at least in part, 
revolves around the desire “to restore something of the stability we feel in our own 
technological culture,” and that “we want to see the protagonist re-create the familiar” 
rather than a different world (130), even if this proves impossible in the narrative. From 
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this perspective, post-apocalyptic narratives tend to serve a conservative function, 
which helps to explain its post-9/11 popularity: after the attacks, many Americans 
wanted to enact a symbolic return to the normal world they felt they lost to the disruptive 
incident/major event that was 9/11. Of course, many post-apocalyptic narratives of this 
time also began to question this conservative function, but I would argue that the 
ultimate efficacy of this effort of creating an alternative political narrative is debatable. 
Rather, what we tend to see is the repositioning of conservative values after their 
disruption in the attacks. Some examples of fear narratives in literature from this era 
include When the Emperor was Divine, by Julie Otsuka (2002); Pattern Recognition, by 
William Gibson (2003); Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, by Jonathan Safran Foer 
(2005, film adaptation in 2011); Cell, by Stephen King (2006); Falling Man, by Don 
DeLillo (2007); The Road, by Cormac McCarthy (2007, film adaptation 2009); 
“Exhalation,” by Ted Chiang (2008); Boneshaker, by Cherie Priest (2009); The 
Submission, by Amy Waldman (2011); Zone One, by Colson Whitehead (2011); The 
Corn Maiden, by Joyce Carol Oates (especially “The Corn Maiden” and “Helping 
Hands”) (2011); Mr. Churchill’s Secretary, by Susan Elia MacNeal (2012);and The 100 
novel series, by Kass Morgan (2013-16) (YA fiction, adapted to television 2014-
present). In television and film, some examples include the HBO television series Band 
of Brothers (2001); ABC’s Lost (2004-2010), Zack Snyder’s Dawn of the Dead (2004), 
Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker (2008), Showtime’s Homeland (2011-present), and 
Marc Forster’s World War Z (2013). 
Stearns and Takacs offer invaluable insights into the post-9/11 evolution of fear. 
By comparing American reactions to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor to those after 9/11, 
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Stearns found that Americans “were over three times as likely to be afraid” after 9/11, 
and were “much quicker to connect attack with personal and familial situations” rather 
than seeing them as directed toward the country or a larger community (36). This points 
to what he calls the personalization of fear: “a striking aspect of the September 11 
accounts involves the narrow focus, the use of individual and small group as primary 
frame of reference” (36). Investigating this concept, Takacs asserts that the rhetoric of 
the Bush administration utilized the theme of the personalization of fear by its 
“construction of the family as a target of terror,” which “has helped to discipline the 
public to accept an increase in political and social repression for its own good” 
(“Monsters” 3). This practice has served to justify the “violation of individual privacy 
rights” in the name of national security (16). It could be argued that this resurgence of 
the personalization of fear, or the political strategy of redirecting the perceived target of 
terror to the self and our immediate family, was easier to accept by the now increasingly 
reactionary and already paranoid neurotic citizen. While this may seem like a drastic 
claim, our construction of the lineage of the American fear narrative shows this to be 
only a small jump from the resurfaced notion of the domestic, internal threat in the Fin-
de-Siècle period. As we have noted, this sense of the internal threat, of course, evolved 
from the Cold War and World War II internal and foreign threats, and from even as far 
back as the efforts of English settlers to distinguish their nascent American identity from 
native populations and internal dissenters. 
Overall, by tracing the genealogy of the American fear narrative, we can discern 
numerous insights into the present formal sedimentation of the post-9/11 American fear 
narrative. For example, the neoliberal evolution of the neurotic citizen, perceiving itself 
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surrounded and beset upon by numerous threats, combined with the utilization of the 
politics of fear by the interested parties that Glassner outlines, has allowed the 
personalization of fear to take firm root in post-9/11 American culture. Yet, through the 
narrative, Bimbisar Irom sees the possibility for change and resistance, but also 
conversely for the solidification of hegemony. He believes the responses to 9/11 from 
both the state and from cultural productions in “the ethical-aesthetic sphere” are 
“attempts to appropriate the event into comprehensible modes of narration that serve 
the purposes of power, hegemony, and resistance” (Irom 517). Building on this, Anthony 
Kubiak implies that a terrorist act is itself a narrative disruption of an environment, 
disrupting one narrative to insert another (300), except terrorism needs an audience to 
interpret it: “Terrorism intends its story…to be understood by those who watch, by the 
‘readers’ and voyeurs of terror’s moment, not by its first-line victims” (298). As such, we, 
as receivers of these terrorist narratives, have a responsibility in how we interpret the 
affective performatives presented to us by historical events and the ideological 
impressions we insert into our culture through the possible worlds of the narratives that 
we construct. It is up to us to write a better narrative for the events of 9/11 and the 
conditions of contemporary American fear, one that leads to liberation rather than 
oppression, one that allows us, as Jameson states, “to wrest a realm of Freedom from a 
realm of Necessity” (The Political 19). 
With these periods of the fear narrative established, I can now give a brief 
example of how fear themes change over time by turning to a canonical example of a 
Victorian-influenced fear narrative in Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Black Cat” 
(1843). This narrative serves as a 19th century historical touchstone to contrast the 
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peculiarity and difference we find in the post-9/11 fear narratives that will be the focus of 
the rest of this study. True to the Jamesonian methodology of this study, I will analyze 
“The Black Cat” and all the narratives in this study by using contemporary scholarship 
that places the text in the concerns and cultural contexts of its own time of production, 
so as to highlight how fear themes have changed from then to after 9/11. Jameson also 
reminds us that thinking of narratives genealogically does not imply that there is a 
historical break between one period and others but rather a formal sedimentation that 
carries aspects of previous periods into its later iterations as residual elements co-
existing with newer formal inventions that update the fear narrative to the material and 
ideological concerns of its new historical context (The Political 138-45). From this 
perspective, it is not accurate to say that post-9/11 American fear narratives are entirely 
different than Poe’s Victorian-influenced American fear narrative. Instead, formal 
sedimentation means that post-9/11 texts have built from a base that contains the 
generic and thematic elements of not only the Victorian-influenced period but all its 
former and subsequent periods.  
In brief summary, “The Black Cat” is told through a retrospective first-person 
narration of a man sentenced to die tomorrow. It recounts the story of his downfall, 
beginning with his lifelong fondness for animals over humans, as the latter have been 
known to make fun of his “tenderness of heart” (Poe 209). He also tells of his marriage 
to his wife who was “not uncongenial” to his own disposition (210), and his fondness for 
his many pets, particularly his black cat named Pluto. Yet, the narrator takes to drinking 
and mutilates Pluto by gouging out his eye and later hanging the cat. When the 
narrator’s house burns down, one wall remains with what appears to be an engraved 
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image of “a gigantic cat” with a rope around its neck (212). Shortly thereafter, the 
narrator comes across a second cat that is strikingly similar to Pluto, and this cat follows 
him home. Yet its presence torments him, and when the cat nearly trips him down a 
flight of stairs, he attempts to strike it with an axe. However, his wife holds back his 
blow. Enraged, the narrator swings the axe into his wife’s skull, killing her instantly. 
Immediately, the narrator plans how to hide her corpse, deciding to put it in a wall of the 
house to brick and plaster her therein. When the police come to investigate, they seem 
unable to find any clue as to his wife’s disappearance, much to the glee of the narrator, 
who covertly celebrates his triumph over them by bragging about the soundness of the 
construction of his house as he knocks on the same wall which conceals his wife’s 
body. In response, a shriek emerges from the wall and the police tear it down find the 
black cat standing on the head of his wife’s corpse. The narrator realizes that he must 
have walled the cat in the tomb with his wife, allowing the cat’s howl to expose his crime 
and sentence him to the hangman.  
Most research on the narrative revolves around either the subjects or objects of 
fear in “The Black Cat”—such as the narrator’s fear of punishment, the narrator’s fearful 
act of murder, the narrator’s fear of the black cat, or the wife’s fear of the narrator—even 
as few ever directly discuss fear itself. In James W. Gargano’s oft-cited 1960 article, he 
interprets the story through the lens of symbolism, stating that the meanings of the 
characters, events, and settings convey their most coherent message when seen as a 
series of symbols that describe the narrator’s descent into evil and the loss of his moral 
senses, which culminates in him murdering his wife (“The Black” 172). In the 1970s 
through the 1990s, criticism often favored a psychoanalytic approach, such as in Ed 
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Piacentino’s 1998 article that constructs from the story a psychobiology to understand 
the motives behind the narrator’s murder of his wife (153-67)3. Susan Amper’s work in 
1992 sees the story as a lie, a deliberate cover-up, in which it is the reader’s job to look 
for clues to the real, underlying narrative of the murder of the narrator’s wife (485). In 
1993, Christopher Benfey draws from Wittgenstein to note how the killers in Poe’s 
stories, such as “The Black Cat” and “The Tell-Tale Heart,” essentially defend their own 
exceptionalism both by stressing their separateness from other people and by believing 
that their actions are secret from all others, even while they believe they understand and 
know the thoughts and experiences of others (Bloom 50). When either of these illusions 
begins to falter, they react with violence to maintain the fantasy, killing those that violate 
their sense of exceptionalism (50). Ann Bliss asserts in 2009 that “The Black Cat” is 
about the narrator’s failed attempts to mask his own femininity, which results in his 
escalating hypermasculine acts of violence and the ultimately the death of his wife (96). 
In 2014, Vicki Hester and Emily Segir look at the text through the lens of recent 
psychological research on psychopathy, noting how the narrator exhibits all of the 
symptoms of a psychopath, including impulsivity, shallow emotions, egocentric lack of 
behavior controls, caring only about the consequences as they apply to his self, blaming 
others for his own actions, being incapable of feeling guilt, and feeling no empathy for 
those around him (175-93). Still other articles approach the text through different 
disciplines, such as John Dern’s 2017 rhetorical analysis of how the language of the text 
uncovers rhetorical signals of the narrator’s hidden thoughts that surface despite his 
intentions to blame the murder on an external force, such as the perversity of the 
 
3 For other psychoanalytic interpretations of “The Black Cat,” see, for example, Rein (1960), Hoffman (1973), 
Reeder (1974), Crisman (1984), Silverman (1991), and Madden (1993).  
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human soul, alcohol, or the titular black cat (163-82). Dern performs this analysis by 
exposing how the narrator’s language conflates the black cat, especially the second 
one, with his wife (169). In 2019, Dewi Fatmawati et al. even look at the text through a 
linguistic lens to perform a “qualitative descriptive analysis” to uncover the patterns of 
thematic progression in the story, dissecting the text into clauses and recording the 
relations of these clauses (64-73). 
Despite their differences, most of these critical traditions often implicitly approach 
the story as centrally concerned with fear, whether it is the fear felt by the narrator or the 
fear felt by readers of the narrator or of his uncanny victimization. To interpret the 
narrative as a fear narrative, I will explicitly analyze “The Black Cat” through its 
contextualized manifestations of primary fear themes and their combinations into 
secondary fear themes to produce new meanings, ideologies, formal structures, and 
affectual potentialities. To do this, I will not conduct a close reading of the particular 
phrasings and techniques used in the narrative but instead I will focus our methodology 
on a larger, Jamesonian ideological reading of narrativity, focusing more on formal 
structures and their ideological and historical implications. It is important to note, 
though, that very few fear narratives ever include all ten fear narratives. Most only 
include a few or emphasize a couple over others. In “The Black Cat,” the most 
prominent primary fear themes that we will focus on include paranoia, contamination, 
and the internal/external threat.  
By looking at a historically contextualized understanding of “The Black Cat” we 
find that the narrative psychologizes its fear themes, opposed to how post-9/11 fear 
themes instead tend to focus on political/cultural content. As Joseph Stark explains, 
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during the 1830s-40s, America was influenced by the tumultuous events of Europe’s 
Industrial Revolution and its own nascent entry into an industrialist economy, which 
began changing the understanding of and relationship between religion and science. In 
the text, this ideological conflict between rationalism and the supernatural presents itself 
in several primary fear themes. First, we can see this in the primary fear theme of 
paranoia, as the narrator inconsistently attempts to blame his actions on an array of 
either internal threats or “external” supernatural forces working against him. In this, we 
discover that the narrator is far from reliable as his objects of blame and descriptions of 
events are not consistent (e.g., Bloom 53; Dern 174; Piacentino 153). As Hester and 
Segir state, “Though the narrator tries to blame alcohol, on the other hand, he ultimately 
blames Pluto [or the second cat] for his violent behavior” (188), and, by the end, he 
completely forgets an earlier attempt to blame it all on the “spirit of perverseness” (Poe 
211). As the Temperance Movement was gaining cultural momentum in the 1840s, this 
initial attempt to blame alcohol grasps for a convenient and all-too-easy suspect, while 
simultaneously evoking in the text the fearful connections between alcohol, domestic 
violence, and dissolution that this movement hoped to counter. Even while alcohol may 
at first seem to be a seemingly rational explanation of his actions, the narrator refers to 
his supposed alcoholism as his growing submission to “the Fiend Intemperance” (Poe 
210), positioning it as an internal condition inflected with supernatural devilry. Seen in 
this light, alcohol itself becomes the fear theme of the external threat ingested in order 
to contaminate the self and become an internal threat. Further, this use of paranoia 
couples with Stearns’s notion, mentioned above, of the precursor to the personalization 
of fear that existed in the Victorian-influenced era that could better be described as the 
125 
 
personal threat. While the post-9/11 personalization of fear typically rearticulates threats 
to society as threats to the self or one’s family, the threat of the Victorian-influenced era 
is directed, first and foremost, to the self and, possibly, to the family, without the 
narrative ever seeming to consider that the threat could also be directed toward society 
as a whole, as if all threats were immediately and essentially personal in nature. This 
focus on individual psychology and individual justice is characteristic of the narrative’s 
place in the movements of American transcendentalism and romanticism of its time, 
formal roots that the text foregrounds in its limited first-person focalization through the 
experiences related to us by the narrator. If there is a larger social threat at work in “The 
Black Cat,” its use of narration draws our attention away from such concerns, focusing 
only on the woes of the narrator dealing with what seem to be internal and supernatural 
threats and the possibility of these threats contaminating the self and the home. In this 
way, these transcendentalist elements urge the text toward psychologizing its fear 
themes rather than politicizing them, as was more often the case after 9/11.  
This personalized use of either internal or supernatural links to legitimate one’s 
paranoia differs from the typical form of paranoia we find in post-9/11 American fear 
narratives. In very general terms, these later narratives, influenced more by the Cold 
War fear narratives they build upon, tend to direct their paranoia toward more secular 
and external threats, such as the machinations of terrorists, an external enemy, secret 
governmental agencies, and big business greed that we see in narratives like Thomas 
Pynchon’s novel Bleeding Edge (2013), which we will analyze in the Chapter 5. Of 
course, exceptions to this post-9/11 generality abound as contemporary fear narratives 
continue to enact residual manifestations of religious and supernatural paranoia as 
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inclusions of formal sedimentations from the Victorian-influenced era, yet the cultural 
move in the twentieth century to secularism and to the concern with the “nation” as the 
entity that must fear threats has altered the typical form of paranoia encountered in the 
narrative today. 
As the primary object of the narrator’s blame, the titular black cat of the narrative, 
Pluto, is depicted as one of the most supernatural elements of the narrative. The cat 
itself evokes a host associations between black cats and superstitions of witches and 
witchcraft that the narrator’s wife makes explicit: “In speaking of [Pluto’s] intelligence, 
my wife, who at heart was not a little tinctured with superstition, made frequent allusion 
to the ancient popular notion, which regarded all black cats as witches in disguise” (Poe 
210). Yet, the cat also manifests as the fear theme of the transgressive creature when it 
seems to cross the boundaries of life and death to appear again as the second cat. This 
connection between the living cat and death is reinforced in the cat’s name, Pluto, which 
refers to the ruler of the underworld in Greek mythology, carrying with it infernal 
associations of death and judgment. The second cat also bears a white mark on its 
chest that the reader can connect to tales in popular American folklore of people or 
animals taking on white marks after being struck by lightning, being scared by a ghost, 
experiencing a close call with death, or otherwise being touched by death, either literally 
or figuratively. A similar obsession with a mark during the Victorian-influenced period 
can be found in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s short story “The Birth-Mark” (1943), in which a 
husband’s obsession with ridding his nearly physically perfect wife of her small red 
birthmark leads to him administering a potion that removes the mark but simultaneously 
kills her. In “The Black Cat,” the addition of this white mark on a black cat that uncannily 
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resembles the thought-to-be-dead Pluto, and the fact that the mark eventually solidifies 
into a shape of the gallows (a foreboding symbol of death), cements the second cat’s 
fearful violation of transgressing the categorical barriers between life and death. While 
we can see the legacy of Pluto reappear in narratives after the Victorian-influenced 
period, such as in the famous undead cat of Stephen King’s Late Cold War era novel 
Pet Semetary (1983), which was adopted into Mary Lambert’s filmic version in 1989 and 
remade as a post-9/11 film in 2019 by Kevin Kölsch, a much more common 
transgressive monster of post-9/11 fear narratives would be the zombie (which we will 
focus on in Chapter 6), an incarnation that the post-9/11 era typically strips of the 
supernatural implications we find in the black cat. Instead, as we will see, the 
transgressive and contaminating nature of the post-9/11 zombie is typically explained by 
a scientific apocalypse or left unexplained, revealing a shift away from religious 
causalities of the Victorian-influenced era to scientific causalities and ideologies 
underlying the worldview that tends to be more common in the post-9/11 era. 
Ultimately, the narrator’s unreliability undermines his excuses and points the 
blame for the murder squarely back at him to enact the fear theme of the internalization 
of the threat. In an article published in American Literature, John Clemen counters 
previous decontextualized readings of Poe to place the story in the political climate of 
the 1840s, noting how Poe’s short stories like “The Black Cat” engage in the 
controversy in England and America over the use of the insanity defense by accused 
murderers (624). From this perspective, the narrative’s contradiction between the 
rational and the supernatural presents an imaginary solution to the seemingly 
irreconcilable political issue of the times, an issue that has since come to resolve itself 
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under the accumulation of legal precedent and the development and continued 
legitimation of the field of psychology. However, “The Black Cat” resolves this conflict by 
undermining the insanity plea as little more than an attempt to erect flimsy excuses for 
what ultimately amounts to our own evil actions. As Stark states about this time period, 
“Evangelicals emphasized the power of the human will to overcome sin and crime…, 
while scientific examination narrowed the gap between the rational human and irrational 
animal, and thereby posited a kind of naturalistic determinism” (257). With the collapse 
of all of the excuses the narrator makes for his actions, in the end we realize that the 
underlying cause of his downfall turns out to be the machinations of his own psyche, a 
truth of which the narrator himself seems to be completely unaware. In the end, as Stark 
attests, the text offers us no satisfying answers to explain why the narrator killed his wife 
(262). Yet, rather than this resulting in a meaningless standoff, Stark states, “by 
depicting a motiveless murder whose actions cannot be sufficiently explained” the text 
places “difficulties in both scientific and religious thought and ironically uph[olds] the 
mysterious nature of the human will in a time dominated by intellectual rationalism” 
(255). In effect, the narrator’s own psyche becomes his own greatest threat, manifesting 
the deeper contradiction between rationalism and supernaturalism in Victorian-era 
society, so that insanity is not enough to rid the narrator of culpability. Yet, this assertion 
of the mystery of human nature and psychology is not enough to resolve the social 
conflict in the narrative. As Gargano states on the end of the narrative, “His swaggering 
confidence in the presence of the police represents, I feel, a blind trust in the power of 
his intellect to triumph over the superstitions which he feels are formulated in the moral 
code” (“The Black” 177). However, in the end the narrator’s attempts at rationalization, 
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even his attempts at creating a rational means of hiding his wife’s body, melt away in 
the narrative as what seem to be events beyond rational explanation result in the a 
supernatural justice brought about through the black cat’s howling, seemingly from 
beyond the grave. This can be read as a Victorian-era fear that the relatively new 
ideologies of rationalism would ultimately prove ineffective in the face of the established 
beliefs in the power of the supernatural, a doubt in the hegemonic transition towards 
rationalism. In contrast, after well over a century of cultural transition, in the post-9/11 
era, this sense of doubt in the ideology of rationalism has largely given way, as the two 
ideological forces rationalism and supernaturalism have either resolved into a largely 
secular culture or synthesized into a neoconservative hybrid of rationalism and religion. 
Of course, residual aspects of supernaturalism remain in modern culture, but the 
cultural crisis of the contradiction between these two ideologies has largely leveled out, 
making it no longer a focus in the concerns of hegemonic culture.  
The narrator’s apparent fear that his internalization of evil will result from the sins 
of his own actions as they contaminate his soul is a common convention in the 
Victorian-influenced fear narrative, in which unholy temptation (here, perhaps, 
embodied in the black cat) pulls the protagonist toward the damnation of their soul and 
their eternal ruin. Such fears of the theme of contamination draw on the cultural 
foundation of not only Catholicism but Puritan Protestantism that carried so much 
weight in this era. For instance, on the killing of his cat, the narrator states, “[I] hung it 
because I knew that in so doing I was committing a sin—a deadly sin that would 
jeopardize my immortal soul as to place it—if such a thing were possible—even beyond 
the reach of the infinite mercy of the Most Merciful and Most Terrible God” (Poe 211). 
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We can see this fear of the contamination of sin in numerous other works of the time, 
particularly in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s short story “Young Goodman Brown” (1835), in 
which the protagonist’s walk in the woods at night leads to an encounter with a man 
carrying a serpent-shaped staff, symbolizing the Edenic temptation of sin. The results of 
this encounter leave the protagonist forever altered and cynical by the loss of his 
religious faith. The Victorian-influenced fear of sinful contamination also works in 
conjunction with the theme of transgression, as it is the character’s act of transgressing 
the laws established by their religion that amounts to sin itself.  
Combined in this way, the themes of the internalization of the threat, 
contamination, and transgression become the secondary fear theme in Victorian-
influenced fear narratives of sinful contamination. While the concern over such 
contamination still exists in some narratives after 9/11, our largely secular modern 
culture tends to transmute this concern with sin into questions of personal ethics and 
accountability. Alternately, it can also, at times, manifest as the fear of ideological 
contamination in which you discover that you have been tempted into transgressing the 
boundaries of your American subjectivity to unwittingly become a terrorist yourself, often 
due to not much more than your encounter with or your exposure to terrorists. Similar to 
these Victorian-influenced fear narratives, the psychological internalization of the threat 
in which one becomes one’s own worst enemy is far from uncommon in post-9/11 fear 
narratives. Indeed, Jess Walter’s novel The Zero (2006) is a prime example of this fear 
theme that we will analyze in the post-9/11 era in Chapter 5. However, in The Zero, the 
narrator’s fear of himself is blamed on the more secular contamination of social and 
political forces as trauma resulting from his living through the apocalyptic aftermath of 
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the collapse of the Twin Towers splits his mind into two personae, one plotting against 
the other. In the post-9/11 American fear narrative, the internalization of the threat 
operates in social or cultural terms rather than through the spiritual concerns of the 
Victorian-influenced fear narrative that we find in Poe and Hawthorne. This 
secularization of sinful contamination can be found in a variety of post-9/11 narratives, 
such as the protagonists of Zack Snyder’s Dawn of the Dead (2004) themselves 
becoming zombies and Ahmad’s conversion into a terrorist in John Updike’s novel 
Terrorist (2006). 
Last, “The Black Cat” also echoes another secondary fear theme of the Victorian-
inspired era in its depiction of premature burial. This theme combines the themes of 
entrapment, often within a coffin or sarcophagus, with a sense of exclusion often 
expressed as a desperate feeling of loneliness and isolation in the grave. In the 
narrative, his wife’s burial in a wall calls forth these strong fears of premature death. 
While not as central to this story as it is in some of Poe’s other works, such as “The Tell-
Tale Heart” in which the narrator hears the heartbeat of the dead man buried beneath 
the floorboards, or “The Fall of the House of Usher” in which Madeline of Usher actually 
rises from her grave, “The Black Cat” evokes the secondary fear theme of premature 
burial as the cry from the wife’s tomb reveals her location in the end and evokes 
thoughts of entrapped, living people screaming out from their graves. While we see this 
secondary fear theme resurrected recently in horror narratives such as Corin Hardy’s 
2018 film The Nun, in most post-9/11 American fear narratives this sense of being 
separated from the world by the wall of the grave has transformed from this Victorian-
flavored personal association with the individual into walls that divide whole social 
132 
 
groups, such as the walls used to divide survivors from zombies in apocalyptic zombie 
narratives of the post-9/11 era that we will analyze in Chapter 6, such as we find in the 
novels by Colson Whitehead’s Zone One (2011), Cherie Priest’s Boneshaker (2010), 
and Justin Cronin’s The Passage (2010). 
In summary, utilizing “The Black Cat” as a contrastive example, we can see that 
the primary fear themes of the Victorian-influenced fear narrative have evolved in the 
post-9/11 era largely by their secularization and a move from a focus on the individual 
psychology to the social psychology. As a result, post-9/11 narratives stress the social, 
political, and apocalyptic traumas over the Victorian tendency toward more personal, 
psychological, and individual threats. In this way, the personalized paranoia in “The 
Black Cat” that is linked to internal and supernatural external threats becomes a post-
9/11 paranoia based on external and secular threats often portrayed as operating at the 
national rather than the personal level. Supernaturally transgressive creatures such as 
the black cat have been transmuted into secularized zombies that are both 
transgressive and contaminative. The internalization of the threat through sinful 
contamination felt by Poe’s narrator on psychological, religious, and personal levels 
becomes ideological after 9/11, often tied to the experience of trauma involving the 
American apocalypse of 9/11, whether depicted explicitly or allegorically. Last, the 
secondary fear theme of premature burial in the Victorian-influenced era that combined 
entrapment and exclusion has become the post-9/11 wall that separates large groups 
from one another. 
With these formal sedimentations of the seven historical periods of the American 
fear narrative in mind, we will next turn our attention to directly analyzing the post-9/11 
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American fear narrative in different genres and media forms. I will apply the Jamesonian 
methodology of the three horizons of interpretation to specific texts in order to discover 
how the post-9/11 American fear narrative manifests primary fear themes and their 
combinations into secondary fear themes on a formal, ideological, and generic level. In 
the next chapter, I will turn to four fear narratives from the genre of the 9/11 novel, 
noting how these texts combine a particular pair of fear themes as their central focus. 
Yet, as we will see, numerous fear themes can co-exist within a narrative, providing a 
deep wellspring of creative potential, as the fear narrative grows, wilts, and reforms 
processually in an ever-changing cultural formation that affectively, and hence formally, 














POST-9/11 AMERICAN FEAR NARRATIVES IN LITERARY FICTION: THE 9/11 
NOVEL 
 
This chapter will explore the fear narrative as it appears in post-9/11 literary 
fiction, in particular the genre of the 9/11 novel itself, whose at least initial genealogy is 
outlined by Arin Keeble (5-11). For our purposes, the 9/11 novel is one that is either 
about 9/11 itself, whether before, during, or after, or features 9/11 in some way. 
According to Keeble, the first phase of the 9/11 novel is the experimental early 
depictions of the event in fiction “marked by unorthodox formal qualities and strained 
efforts to balance references to history and individual trauma,” such as in In the Shadow 
of No Towers (2003) by Art Spiegelman and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
(2005) by Jonathan Safran Foer (14). The second phase of the domesticated novel runs 
from 2005-2007 and consists of the novels that novelist Pankaj Mishra and scholars 
Richard Gray, Michael Rothberg (“Seeing Terror” 129-30), and Bimbishar Irom (520) 
have criticized as domesticating 9/11, pulling the focus to personal and relationship 
dramas that strip 9/11 of its political and international meanings and implications, 
neutralizing “the unfamiliar into familiar structures” (Gray, After the Fall 30). Keeble 
notes that these novels seem to attempt “a return to normality” after the attacks and 
include Don Delillo’s Falling Man (2007) and Claire Messud’s The Emperor’s Children 
(2006) (14). Interestingly, Keeble argues that the third phase consists of the 9/11 novels 
published after hurricane Katrina, which he describes as a move towards 9/11 texts that 
are overtly politicized and characterized by dissent and reconciliation (15). These 
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political novels include Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist (2007) and Amy 
Waldman’s The Submission (2011), the latter of which we will examine in detail later in 
this chapter. Yet, as we will see in this chapter, the creation of these three phases 
(experimental, domestic, and political) tends to create a mindset of overgeneralizations 
about the 9/11 novel genre that overlooks outliers and texts that defy this topical 
chronology.  
Overall, though, by starting with fear narratives from 9/11 novels, I can establish 
a baseline of post-9/11 themes as they have been inspired by literary fiction texts 
operating under what Steve Neale calls an ideology of realism (48). The ideology of 
realism is a concept that he draws from Tzvetan Todorov’s understanding of realism, 
which “as an ideology can partly be defined by its refusal to recognize the reality of its 
own generic status, or to acknowledge its own adherence to a type of generic 
verisimilitude” (Neale 48). Jameson would likely agree with Todorov here, as he states, 
“Realism…is a hybrid concept, in which an epistemological claim (for knowledge or 
truth) masquerades as an aesthetic ideal” (Antinomies 5). While Jameson may be 
referring to the nineteenth century literary movement and Todorov to a more 
contemporary sense of its use in film, the two express the same sentiment: creating a 
text and claiming it to be a depiction of the Real is an advancement of a particular 
version of reality, one soaking with political, ideological, and moral claims, but not one 
that depicts reality “as it really is” in some sort of objective sense. Realism, in any of its 
forms and incarnations is a move to assert a version of reality in the eternal 
epistemological and political struggle to maintain or gain control of reality. By starting in 
this chapter with analyzing 9/11 novels as monomodal fear narrative texts, I can, for the 
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time being, remove the formal complications of multimodality to focus on the themes I 
have found in 9/11 texts at large. Then, in future chapters I will broaden my scope to 
multimodal texts in other genres to see how these aspects affect the nature and 
execution of my proposed fear themes and their combination into secondary fear 
themes in post-9/11 fear narratives. 
This chapter will explore political, social, and historical implications uncovered 
through the formal contradictions present in post-9/11 American fear narratives of 
literary fiction. In particular, it will filter these analyses through primary fear themes in 
order to better explore and explicate these concepts and to better understand the 
novels as fear narratives and what this means in regards to their ideological functionality 
as responses to 9/11, noting how they engage in cultural work by often simultaneously 
perpetuating and constructing both oppressive and Utopian cultural messages.  
My approach to textual selection throughout my project will be to focus my 
analysis on a few representative examples of specific trends that I have found within 
fear narratives of the overall 9/11 novel genre, peripherally tracing other texts as 
contextual, comparative or problematizing examples to enrich the analysis. As such, the 
analyses of these novels are not meant to be comprehensive (were that this was even 
possible) or even especially multifaceted, but are meant to use Jameson’s three 
horizons approach to focus on the analysis of a particular fear theme or related set of 
themes as they appear in the narrative and the formal techniques used to articulate 
those themes in order to depict or evoke fear. As such, this chapter will focus on four 
9/11 novels that each serve as especially apt examples of various primary fear themes. 
First, in Jess Walter’s The Zero (2006), I will explore the novel through the lenses of the 
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themes of trauma and entrapment, as, after experiencing 9/11 first hand, the 
protagonist, Remy, repeatedly experiences gaps in his memory, which he cannot seem 
to escape, all while attempting to come to terms with his darker urges that seem to take 
on a life of their own after the terrorist attack. Second, I will turn to Thomas Pynchon’s 
Bleeding Edge (2014) to explore the formal manifestations of the primary fear themes of 
paranoia and the personalization of fear. It is a novel concerning events both leading up 
to and following 9/11 that are filled with conspiracy theories, invisible and largely 
unidentifiable threats, and fears of the imminent incident, all somehow targeted at the 
protagonist or her family rather than at the nation as a whole. Both of these first two 
novels also allow us to establish some foundational understanding of the aspects of the 
fear narrative as it is authored by the dominant social group, i.e., white males.  
To help put these texts in contrast with those authored by marginalized groups, 
the next two novels will be by an Iranian-American woman and a white woman, 
respectively. This will begin our exploration of the differences of fear narratives 
produced by different social groups and the effects of power on narrative expressions of 
fear. The third novel will be Porochista Khakpour’s Sons and Other Flammable Objects 
(2007), in which we will focus on the themes of exclusion and contamination, as the 
novel follows an Iranian-American character at odds with his hybrid position between his 
heritage and the only nation he calls home. The fourth and last novel is Amy Waldman’s 
The Submission (2011), in which we will explore the dichotomous theme of the 
internal/external threat as the novel relates the experiences of protagonist Mohammad 
Khan, an American Muslim attempting to create a memorial for the victims of 9/11 only 
to face the othering of Islamophobia that flared in America after the attacks, when the 
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lines between the citizen and the threat began to blur for many Americans and we 
turned on each other, often across racial lines. In all of these 9/11 novel fear narratives, 
as we will see, generic contradictions or mixtures are key to how the fear themes act 
ideologically and symbolically to construct imaginary relations to 9/11. 
 
TRAUMA AND ENTRAPMENT IN WALTER’S THE ZERO 
If we see 9/11 as a traumatic event, which is, perhaps, the most common way 
that scholars and the public have approached the subject, we can generally agree with 
Kristiann Versluys’s assertion that 9/11 “is a limit event that shatters the symbolic 
resources of the culture and defeats the normal process of meaning making and 
semiosis” (1). While many have argued against the post-9/11 slogan “Everything has 
changed,” it would be hard to deny that many also felt this way through some 
experience of trauma after the event, and for a variety of reasons. Delving into this, 
Susan Faludi gives voice to this affective sense of disruption: 
The intrusions of September 11 broke the dead bolt on our protective myth, the 
illusion that we are masters of our security, that our might makes our homeland 
impregnable, that our families are safe in the bower of their communities and our 
women and children safe in the arms of their men. (15) 
While Faludi utilizes this insight to analyze the American myth of invincibility (18), this 
sense of 9/11 as a culturally disruptive event has even wider-reaching applications to 
understanding American culture as well. Essentially, 9/11 functioned as an affective 
performative that could not be interpreted and understood via the extant ideologies of 
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the time. Explained in another way through Jamesonian terms, 9/11, as an affective 
event in American culture, was a felt intensity that defied linguistic expression and the 
capacity to be categorized into the established, named emotions available, emotions 
that, by being previously nominalized into their socially accepted forms, objectified 
ideological content that no longer addressed the situation at hand (Antinomies 29-32). 
From this perspective, 9/11 left America ideologically adrift, seemingly entrapped in a 
traumatic state that our established beliefs and myths, which had previously served so 
well as the foundation for the pre-9/11 American identity, were unable to incorporate 
into the narrative of what it meant to be an American citizen and nation. 
This spurred a cultural effort to adapt and replace our failing ideologies with new 
ones that addressed the material conditions of the times, and, more implicitly, the 
trauma 9/11 inflicted on American ideology itself. As such, the years after 9/11 were a 
destabilized arena of cultural struggle, of clashing dialectic contradictions, all seeking to 
create a new, relative sense of equilibrium, of attaining a hegemonic narrative through 
which we could once again pull together an effective American identity that addressed 
the material conditions of our times. In narratives produced at this time, we frequently 
capture instances of these struggles, often failed attempts at cultural synthesis, but 
each pointing toward a diverse range of cultural and political potentialities. Judith Butler 
notes the historic potentiality of the moment, and the direction that these potentials 
ended up taking: “It was my sense in the fall of 2001 that the United States was missing 
an opportunity to redefine itself as part of a global community when, instead, it 
heightened nationalist discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended 
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constitutional rights, and developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship” 
(Precarious Life xi).  
Capturing this sense of historic potentialities, The Zero, by Jess Walter is a 
useful example of the primary themes of trauma and, to a lesser degree, entrapment in 
the post-9/11 American fear narrative. The Zero entraps Remy in his own trauma, as he 
seems to lose his agency or ability to change the events around him that seem to be 
determined by his other personality during the gaps. Further, through most of the novel, 
Remy can see no way out or any way to work through his trauma as he, apparently, has 
no access to causation and thus no way to place his trauma in a larger narrative of his 
life. As we will note, Remy’s entrapment also seems to restrain him from any agency to 
act morally and politically, which has interesting ideological implications. 
It is worth noting that this novel is often excluded from the academic canon of the 
9/11 novel and, being published in 2006, defies Keeble’s chronology of the genre, which 
should have placed it in the domestic phase, even if, as we will see, it would better fit in 
the political phase that followed. The Zero uses extradiegetic third-person narration 
focalized through only the more innocent of the two personalities of Brian Remy, a New 
York City police officer and survivor of the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), 
who is left traumatized in the ever-present sense of life after-the-event, after it 
happened. The narrative begins with Remy waking up on the floor after he may have 
attempted suicide or perhaps just had an accident while cleaning his gun. The problem 
is that Remy can’t remember how he ended up inflicting a bullet wound to his head, and 
this is only the beginning of his memory problems. He increasingly experiences “gaps” 
wherein he does not remember what he has been doing. Yet, the narrative reveals in 
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hints that between the gaps Remy is continuing to act with what seems to be a different 
personality, leaving our protagonist scrambling to figure out what the other Remy, the 
novel’s chief antagonist, has been doing in the intervening time. In his struggle over 
personal agency, the protagonist-Remy also deals with a host of other problems 
including “macular degeneration” and “vitreous detachment” of the eye that increasingly 
impair his vision with “floaters” that mirror the novel’s opening scene of paper falling 
from the sky after the attacks on the WTC (Walter 26). On top of that, his own son tells 
everyone that Remy died in the attacks (31), and his psychic split makes for a 
complicated romantic relationship with April Selios. All of this is set in conflict with the 
actions of his other that lives on during his gaps and is omitted from the narrative’s 
discourse except via the clues that Remy discovers along the way. This antagonist-
Remy seems to be heading a counterterrorist organization dedicated to collecting all of 
the lost paper from the rubble of the WTC and following the fractured clues it finds to 
track down terrorist threats. Further, this villain has selected April as a possible lead to a 
terrorist plot and is sleeping with her for information. However, rather than finding 
legitimate terrorists, this organization competes with the FBI and CIA to turn innocent 
Arab Americans into fake terrorists so that the organizations can bust them for their own 
personal gain. In short, in creating a terrorist cell led by the character they codename as 
Jaguar, they justify their continued existence. As Duvall notes, “Jaguar represents the 
Boss’s [an apparent stand-in for former Mayor Giuliani] freelancing to ensure that there 
will be some credible minor terrorist threat that will show Americans how they are being 
protected from major terrorist attacks” (291). At its core, The Zero is a postmodernist 
novel that utilizes its strong sense of conflict in a hybrid-thriller plotline mixed with 
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generous amounts of parody and irony that satirizes post-9/11 culture and politics, 
recovering our own implication in global terrorism and oppression that many Americans 
feel separated from through complex layers of American exceptionalism. 
Of course, there are a number of other 9/11 novels focused on trauma that I 
could have selected for this study, but few offer the ideological breadth of the 
exploration of trauma offered by The Zero. Further, at present, a select cadre of novels 
have attracted heavy critical attention, and have thereby formed a sense of a canon of 
9/11 novels, much to the detriment of numerous overlooked texts, such as The Zero, 
and, I would argue, much to the detriment of the study of the 9/11 novel itself. For 
instance, in a popular anthology Mitchum Huehls reviews two popular texts, Jonathan 
Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and Art Spiegelman’s In the 
Shadow of No Towers, as portraying 9/11 trauma to “chronicle different attempts to 
mend the relationship between temporal experience and consciousness” (42). Perhaps 
even more of a popular choice is DeLillo’s Falling Man, but this novel only depicts the 
experience of being trapped in the experience of trauma. As Versluys notes on the 
novel, “In psychoanalytic terms, it describes pure melancholia without the possibility of 
mourning. The endless reenactment of trauma presented in Falling Man allows for no 
accommodation or resolution” (20). In short, Falling Man is an excellent case study in 
the affective experience of trauma, but it offers no sense of agency, means of therapy, 
or a sense of the future beyond the trauma; in Falling Man, we are only the victims of 
trauma. In many ways, this fear narrative is an expression of a felt state, the affective 
experience of melancholia, and in this it is a notable exploration. Yet, as an exemplar of 
the ideological function of the fear theme of trauma, it offers limited value, as it does not, 
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itself, include the ideological interpretation necessary to depict or lead toward working 
through the traumatic experience, other than implicitly to say that no such interpretation 
is possible. 
This limitation of scope is part of why these 9/11 novels of trauma have been 
described as constituting the domestic era of the genre, yet even this criticism may 
prove only a generalization based on selective academic canonization. On the 
Mishra/Gray/Rothberg debate mentioned above that proposes what they deem to be the 
disappointing domestication of the 9/11 novel, John N. Duvall and Robert P. Marzec 
state, “Gray and Rothberg are both unwilling to look very closely at what 9/11 fiction 
sets out to do because they are both sure that they know what 9/11 fiction ought to be 
doing” (384). Rather than seeing the problem of domestication as intrinsic to the texts, 
Duvall and Marzec imply that the focus of 9/11 literature scholarship on trauma theory is 
itself what has steered this very same scholarship away from analyzing 9/11 novels that 
would better explore the political aspects of 9/11; it is the focus on trauma theory itself 
that has pushed the scholarship towards the personal and domestic experiences of 
particular texts (385). As such, this unified hypothesis of the domestication of the genre 
only works if we restrict our analysis to the same works that have attracted the bulk of 
academic attention. Yet, other more overlooked 9/11 novels during this period certainly 
exist. As Duvall and Marzec state, Falling Man and Foer’s novel “have already become 
hypercanonical in the discussion of 9/11 fiction…[and] it is time to look at other fiction of 
9/11 in the future” (394). 
The Zero is itself one example of a 9/11 novel largely ignored in critical 
discussion, but one that has much to offer, especially through a three horizons 
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interpretation. Duvall and Marzec describe The Zero as offering “paranoid plot and 
characters” and “political and domestic satire” (385). As such, the novel extends the 
exploration of the theme of trauma into the individualistic and domestic concerns of its 
canonical contemporaries, but it also connects these aspects to collective and political 
horizons as well. According to Duvall, “Even what appears in The Zero as overtly 
domestic ultimately returns us to ethical problems of the geopolitical and the war on 
terror” (“Homeland” 287). As such, at the first horizon, the novel uses the formal solution 
of the “gap” in order to resolve the contradiction between the thriller and postmodern 
satire novel, allowing the narrative to be both mysterious/suspenseful and 
parodic/satirical. While thrillers typically use gaps to heighten suspense with ellipses 
and paralipses, postmodern novels often use gaps to disrupt realism, allowing for the 
defamiliarization of the familiar to enable cultural critique through satire, parody, and 
pastiche. The Zero combines these uses of the gap to disrupt the ideology of realism 
common in the 9/11 novel by stripping the narrative of its ability to claim or project 
objectivity by highlighting the limitations of the traumatized individual as focalizer. Seen 
at the second horizon of interpretation, the gaps express an ideologeme of post-9/11 
innocence through trauma, one which the novel both parodies and endorses. In this 
ideologeme, our post-9/11 traumatic state enables and justifies a sense of innocence 
from all moral responsibility for our actions, an innocence that operates through an 
obscured sense of etiological understanding, the spectatorial passivity of the citizen as 
the virtual imperial grunt, and a reformulation of the established national fantasy of 
American exceptionalism. Essentially, trauma frees one from moral obligation, and, 
when entrapped in this condition, it frees one from political and personal agency as well. 
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At the third horizon, we see the contradictions of these two genres at once perpetuating 
the ideologeme of innocence by stressing the impossibility of political and moral agency, 
while simultaneously critiquing innocence through trauma by utilizing fear to motivate 
the reader to act before we lose all ability to change the direction of American culture 
after 9/11. 
At the first horizon of interpretation, then, perhaps the most conspicuous formal 
invention of The Zero is its use of gaps. In the discourse of the text, these gaps are 
indicated through a double-space scene break and often the use of dashes to denote 
the abruptness of the interruption on Remy’s consciousness. In narratological terms, 
these gaps are ellipses, in which, as Chatman states, “the discourse halts, though time 
continues to pass in the story” (70). As such, these ellipses serve as temporal 
disruptions that omit important sequences of Remy’s life, leaving the character often 
feeling confused and lost. In this way, they have a dual-purpose as paralipses, “where 
deletions are not intervening events but rather components of the very situation 
unfolding” (65). Overall, the gaps are a formal ideological resolution of the text’s 
fundamental generic contradiction of marrying a thriller novel with a postmodern novel, 
since gaps are conventional formal elements of both thrillers and postmodern narratives 
but they function differently in each genre. In The Zero, they allow the narrative to be 
both suspenseful and satirical simultaneously. 
As James Scott Bell notes, “In a thriller, the feeling is more like a vice closing on 
the Lead. And the events get tighter and tighter, threatening the Lead in some drastic 
way” (219). This increasing forward momentum of the thriller novel leads to a climactic 
scene that is often a showdown with an opponent of some kind, creating a strong 
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tendency toward linear narratives fed with ample uses of suspense, a delicate epistemic 
tension created by the concealing and revealing of information that is often important to 
the wellbeing of the characters with which the reader has established a sympathetic 
bond. Rather than only using scene breaks in the typical, elliptical way to follow Alfred 
Hitchcock’s axiom that “a good story [is] life, with the dull parts taken out” (Bell 20), 
Walter often uses these gaps as paralipses to conceal important information from the 
reader, thereby heightening suspense.  
Yet, as a postmodern novel, the gaps add layers of irony, ambiguity, and 
indeterminacy as the two points in time that each gap conjoins are often brought 
together in disorienting or humorous ways that ideologically and tonally disrupt the 
affective experience of the thriller novel, allowing for the injection of satire. The gaps 
even provoke a momentary sensation of the confused, reified amalgamation created by 
pastiche, even if this tension is slowly resolved as Remy comes to understand his new 
surroundings and the intervening events of the gap. For instance, at one point when 
Remy is in bed with April, it goes from “Remy reached out and stroked—” to “THE MAN 
was in his fifties, tall, thin, and aristocratic, with an expensive haircut and braces on his 
teeth” (Walter 103). Later, in a moment of juxtaposed disorientation, Remy has a 
contemplative conversation with Jaguar that ends, “Remy looked up, but the man’s car 
was gone, and the next thought he had was—,” which transitions into, “SLIDING, 
CLUTCHING, hands and toes clenched, hail streaking behind his eyelids, Remy woke 
in a gasp of stale air, claustrophobic, strapped in, his face pressed against a cold round 
window” (129). Anticlimactically and sardonically, it turns out that he has only awakened 
after falling asleep at a window seat on a plane, the hail streaks only his familiar floating 
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tissue from the macular degeneration that he always sees when he closes his eyes. 
Yet, the abrupt transition leaves him disoriented, like waking from a dream or switching 
the channels on a television, metaphors used repeatedly in the novel to describe the 
experience of the gaps (103, 235, 325). 
Further, Walter uses these gaps in Remy’s memories as formal representations 
of his symptoms of trauma. This use of the fractured narrative to denote a protagonist’s 
trauma or psychological deterioration has a long tradition in American narratives 
including Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969) and, in a different but productive 
way, Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996) and its movie adaptation directed by David 
Fincher (1999). While these examples may arguably not qualify as fear narratives, as 
they use the trope of the fractured narrative to focus more on the amelioration of fear 
and anxiety through an atemporal sense of narrativization (“So it goes”) or the 
psychological struggle for the release from socially ingrained inhibitions placed on late 
capitalist masculinity, respectively, Walter adapts the trope to explore the frightful and 
traumatized fracture of the American psyche after 9/11. When the omission of parts of 
Remy’s memories and actions are coupled with his increasingly degenerating and 
impaired vision, these two physical symptoms create what Duvall would call a condition 
of “serial ignorance” and “an ironically impaired point of view” (284). With these 
conditions embodied in Remy, the novel implies that Americans after 9/11 have 
increasingly been losing their ability to perceive and understand, much less control, 
events in the world around them. 
On a formal level, though, this implies how the gaps allow the disruption of the 
ideology of realism common in the 9/11 novel. The gaps strip realism of its claim toward 
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objectivity by using the traumatized individual as focalizer in order destabilize the belief 
that reality is universally experienced by all in the same way. As such, trauma 
problematizes the notion of a single sense of objective reality as it alters the experience 
of reality on a subjective level. Remy, as a result of his particular traumatic symptoms, 
seems to experience the storyworld differently than any of the other characters in the 
novel, each of whom struggle with symptoms of their own, hinting at a variety of 
subjective and conflicting experiences of the events in the narrative.    
This individualization of trauma pulls us into the second horizon, wherein the 
gaps can be re-interpreted as formal representations of the ideologeme of post-9/11 
American innocence through trauma. This is an illusory concept in which exceptional 
trauma enables and justifies a sense of innocence freed from the moral responsibility for 
one’s actions. We can access this ideologeme by analyzing the narrative’s characters 
as ideologues, particularly in Remy’s two ideological stances that are enacted in his two 
personalities. 
In that pursuit, if we read Remy as a representation of the American “everyman” 
after 9/11, a popular reading of the character, then Remy, according to Duvall:  
[R]epresents the failure of American citizens to credit what otherwise should be 
obvious—a complicity with government policies, most notably the Patriot Act, that 
curtail the civil rights of all Americans, but most particularly those of Arab 
Americans, in the name of making the US safe from future terrorist plots. (285)  
Remy, in this light, represents the post-9/11 state of American citizenship of the 
“Everyman of American political blindness” (285). Of course, I would argue that Duvall is 
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making a gross overgeneralization in calling any character an “Everyman,” not to 
mention that this term can lead to a conspicuous gender bias. While no single character 
can or should be seen to encompass all Americans’ experience on anything without 
threatening to engulf the multitude of divergent, subjective experiences in America after 
9/11 into some hegemonic and, hence, oppressive and proscriptive form, Remy does 
stand in as representing an experience that, perhaps, was felt in one way or another by 
many Americans, whether man, woman, or otherwise. With this caveat firmly in mind, 
returning to Duvall, we can probe into this contradiction even more productively:  
Remy’s divided identity also points to something even more uncomfortable: in 
order to feel secure in our consumer society, we perhaps secretly desire and 
unknowingly support what we think we oppose. Remy is but the latest in a long 
line of American Adams, guilty precisely because of his innocence. (285)  
At times, the protagonist-Remy attempts to resist the pull of the narrative, either through 
denial, medication, or active resistance to the actions of the antagonist-Remy, only to 
repeatedly submit to the inertia of events to which he seems to morally object.  
For instance, in one important scene, Remy accompanies the antagonist-Remy’s 
counterterrorism partner Markham to a freighter in international waters where a terrorist 
suspect, Assan, an Arab American citizen taken from his home in the middle of the night 
with no charges given, is being tortured for information. Remy, finally, decides to do 
something, to act against the horrors initiated by the antagonist-Remy, and cuts Assan’s 
restraints, taking him to a boat to escape. However, when Assan opens up to the 
sympathetic Remy, they realize that the boat was actually taking them in a wide loop 
back to the freighter. Here, the boat’s pilot praises Remy’s amazing interrogation skills 
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and Markham waits to receive the two of them and any information that Remy has 
found. Rather than continuing to resist, or to put up any resistance at all, Remy gives up 
and hands over the information to Markham. In this moment, we see protagonist-
Remy’s complicity, albeit reluctantly, to the horrors perpetrated in the name of 
counterterrorism that his antagonist personality has initiated. It seems the “good” Remy 
is not entirely innocent after all. 
These gaps indicate, however, not just ignorance in the sense of epistemic gaps, 
but end up causing etiological gaps in Remy’s awareness, as, at times, he seems to 
know some of the details of the moments of his life that were skipped, but he 
consistently does not know the causes of his present state or the events taking place in 
his life. For instance, when he finds himself drinking coffee at his ex-wife Carla’s house 
(Walter 26-7), he has no idea what caused him to make the visit. This is much to Carla’s 
frustration as it turns out he is there to ask his son why he told his school that Remy had 
died in the WTC attacks (30-1), a subject Carla has to bring up, even though it should 
have been broached by Remy himself, had he any memory of the causes of his present 
situation. Other situations without a cause that Remy encounters include when he 
discovers that he is in a field apparently staking out a woman living in a distant house 
(196), when he wakes up naked in bed with April’s boss (200), and when he repeatedly 
finds himself in his car distantly watching his son leave his ex-wife’s house for reasons 
unknown (275).  
Yet, the lack of etiological structure is perhaps even more apparent in the 
storyworld observed by Remy. As Remy reads missing person signs of 9/11 victims in 
New York street windows, the narrative uses implicit narration to peer into what appears 
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to be his thoughts: “Some of the notes were pleas for mercy, as if the missing had been 
kidnapped and might be released if the kidnapper found out they had two children, or 
had just overcome cancer” (72). Later, when looking through scraps of paper collected 
from the WTC rubble, he finds “a ledger sheet with several columns of numbers, 
although the top row had been burned off, so he couldn’t see what the numbers referred 
to” (98). In this scene, he has the results of the numbers but no way to understand their 
origins or causes in order to give them meaning. These, and other instances, imply that 
these gaps are, in part, disruptions of etiological reasoning that extend beyond Remy, 
becoming a collective condition of post-9/11 experience, a traumatic symptom felt by 
many. 
As such, the gaps function ideologically to both explain and excuse Remy’s and, 
by extension, American culture’s post-9/11 lack of understanding. Just as the novel 
depicts Remy as not being at fault for his complicity in the boat scene described above, 
these gaps in etiological reasoning explain and excuse traumatized Americans for their 
actions after 9/11. On an ideological level, it asks the reader: how can we blame trauma 
victims if they make terrible decisions, such as attacking the wrong countries, turning on 
Arab American citizens, or sacrificing freedoms for increased security? Essentially, it 
asserts that the traumatic condition affords them a position of seemingly impeccable 
innocence, exempting them from the consequences of their own actions. In this sense, 
the novel implies that traumatized American citizens, like Remy, had no access to 
causation and thus could not narrativize their experience to cure themselves of their 
trauma, entrapping them in a condition wherein they could not even understand what 
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had caused the traumatic events to occur. How could we find them at fault for their 
subsequent actions? 
Entrapped in this ideological state of innocence, Remy and many post-9/11 
American citizens lost much of their sense of agency, as without having access to the 
underlying causation of events arising around them, they often had to work under the 
assumption that these disjointed events would simply have to take care of themselves. 
When combined with the media coverage of military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
this created a sense that citizens should be passive spectators to the violence (Pease 
173). This instituted a model of citizenship that lacked an ability to take responsibility 
for, or even to be concerned about, the state of the world in which one lives, therefore 
further deferring accountability for one’s actions. In some respects, this resembles 
Lauren Berlant’s observed phenomenon of the infantile citizen as an enactment of 
national identity. As Berlant states, “democracies can also produce a special form of 
tyranny that makes citizens like children, infantilized, passive, and overdependent on 
the ‘immense and tutelary power’ of the state” (The Queen 27). Building on Berlant, 
Takacs notes how after 9/11 the cultural push towards identifying with the soldier in the 
narrative, and the creation of an either-you-are-with-us-or-against-us dichotomy (i.e., 
American citizen/terrorist) mingled with Berlant’s already established infantile citizen to 
create what Roger Stahl calls a “virtual-citizen soldier” (Terrorism TV 26). From here, 
Takacs notes how this identification with “the noble grunt” promoted a military culture 
that naturalized American imperialism in the middle east, transforming our sense of 
citizenship into the “virtual imperial grunt” (145). This evolution of the subjecthood of the 
American citizen and of the national identity denotes our acceptance of the ideology of 
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innocence and the stripping away of our agency as citizens, and it directs us toward our 
uncomfortable complicity with the current state of the world that Duvall finds satirized in 
The Zero. In this way, the novel asserts that the post-9/11 citizen, like Remy, is blind 
and unaware of what their actions, left forgotten in the gaps of life, are producing, and 
innocently surprised and not to be deemed at fault when undesirable consequences 
arise. Remy’s trauma and split-personalities represent a fundamental contradiction in 
the post-9/11 American conscience, one that feels that it is passively innocent of the 
imperialism of the military in all of its actions, and is simultaneously compelled by the 
us-versus-them dichotomy to support the military in all its actions, imperial or not. 
This collective national state fantasy of exceptional American innocence in the 
face of exceptional trauma is an ideology that has its roots in the overall genealogy of 
the beliefs underlying the national identity of the American citizen. Donald Pease 
identifies this genealogy as the historic evolution of the US state fantasy of American 
exceptionalism, a concept, which, in the terms of this study, is a major thread of 
American ideology that we see reformulate as innocence through trauma in The Zero. 
Yet, not only is the concept of American exceptionalism important to interpreting this 
one novel, but it is also one that we will return repeatedly in this study, so it is worth our 
time to take just a moment to lay its foundations before we proceed. Overall, the state 
fantasy of American exceptionalism has been supported, sustained, and justified 
through various historical conditions by a series of national myths. Pease states that 
these national myths become outdated as collective or national traumatic events 
“precipitate states of emergency that become the inaugural moments in a different 
symbolic order and take place on a scale that exceeds the grasp of the available 
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representations from the national mythology” (5). To Pease, 9/11 is one such event that 
defied the extent national mythology, requiring a new one to be constructed in order to 
maintain the viability of the state fantasy of American exceptionalism. A state fantasy, 
according to Pease, “does not refer to a mystification but to the dominant structure of 
desire out of which U.S. citizens imagined their national identity” (1). It is ideology writ 
large, not only as oppressive, but as an overall system of belief. To Pease, American 
exceptionalism, then, is “a complex assemblage of theological and secular assumptions 
out of which Americans have developed the lasting belief in America as the fulfillment of 
the national ideal to which other nations aspire” (7).  
This fantasy portrays the American citizen as an exception to the perceived 
shortcomings of the world, as an innately innocent exception from the hordes of sinners, 
the misled and unwashed masses of the world, who wish they could only be as pure as 
Americans. Often, this fantasy serves to wash clean all American acts as being done 
with the best of intentions for the rest of the world, despite the actual outcomes they 
have on the lives of others. In order to maintain this state fantasy, events that contradict 
it, such as “Japanese internment camps, Operation Wetback, and the Vietnam War,” 
must be disowned through “structures of disavowal” as “‘exceptions’ to the norms of 
American exceptionalism” (12). Myths, then, “do the work of incorporating events into 
recognizable national narratives” that support the state fantasy (5), or disowning those 
that do not fit. As Pease notes, myths also function to overcome historical trauma, 
wherein by integrating events into its narrative, “myths give closure to traumatizing 
historical events by endowing them with a moral significance” (156). For example, under 
the pseudo-logic of American exceptionalism, much like Remy is not at fault for his 
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actions in the novel because of his trauma, the Puritans and their descendants, 
traumatized by their religious persecution, cannot be seen as being at fault for killing the 
native inhabitants of the Americas or enslaving Africans. 
However, this state fantasy needs to be adapted to historical conditions through 
national myths that change to meet the unique needs of the times. As Pease describes, 
the attacks of 9/11 were traumatic events that escaped the bounds of the extant myth of 
the Virgin Land metaphor, a myth constructed in 1950 and retrospectively applied to all 
of American history, establishing a new sense of American tradition and identity (165). It 
centered on “the belief in the inviolability of the Virgin Land” (155), which is justified by 
the subsequent belief that the “Virgin Land was inviolate because the American people 
were innocent” (158), creating a myth based on a confoundingly tautological and 
circular line of reasoning that is as difficult to articulate as it is to critique in its everyday 
use. However, when the attacks of 9/11 violated the inviolable, this myth no longer 
served to explain reality and had to be replaced by the Ground Zero myth that focused 
the national attention on the geographical location of the violation, thereby “[linking] the 
people traumatized by the events” (155). This, in turn, allowed the declaration of a state 
of emergency that focused on defending a new myth, the concept of the Homeland 
(168). In the end, without the Virgin Land myth to fortify our national fantasy, Ground 
Zero forced us to look at our nation as the Homeland and as the Homeland Security 
State, a state of exception that justified exceptional actions taken by the government as 
effectively innocent. However, the creation of this new national myth excluded the 
people from “the normal political order” that they had previously known (169). This 
estrangement from the political sphere decreased the sense of political agency in the 
156 
 
national subject and paved the way for the institutionalization of the American citizen as 
Takacs’s virtual imperial grunt, a national subjecthood that entrapped the citizen in their 
own sense of trauma and urged them to give away their privacies and freedoms to the 
needs of the new national myth, the Homeland Security State. Yet, before the creation 
of the Homeland Security metaphor, America existed in a moment of transition that was 
filled with incompatible contradictions that exposed our past and present acts of 
exception, acts that violated our sense of American ideals.  
The Zero captures this moment of social contradiction through Remy’s 
experiences of ideological conflict made literal through his split personalities. Seen from 
this new perspective, Remy’s gaps are now more like unconscious acts of psychological 
protection from an overwhelming sense of identity dissonance. The gaps are acts of 
enforced ignorance creating the absences or omissions in consciousness necessary for 
the individual national subject to support the continued existence of the state fantasy of 
American exceptionalism, now based in inalienable innocence through trauma, 
especially since the extant national myth no longer sufficiently supported this fantasy.  
As such, the ideologeme of innocence through trauma captured in the novel is a 
facet of the evolving nature of American exceptionalism, one that existed in the gap 
between the myths of the Virgin Land and Homeland Security. Without an acceptable 
myth in place, individuals and the nation had to confront reality without the structures of 
justification that disavowed historical events and political policies that contradict our 
innocent notion of American exceptionalism, including gross violations of international 
and humanitarian laws and values. This ideological rupture often manifests in post-9/11 
narratives through reminders of national traumas long thought forgotten and 
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suppressed, such as the genocide of the Indian Wars, Jim Crow, the bombing of 
Dresden, and the holocaust. Overall, innocence through trauma is a transitional 
pseudoidea expressed in the novel through the class struggle between the middle class 
of the protagonist-Remy as police officer and the antagonist-Remy that enacts the 
dictates of the ruling class’s emergent Homeland Security rhetoric. Throughout the 
narrative, this burgeoning rhetoric is fed to Remy both directly from “the Boss,” an 
apparent stand-in for former mayor Rudy Giuliani, and indirectly from the president at 
the time, George W. Bush, whose quotations line the walls of Remy’s workplace.  
In all, The Zero illustrates how even a trauma as seemingly incomprehensible as 
9/11 can be readily incorporated into this state fantasy, merely by reconstituting itself 
into the ideologeme of innocence through the vehicle of trauma, a stance the novel 
struggles with as it both endorses and parodies its implications. Yet, the novel ultimately 
does not truly expunge Remy of moral responsibility, as it does not depict him as 
entirely innocent, and in this it succeeds in exposing the illusory pseudoidea for what it 
really is. Throughout the much of the narrative, Remy is complicit with the events 
happening around him, either through his inaction or by allowing them to happen, as in 
the scene on the freighter with the innocent terrorist suspect, Assan, mentioned above. 
As Duvall notes in regards to this scene, “Remy may be sickened by the incident, but 
that does not prevent him from doing his duty as a counterterrorism agent: his ‘innocent’ 
self passes” the note with the name on it of another truly innocent terrorist suspect to his 
fellow agent, Markham (286). Throughout much of the novel, Remy performs as a 
model virtual imperial grunt, spectatorially and complicitly aiding the imperial aims of the 
emerging Homeland Security State, but not without struggle and a few exceptions.   
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As such, the narrative utilizes the trope of trauma to depict Remy struggling to 
synthesize the contradictions of American policies, actions, and desires into a single 
identity, one that he ambiguously seems to attain in the end. Seen in this way, when 
trauma defies narrativization into the extant myths supporting American exceptionalism 
after 9/11, Remy’s consciousness splits between the innocent, exceptional protagonist-
Remy, an embodiment of violated Virgin Land innocence struggling to remain intact, 
and the vicious, amoral, and selfish antagonist-Remy, a representation of all the worst 
of the Homeland Security myth seen clearly before it integrates into the national 
structures of disavowal, a myth that later justifies, for instance, the violation of human 
rights enacted in Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, events which are echoed in The 
Zero in scenes depicting off-scene torture and the murder of innocents. As Pease notes, 
these events and others like them are blatant acts of exception, logical contradictions 
that are justified under the State of Exception incited by the national trauma of 9/11: 
“The state violated its own rules, that is to say, in the name of protecting them against a 
force that was said to operate according to different rules” (177). With Remy as 
embodying the internal struggle between the traumatized national subject in the process 
of freeing itself from the Virgin Land myth and confronting the emergent dominance of 
the Homeland Security myth, the novel is a dialectic that seems to resolve its class 
conflict by its end, as the traumatic gaps seem to stop and his identity meets some form 
of unification. 
Yet, if state fantasies are, as Pease notes, “the dominant structure of desire” 
(Walter 1), what sort of desire does The Zero capture forming, or re-forming, in America 
after 9/11? Certainly, as Faludi reminds us, there was a strong desire to re-assert a 
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national sense of capable and effective masculinity after the attacks violated our Virgin 
Land myth, but the novel seems to add something else to this sense of desire. In a 
conversation with The Boss, Remy threatens to quit, but The Boss tries to convince him 
to stay with the mission, finishing with, “‘You want to know what caused this, Brian 
[Remy]?...Ask yourself this: What causes hunger?...Hunger’” (298). This statement, 
however, is never overtly explained. Is The Boss pinning the blame for 9/11 on the 
hunger of the terrorists? Or does he imply that it goes back forever, in an infinite loop of 
hunger with no origin? Or, do we read this as irony, as Remy might see it as the hunger 
of the antagonist-Remy that started the counterterrorism plot gone wrong? This 
explanation comes up again near the end of the novel, when Remy confesses to Jaguar 
that they set him up and that all of the terrorist suspects actually work for either the FBI, 
CIA, or Remy’s organization, and that there never were any real terrorists among them. 
When Jaguar asks why, Remy gives the only response that he thinks seems true: 
“Hunger” (321). Under this context, hunger seems to take on new connotations. Is it 
referring to America’s hunger to take revenge on someone, anyone, after the attacks of 
9/11? Perhaps, and this would point to some of the nation’s motivation to engage in the 
often problematic War on Terror. However, this description for post-9/11 hunger 
originally comes from The Boss himself, who makes statements that mirror Bush’s pleas 
after the attacks to have citizens go out and shop in order to do their part to fight 
terrorism. As The Boss states, “‘in today’s world, there is no separation between civilian 
and soldier, between business and government. The private sector is the ultimate covert 
ops” (296).  
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Desire, here, dressed in the new rhetoric of the Homeland Security State, is the 
pure drive for profit. Coming from Remy’s lips at the end, “hunger” sounds more like his 
admission of complicity with his other self, a moment that solidifies his unification of self, 
of the dialectic synthesis of the national myths as represented in Remy. As such, the 
hunger Remy speaks of here is the desire for the resolution of the ideological gap after 
9/11, a hunger to unproblematically embrace the ideologeme of innocence through 
trauma, a hunger for an illusion that will justify an American freedom from morality and 
once again satisfactorily mask the amoral acts of America’s past, settling the 
conscience of the American citizen, now the virtual imperial grunt. It is a hunger to find a 
way to treat the trauma by narrativizing it under a new ideological framework, to reduce 
the ideologeme of innocence through trauma to simply an ideologeme of innocence, a 
new American exceptionalism that later took form under the myth of the Homeland 
Security State. 
However, in its specific context within the narrative, this admission of hunger is 
also a satirical criticism that the creation of terrorists where they do not exist has been 
motivated by personal profit, for greed, that has only been masked in the justification of 
a pursuit of an illusory sense of justice. It is hard not to draw parallels between the 
counterterrorist plot gone wrong with its final admission of hunger and the wide-spread 
real-world belief, at the time, that America had invaded Iraq as a response to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Especially when in 2006, years after the combat operation was 
over and Saddam Hussein was captured and soon to be executed, Bush admitted that 
Iraq was not responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11 but had only posed “a clear 
threat” that was entirely unrelated (Goldenberg). In both cases, America is shown as 
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creating terrorists were there were none, and, as it has been argued, it has done so for 
the hunger of profit and personal gain (see, for example, Hanson). 
From Jameson’s third horizon, The Zero historically registers this long-standing 
contradiction in American exceptionalism into a contradiction of the formal and historical 
traditions of the postmodern and thriller genres. As Duvall and Marzec note on the 
novel’s genre contradictions: 
Both using and repurposing the genre of the detective/spy thriller, Walter 
satirizes the hero narrative to examine the conflation of personal and collective 
grieving that emerges at a time when the forces of nationalism, media, and 
capital work in concert to mobilize public support for the notion of just wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and for curtailed civil rights at home. (281)  
As Duvall notes, the novel tends to trade the realism that is characteristic in the thriller 
novel for the ludic play of the postmodern novel (282), allowing for a satire of post-9/11 
culture that can depict its proposed absurdity without having to adhere to the 
established formal and ideological conventions of realism, all while borrowing the 
narrative technique of epistemic suspense typical in the thriller genre. These 
conventions of realism are, after all, only the dominant ideological understanding of a 
particular relation to the Real, and as such are social constructs that are always in 
process, just like any other convention. By combining these two genres in this way 
through their shared reliance on gaps, Walter finds a way to escape many of the 
hegemonic ideologies of his time to explore what lies beneath. In the novel, this 
technique tends to make many of the real-world commonplace post-9/11 practices look 
absurd. Even Remy’s split personalities and gaps serve to defy the conventions of 
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realism, but as Duvall notes, “Remy allegorizes Jameson’s sense of historical amnesia 
inasmuch as he experiences a form of literal amnesia that prevents him from 
recognizing his crucial role in the Homeland Security State” (282). While most American 
citizens did not have such gaps to justify their culpability in global concerns, the satire of 
the novel exposes that many Americans live just such a double life, one that is justified 
by ideologemes of innocence. Yet, the postmodern satire itself is not entirely free of the 
use of innocence through trauma either, as the genre invites us to simply laugh at the 
absurdities of post-9/11 culture rather than take action towards change, such as 
passively allowing the invasion of Iraq, the wrong country, because we no longer have 
an alternate agency of resistance anymore under the auspices of innocence. As such, it 
is important to realize that neither realism nor satire are entirely free of the pull of this 
ideologeme, as both utilize gaps to enable tonally different but ideologically similar 
escapes from the responsibility of being a free agent. 
While this ideological resolution of genre contradictions allows for satirical 
demystification, what hope does it give for a progressive future that escapes the social 
absurdities that it portrays? In this sense, The Zero at first appears to be a fear narrative 
that is simply oppressive in nature, telling its readers through Remy’s entrapment in his 
trauma of etiological gaps that we, as passive, spectatorial, post-9/11 American citizens, 
are doomed to live a life without agency, pulled along by the machine of American 
culture toward unconscionable acts that we may consciously abhor. Because of the 
novel’s function as a source of trauma therapy, it, by necessity, displaces reality in order 
to narrativize the trauma of 9/11, establishing an illusory framework in order to integrate 
the event into a larger national narrative, in this case through an ideologeme of 
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innocence through trauma. However, at the same time, its use of parody exposes the 
absurdity of this ideologeme, urging us to the social consciousness of its presence. 
Ultimately, it is the tragedy of the story that gives it its dramatic power at the end as 
Remy finally does try to take action, to take control of his life (Walters 212), but is too 
late to fix the acts of his repressed self, leading to the death of April and four others at 
the train platform when Jaguar finally embodies the suicide bomber that he has been 
pushed into becoming (322-25), even if in ways that no one had expected ahead of 
time. 
From a progressive perspective, then, this story’s ambiguous ending works as a 
warning to the American reader, using fear as a motivating force. The narrative serves 
not only as a tragedy, but as a satire of post-9/11 America, urging us to take action now 
so that we don’t befall the same end as Remy. Seen in this way, the narrative pushes 
us to liberate ourselves from enacting the disempowering identity of the post-9/11 State-
of-Emergency American citizen, the virtual imperial grunt, and to open our 
consciousness to the reality that our consent to inaction is really a consent to the 
domestic and imperial atrocities and injustices committed by America, such as 
Islamophobic acts dehumanizing Arab American citizens at home and the human rights 
violations at Abu Ghraib that dehumanized human beings abroad. In the end, the novel 
points to liberation through political and civil action, but Remy’s failure to secure his 
relationship with April pushes us to fear that it may already be too late, that the actions 





PARANOIA AND THE PERSONALIZATION OF FEAR IN PYNCHON’S BLEEDING 
EDGE 
Many 9/11 novels dabble in the murky waters of the primary fear theme of 
paranoia, exhibiting hints of conspiracy theories, anxious glances toward the sky for the 
next hijacked plane to come plummeting out of the sky, or increased security measures 
to address all possible terrorist contingencies (however ineffective this may turn out to 
be), but few focus overtly on paranoia like Thomas Pynchon’s Bleeding Edge (2013). 
While chronologically later than many of the selections in this study, as Joseph 
Darlington notes, its historical distance from the attacks of 9/11 allows it to place the 
attacks within a larger historical picture (244-5), as opposed to seeing the attacks as 
some sort of historical discontinuity, one that came “out of the blue.” Paranoia has long 
been established as one of Pynchon’s primary themes throughout his oeuvre, so much 
so that when Stefano Ercolino posited the existence of the maximalist novel, a genre of 
the postmodern novel that lists the paranoid imagination as one of its required 
characteristics, the very first novel he selected as paradigmatic of this form was 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), and two of Pynchon’s other novels were also 
included in the extended corpus of the maximalist novel, including Mason & Dixon 
(1997) and Against the Day (2006) (241-42). Had Bleeding Edge been written prior to 
Ercolino’s 2012 article, it would certainly have been included in this list as well. 
As such, Pynchon’s Bleeding Edge, with its tangled and interconnected web of 
clues that lead to one possible evil source behind it all, is an exemplary model for the 
exploration of the ideologeme of post-9/11 justified paranoia, one also tempered by the 
personalization of fear, as the nebulous dangers all seem directed at the protagonist 
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and those she loves. The narrative follows Maxine Tarnow in New York after the dotcom 
bust, through the attacks of 9/11, and into the return of a sense of normalcy after the 
historic event. As a decertified certified fraud examiner (CFE), Maxine has been hired 
by Reg Despard, a documentary filmmaker, to look into a computer-security firm called 
hashslingrz. Once described in the novel as “an arm of [the] U.S. security” apparatus 
(Pynchon 462), hashslingrz hired Despard to make a documentary on their company 
but refuses to give him full access to the workings of the company, even as they claim 
that he really does have full access (8-11). This makes Reg suspicious, so he goes to 
Maxine to see what he has gotten himself into. As a former CFE, Maxine is trained “to 
look for patterns” through the language of money (22) (see Pöhlmann for an excellent 
analysis on the representation of money in the novel). And Maxine certainly does find 
patterns as fraud leads to money laundering to off-shore accounts, embezzlement, post-
dotcom bust information theft, possible terrorist connections, Deep Web corporate 
infiltration, and maybe even a little time travel, 9/11 conspiracy theories, and two 
possibly interrelated murders, each stretched along seemingly separate cases and 
personal and even familial relations that all seem to connect back to the same 
malevolent source, hashslingrz CEO Gabriel Ice, the novel’s allegorical personification 
of late capitalism and the novel’s most despised sin: “the perimeters of ordinary greed 
overstepped” (90).   
Clearly, there is plenty to work with in this novel for a Jamesonian three horizons 
analysis, and the following is a brief outline of my interpretation. At the first horizon, the 
narrative symbolically resolves the formal contradiction of combining the narrative 
inertia of the detective novel with the diegetic exuberance, or information overload, of 
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the postmodern maximalist novel through the formal device of rhizomatic plotting. 
Rhizomatic plotting, as used in the novel, is a formal manifestation of both paranoia and 
the personalization of fear that enacts the paranoid belief that all people and events are 
somehow connected and united in a conspiracy revolving around the self. It does so, 
essentially, by structuring a storyworld in which a series of seemingly disparate plot 
events and characters connect back to the protagonist. In the novel, this formal 
structure serves to destabilize the realist ideology of epistemic certainty found in the 
traditional detective novel, showing that in the late capitalist information age such 
objective solutions are implausible. Extended to the second horizon, this manifestation 
of paranoia through rhizomatic plotting evolves into the ideologeme of justified paranoia, 
a form of paranoia seen as a justifiable survival mechanism in a world without access to 
definitive knowledge, one that justifies any action one takes as long as it is intended to 
lead to a sense of justice or personal safety, whether or not the action actually meets 
this end. This ideologeme of justified paranoia, in part, mirrors how, after 9/11, the Bush 
administration could justify retaliatory attacks against Middle Eastern targets that later 
were deemed unconnected to the 9/11, such as the invasion of Iraq, and why the public, 
also operating under this ideological lens, largely accepted these actions. At the third 
horizon, we see that the combination of these two genres effectively allows the narrative 
to capture this post-9/11 paranoid state, one that simultaneously presents the late 
capitalist system it depicts as so far beyond comprehension that changing it may be 
impossible, while also utilizing its personalized paranoia to expose this oppressive 
ideology to the reader, raising our social awareness about this present condition of the 
world, once again utilizing fear to motivate action to change our conditions, however 
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much the conservative epistemology of the detective genre makes this seem 
impossible. 
At the first horizon, a principle feature of the Bleeding Edge is its attempt to use 
both paranoia and the personalization of fear, combined into a personalized paranoia, to 
resolve the genre contradiction between what Ercolino calls the maximalist novel, which 
is a particular genre of the postmodern novel, and the classic detective fiction genre. 
Here, it is important to note how in many ways this is similar to how The Zero uses 
gaps, formal symptoms of the primary fear themes of entrapment and trauma, to unify 
the postmodern and thriller genres in order to move beyond the ideological limitations of 
realism popular in the 9/11 novel. Likewise, Bleeding Edge uses different fear themes to 
formally unify the maximalist and mystery genres, liberating the latter of its realist view 
of epistemic certainty, as we will see shortly. In both of these texts, we see the use of 
fear themes to resolve formal contradictions in ways that destabilize objective ideologies 
ingrained in generic forms, and this potential social function of fear to subjectivize 
experience may have further implications as this study progresses. In Bleeding Edge, 
one way this ideological use of personalized paranoia presents itself is in the formal 
contradiction between diegetic exuberance and the detective novel’s need to come to a 
definitive solution to a crime through the accumulation of clues and suspects.  
The maximalist novel, according to Ercolino, first appeared in the U.S. in 
Pynchon’s earlier works (241). As he states, “It is called ‘maximalist’ due to the 
multiform maximizing and hypertrophic tension of its narrative” (241), which essentially 
means that these postmodern narratives attempt to maximize the sheer volume of 
information in the novel, with some interesting interpretive and formal results. One of the 
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required characteristics of the maximalist novel that he describes is diegetic 
exuberance, in which “its stories and characters are innumerable” (247). This formally 
manifests as a series of digressions or a “digressive narrative system” (247), wherein 
digressions are not seen as deviations from the central narrative logic of the piece, but 
as: 
a sort of extended turbulence produced by the omnivorous and encyclopedic 
élan of the story, a turbulence generated by the tension that is created between 
an extraordinary dialogic openness, on the one hand, and the necessity, on the 
other, to give form and order to that which would otherwise end up being 
ungovernable narrative chaos. (248)  
In Bleeding Edge, we see this in the information overload of objects, characters, and 
seemingly unrelated events that Maxine encounters along the way which all somehow 
manage to remain relevant to the central narrative. 
However, under the logic of the detective novel, all of these characters and the 
abundance of information are seen as suspects and clues, which must somehow lead to 
the definitive solution of some sort of crime. As Peter Hühn notes on the classic 
detective genre, “From the perspective of the detective, the traces left by the criminal 
appear as ‘clues,’ possible indicators of the hidden story of the crime” (454). Further, “it 
is an essential premise of the classical formula that there ultimately exists such a 
determinate meaning” (455), “that there is one and only one true meaning,” which has a 
vital social function: “the crime and its solution concern the basic order system 
regulating the life of the community in the book, and these systems normally cannot 
tolerate indeterminacy (as is already evident from the urge felt to solve the mystery in 
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the first place)” (456). As such, the fictional world of the detective narrative operates 
under what Doležel would call an affirmative and constative epistemic modal system, 
ultimately affirming the ability of subjects to find the solution of even the most puzzling 
enigma (126). However, in this novel, the tension between the need to deduce pertinent 
clues and its diegetic exuberance lead only to suspicions, to likely suspects, and hence 
a more conditional epistemic. Yet, due to the transnational, embodied, and digital nature 
of the information age of late capitalism that this novel depicts as an evolving historic 
form, it is impossible in the maze of rhizomatic threads of information to definitively 
resolve the crimes with an “arrest and punishment” (Hühn 460). However, it is this 
sense of resolution that is normally required in a classical detective narrative to return 
the fictional world back to a sense of social order (452).  
In order to resolve this formal contradiction, Bleeding Edge employs what I am 
calling rhizomatic plotting. This plotting structure, as it is used in this novel, is a formal, 
symbolic representation of personalized paranoia that creates a narrative consisting of a 
maximalist overload of characters and events that are somehow all connected together 
by and revolving around the protagonist. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us, rhizomes 
are essentially acentric networks of causation and influence, which, in real practice, are 
forever changing and growing (21). Of course, this novel does seem to center itself on 
the focalization of the protagonist, and, in print form, we are seeing the rhizome 
synchronically, as a series of moments frozen on the page, not as a constantly 
changing form. Despite all of this, I still call it rhizomatic because all the characters and 
events in the novel exist interlinked, networked together in a way that they each become 
points somehow connected to all other points in the narrative. Further, the narrative 
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itself is not centered on a sense of beginning and end, as the traditional detective novel 
resolution of solving the crime and arresting the criminal are not possible. Instead, the 
narrative is structured in the middle of events, only framed at the start and finish by 
Maxine and her children going to school in different ways. Maxine pursues answers to 
the crimes that occur in the novel, but never attains a resolution. In addition, while the 
narrative appears synchronic from the perspective of the reader, the characters 
encounter the material conditions of the storyworld as constantly changing, as moving 
from a post dotcom boom economy to 9/11 to life thereafter. In this way, its rhizomatic 
plotting decenters the traditional narrative structure to depict a segment of the middle of 
life that is constantly in motion, but not resolving. This rhizomatic plotting embodies a 
personalized paranoia because all of the events in the storyworld actually are 
connected together, manipulated by forces unseen, but always centering around and 
threatening Maxine and her immediate family. While this personalization of the threats 
in the narrative may seem to disqualify it as a rhizome, this protagonist center is really 
only an illusion brought about by focalizing our experience of the narrative through a 
single, subjective perspective: if we are only able to see the total system from one 
perspective, one that is interconnected at all points, it would appear that all points are 
connected to the subject, because they are, but only because the subject is just one 
point in an interconnected system, not a true center of anything except her own 
conscious awareness of the total system. In this sense, subjectively experiencing the 
Real as a rhizomatic network itself creates personalized paranoia, as, from this 
perspective on reality, all the points really do connect back to you, even if their overall 
meaning both for you and for the world remains elusive in the vast complexity of the 
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rhizome. As such, rhizomatic plotting makes a narrative with an objective, fixed, 
knowable solution impossible, making it, at best, seem entirely naïve, and instead 
substitutes in its place a false perspective of all events and existents in the system 
connecting back to the protagonist-as-focalizer as a false nexus whose limited 
perspective makes them incapable of giving the events any discernible meaning. 
Overall, though, by combining these two forms together into a rhizomatic plot, 
Pynchon gives the often sprawling maximalist novel the narrative structure of the quest 
for knowledge and then removes the clean resolution of the mystery novel, allowing for 
a postmodern sense of indeterminacy and ambiguity. This allows the novel to 
epistemically update the detective genre and the 9/11 novel genre simultaneously to 
reflect the death of objective, or definitive and singular, knowledge forwarded by 
poststructuralist philosophers since Derrida and Foucault. In combination, we now arrive 
at a novel form that denotes the late capitalist search for and the accumulation of 
information in the digital age, but notes that this search never ends and does not lead to 
clean, definite answers or to a transcendental signified that would allow an absolute 
sense of causation, and thus definitive accusation or explanation. As such, it 
demonstrates how accusation and culpability in the rhizomatic and networked 
postmodern world is complex, fuzzy, and often beyond something that can be verified, 
possibly dispersed beneath layers of mystification and thereby affectively naturalizing 
paranoia as a “realistic” or appropriate response to epistemic failure and moral shots in 
the dark.  
In this new form, this open-ended search for information means that the threat, 
the problem introduced in the mystery novel, is never entirely resolvable. It can seem to 
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be made irrelevant, such as the possible neoliberal hit man Nicholas Windust’s murder 
that is never definitively solved and directed toward a particular murderer, even if 
Windust and Maxine’s paranoid imagination points the reader toward the likely culprit of 
Windust’s mysterious and unidentified employers. After all, if a murder is perpetrated by 
an organization that we cannot even name or identify, how can the detective make an 
arrest? And so, the solution of the murder becomes indeterminate and a conclusion that 
Maxine does not even need to pursue. Even the murder of Lester Traipse, likely 
perpetrated by Windust, becomes lost in a web of conspiracy. If Windust was the 
murderer, acting as a hitman, who was ultimately responsible for calling the hit? In this 
storyworld, an arrest is irrelevant; all that is important is the epistemic quest, the search 
for and likely identification of the criminal, yet no restoration of a social order led by an 
agent of law and justice is accessible. Even Gabriel Ice, the antagonist that seems to be 
at the center of nearly all the criminal and even immoral events of the novel, never 
meets justice. As Sascha Pöhlmann notes, “Gabriel Ice certainly is not a happy 
billionaire by the end of the novel, but he is still a billionaire” (27). Without definitive 
solutions, and in a rhizomatic world, personalized paranoia is presented as the only 
effective means of navigating through late capitalist life.  
At the second horizon, this formal representation of personalized paranoia 
through rhizomatic plotting can be reinterpreted as the ideologeme of justified paranoia, 
which the novel both endorses and criticizes. Justified paranoia is a form of paranoia 
that is doubly justified: first, it is seen as a justifiable survival mechanism in a world 
without definitive knowledge (or perhaps accessible causation as The Zero noted), and, 
second, as we will see, it justifies any action taken by the paranoid individual, as long as 
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it is intended to lead to some sense of justice or personal safety. This ideology of 
justified paranoia after 9/11 is part of what motivated some Americans to want to 
retaliate by attacking any target in the Middle East, allowed the Bush Administration to 
invade countries that were not involved in the attacks (such as Iraq), motivated the 
rendition of terrorist suspects without evidence to prisons such as Guantanamo Bay, 
and convinced the majority of the public that these actions were justified, so long as 
they led to greater safety and served a sense of justice to those lost in the attacks. After 
all, seen through this paranoid ideologeme, the terrorists could be anyone, anywhere, 
so why not attack everyone? 
In the novel, one way to find the ideologeme of justified paranoia at work is 
through the protagonist, Maxine, and how she uses it as a survival mechanism to 
understand her world. As a decertified CFE, Maxine can be seen as something of a 
hybrid figure that can walk between the worlds of law and crime. She can work outside 
the restrictions of the legal system that the novel depicts as outdated and no longer able 
to resolve the social disruption of the crime. In this epistemic fictional world, only she 
has the ability to find what can approximate for truth in the postmodern age of 
information, and this truth is all that can be used to restore a tentative sense of order, 
even if by the end of the narrative the spectral organizations behind the crimes are still 
at large, still looming as a threatening presence that can seemingly never be identified, 
much less brought to justice. The tool that Maxine uses to access this sense of truth is 
paranoia, which she sees as one of her most valuable assets. For instance, as she 
states, “‘paranoia’s the garlic in life’s kitchen, right, you can never have too much’” 
(Pynchon 11), and at one point the activation of her investigative instincts are described 
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as paranoid: “A paranoid halo thickens around Maxine’s head, if not a nimbus of 
certainty” (183). Her paranoia here can be read as a way to understand, comprehend, 
and detect the spectral structural power that is above all traditional divisions, influencing 
all things, the rhizomatic structure of information age capitalism. In this effort, Maxine is 
an exemplar of Jameson’s concept of the social detective, one who, rather than convict 
an individual as the criminal detective once did, is a collective agent focused on “the 
indictment of a whole collectivity” (Geopolitical 37), who is an intellectual dealing in 
knowledge, just as Maxine is a fraud investigator dealing in the language of money, the 
blood flow of capitalist power, which enables her to see some of the workings of the 
social totality, the underlying system that paranoia can attempt to grasp (63). 
While Maxine may use paranoia as a means of survival in her daily life to 
understand her world locally, its relevance as a means of survival on a global scale also 
points to the increasing irrelevance of traditional definitions of sovereignty, and how this 
erosion of the efficacy of borders can erode our personal sense of safety. Traditionally, 
sovereignty has been defined as a political concept “founded on a sacrosanct boundary 
between an ordered domestic realm and an anarchic international realm” (Pepper 410). 
Yet, as Andrew Pepper notes, 9/11 and our responses to the attacks have had the 
effect of “transforming the political significance of borders, territory, and indeed 
sovereignty” (410), and the traditional internal/external and national/international 
dichotomies are “increasingly rendered moot” (413), so much that the international 
today is more like the way it is portrayed in the novel, as “a complex and unstable 
spectrum comprising powerful and less powerful state and non-state actors” (418). 
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As such, for those experiencing personalized paranoia after 9/11, the 
destabilization of these concepts of division inflamed concern over re-establishing a 
sense of safety that these concepts had once conveyed, thereby ushering in the 
national myth of the Homeland Security State described by Pease. Under the urgency 
inspired by this state of fear, a sense of safety had to be created and maintained no 
matter the cost. Yet, in light of the advances in communication and transportation 
technologies in the information age, the notion of the border became only more porous 
and supple than it had once been. These developments have had the effect of greatly 
widening the sense of rhizomatic networks at work in the lives of the contemporary 
individual, expanding them to the point that they become practically beyond 
comprehension and control, leaving paranoia as the only viable alternative to navigating 
the total system. In the novel, this new transnational reality is seen as existing prior to 
9/11, and Maxine’s hybrid legal status and use of the paranoid imagination allows her to 
work within its new, more fluid trajectories, enabling her to enact the role of detective in 
ways superior to traditional law enforcement, whose adherence to outdated ideology of 
traditional sovereignty make them ineffective and largely irrelevant against the dealings 
of multinational corporate entities, such as the novel’s villain, Gabriel Ice.  
While the text revolves around Maxine’s perspective of her life and her domestic 
concerns, the breakdown of the traditional boundaries of the criminal detective is 
everywhere evident, and with this loss comes a loss of a sense of safety, of control and 
understanding of the world we live in. As a result, the local corporate concerns she 
investigates frequently sprawl into international territories. For instance, Ice embezzles 
money from hashslingrz through the Middle Eastern hawala transfer system (Pynchon 
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81); Russian torpedoes Misha and Grisha’s involvement with Lester Traipse (370-1); 
and Maxine’s son’s krav maga instructor, Emma Levin, in all likelihood being an ex-
Mossad sleeper cell (414). Everywhere boundaries once thought permanent and 
inviolable are proven fluid, and, perhaps more important to justified paranoia, easily 
crossed by actants who are somehow interconnected. Safety, then, can no longer be 
granted by the boundaries of borders, as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 made clear with 
their disruption of the Virgin Land myth, and cannot be ensured by law enforcement 
institutions that are bound to jurisdictional limitations that the criminals are not. Justified 
paranoia, then, motivates subjects through the personalization of fear to look out for 
their own safety on an individual level, and, without access and the security of definitive 
knowledge, any action is justifiable in the name of safety. For instance, when Maxine 
and Windust take cover from an unseen gunman in the streets of China Town, she, in 
broad daylight, responds by opening fire into a random open window that may or may 
not contain the shooter, after which the shooting just so happens to stop long enough 
for them to escape (Pynchon 392). This action, taken to defend their safety, may have 
injured innocents and may not have even been directed toward the actual shooter. Yet, 
under the ideologeme of justified paranoia, the action is a justified because it is done 
with the intention to pursue their safety, and Maxine suffers no subsequent punishment 
or even judgment for her dangerous retaliation. 
However, in America after 9/11, despite epistemic uncertainty creating webs of 
paranoid suspicions, the desire for justice, answers, truth, and the identification of those 
responsible were major concerns. After all, terrorists can often be identified individually, 
but finding out who is behind their attacks and even the motivation for the attacks often 
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becomes lost in an increasingly dissipating causative network of financial backers, 
political organizations, and opaque charity organizations funded by individuals who may 
not even be aware that they are funding terrorist exploits. At this level, Bleeding Edge 
ideologically reframes the question of who is to blame by simply finding these 
conclusions irrelevant and impossible. Instead, what matters is that the karmic 
“accounts are balanced” in the end (Pynchon 370). This implies the existence of a 
personal sense of justice that is at best vaguely defined, but one that is enforced by 
individual acts of judgment that Maxine and others in the narrative carryout, actions that 
are justified because the law in the storyworld is no longer able catch up with 
information age criminals and mete out justice. For instance, when investigating the 
murder of Lester Traipse, the police believe that the murder weapon points to a KGB 
assassination, but, as a hybrid figure, Maxine can access her contacts outside the law 
to find out that it is only an urban legend that this is a Russian weapon. Rather, she 
finds out that it is more likely that the weapon was used to make the murder look like a 
Russian hit in order to throw off the investigation (206). Again, there is no resolution for 
the crime, and even the clues that Maxine finds are not definitive, but the police 
consistently prove ineffective throughout the narrative, and only Maxine is able to figure 
out that Windust was the likely killer. This sense that vigilante justice as the only option 
for Maxine to set things right reflects the way that America after 9/11 repeatedly violated 
international laws, and made exceptions to its own laws, to hunt down and interrogate 
terrorist suspects both at home and internationally, such as in Abu Ghraib and the illegal 
wiretapping of US citizens. Under the ideologeme of justified paranoia, the law is 
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ineffective and limited, and individuals must be free to take justice into their own hands, 
especially if they want to ensure the safety of their loved ones.   
Another danger of the ideologeme of justified paranoia is that it functions as an 
economic motivator and as an infinite generator of forever imminent threats, creating 
pre-cognitive, vague affective performatives, open signifiers easily available for 
articulation to just about any political aim. As Pepper notes, the foreign terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 that violated the Virgin Land myth, threatening the stability of our belief in the 
efficacy of traditional borders, prompted a sort of conservative backlash through the 
“reassertion of traditional accounts of sovereignty, especially in the popular imaginary, 
pitting ‘here’…against ‘there’” (407). Rather than diminish paranoia, this established a 
contradiction between traditional geopolitical concepts and the extant transnational 
totality that only served to inflame paranoid sensibilities. After all, are the traditional 
concepts, and the ramped-up securitization that have been implemented to re-assert 
them, really just a way to hide the “real” connection behind all things? In a similar 
fashion, the War on Terror resulting from 9/11 has become the ultimate war of paranoia, 
one without end, in which the evil terrorist might always still be out there. We can fight, 
and the ideological message is that we must fight whatever we fear, but we can never 
be sure the war is over as evil may still be out there. This creates a political logic that is 
an endless justification for furthering war and increasing surveillance, whether toward 
outside threats or the possible internal threat located among our own citizens. In short, 
paranoia can become a constant, low-grade affectual state, a conditioned background 
static that can be utilized as an ideological tool ripe for manipulation and the infinite re-
assignation toward any imagined threat, whether present or not. In this state, paranoia 
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can lay dormant as a form of low-level fear, in Massumi’s terms, that spreads 
throughout American culture, creating an endless stream of justification not only for 
worry and anxiety, but also for random, seemingly “unreasoned” action or lashing out. 
After all, maybe there isn’t a threat and maybe we actually are being ideologically 
manipulated by dominant culture, but, well, maybe we aren’t? What if the threats are 
real? Can we afford to ignore the possibility of a threat, even if it is unlikely? And thus 
starts the infinite and uncertain ball-rolling of paranoia, one that appears haphazard, but 
becomes justified under the lens of this ideologeme. 
At the third horizon, combining these two genres of the postmodern maximalist 
novel and the detective novel allows Pynchon to register the long history of American 
epistemic ideology, from the objective certainty that we can use information to find 
definitive resolutions, to the rhizomatic information overload that not only prevents 
resolutions but overrides a belief in personal agency, leaving us with only the 
ideologeme of justified paranoia to navigate our daily life. Effectively, this combination of 
genres allows the novel to demonstrate why objective resolutions are gone, while still 
combining together as a postmodern narrative with the drive, interest, and momentum 
of a detective novel. However, as a true, consummate fear narrative, this novel leaves 
us with no hope for the resolution of the fearful state of the world, but instead valorizes 
the ideologeme of justified paranoia as the necessary means of survival in a world 
rhizomatically interconnected by oppressive centralization around nexuses of capital. 
For instance, while Maxine champions the internet as a site of almost radical freedom, 
her father, Ernie, reminds us that it was the military who made the original form of the 
internet, DARPAnet, and that it is a technology steeped in Cold War ideologies of 
180 
 
control, not freedom: “It was conceived in sin, the worst possible. As it kept growing, it 
never stopped carrying in its heart a bitter-cold death wish for the planet, and don’t think 
anything has changed, kid” (Pynchon 420). As such, the novel asserts that the internet 
still serves the desires of the wealthy ruling class, who continue to use it to pursue their 
goals of infinite capital accumulation in ways that seem inexorably indeterminate and 
invisible to all but the most skilled social detectives learned in the arts paranoia. In 
addition, we see corporate and private interests contaminating Maxine’s world as 
Gabriel Ice buys up internet infrastructure to control its future (156); real estate barons 
gentrifying and sterilizing Times Square in a process that Maxine compares to 
Disneyfication; and the suspicious post-9/11 hack and subsequent commercialization of 
DeepArcher, a site on the Deep Web that once offered those skilled enough to get in 
untraceable freedom on the web. After all, at the end, the true threat is revealed not to 
be Gabriel Ice after all, but the shadowy figures he must work for, the “Death Lords” or 
“overlords [he] always worked for” (474-5). Even if the proposed threat of Ice has been 
identified and encountered at the end, the system—i.e., global late modern capitalism—
that gives birth to such capitalists remains shadowy, unresolved, and, in their 
insubstantiality, a forever imminent, possible threat. 
Seen in a Utopian way, this novel points to the use of paranoia as an intuitive 
means of navigating the rhizomatic postmodern world, as opposed to the more modern 
notion of using rational, definitive reasoning, which it asserts is no longer capable of 
grasping the maximalist complexities of Maxine’s storyworld, and, by extension, our 
contemporary late capitalist world. While, as noted above, the narrative clearly 
demonstrates that paranoia is far from a perfect solution to the problem, its use of 
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paranoia seems to grope toward something just beyond its comprehension that would 
allow society to unite as a collective force against the distributed systems of hegemony, 
a means of not just surviving, but of collectively thriving in the social rhizome. Through 
the fear theme of paranoia, it almost seems to be grasping for a sort of affective 
reasoning, one that is pre-linguistic and can navigate the felt intensities of affective 
potentials in an intra-cognitive way that is much more rapid and diffuse than filtering 
these same potentials through ideological interpretations. After all, Maxine’s acute 
paranoid instincts do allow her to create a collective web of human contacts that she 
utilizes throughout the narrative in a way that is unrestricted by the traditional 
boundaries of legality or sovereignty and helps her stay one step ahead of the 
antagonists. It allows her to navigate her reality instinctually and find practical solutions 
to issues that are just beyond her rational understanding, such as the exact connection 
between the murder of Lester Traipse and Gabriel Ice or who really is responsible for 
the death of Windust. Further, her intuitive navigation of the social rhizome of her 
fictional world allows her to survive the threat posed in the narrative by Gabriel Ice, 
something that may not have been possible if Maxine had attempted a rational strategy 
of arrest and prosecution. While far from perfect, Maxine’s intuitive use of paranoia 
seems to point beyond it toward a means of social collectivity through the navigating 
and negotiating of intra-cognitive affective potentials that utilizes the connections of the 
rhizome in ways that appear to exceed the individual human capacity to reason through 
ideological lenses, as we do today. 
In an alternate direction, which is likely the novel’s intended aim, we could also 
say that the novel is Utopian in that it serves to raise the class consciousness of the 
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reader by exposing them to the larger historical reality of late capitalism so that we can 
recognize the vital historical moments of collective potential that have been lost so that 
we can better recognize them in the future. It asserts that these moments of opportunity 
for Utopic liberation, such as the countercultural movement of the 1960s, the Internet, 
and 9/11 itself, have each fallen under the oppressive forces of corporatization and 
commercialization. As Jason Siegel notes, in its quest for knowledge of the total system, 
the novel does aim to “offer one final possibility for resistance” by raising our class 
consciousness (24). As this novel explores the historical foundation behind many of our 
current and naturalized technologies, such as the Internet, texting, smartphones, 
smartwatches, and even YouTube, it helps “to make readers more conscious of their 
position within a technological global capitalist system” (25). As such, Bleeding Edge 
shows how the advancements forwarded by the technologies of the information age 
have made the identification of causation and definitive solutions to threats practically 
impossible as their origins and perpetrators range across distributed, rhizomatic, and 
transnational networks. From a different perspective, Albert Rolls presents another 
potentially liberatory aspect by asserting that the framing technique used in the narrative 
by beginning it with Maxine walking her children (Ziggy and Otis) to school when they 
do not need the supervision anymore and ending it with her children getting ready for 
and going to school by themselves points to a future wherein the next generation does 
not need our help, guidance, and, potentially, denotes their resistance to the status quo 
set by their parent generation. 
While Rolls’s other interpretations may have some currency [especially in relation 
to the videogame depicted in the novel, “If Looks Could Kill” (Pynchon 34)], I cannot 
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help but see the ending of the novel differently. Considering how recent 9/11 occurred in 
the story and the fact that one of her children were nearly just attacked by a possibly-
privately-contracted gunman who targeted her children because of Maxine’s 
investigation, it is hard not to see her last gaze at her children as fearful for what the 
future has in store for them. After all, as the text states when she realizes that she may 
have placed her children in danger, “Every place in her day she’s taken for granted is no 
longer safe, because the only question it’s come down to is, where will Ziggy and Otis 
be protected from harm?” (412). Further, even during the last gaze at her children 
leaving for school, the text reminds us of “the spiders and bots” that still threaten to 
corporatize and control her children’s future (476). Since we have been positioned to 
sympathize with Maxine, it is not the children’s freedom and independence that we exult 
in and feel at the end, but Maxine’s paranoid fear of what their future has in store for 
them. After all, the system is still intact, the guilty parties are still free, order has not 
been restored, and her children are going out into that chaotic and seemingly unfixable 
world without her protection. In this scene, the threats generated by her object of fear, 
the transnational and dehumanizingly rational late capitalist system, have become re-
articulated as personalized threats not just targeting Maxine anymore but now turning 
on her children (and her husband when they momentarily fear that he might have been 
killed in 9/11). The message at the end is the enduring nature of paranoia and the 
personalization of fear combined as personalized paranoia, a fear theme felt by Maxine 
after 9/11, and, by extension, throughout American culture after 9/11. As such, 
personalized paranoia has become especially difficult to move beyond, as it continually 
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asserts that future threats are always imminent since we cannot know that they have 
been resolved.  
As a result, the ending of the novel refuses to return to the sense of safety 
typically offered by the detective novel, and in this way escapes this genre’s politically 
oppressive and conservative sense of comfort in the status quo. Yet, at the same time, 
the diegetic exuberance of the postmodern maximalist novel occludes any sense of a 
way out of the bind, as the perspective of the rhizomatic plotting only offers 
personalized paranoia as a replacement for any sense of agency. This sense of 
paranoia, in turn, justifies self-righteous aggression because of the mystifying 
maximalist overload of information, resulting in devastating real-world consequences 
and compromising any sense of ethical American behavior in domestic or international 
relations. However, as Jameson states, narratives such as this that pit the characters 
against conspiracies often must end with the threat still at large and tensions 
unresolved, because in the end “the conspiracy wins, if it does…, simply because it is 
collective and the victims, taken one by one in their isolation, are not” (Geopolitical 66). 
As such, in this conspiratorial storyworld, the future is not safe, Maxine’s family is not 
safe, and her paranoid imagination, the same one that has allowed her to detect crime 
and keep herself safe throughout the novel, now tells her to be very afraid for her 
family’s future as the threat is forever immanent and ever-present. However, despite 
appearances, this ending is indeed still liberating because it increases our social 
awareness by demonstrating how the dead end of the ideologeme of justified paranoia 
is ultimately oppressive, creating only a lived experience of constant anxiety, one in 
which solutions to systematic problems seem impossible, and, thereby, future 
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improvements to the world seem beyond control, killing any real sense of human 
agency. Similar to The Zero, we can read Bleeding Edge as employing a fearfully 
ambiguous ending in order to motivate social change by increasing our awareness, only 
while Walter arrives at this point by exploring the felt experience of the traumatized 
post-9/11 American, Pynchon utilizes the historic origins of America’s present conditions 
and the oppressive effects of contemporary American fear to drive home a similar point: 
act now before it is too late. 
 
EXCLUSION AND CONTAMINATION IN KHAKPOUR’S SONS AND OTHER 
FLAMMABLE OBJECTS 
 To continue our exploration of primary fear themes in the 9/11 novel begun in the 
analyses of the two texts above, we will now move our focus away from fear narratives 
authored by the dominant, white, male hegemonic group, and turn our gaze toward fear 
narratives authored from various marginalized positions. First, we will analyze 
Porochista Khakpour’s 2007 novel, Sons and Other Flammable Objects, as a fear 
narrative seen primarily through the lens of the fear themes of exclusion and 
contamination. Overall, Sons, is a 9/11 novel even more ignored by academia than The 
Zero, as my research did not turn up any academic articles on the text, but only book 
reviews, interviews with the author, and her autobiographical newspaper feature 
articles. It is impossible to tell if this academic oversight could be attributable to its 
marginalized authorship, but Sons is certainly a text whose stylistic complexity, 
multilayered ideological explorations of pan-Middle Eastern concerns after 9/11, and 
dark humor make it a 9/11 novel that deserves more attention. 
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Sons centers on explaining, depicting, and resolving the tension between Darius 
Adam and his son, Xerxes, as the narrative centers around a miscommunication that 
causes them to vow to never speak to each other again. When Xerxes is twenty-five, 
Darius visits his son in New York, and they attempt a series of strained conversations. 
In one instance, Xerxes asks his father about an incidence when Xerxes was twelve 
and his father had attempted to save the neighborhood birds from the cats of their 
apartment complex, calling it “the whole bird thing,” a part of his childhood that he had 
never quite understood (Khakpour, Sons 28). Darius misunderstands his question and 
instead tells him how when Darius was a child in Iran, they would capture doves, light 
them on fire, and release them to fly off into the sky to burn like “shooting stars” (31). 
Unprepared for this story that Darius blurts out like a confessional, an apparent attempt 
to testify about this childhood trauma, Xerxes tells his father that he had never known 
about that and was only asking about the neighborhood birds and cats from his 
childhood. Darius is embarrassed by this social misstep, this unwanted sharing of a 
moment so emotionally raw for him, and bursts in rage at his son, exclaiming that he 
came from this past, that Xerxes cannot hide from his past, and that he should just 
accept it already instead of trying to deny it. Xerxes, unprepared for this response, 
emotionally shuts down at this point, and the two part ways vowing to never speak to 
each other again. The novel spends much of its time exploring their past that led up to 
this event, and then moving ahead to how witnessing the attacks of 9/11, Xerxes 
romantic relationship with Suzanne, their attempted trip to Iran, and Xerxes’s ultimate 
nervous breakdown all lead to the father and son to once again talk to each other on the 
phone, re-uniting the two men and breaking their vow of silence at the end. 
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To relate this story, the novel is primarily told through the three perspectives of 
the Adam family, Darius, Xerxes, and his mother Lala, through extradiegetic third-
person narrative sections focalized separately on each of these characters in turn. This 
constellation of perspectives limits the storyworld only to the view of the Adam family 
itself, an immigrant family excluded from its former home in Iran. Many Iranian 
immigrants fleeing the 1979 Iranian Revolution came to America forming what is often 
called Tehrangeles, a diaspora consisting of a large population of affluent Iranian 
refugees in Los Angeles. However, as Khakpour notes, the novel ended up becoming 
somewhat autobiographical, as the characters in the novel, much like Khakpour’s own 
family, lacked the financial means to move to Tehrangeles, and instead had to move to 
more affordable apartments (Khakpour, Interview), which in the novel are the fictional 
Eden Gardens, where “there were secret immigrants everywhere in the neighborhood” 
(Khakpour, Sons 87). As one of these family units of secret immigrants themselves, the 
Adam family is an isolated cultural unit, a nuclear family, and the novel formally 
represents this sense of exclusion by limiting its focalizers primarily to only their 
perspectives.  
However, the real focus of the narrative is on Xerxes and his efforts to negotiate 
his Iranian heritage with his identity as an American, a journey that Sepidah Saremi 
aptly describes as “the young protagonist’s initial rejection of, and ultimate steps toward 
reconciliation with, an identity that feels untenable, uncertain, and not his own, an 
identity complicated by geography, family, language, and current events” (201). 
Rejecting his heritage, upon graduating from high school Xerxes flees to New York with 
the aid of a college scholarship, only to become a witness of the attacks of 9/11. As 
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Jessica Boudakian notes, “9/11 initiates Xerxes’ relationship with his girlfriend Suzanne 
and sets in motion events that resolve the novel’s father-son tension. This vision of 9/11 
is still tragic, bleak, and terrible, but it nonetheless encourages readers to move forward 
and, in whatever way possible, to progress” (13). Yet, far from uniting the Adams with a 
national sense of American patriotism, the attacks only seem to be the catalyst that 
bonds the family itself back together. As Harlow and Dundes note, this may be a 
common reaction to 9/11 for many marginalized groups: “Rather than bring people 
together, this tragedy may have served to solidify already existing racial and ethnic 
divisions by making explicit the previously hidden boundaries of American inclusion and 
exclusion and further alienating already marginalized populations” (453-4).    
With all of this in mind, through the lenses of exclusion and contamination we can 
interpret Sons in the following way. At the first horizon, we can see the formal 
contradiction as the separate, limited third-person perspectives typical of the American 
immigrant novel are repeatedly interrupted by the voices of other characters in places 
where the established rules of its limited third person perspectives should not allow. 
This crossing of the conventional borders of narratorial perspective introduces elements 
of the maximalist postmodern novel’s polyphony, the inclusion of numerous voices, into 
what I am calling polyphonous interruptions, which begin to bring the isolated characters 
of the Adam family together, seeming to merge the extradiegetic and diegetic levels of 
the text for both the readers and the characters themselves. This allows the text to 
resolve the seemingly unresolvable issue of Xerxes integrating his Iranian heritage, as 
represented by his father, with his identity as an American, a feat that was especially 
difficult to conceive of during the Islamophobia that erupted after 9/11. At the second 
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horizon, the characters can be seen in conflict with the ideologeme of irreconcilable 
differences, one that pulls Xerxes between the forces of his Iranian heritage and 
Americanization, an ideologeme that the novel asserts can be demystified only if we 
discard the toxic elements of hypermasculinity by balancing it with a more unifying 
femininity. The novel’s resolution to this social contradiction points to an imaginary 
resolution to the perceived irreconcilable differences between the East and the West 
that leads toward reconciled, hybrid, and integrated individuals and futures. At the third 
horizon, the novel utilizes postmodern polyphonous interruptions to generically hybridize 
the American immigrant novel in a way that creates a formal logic of amalgamation 
permitting Xerxes to strive toward the utopic and seemingly impossible subjectivity that 
allows the hybridizing the East and the West. Yet it does so only after relaying a 
narrative that delves into the oppression of the fears of exclusion and contamination, 
even if its hopeful ending of integration offers a Utopian hint of a future wherein the 
West and the Middle East are no longer in opposition. 
At the first horizon, the novel resolves its generic contradiction of integrating a 
maximalist postmodern novel and an American immigrant novel through the formal 
resolution of what I am calling polyphonous interruptions, breaks in the extradiegetic 
limited third person perspectives in which multiple perspectives converse together 
momentarily. These polyphonous interruptions have the function of bringing the isolated 
characters of the Adam family together, allowing Xerxes to achieve what often seems 
impossible in the real world: to begin to synthesize his Iranian heritage with his 
American national subjectivity, becoming a functional, hybrid individual. In the real world 
of post-9/11 American Islamophobia, this sort of identity integration was especially 
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challenging as the media and the political rhetoric of the time made it seem that what 
made one American was to not be Middle Eastern, a paradigm of exclusion that 
believes that these two identities are to be forever separated by irreconcilable 
differences.  
Most of Sons portrays this experience of exclusion—from American culture, 
Iranian culture, and even each other within the family unit—but as personified in the 
character of Xerxes who tries to find some viable solution to living with these two sides 
of his identity. The novel depicts the story fragments of the three members of the Adam 
family primarily through separate sections of limited third person perspectives: Darius, 
who often represents their Iranian heritage resisting American cultural contamination; 
Xerxes, who tries to escape his heritage in order to assimilate and avoid American 
exclusion; and, Lala, who often acts as a bridge between them and perhaps attains the 
most successfully hybridized identity of the three of them. Yet, separating the three 
family members into different third-person sections, a formal convention often used in 
the immigrant novel, only serves to heighten this sense of mutual isolation even from 
each other, as at the level of the story, the misunderstandings, traumas, and tensions 
between the characters prevent them from being able to communicate with each other 
effectively. In each of these sections, “Khakpour invokes the past through the 
characters’ remembrances” (Boudakian 12), and this has the effect of trapping their 
fragmented stories inside their heads, only allowing miscommunications to fracture their 
identities further, isolating them from each other for much of the narrative.  
However, even with these generic conventions of the immigrant novel present, 
Khakpour states in regards to Sons, “I wrote it actually in some ways [as] a reaction 
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against…the traditional immigrant narrative” (Khakpour, Interview). Khakpour instead 
states that she sees herself as a “language writer,” in that she prefers to focus on 
playing with language, and states that she sets up a “maximalist tone” in the first few 
sentences of the novel, below, that set the pace for the rest of the text: 
Another in the long line of misunderstandings in their shared history, what 
caused Xerxes and Darius Adam to vow never to speak again, really began with 
a misplaced anecdote, specifically an incident that happened many years before 
in the summer of Xerxes’s twelfth year, known always in the Adam household as 
‘the summer when Darius Adam began terrorizing the neighbor’s cats,’ known 
privately to Xerxes’s future self as ‘the summer in which I realized something was 
very wrong with my father, something that would cause us to never have a 
normal father-son bond—the summer, years later, accidently triggering the very 
last straw that would cause us to never communicate again.’ Ever? ‘Well, wishful 
thinking, for starters.’ (Khakpour, Sons 1, italics in original) 
The maximalist tone we find here, with its strings of clauses united in rambling, almost 
stream of consciousness-sounding flow of language, finds outlet in the diegetic 
exuberance of much of the novel, as the formal complexity of her sentences seem to 
convey the difficulty the family has in communicating through the many traumas of their 
past and the difficulties of their present.  
Yet, it is the maximalist use of polyphony that allows these separate family 
identities to begin to integrate, setting up the narrative for the moment of reconciliation 
at the end. To Ercolino, polyphony in the maximalist novel allows multiple voices to be 
heard, or, as he explains it, “The languages, the registers, the styles, the genres, the 
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knowledge and voices of the various characters are there accumulated paroxistically, 
creating an extraordinary openness and dialogic richness” (247). Yet, in maximalist 
terms Sons restricts itself to relatively few voices. Instead, the polyphony of the 
narrative comes in the form of diegetic interruptions wherein another character’s voice 
interjects where it seems like it could not, if the text were following the conventional 
limits of the third person perspective. By doing so, these polyphonous interruptions 
allow the characters to converse at the extradiegetic level of the discourse of the text in 
ways that they could not at the level of the story, the linear temporality of the fictional 
lives of the characters themselves (Chatman 19). These polyphonous interruptions 
manifest in the novel as brief moments in which the consciousness of Xerxes can 
intrude across the boundaries of perspective from which they are otherwise excluded, 
and even Darius and Lala can communicate retrospectively about the events of the 
story.  
In the text, these polyphonous interruptions come in numerous forms, serving 
initially as puzzles for the reader to solve by often leaving it up to the reader to 
determine who these voices belong to and how they can appear where they do. For 
instance, the italicized introductory paragraph, quoted above, at first sounds like the 
voice of an omniscient narrator who describes the narrative’s central problem of the 
miscommunications causing Darius and Xerxes to never talk again, thereby establishing 
the situation and plot of the whole novel. Yet, the paragraph ends with a negation that 
tells us that they actually will talk again, but that it may not occur the way the narrator 
would like it to happen. This begs the question of the identity of the narrator, a hint of 
which can be found in the tone of its last few words: “…never to communicate again.’ 
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Ever? ‘Well, wishful thinking, for starters’” (Sons 1). While this narrator could be some 
other voice not present in the novel, the fact that it is not excited that the father and son 
will talk again implies that we are hearing Xerxes acting as a narrator and, perhaps, 
either as the retrospective author of this entire tale or at least as one of its readers with 
the capability of adding in his own commentary. 
Yet, Xerxes as the omniscient narrator is not the only way that he and others can 
interrupt the discourse. Xerxes’s thoughts often intrude in other people’s sections, such 
as in Lala’s section where she seems to be engaging in what Chatman would call a 
conceptual interior monologue (188), one that describes the death of her parents. 
Xerxes thoughts in italics interrupt this by interjecting that Iranians are obsessed with 
the tragedies of their past, but Lala does not seem to notice the interruption and 
continues with her monologue (Khakpour, Sons 59-60). This polyphonic intrusion of a 
second voice makes us question our understanding of the narration, as what appeared 
to be Lala’s thoughts suddenly now seem to depict that Lala had told Xerxes this story 
before and that he was tired of hearing it again. Placing this interruption here implies 
that these are not her private thoughts at all, but a level of narrative that is accessible to 
Xerxes, if not to others as well. Similarly, when Darius tells his story of Xerxes, King of 
Persia, his son’s namesake, the Xerxes of the novel makes comments that sound like 
he is listening his father tell these stories to him as a child. For instance, when 
discussing the historical character of Xerxes, who “while interesting, ruined everything” 
(64), we see the following dialogue: 
They say it was his vain ways and the prospect of topping his father’s fame that 
fueled him so crazily. 
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And why am I named after this total loser? 
Because after Darius, Xerxes comes next, no stopping it, son—enough! 
Besides, some call it a kind of greatness—Xerxes became a legend in his own 
way. (65, italics in original) 
At this point, Xerxes interruptions are either his conversations with his parents, or his 
comments on stories he was familiar with during his upbringing. While Xerxes interrupts 
unheard in Lala’s section, he is directly conversing with his father in the latter section. 
However, it is not always Xerxes who can interrupt, as at one point an “older Darius” 
intrudes on his own conceptual interior monologue to “talk” in italics across time to an 
older version of his son not present in the story in order to explain his inability to 
communicate at the time (74). Moreover, these interruptions are not always limited to 
one voice, as a later section written as an extradiegetic screenplay script allows Lala 
and Darius to discuss the events of the story to an unknown audience as if they were 
reading the text along with the reader, and then Xerxes interrupts with comments on 
their comments that Darius and Lala seem unable to hear (91-94). Further, one of 
Darius’s sections is interrupted by what appears to be a response by Xerxes, as “[i]f his 
son had been there at that moment” (210), but a response of which the story-level 
Darius is not aware.  
In total, these polyphonous interruptions allow the characters to interact across 
the discourse of the narrative in ways that they were not able to within the events of the 
story, giving the impression that you are reading the text along with the Adam family 
with Xerxes able to get in the last comment at all point. The polyphonous interruptions 
effectively act as commentary made by the characters who are reading the discourse 
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along with the reader. In this way, these interruptions imply early in the novel that the 
family has actually already reconciled the problems described in the narrative as they 
actually are talking with each other at this extradiegetic level. From this vantage, the 
family is now retrospectively looking back at the events of the story. With this formal 
logic in place, the reader can easily believe the novel’s resolution when they bridge their 
differences, because the polyphonic interruptions prove to be evidence that it has 
already happened. Therefore, within the novel’s complex temporal logics, the family’s 
reunion is inevitable. The polyphonous interruptions make it perfectly acceptable that by 
the end of the narrative Xerxes can resolve this unresolvable contradiction and come to 
some sort of peace with both the Iranian and American parts of his identity. Further 
supporting this interpretation, it is worth noting that as the narrative progresses, these 
interruptions occur less frequently, as the text needs progressively less formal help to 
bring the characters together as their reconciliation becomes increasingly imminent and 
logically inevitable. In total, the polyphonous interruptions are used in the novel in ways 
that defy the normal markings of voice as intradiegetic or extradiegetic, and thereby 
function to simultaneously get the family talking at some level while refusing to say how 
or where this could happen within the logics of the storyworld. 
At the second horizon, the three central characters of Sons can be re-interpreted 
as ideologues in a social clash with the ideologeme of irreconcilable differences, a belief 
made increasingly popular after the 9/11 attacks. This pseudoidea essentially posits that 
the West and the Middle East are so different that they can never work out their 
problems and exist in harmony. Thus, the only solution to these differences is to engage 
in a never-ending War on Terror that can only lead to the utter destruction of the 
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opposition. Yet, this ideologeme leaves individuals who are both Middle Eastern and 
American, such as Xerxes, in a difficult and seemingly impossible situation. Is it true that 
they can never integrate these two aspects of their identity into a functional, hybrid 
form? Sons argues against the ideologeme of irreconcilable differences, as its 
conclusion shows that reconciliation is possible, even if in the novel it is shown to be 
extremely difficult to achieve to the point of driving Xerxes to a nervous breakdown. 
Formally, the ambiguous identity of the interrupting voices heightens this difficulty for 
readers who are often not given any textual clues as to who they are listening to or from 
what point in time the intruding voice belongs. Further, it asserts that the belief in 
irreconcilable differences can be demystified by working past the more toxic elements of 
post-9/11 hypermasculinity and balancing in aspects of a more unifying feminine 
approach. Of course, by extension, the narrative symbolically asserts that this real-world 
confrontation of the classes between the hegemonic American culture and the Middle 
East, whether domestic or abroad, actually can be reconciled in the same way. 
The novel captures this struggle over the ideologeme of irreconcilable differences 
through the two opposing cultural pulls that Xerxes experiences, his native Iranian 
culture and Americanization. Xerxes experiences this first pull towards his traditional 
Iranian culture through the urgings of his parents, Darius and Lala. However, Xerxes 
soon learns that his Iranian culture can often exclude him from being perceived as 
belonging to American culture, as when his childhood friend had gotten revenge on him 
by drawing a camel on a Christmas card to Xerxes, an incident that was his first real 
encounter with racism (Khakpour, Sons 70). Yet, part of the reason that Darius and Lala 
choose to remain excluded and, at least initially, resist assimilation, is because, as 
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Khakpour notes, among Iranian immigrants who had fled the Iranian Revolution, “there 
was always this idea that Iranians would go back to Iran that even Iranians perpetuated” 
(Boudakian 14). This belief in their temporary existence in America cast assimilation in a 
fearful light as a force of contamination that might threaten to overwrite the Iranian 
identity they would need when they returned to their home country. However, this sense 
of living for a future return to Iran leads the family to the awkward condition of exclusion 
from the American culture surrounding them, and, as they learn by the end of the novel 
and as Saremi notes, “it is ineffective to try to return to a pre-revolutionary Iran, as it no 
longer exists” (202). Instead, this dream leaves the family unit isolated from the world 
around them. Khakpour captures this unmoored unhomeliness in her own childhood’s 
felt experience of exclusion and isolation from American culture: “[I would] think about 
my father and mother and me as a galaxy of just three planets, hopelessly alone, 
revolving around and around and around ourselves, while circling epicenter America, a 
big beaming blue and white marble” (Khakpour, “Pool Waters”).  
The second force of Americanization exerts an almost overwhelming pull on 
Xerxes as a first-generation American immigrant. This pull takes form in nearly all of his 
interactions outside the home, such as at school and through the media, particularly in 
his obsession with I Dream of Jeannie (Khakpour, Sons 89). Lala and Darius cannot 
seem to understand his obsession with the show, and, misunderstanding it as a girl’s 
show, fear he may be gay, an identity that could prove a permanent form of exclusion 
from the heteronormativity of their Iranian culture. As a result of being steeped in this 
culture, Lala believes that homosexual men do not exist in Iran, and Darius believes that 
any homosexual men who do exist in Iran hide their sexuality out of fear of persecution 
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(93). Yet, Xerxes is unable to explain to them or anyone what he finds so appealing 
about the show, and can only express it solipsistically within his own narrative sections: 
for him, Jeannie was an escape from his heritage, as to him, in part, she represented 
the opposite of the “dark, doom-loving, heavy with the weight of history” worldview that 
he learned from his parents and associates with Iran (94). Darius works endlessly in the 
hopes of preventing his son’s contamination by Americanization, fearing that it will 
incorporate his son. Yet, the persistent evidence of Xerxes’s contamination and his 
willful exclusion of his Iranian heritage are what often makes it so hard for Darius to 
accept his son as he grows up, leading to Darius’s outburst at Xerxes in New York just 
before they vow to never talk again: “You can’t face that you were built of my past—hell, 
even the past before me—can you? You’ve decided to be of no past!...But it doesn’t 
work, I am telling you!” (33). 
One result of this struggle of forces on Xerxes is his learned fear of mixing the 
two worlds (Khakpour, Sons 34), a fear that works toward supporting the thesis of 
irreconcilable differences. Throughout his life, Xerxes has come to believe that the two 
worlds of his heritage and American culture should never mix, as things repeatedly go 
horribly wrong for Xerxes whenever they do. His solution is “compartmentalization,” that 
he calls his “dual-citizenship agreement” (136) and “his double agent status” (137). 
However, the narrative reveals that these things go wrong not because of the mixing of 
the two cultures, but because of other forces of which Xerxes is completely unaware. 
For example, in one scene, Xerxes sneaks his first female friend, Sam, to the Adam 
apartment, he has his first kiss, and he accidently breaks a frame containing a family 
picture of them in Disneyland. When his parents return home early, Sam sneaks out, 
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but when Darius finds the broken frame, he beats Xerxes severely, leaving two black 
eyes (145). At this point, Xerxes vows to leave home immediately after high school, 
using college as a way out to get as far away from his family, and the heritage that 
came along with them, as possible. Interestingly, it is a feminine force in the novel, Sam, 
who almost integrates the two sides of Xerxes at this point in his life, nearly mixing his 
worlds together, forcing him to “consider his existence so comprehensively” (157). 
However, from this perspective, we could say that her marginalized position as a minor 
does not provide nearly enough power to contend with Darius’ hypermasculinity, 
resulting in a backlash that has the opposite effect, as the trauma of the beating creates 
an almost permanent wedge between Xerxes’s two worlds. 
Finding his opportunity, Xerxes moves across the country to New York to go to 
college. As Saremi notes, “New York City, a place synonymous with anonymity, affords 
Xerxes a fantasy of reinvention” (202). Here he willingly succumbs to Americanization, 
shedding his heritage, and his family, entirely. Yet, during 9/11 he meets Suzanne on a 
rooftop, and their romantic relationship is the first step to leading Xerxes back toward 
integrating the two parts of his identity. Saremi asserts that Suzanne’s own name 
denotes her important role in the novel: “In Farsi…her name is ‘needle’; appropriately, 
then, she is both the catalyst that causes him to examine himself in the context of his 
relationship with Darius and, later, a driving force in threading together their 
relationship” (202). Yet, Xerxes’s struggle with the two irreconcilable parts of his identity 
come to a climax when, through a series of events, he and Suzanne set out to fly to Iran 
to meet Darius, where his father hopes to make a return visit to their homeland. This 
mixing of the two worlds sends Xerxes into a panic attack, causing him to be detained at 
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a German airport, questioned, and returned to America to the JFK airport. Yet, it is the 
final feminine influence in his life that finally unites him with Darius, and, hence finds 
reconciliation between the West and the Middle East, as Lala, who travels to New York 
in what seems like a wasted trip to find her lost brother and visit Darius, just so happens 
to be in town when Xerxes is sent back to America. She brings Xerxes back home, and 
finally gets him on the phone with Darius (Khakpour, Sons 396), the first step in the 
process of their reconciliation and the breaking of the oath to never speak to each other 
again. By opening himself to his father, an ideologue of his Iranian heritage, while being 
in the space of his New York apartment, its status as his home making it a 
psychological representation of his self, we see Xerxes first allowing his heritage to 
have a place in his Americanized New York life, and thereby taking the first step to 
becoming a hybrid identity that functionally integrates these two, supposedly 
irreconcilable, cultures. In the end, through Xerxes’s struggle, the novel symbolically 
asserts the falsehood of the ideologeme of irreconcilable difference by showing that 
these two worlds can come together.  
Yet, it notes that the way to reconciliation is through balancing the forces of 
hypermasculinity with the mediating forces of femininity. The hypermasculine 
personality that post-9/11 culture called for as compensation for the violation of the 
Virgin Land myth is characterized both by the individuality that Xerxes enacts by moving 
to New York, and by the taciturn verbal expressions, physical violence, and emotional 
reticence that leads Darius to the initial miscommunication that starts their vow to never 
talk again. And their competitive desire to win the resulting dispute has become a toxic 
form of what R. W. Connell calls hegemonic masculinity (76). Thomas Scheff states, 
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“the hypermasculine pattern leads to competition, rather than connection between 
persons” (3). As such, this dysfunctional post-9/11 hypermasculinity only serves to 
prevent reconciliation, seeming to prove the irreconcilable differences thesis. Yet, it was 
only through the introduction of compassion, forgiveness, communication, and the 
efforts toward social reunification taken by the two feminine forces of the novel, Lala 
(representing Xerxes’s Iranian heritage) and Suzanne (representing Xerxes’s 
Americanized identity), that reconciliation is possible at the end. Seen in this light, Sons 
asserts that it is only through the re-introduction of aspects of femininity into our culture 
and international relations policies that post-9/11 America can achieve a sense of 
balance, connection, and reconciliation that would allow a future in which both the West 
and Middle East might come together in a way that does not result in the destruction of 
one or even both sides.  
Of course, similar to how, at the formal level, the polyphonous interruptions only 
allow the reunification of the family to occur via an imaginary extradiegetic level 
removed from the more realistic possibilities of the diegetic level, the resolution of the 
ideologeme of irreconcilable differences through the introduction of feminine influence in 
Xerxes life at the end also occurs within the narrative along somewhat unrealistic and 
accidental means. After all, Xerxes only meets Suzanne by accident on a rooftop during 
the attacks on 9/11, and Lala only incidentally happens to be in New York at the end 
because she is searching for her brother. The artificiality of these coincidences, much 
like the experimental artificiality of the polyphonic interruptions, highlights the actual 
difficulty of arriving at these same resolutions in real life. If the imaginary resolution to 
the narrative’s contradictions seem somewhat contrived, it is likely because the actual 
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world resolutions to these problems seem so far removed from the post-9/11 culture in 
which Khakpour was writing. In effect, at both horizons so far, the novel presents an 
imaginary if not somewhat romantic solution to its contradictions, and, because it has to 
resort to such artificial and unrealistic means to arrive at these solutions, it 
simultaneously suggests how hard it would be to reproduce these solutions in real life, 
in which such atemporal interruptions and coincidences are not realistic or practical 
answers to political or social problems. 
At the third horizon, Sons is a generic contradiction between the American 
immigrant novel and the maximalist postmodern novel. As a result, the isolated third 
person perspectives of the immigrant novel and its focus on the processes and 
problems of assimilation are mollified and symbolically resolved through a curious use 
of postmodern pastiche, allowing for a sense of hybridity rather than cultural 
incorporation. Its use of polyphonous interruptions is in many ways a unifying form of 
pastiche, bringing various conventions of other genres together, such as the omniscient 
narrator, screenplay script dialog, and extradiegetic commentary. As Jameson notes, 
the use of pastiche in postmodern visual works has become a “‘form of commodity 
reification’” (Postmodernism 18). However, rather than just reifying the genres that 
these insertions borrow from, the textual representations of the genres as used in this 
novel utilizes their implicit historical and social processes to symbolically create a 
generically hybrid narrative that integrates the now culturally hybrid character of Xerxes. 
At the same time, the narrative trades the typical narrative closure of the immigrant 
novel for a classic postmodern novel ending of indeterminacy and contingency, as even 
though Darius and Xerxes once again talk over the phone, there is no indication of how 
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permanent this reunification ends up being, or even if Darius responds to Xerxes’s 
voice. Rather, the narrative’s Utopian ending of reconnection and reconciliation is 
almost as imaginary as the polyphonous interruptions or the coincidences we found at 
the last two horizons. Rather than explicitly depicting their moment of connection, the 
ending only offers the hope of the beginning of their reconciliation, while most of the 
novel depicts the results of the fears of exclusion and contamination that support the 
existence and lasting power of the ideologeme of irreconcilable differences. However, it 
is in this hopeful ending that we find the keys to a Utopian future that can overcome 
these differences through the re-introduction of the feminine, allowing not only the 
dichotomous thinking of hypermasculinity, but the possibility of unification, 
amalgamation, connection, and hybridity in order to become something new that is both 
functional and has the potential to be at peace with itself. The key, the novel asserts, is 
finally getting both sides to talk to each other, to mix both worlds to become something 
not exclusively one or the other but contaminated by both. 
It is worth noting here, though, that this is a somewhat different kind of fear 
narrative than we have seen thus far in this study, as the ending of this novel is 
significantly different from the endings of our two previous 9/11 novels of hegemonic 
origin, The Zero and Bleeding Edge. Whereas these novels featured a fearfully 
ambiguous ending that utilizes fear to motivate its reader, Sons follows a narrative 
riddled with fear that concludes by offering a hopeful ending. The use of the hopeful 
ending appears to be a relatively common convention of fear narratives written by 
marginalized authors, appearing in such works as Invisible Man, by Ralph Ellison (1952) 
and Boneshaker, by Cherie Priest (2009) to much the same effect. While the fearfully 
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ambiguous ending presses for change by making us fear for the state of the world, 
marginalized authors tend to portray a fearful world, but end it with the promise of 
something better to come. It is important to note, however, that this “better thing to 
come” is not depicted and can only be hinted at. This lack of depiction likely points to 
the inherent impossibility of depicting Utopia, as it is something that escapes the 
oppressive confines of our present ideological outlook on reality, or as Jameson states, 
“our constitutional inability to imagine Utopia itself [is]…not owing to any individual 
failure of the imagination but as the result of the systemic, cultural, and ideological 
closure of which we are all in one way or another prisoners” (“Progress Versus Utopia”). 
This structural difference in fear narratives is something to keep in mind in the upcoming 
textual analyses, but, whatever the cause, marginalized fear narratives often seem to 
point towards reconciliation, hope, or the possibility of living beyond fear, whereas 
dominant, hegemonic narratives often utilize ambiguous endings to prolong a sense of 
fear and to keep its tensions unresolved. 
 
THE EXTERNAL/INTERNAL THREAT AND EXCLUSION IN WALDMAN’S THE 
SUBMISSION 
 The next novel, The Submission, by Amy Waldman, is a second example of a 
9/11 novel written from a marginalized position, though one arguably less to, as it 
comes from a white female perspective. Amy Waldman was a former reporter for the 
New York Times, where she was a co-chief for the South Asia bureau and covered the 
aftermath of 9/11. While receiving mostly positive reviews, The Submission, her first 
novel, is sometimes criticized for its elements of journalistic style (cf. Crispen, Jones), 
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while others see these generic inclusions in a more positive light (Keeble 171). Overall, 
this novel has received more academic attention than most of the novels mentioned so 
far in this study (excluding Pynchon, who has a devoted academic following), and 
Keeble describes it as one of the third phase of the 9/11 novel, what he calls “political 
9/11 novels” (15), texts that successfully engage with the political aspects of the attacks, 
not just the domestic concerns of the characters. Yet, as we will see, it ironically 
achieves its status as a political novel by engaging in the domestic lives of six individual 
characters, successfully fusing the domestic and the political in an ultimately ideological 
symbolic act.      
 In The Submission, a jury conducts a blind selection for the 9/11 memorial, only 
to discover that their final pick out of the thousands of design submissions entered, 
named The Garden, was designed by a Muslim architect, Mohammad Khan. When 
Mohammad’s identity gets leaked to the public, it erupts in an outburst of debate and 
emotion across the country as people take sides on whether a Muslim should be 
allowed to design a memorial to 9/11. The narrative depicts the national debate through 
six individuals as focalizers. Mohammad Khan, who initially goes by Mo, is an up-and-
coming architect and first-generation Indian immigrant, raised in Virginia, who leads an 
initially very New-York lifestyle, considering himself at least an agnostic and hardly a 
Muslim at all (Waldman 30). Paul Rubin is a successful chairman of an investment bank 
that heads the selection jury as a means to satisfy his wife’s social climbing desires. 
Claire Burwell, whose husband, Cal, died in the WTC, sits on the selection committee 
as a representative of the families of the victims, and is at first the strongest supporter of 
Mohammad and The Garden. Sean Gallagher is the brother of a firefighter lost in the 
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WTC and represents the volatile position of Islamophobia popular in America after 9/11. 
Asma Anwar is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh and devout Muslim, whose 
husband, Inam Haque, was a janitor who died in the WTC. Last, Alyssa Spier is an 
ambitious and decidedly unethical journalist who leaks the jury selection story first and 
whose later stories lead to Asma’s deportation order and death before she is able to 
leave the country. Together, we see the conflict played out through these six characters 
as events culminate with Mohammad ultimately withdrawing from the competition and 
leaving the country. 
In overview, my three horizons interpretation of the novel is as follows. At the first 
horizon, by blending the investigative journalism article and aspects of the domestic 
9/11 novel genres, Waldman constructs a developed panoramic cast of characters and 
formally resolves the contradiction between the 9/11 novel and simplified depictions of 
people in current events as portrayed in the media, offering a problematized view of 
people as more than just embodying an absolutized type or a single political position. 
This formal solution works to question the reification of the human agents behind the 
current events that shape world history, exposing the way that the media masks 
complex problems under sound bites and stereotyping as shorthand, while 
simultaneously using journalistic form to question the often limited focalization of the 
domestic 9/11 novel. At the second horizon, the cast of characters can be reinterpreted 
as allegorical representations of the numerous social positions and ideological stances 
that, after the attacks, engaged in dialogue over the inherent contradictions of the 
ideologeme of the clash of civilizations, one which encourages the exclusion, 
dehumanization, and absolutization of Muslims to transform them into threats to be 
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externalized, as happens to Mohammad Khan in the novel. In this process, the novel 
rewrites the ideologeme of the clash of civilizations into a sense of an expanded and 
integrated national subjectivity that incorporates Muslims into its definition of the 
American citizen, but does not go as far as breaking down the nationalistic and spatial 
divisions between the terrorist and the American, the East and the West. At the third 
horizon, the contradiction of genres in the novel allows a Utopian unmasking of layers of 
American ideology that turn people into quick stereotypes that simplify current events 
into dichotomous debates for easier understanding. Simultaneously, it avoids the 
individualizing tendency of the domestic 9/11, and this mixture allows the 9/11 novel 
genre to develop from what Keeble calls its domestic subgenre into the political 
subgenre, but not without carrying along with it many of the devices, themes, and 
concerns of the domestic 9/11 novel in its formal sedimentation. The ambivalence the 
narrative shows in the ambivalence of its hopeful ending that both notes the oppressive 
endurance of Islamophobia in American culture and gives us hope that future 
generations more removed from 9/11 will overcome the racialized divide of 
Islamophobia.   
At the first horizon, we find in The Submission (2011) the clash between the 
genres of investigative journalism and the domestic 9/11 novel that Waldman combines 
to create something more like Keeble’s political 9/11 novel through a developed 
panoramic cast of characters that utilizes the novelistic depth provided by interiority to 
create a formal solution to the dichotomous and simplified depictions of people in 
current events as portrayed in the media. Doing so it also combats the individualistic 
pull of many 9/11 novels that isolate their focalization to one or two main characters, 
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opening up a more collective perspective on the storyworld. As Keeble notes, at the 
point of the publication of this narrative, the 9/11 novel was a relatively established 
genre, allowing Waldman to write one of the first generation of “‘self-conscious’ 9/11 
novels” that in many ways works with a metafictional understanding of the conventions 
of the genre to intentionally alter them in ways that create new formal affects (15). As 
such, Waldman pushes the 9/11 novel form to better implement the fairness, balance, 
and completeness of the news article by including narrative sections devoted to 
separate characters that represent their different sides of the story (Mencher 43-46). 
Waldman utilizes these journalistic conventions to create a cast of characters that 
Keeble calls a “schematic panorama of American society” (186). Rather than divide the 
family unit, as these separate sections did in Sons as we saw above, The Submission 
uses them to present multiple points of view to the reader, allowing an exploration of a 
media event from numerous angles that the reader can witness in conjunction. In this 
way, Waldman uses journalistic investigation to challenge and symbolically solve the 
us/them binary of the ideologeme of irreconcilable differences that often plagues many 
9/11 domestic novel, such as Sons, not to mention American culture in general. 
This combination of genres, however, has brought this narrative some mixed 
critical reactions. Particularly, the inclusion of the news article conventions and stylistic 
elements of investigative journalism has earned it the most criticism, such as Crispen’s 
assertion that the narrative is weighted under so many “facts and figures” that “the story 
services the information that the author believes he or she must convey to the reader.” 
She also states that the “[c]haracters can become stand-ins for the viewpoint they 
express” (Crispen), characters which Radhika Jones states “are there to say the things 
209 
 
we know must be said” (56). However, Keeble sees these generic aspects in a different 
light. Regarding the panoramic cast of characters, he states, “several ‘types’ are 
established or suggested, and then subverted to the extent that every cliché is 
challenged” (Keeble 171). As he continues, “[T]he real complexity of the novel rests in 
its ability to move beyond simplistic two-sided debates and explore its characters’ 
internal conflicts” (171). As such, the novelistic inclusion of the interior dialogue of the 
characters gives the reader access to how these characters are more than the 
stereotypes that they appear to be externally. This novelistic and specifically domestic-
9/11-novel style of exploring of the interior motivations and the inherent complications of 
the psychology of individuals through its use of characters as allegorical representations 
of types prompts the reader to question the stereotypes they see portrayed in the media 
concerning real world debates, such as the 2010 “Ground Zero Mosque” and the 1981 
Maya Lin controversies that likely inspired the narrative (Keeble 166, Crispen).  
Often, the formal constraints of the news genre, including limited print space and 
rushing stories to publication, necessitates an abbreviation of real-world events that can 
absolutize and simplify the concerned parties into expected types that represent 
defined, immutable positions. However, the novelistic interiority introduced in The 
Submission problematizes its depiction of the news controversy. The novel presents 
characters battling with doubts, changing their minds, and working under philosophical 
positions that they later find to be at fault. Further, the final chapter of The Submission, 
set twenty years in after the events of the main narrative, shows that key players in 
current events do lead their own lives after the story has ended, a life that might not 
align with the simplistic representations often presented in investigative journalism. 
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Simultaneously, the journalistic style balances the often limited focalization offered by 
9/11 novels to demonstrate how there are many positions to every historical event, 
fictional or actual. This notion that people and situations are more complex and less 
black and white than they often seem in the media destabilizes the dichotomous, us-
versus-them thinking that Peter Ferry sees as a dominant social force of the time: 
“Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001…hegemonic white American 
masculinity once again defined itself in terms of opposition: them and us, Western and 
Muslims, the beardless and the bearded” (167). This pushes people in post-9/11 
America as either a member of the in-group or a threat to the nation, often an internal 
threat that needs to be resolved in one of three ways: re-incorporation into the in-group 
by changing their mind, exclusion to become an external threat, or, as happens with 
Asma, elimination by being killed in order to remove the threat entirely. 
In short, at Jameson’s first horizon, the novelistic inclusion of the interior thoughts 
of the journalistically-researched and (stereo)typical characters not only complicates the 
positions that they represent and that are too often absolutized into immutable positions, 
but it also has the effect of taking dehumanized stereotypes that are only too familiar to 
the reader and re-humanizing them, countering the reification of their political positions 
by giving insight into the social processes that made them who they are in the narrative. 
This humanization of the character types pushes The Submission to exposing the 
Islamophobia that erupted after 9/11 from all perspectives, not only in Sean’s overtly 
bigoted rants, but even in the liberal-minded Claire succumbing to the social pressures 
that pushed her to ask Mohammad to withdraw because she could not trust the nature 
of his true intentions behind the design of The Garden. Was it intended as a martyr’s 
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paradise or an Islamic Garden as many in the narrative fear? From the distance of 
twenty years later in the last chapter, this idea appears embarrassing, but even as 
Claire admits regret and apologizes for her final choice, and even states that she felt 
that “we were in the grip of some frenzy, possessed almost, at the time” (Waldman 332-
3), she still holds Mohammad as suspect for no other reason than because he is a 
Muslim and finds that she can never trust the motives behind The Garden (336), forever 
seeing it as a potential threat, a possible insult to the memory of the dead. At least in 
Claire’s mind, her persistent doubts toward Mohammad position him forever as a 
Muslim threat, whether internal or external. 
Reinterpreting this at the second horizon, the cast of characters becomes a 
series of allegorical representations of different social positions and ideological 
orientations toward the central problem of the narrative, which for our purposes is not 
actually the memorialization of 9/11, but the post-9/11 Islamophobia that creates threats 
out of American in-group members by drawing racialized borders around the 
constructed and hegemonic definition of American identity. As such, the panoramic cast 
of characters comes together in a dialogic mock-social arena concerning the 
ideologeme of the clash of civilizations, finding that the us/them binary logic of the 
concept does not hold up to the dynamism of its more developed characters who prove 
to defy simple categorization. In the end, the narrative rewrites the ideologeme by 
integrating Muslim Americans into a new, integrated definition of American subjectivity 
as part of the in-group, even if it does not dismantle the out-group divisions between 
America and the Middle East. As such, while the novel does promote the disintegration 
of the divisions of groups along racial lines, it does not go as far as removing from the 
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clash of civilizations ideologeme the irreconcilable divisions it places along the spatial 
lines of national residence. 
As Peter Morey and Amina Yaquin state, “‘Clash of civilizations’ discourse begins 
from the assumption that cultures and nations are fixed, finished, and stable” (80). It is a 
belief that the East and the West are so different, and their characteristics so 
immutable, that the only way to resolve the tension is through the extermination of one 
or the other. Since this ideologeme operates in the strict dichotomous structure of 
America/Middle East, US/terrorist, or us/them, those operating under this ideologeme 
must be sure to maintain the established “American” identity, without questioning its 
boundaries, administrative policies, or actions lest they risk exclusion from its social 
group by being labeled an internal threat—or terrorist—themselves. As a result, this 
discourse is hegemonic in nature, as it “might be expected to favor with those who rule, 
since it emphasizes both obedience and integration with what already figures as the 
norm” (80). As Keeble notes, the “Clash of Civilizations or ‘Islam versus the West’ 
discourse” directs one’s attention not only to the external threat abroad, but to “the 
enemy within” (170), which it primarily sees as the Muslim citizens already living within 
the geographic borderlines of the US and those who sympathize with them. However, 
Keeble states that “the reductive clash of civilizations dynamic” is destabilized in the 
narrative through “the internal divisions within each ‘side’ of this crude polarization and 
indeed within the inner worlds of the individuals involved” (170). As a result, the cast of 
six characters as focalizers demonstrate the reductionism of the clash of civilizations 
ideologeme to be an inadequate worldview, as it fails to encompass the true diversity of 
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positions that surround any given event or set of beliefs, not to mention exposing the 
reality that people often change their nuanced positions on issues overtime.    
This mystifying ideologeme is implicitly written into the post-9/11 rhetoric of the 
Bush Administration, which Keeble calls the “unilateral rhetoric of the ‘Bush Doctrine’” 
(186), one that “Waldman’s novel challenges directly—the rhetoric of ‘us and them,’ of 
good and evil, and good guys and bad guys” (167). In this ideologeme, the terrorist is 
essentialized into what Kenichi Yamaguchi calls “the incommensurable other,” an 
irrational, unreasonable enemy that can only be opposed by “aggressive tactics of 
violence by which the advantaged side does not aim to assimilate or indoctrinate the 
Others but to conquer them. Dubbing them as the evils of mankind, the advantaged side 
deploys the maximum force of death and destruction to achieve an unconditional 
surrender” (249). 
In the novel, the clash of civilizations ideologeme initially finds voice through 
Sean, who later struggles with the pseudo-idea’s limits through his interactions with 
others, becoming more aware of alternate perspectives on the world. Sean’s initial 
dichotomous worldview is based on his understanding of team sports, which he 
translates to all of his interpersonal interactions, as he sees in all situations two teams in 
opposition with only one possible winner. However, Sean begins to see the limits of this 
worldview when he begins to feel empathy with Muslims after Asma’s public speech at 
the hearing for the memorial: “But their claims weren’t equal; he had to remember 
that…Pitying the other team…would erode Sean’s will to crush them…so that he would 
start giving away plays without meaning to…Sean had to stamp out these glimmerings 
of sympathy. To lend his heart to the other side would weaken his own” (262-3). As 
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such, Sean becomes an increasingly conflicted character that has trouble maintaining 
his clash of civilizations ideology as the narrative continues. According to Keeble, 
“Sean…represents the average American who in 2003 was fully invested in the Bush 
Doctrine” and thereby “driven by anger and fear” (181). In this character, “[t]he 
suggestion is that, in order to cope with his traumatic loss and disorienting emotions, 
Sean gravitates toward a clear narrative and set of objectives” with the “clear enemy” 
that the Bush Doctrine supplies to its adherents (183). 
The contradictions surrounding the clash of civilizations ideologeme is centrally 
depicted in Mohammad and Claire’s interactions in the narrative, two characters 
attempting to weather the strong influences of numerous social groups and the historic 
events surrounding the narrative. As Keeble notes on these two, “Both characters are 
shown to be deeply conflicted and, crucially, to have other external pressures 
influencing their emotions” (182). Claire represents the privileged liberal moderate’s 
philosophy of tolerance and multiculturalism, which she plays well when initially being 
Mohammad’s strongest supporter both before and after his identity is revealed. 
However, as Aysem Seval states, the text “reveals the illusory nature of the liberal 
discourse of tolerance and the impossibility of maintaining that illusion in emerging 
representations of self and Other after 9/11” (103). This instability is illustrated in the 
novel as Claire cannot find a way to tolerate all of the people she is supposed to 
support, including Mohammad and the families of the victims, who have taken on 
diametrically opposite positions.  
Mohammad, on the other hand, plays the part of the Muslim American who 
becomes racialized into a perceived out-group threat. At the beginning of the narrative, 
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Mohammad is a member of the American in-group, living a typical New Yorker lifestyle: 
“He is [a] successful…stereotypical New York bachelor whose many ex-girlfriends of 
multiple ethnicities are freely mentioned” (Keeble 172). However, Mohammad’s social 
situation quickly changes as the actual external threat of the 9/11 terrorists ignite a 
wave of Islamophobia that rearticulates him to a suspected position, one that articulates 
all Muslim Americans into internal threats until they can prove their trustworthiness, 
which Mohammad refuses to do. After all, a non-Muslim would not be required to justify 
their intentions in the same situation, and this makes their suspicions clearly 
discriminatory. In the end, all of the events and actions of the narrative are motivated by 
the omitted external threat, the actual terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks, 
which are never depicted or represented in the novel. Even the name of the event and 
the particulars of the attack they are memorializing are never specified in the discourse 
of the narrative, only implied by the historic context of its publication. Still, 9/11 and the 
terrorists involved play a central role in the debate surrounding the memorialization of 
Ground Zero and serve as an ever-present affective performative that influences the 
actions and thoughts of all the characters involved.  
In this way, the attacks of 9/11 act as a catalyst that creates a pan-Middle 
Eastern identity, conflating ethnic and national differences together into a new racially 
defined group affiliation. While not using the same term, Ferry identifies this same social 
phenomenon when observing that 9/11 initiated “the creation and consolidation of a new 
identity category that grouped together all people who appeared Middle Eastern, Arab, 
or Muslim, with this consolidation reflecting a racialization wherein members of this 
group are identified as terrorists and are disidentified as American citizens” (169). The 
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novel itself notes the connection between the clash of civilizations ideologeme and the 
pan-Middle Eastern identity when, meeting the executive committee of the Muslim 
American Coordinating Council (MACC), Mohammad reflects that “the group was 
striking in its diversity” (87), while Sean, the narrative’s primary representative of the 
clash of civilizations ideologeme, consolidates the group into one race, stating the he 
just sees them as “[a]ll shades of brown” (202).  
Yet, not only does the pan-Middle Eastern identity link vast groups of people 
together through sweeping racial generalizations, it also articulates them with the 9/11 
terrorists, creating the suspicion or even assumption that all Middle Eastern people are 
also terrorists, potential threats both external and internal. For instance, when Claire 
asks Mohammad why he refuses to explain if The Garden is really a martyrs’ paradise, 
he refers to Asma’s public speech in which she states that the American people should 
be ashamed for their unfounded suspicions. As Mohammad states, “‘[Asma] was saying 
terrorists shouldn’t count more than people like her husband. But your questions—the 
suspicions they contain—make them count more. You assume we all must think like 
them unless we prove otherwise’” (302-3). In other terms, the clash of civilizations 
ideologeme essentializes all Middle Eastern people in racialized terms in order to place 
them on the oppositional side of the us/them binary, making the pan-Middle Eastern 
conglomerate into an assumed threat, no evidence required. 
Despite Mohammad’s efforts to live a very typical American life, he quickly finds 
himself pulled into this pan-Middle Eastern identity. This exposes Mohammad’s status in 
America as, what Slavoj Žižek calls a “Neighbour,” essentially a marginalized Other that 
is provisionally accepted into a society (Violence 106), a condition faced by Muslims in 
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American society. As Seval explains, “The position of the Neighbour is tolerated at best. 
This politically correct tolerance is hypocritical as it could potentially turn into hostility at 
any time. Because the Neighbour is close to the self, it poses a threat to the internal 
psyche and the very core of personhood” (103). As such, a Neighbor is a status of one 
who is a conditional member of the in-group, and therefore, due to the aspects that 
differentiate them from full members of the in-group, can be excluded from the in-group 
at any time. Once articulated in such a way, their very presence can be seen as a 
threat. Seval states that it is this proximity of the Neighbour “to the self that makes the 
Other so threatening” (106). After Mohammad deals with ethnic discrimination that loses 
him a business venture in Afghanistan and incites public outrage over his design 
submission, he begins to realize the tenuous nature of his previous identity as an 
American, painfully becoming aware that he was only ever a tolerated Neighbour. In 
response, he grows a beard and fasts for Ramadan for the first time in his life, which 
Seval sees as “acts of protest rather than faith” (113). As such, “Mohammed’s [sic] 
world shatters when he realizes that he is not an ordinary American but the tolerated 
Neighbour” (113), and he soon finds himself drifting between temporary homes and 
becoming increasingly disconnected from his work at the architectural firm. 
It is through the racialized suspicion of the clash of civilizations that Claire, who 
for most of the novel is just about the only person on Mohammad’s side, begins to 
question his affiliation with her social in-group as an American, wondering if he really 
could fit the stereotype and be an actual internal threat in her midst. The stereotyping 
process portrayed in the novel, however, is complex, involving multiple parties in its 
creation. Morey and Yaquin describe this as the dialogic nature of stereotyping in which 
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multiple discourses interact in order to negotiate the identity of those considered as 
either an insider or an outsider to the dominant discourse, which results in discursive 
representations of positive and negative stereotypes interacting to create an evolving 
meaning that is projected on the Other or those perceived to belong to that particular 
social group (31).  
Mohammad enacts his struggle with dialogic stereotyping in his reactions to the 
personal encounters and media portrayals that start to push him out of the in-group, in 
which he “is portrayed as an enemy of everything that he is” (Keeble 174-5). His 
growing of his beard and fasting for Ramadan, in this light, are both acts of defiance, 
“defiance that grows quickly in response to the identity the media creates for him and 
projects onto him" (173). However, this stereotyping also results in him “taking on 
aspects of the identity that is created from him by a biased conservative media” (173). 
As Morey and Yaquin state, Mohammad is not the only one to find himself in such a 
situation, as Muslims find themselves increasingly in “a double bind of permformativity: 
called upon to demonstrate through performance their national identities, while at the 
same time performing what is sometimes viewed suspiciously as a conflicting allegiance 
to the overarching Ummah,” the Islamic community (40). As they state, “Thus, Muslims 
in the West may find themselves overdetermined by the requirements of conflicting 
performances” (40). Mohammad clearly feels these pressures, as he reflects, “Mo had 
found himself reinvented by others, so distorted he couldn’t recognize himself” 
(Waldman 330). Despite the conflictedness of these performances, both sides of the 
stereotyping dialogue tend to act as excluding mechanisms, as the Muslim is expected 
to act Muslim, but in doing so, they sow the seeds for public suspicion of their true 
219 
 
allegiances, as, after all, under the clash of civilizations ideologeme, one cannot be an 
American and a Muslim at the same time. Thus, to the Muslim American, the double 
bind is trap that articulates them as an internal threat, one to be watched, scrutinized, 
but never trusted, since there is a trace of the incommensurable Other in all of their 
actions, just as Mohammad’s memorial is scrutinized and mistrusted only because of 
his Muslim ethnicity.  
While some of the characters in the narrative become articulated as internal 
threats while others do not, all of the characters struggle to maintain the 
internal/external and us/them dichotomy that the novel itself deploys in order to critique. 
For both of the characters that are turned into perceived internal threats, Asma and 
Mohammad, race is the dividing line as they become incorporated into the pan-Middle 
Eastern identity based largely on their appearances, and hence are othered by 
racialized physical stereotypes that ignore all other aspects of their identity, such as 
their human decency or American citizenship status, respectively. Under this weight, the 
novel portrays the clash of civilizations ideologeme as an oppressive pseudoidea that 
nullifies political agency for both out-group and in-group members, as all of the 
characters in the text are ultimately unable to fight the social pressures of Islamophobia 
that shaped life in America after 9/11. This triumph of Islamophobia culminates as Claire 
sides with MACC to request that Mohammad withdraw his memorial design from the 
selection process (Waldman 309), an action that solidifies Mohammad’s status as a 
perceived internal threat. Since an internal threat must be eliminated in some sense, 
Mohammad finds himself excluded from the American in-group, as, after hearing 
Claire’s request, he finally leaves America, feeling stripped of his status as an American 
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citizen, his sense of belonging to the in-group of the nation, and becomes an 
international architect, a move that Keeble describes as “a complete immersion in multi-
national capitalism” (172), a re-articulation of his identity as a citizen of the world, but no 
longer a citizen of America. This moves Mohammad from not only being culturally 
excluded from America and his sense of citizenship, but spatially excluded as well, 
reinforcing the belief that America and the rest of the world still exist on different sides of 
the binary clash of civilizations equation. 
The final chapter of the narrative attests to the endurance of the racial 
discrimination and stereotyping at the heart of the clash of civilizations ideologeme, as 
we make a proleptic jump twenty years into the future, into the post-9/11 world of 2023. 
Not only is this a temporal jump but a spatial jump as well, as Mohammad, now in 
Mumbai, looks back at a long career as an international architect and is interviewed for 
a film documentary about the memorial competition controversy, now seen as a crucial 
moment in American history. At this point, we are given clues about a seemingly 
Utopian future in which post-9/11 Islamophobia is a thing of the past (Waldman 323). In 
this future, the decision to have Mohammad withdraw is seen as a mistake, one that 
Claire regrets (332). This ending solidifies Waldman’s harsh criticisms of both American 
racism and the ineffectiveness of liberal moderate tolerance as Claire is depicted as 
living a life of regret over her choice, never quite able to come to terms with the 9/11 
attacks without the effective memorial that she believes The Garden would have been.  
It turns out that the nameless cameraman in the interview is actually Claire’s son, 
William, and the interviewer, Molly, his girlfriend. William has spent his life longing for a 
memorial that he could connect to the loss of his father, Cal, and struck out to find 
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Mohammad in Mumbai. The flag memorial that was built instead of The Garden never 
seems effective to William or Claire. Yet, in his visit, Mohammad reveals that he was 
later commissioned by a wealthy Muslim to make The Garden, and he takes William 
there to see it. William quickly makes a pile of rocks there as a funeral cairn to his 
father, finally achieving the memorialization that he had needed all of these years to 
successfully grieve for his father. Crucially, though, William later shows the film of his 
visit to The Garden to his mother Claire, who notes that two changes were made to the 
design: the metal trees are planted upside down with the roots pointed up and the 
names of the victims on the wall are changed to verses from the Quran. William seems 
to accept The Garden for what it is, but Claire still sees the changes as some form of 
personalized message to Claire about his true terrorist intentions (Waldman 336). Even 
after all of these years, the tolerant liberal Claire still holds on to her Islamophobic 
suspicions and still proves to be under the grips of the clash of civilizations ideologeme. 
However, as Seval states, “the reader may eventually conclude that if there is anything 
sinister in ‘The Garden,’ it is in the eye of the beholder” (122), as each character seems 
to glean their own interpretation, and Mohammad never supplies an answer. Overall, at 
the second horizon, this future points to a Utopic time when the racial lines demarking 
the clash of civilizations dichotomies appears to be removed, at least within the borders 
of America. However, Mohammad is still excluded from America at the end, as all of his 
buildings have been made outside the country and he is still unable to get himself to 
travel back to the states, proving that the novel does not undo the ideologeme entirely. 
The spatial divisions of East and West still remain, and Mohammad finds himself 
excluded from America, permanently on the side of the East, unable to make himself 
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return. Perhaps the novel promotes the end of Islamophobia in America, even if it never 
actually describes how this comes to pass, avoiding the details of the issue through its 
futurist prolepsis. Yet, it still reinforces the spatial divisions of the clash of civilizations 
ideologeme, working to alter but not to dissipate its occlusions entirely.    
At the third horizon, expanding and re-interpreting the clash of civilizations 
ideologeme to the historic production of genre forms, we see that the novel’s imaginary 
fusing of the investigative journalism article genre and the 9/11 domestic novel genre 
results in ambivalent Utopian impulses that mirror the narrative’s own ambivalence 
toward the two genres it mixes together. While this combination allows the novel to fit 
into Keeble’s description of the political 9/11 novel, The Submission also has its own 
unique character that deserves analysis outside these often superimposed lines of 
subgenre-fitting generalizations. By utilizing this mix, The Submission engages in the 
Utopian unmasking of the formal and ideological pressures of investigative journalism 
that turns people into stereotypes, making it easier for the American public to take quick 
positions either in favor or in opposition to individuals and their actions. This stance 
critiques the formal pressures of the investigative journalism article toward the creation 
of strict demarcations, not only between social groups, but between asserting 
information as fact and fiction as well. Both of these formal urges can push journalism 
toward dichotomous worldviews, similar to what we find in Sean’s team philosophy 
mentioned above. Yet, the narrative counters this problem by employing the interiority 
available to the domestic 9/11 novel, as the narrative presents multiple sides of the 
story, and the inner thoughts of the characters begin to complicate and destabilize the 
stereotypes the characters at first seem to enact, as with Sam, Mo, Asma, and Claire, 
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Of course, this all comes together to partially transform the clash of civilizations 
ideologeme, as we have mentioned. Simultaneously, though, this use of multiple 
focalizing characters critiques the novelistic pressures toward the deep exploration of a 
single, and hence individualistic, limited, and isolated, perspective. Seen in combination, 
the ambivalent formal composition of The Submission, one that both critiques the 
weaknesses and celebrates the strengths each of its constituent genres, creates an 
unresolved narrative tension. This tension was likely felt, if not so explicitly articulated, 
by it many during its mixed critical reception, as many critics seemed concerned with 
which genre it was trying to be, and whether or not it performed well as either of these 
genres in isolation. Of course, the novel was not trying to be any one of its genres, but a 
sedimentation of the two, and following the Jamesonian maxim of “the content of the 
form,” this formal tension manifests in the content of its ambivalent Utopian impulses as 
well, offering mixed messages. 
As mentioned above, even the destabilization of stereotypes that if offers only 
partial transformations the clash of civilization ideologeme, as the narrative’s push 
toward the integration of group differences only extends to those within the borderlines 
of America as a nation, and the spatial borders between the East and West are still left 
as distinct as ever. An out group still remains in the futurist prolepse at the end, and, 
from the American perspective of the narrative, the out group is still the East. The clash 
of civilizations paradigm survives the novel, if only altered to include an integrated and 
re-negotiated sense of the West as both Christian and Muslim, white and Middle 
Eastern. As such, we end with a partial, ambivalent step toward Utopia. It has moved 
toward the uniting of the West, a noble and worthwhile effort, deploring the racialized 
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divisions of Islamophobia in its contemporary form, yet noting that these divisions still 
live strong in the transnational arena. If, as the narrative asserts, these divisions no 
longer exist in the near future along racial or ethnic lines, they clearly still exist as based 
on one’s nation of residence, as those living in the East, such as Mohammad by the end 
of the narrative, are still considered separate from the West. 
Contrary to this partial glimpse at progress, the ending is ultimately constructed 
as a hopeful ending. Even though, as Keeble notes, “each of the key narrative strands 
ends negatively” (186), it does offer hope for the future generations who come after 
these main characters, even if the characters we have spent our time with seem to be 
lost and unable to change. However, it is important to note that the ending does not 
actually depict the Utopian future of racial harmony that it claims as existing twenty 
years after the main narrative. Similar to how we noted in Sons that fear narratives of 
marginalized authors often end with a hopeful ending that points to a Utopic future that 
the narrative can never truly depict, The Submission ends with Molly and William telling 
Mohammad how America has changed, but only from the external geographical position 
of Mohammad’s home in Mumbai. While it hints at the Utopic possibilities of an America 
in 2023 that has at least resolved the internal social divide between the West and the 
Middle East, we are never quite able to tell if this is true. After all, Mohammad never 
chooses to return to America, never feeling that he has been accepted back into the in-
group. Instead, in the final scene we find that despite Claire’s apologies, even nearing 
her own death, she still distrusts Mohammad, still not believing that his intentions in 
designing the memorial were to respect the dead of 9/11 (Waldman 336). This final 
moment calls the Utopic reconciliation hinted at in the ending into question, and 
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oppressively re-asserts the permanence of the irreconcilable difference of the East and 
West. Further, it denotes the need for the creation of false threats as sacrificial 
scapegoats to appease social tensions, as Mohammad remains excluded from America, 
and even Claire cannot trust that he has not become an external threat, that he has 
somehow become equal to the terrorists who attacked the WTC themselves (302-3). 
Despite the facts presented by the reportorial aspects of the narrative, and the diverse 
caste of representative characters, the roots of discrimination and racism are too deep 
for Claire to overcome, and, hence, her generation of Americans, of which she is a 
representative in-group member. 
Yet, the punishment of Claire, who falls victim to an unnamed sickness, implies 
the novel’s disapproval of her Islamophobic mistrust as a kind of counter-contagion, and 
points us toward the Utopian hope of the next generation of Americans as represented 
by Molly and William who accept his memorial, even with the changes, without question, 
apparently seeing past 9/11-era American Islamophobia. This acceptance conceptually 
unites the West and the East in mourning the victims of the attacks and removing from 
Mohammad his status as a threat, a status that, unfortunately, Mohammad seems to 
have internalized so deeply at this point that he cannot remove it from his own self-
conception anymore and remains excluded at the end. With all of this in consideration, 
though, from the perspective of the reader, the novel offers the Utopian element of 
unmasking the ideologies that reify individuals and force people to fit into political 
positions that they may not actually feel they belong to, a process that can ultimately 
result in people being stereotyped into the dehumanizing role of the threat. While 
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ambivalence exists throughout, the narrative is still not without Utopic utility, if viewed 
from a particular interpretive perspective. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, in this chapter’s discussion of the 9/11 novel, we have seen how the 
primary fear themes operate in the narrative, and we have even discovered a few 
notable patterns emerging from the fear narratives of this genre that may prove 
applicable to fear narratives as a whole. In the texts we reviewed by authors of 
dominant positions, The Zero and Bleeding Edge, we found the repeated use of the 
fearfully ambivalent ending, one that utilizes fear as a motivating tool to either prevent 
change or to urge change in a particular direction. Opposing this, we found in the texts 
authored by marginalized authors, Sons and Other Flammable Objects and The 
Submission, the use of the hopeful ending, one that follows a narrative stricken with fear 
with an ending that points to a hopeful future, but is unable to directly portray that future 
Utopia. I would speculate that this difference between the two types of endings stems 
from the likely unconscious political desires of the authors stemming from their different 
social standings, but also from their very different ideological positions. In either case, 
these resolutions point to a longing for a solution to the contradictions the authors 
experience in society, but the fear surrounding each implies that they cannot quite trust 
their own symbolic solutions as being adequate to the political challenges they face. 
Whereas the ambivalent ending itself tends not to change the world, but instead fears 
that it is changing or has already changed, the hopeful ending points to the possibility of 
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social change in which marginalized groups may better their position, even if, as we 
have noted above, it is only a tenuous or largely imaginary possibility. As such, it is 
possible that despite the various political beliefs of the authors, the ambivalent ending 
may serve conservative forces and the hopeful ending serve progressive efforts.  
One last notable observation from these texts is that few of them seem overtly 
depict the terrorist. There are, of course a few notable exceptions, such as John 
Updike’s Terrorist (2006) and Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007), two novels that have 
received tremendous amounts of negative feedback for their allegedly flawed depictions 
of the terrorist Other by such critics as Rothberg (“A Failure” 154) and Gray (“Open 
Doors” 134). As such, for some, the omission of the terrorist or their failed depictions of 
the Other has been often perceived as “[t]he great failure of the contemporary American 
novel” (Ferry 166). However, Ferry sees this failure in political terms as an unconscious, 
or possibly conscious, conservative reaction to 9/11: 
 [P]erhaps we are expecting too much from our novelists, our urban spectators, 
our cultural mediators, to write this Other that, frankly, they can’t possibly know. 
As will become apparent, the approach of contemporary American authors has 
been to fall into well-worn frameworks of seeing (a masculinity) crisis as 
opposition, endeavoring to set binary oppositions within traditional American 
mythic narratives that hopefully reach some sort of resolution. Perhaps this 
reductive dualistic approach is a (sub)conscious reaction to reaffirm their 
whiteness, rather than an attempt to understand the motives of the Other. (167) 
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With all of the information we have gathered in the analyses of this chapter it would 
seem that Ferry’s suppositions are supported, at least in part. After all, in the texts by 
dominant authors we see the ambiguous endings making a conservative push to stop 
the world from changing before it is too late. However, in the marginalized authors we 
see a greater attempt to understand the Others, to momentarily become the other if only 
in narrative focalization, even if the terrorists themselves, the incommensurable Other of 
early twenty-first century America, are not directly approached. Yet, as Ferry notes, how 
can they depict that which they do not know? With this in mind, we can safely state that 
the 9/11 novel, at least as it currently stands, does not strive to understand the terrorist, 
but instead works to understand the American reaction to the attacks, our trauma, our 
conflicts, our racism, and our pain.  
Consequently, even novels that overtly question divisive ideologemes such as 
the clash of civilizations, irreconcilable differences, or justified paranoia in an effort to 
diffuse their affective pressures as they relate to 9/11 and American culture seem at a 
formal and symbolic level only to re-inscribe these same mystifications at the level of 
the textual unconscious. Rather than dissolving these ideological and affective 
pressures, the fear present in many 9/11 novels serves to re-inscribe them back into the 
American imaginary by often altering but re-circulating these mystifications in new 
forms, while ignoring the real international scope of the political issues brought 
uncomfortably to our attention by the attacks of 9/11. In other words, in reaction to the 
shattering of the Virgin Land myth, which is essentially our belief in America’s 
invulnerability to and separation from the possibility of foreign attack, rather than face 
the complicated questions of terrorism, the 9/11 novel has instead pulled America’s 
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attention back into itself in a way that has served to repair our belief in American 
exceptionalism, if only under the justification of a new national myth. Just as Jameson 
notes that hegemonic texts must manage subversive impulses by kindling these same 
impulses before extinguishing them (The Political 287), this chapter’s study of the 9/11 
novel points to the conclusion that even texts that attempt to be subversive or critical of 
the hegemonic simultaneously reproduce these oppressive ideologies, even if in subtly 
altered forms.       
Most American attempts at representing the terrorist, in any media, follow the 
process that we have outlined in the previous chapter—personalization, pathologization, 
and absolutization (Takacs, Terrorism 59)—which occludes the political and material 
aspects of the subject under layers of ideology and turns the terrorist or even the 
suspected terrorist into a Western villain archetype. It also has a second effect, 
however, in that the concept of the terrorist, when explicitly depicted, becomes so 
diluted and misdirected that the literal presence of a terrorist may actually serve to 
occlude the narrative’s attempt to engage in a dialogue about terrorism and the terrorist 
after 9/11. Instead, if we look to other genres than the 9/11 novel that do not explicitly 
depict the terrorist, a narrative may actually be able to better examine their cultural 
impact and meaning, because it would no longer need to operate under the dominant 
ideological weight of the process outlined above. Instead, defamiliarizing the terrorist by 
depicting it in other forms, such as the zombie, robot, or walker, allows narratives to 
work under some of the ideological radar of their audience, enabling it to engage in 
often deeper, more controversial, and more sympathetic analyses that, if they were 
depicted overtly, would likely face public censorship as being unpatriotic or insensitive 
230 
 
to the grief of those morning the 9/11 attacks. Effectively, the implicit discussion of 
terrorism and the attacks of September 11 that we find in horror, science fiction, and 
fantasy narratives has the potential to more open, productive, and insightful 
interrogations of the subject than those overtly depicting terrorists, such in the 9/11 
novel. The nature of speculative fiction is often more open to positing controversial 
positions through allegorical and symbolic representations than realistic fiction can, as it 
allows, in part, both the reader and writers to circumvent the ideological screens that 
seek to pre-interpret their discussions along the lines of the dominant rhetoric of the 
post-9/11 Bush Administration. In the coming chapters, we will use what we have found 
in the 9/11 novel as a conceptual baseline to see if works of speculative fiction have 
lived up to their potential to dig deeper and stray further from the conservative status 















POST-9/11 AMERICAN FEAR NARRATIVES IN THE HORROR GENRE: THE 
ZOMBIE NARRATIVE 
 
 In the last chapter we analyzed post-9/11 American fear narratives as found in 
the 9/11 novel, focusing on the role of primary fear themes in these works, both in texts 
that illustrate dominant and marginalized cultural perspectives. In this chapter we will 
continue to enlarge our understanding of the fear narrative by analyzing post-9/11 
American fear narratives in the horror genre across various media. In order to limit our 
analysis to a more manageable body of texts, we will focus on the zombie narrative sub-
genre, a tradition of horror that was especially popular in the decade after 9/11. 
 In general, defining the horror genre can be just as tricky and reductionist as 
defining any narrative genre. Andrew Tudor calls the attempt to make a set definition of 
a genre “the fallacy of concreteness,” one in which we “adopt a nominalist approach to 
defining the genre, identifying by fiat its allegedly universal distinguishing 
characteristics” (456). As he states, “Genres change over time and sustain differently 
constructed audiences. And in as much as audiences are composed of active agents 
they can and do conceive genres variably, taking divergent pleasures from them” (456). 
Further complicating the matter, in his discussion of television genres, Jason Mittell 
reminds us that genres are social constructs, not just collections of formal elements: 
“Television genres are cultural categories that discursively bundle texts together within 
particular contexts, not simply sets of textual conventions” (233). The social and 
processual aspect of genre classification is evident in other media as well, such as the 
232 
 
relatively arbitrary belief that Ridley Scott’s film Alien (1986) is science fiction, even 
though it shares formal aspects of both science fiction and horror, or the ongoing debate 
about whether Shelley’s Frankenstein; or the Modern Prometheus (1818, 1823) is a 
gothic novel or the first science fiction novel (cf. Aldiss).  
With these thoughts carefully in mind, it is still useful to establish a general 
working definition before we attempt to analyze a given genre, at least to establish a 
sense of the borders of my object of study for the purposes of this particular project. As 
such, Gary Hoppenstand, while explicitly referring only to horror fiction literature, gives 
us a good start that seems to ring true to the everyday understanding of the genre in 
any medium: “the horror story is written and read for the express purpose of 
experiencing the emotion of fright in order to be entertained,” even if it is also “the 
formal expression of our collective fears” and “a subliminal representation of the id” (8-
9). While this does not attempt to reduce the genre to a single, oversimplified function or 
purpose for all audiences, it does provide a reasonable sense of our topic. The horror 
genre is dominated by the experience of the emotion of fear itself, and this experience is 
often evoked through powerful performatives (external stimuli that produce pre-cognitive 
affect) and visceral reactions in its audiences, who empathetically connect with either 
written characters or the virtual on-screen body of those threatened in horror narratives. 
As Xavier Aldana Reyes states, “The power of corporeal horror resides in its capacity to 
affect corporeally by making the fictional body a virtuality, a potential body-in-suffering 
that can be consumed. Alignment with the on-screen body is therefore crucial for affect 
to occur” (253). Making this connection with the endangered virtual-Other, according to 
David Pendery, stimulates the human fear response, but in a way that provides its 
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sensation-seeking viewers with pleasurable rewards at both the affective level through 
autonomic neurochemicals such as serotonin and norepinephrine, but also later through 
the cognitive stimulation of the “pleasurable involvement in narrative” (150, 153). 
 Of course, the horror genre encompasses many subgenres that enjoyed 
popularity after 9-11, such as the torture-horror film—as in James Wan’s Saw (2004) 
and Eli Roth’s Hostel (2005) (see Aldana Reyes)—and the found-footage horror film—
as in Oren Peli’s Paranormal Activity (2007) and Matt Reeves’s Cloverfield (2008). 
However, it could be argued that none of these movements were as popular during this 
period as the zombie narrative. Zombie narratives can be found in just about every 
media conceivable, from movies, literature, television, video games (on all platforms), 
art, novelty items, cosplay, social media, and actual emergency preparedness 
publications authored by legitimate public health institutes (Olney 2-6). With all these 
zombie narratives considered in aggregate, the horde of texts becomes an 
overwhelming cultural mass of influence and relevance that overpowers other post-9/11 
strands of horror. Kyle William Bishop proclaims the era a “zombie renaissance” (12), 
and, even in 2011, journalist John Ogg estimated that “today’s zombie genre economy 
is worth…$5.74 billion.” 
 Bishop believes one reason for this strong cultural response to the zombie is that 
the monster adapted within the American imaginary to its new historical context so that 
“the primary metaphor in the post-9/11 zombie world” is “terrorism itself” (29), a concern 
that generated the most central source of cultural anxiety since the attacks. Journalist 
Warren St. John makes this connection between the fictional zombie trope and the 
imagined fears of the terrorist explicit:  
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[I]t does not take much of a stretch to see the parallel between zombies and 
anonymous terrorists who seek to convert others within society to their deadly 
cause. The fear that anyone could be a suicide bomber or a hijacker parallels a 
common trope of zombie films, in which healthy people are zombified by contact 
with other zombies and become killers.  
Given this new context, zombies have adapted to resonate with post-9/11 American 
concerns, and, as this quote implies, also act as a nexus for a number of primary fear 
themes, even forming into a number of insightful secondary fear themes that we will 
discuss shortly. 
 The zombie, of course, has a long history in American culture, and both the fear 
themes it utilizes and the zombie narrative itself has changed continuously in the past 
century, so it can help to think of this formal evolution as progressing through repeated, 
processual loops of a genre life cycle. Using this concept, we can think of the dominant 
trajectory of the genre and its formal elements as they have changed over time, moving 
from the stages of invention, convention, and finally cliché if they fail to inject new 
elements into their mix. John Cawelti uses the term invention in popular fiction in a way 
entirely different from the way invention is used in rhetoric. To Cawelti, invention, as we 
will use the term, refers to “elements which are uniquely imagined by the creator such 
as new kinds of characters, ideas, or linguistic forms” (Cawelti 732). Conventions, by 
contrast, are “elements which are known to both the creator and his audience 
beforehand” (732). Often, conventions include “favorite plots, stereotyped characters, 
accepted ideas, commonly known metaphors, and other linguistic devices” (732). 
Another way of looking at this is that the “[c]onvention is the fulfillment of an established 
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expectation” (Amend 132), what a consumer expects to find in a particular genre. 
However, as Cawelti reminds us, textual elements, or even texts themselves, cannot be 
exclusively categorized or conceived of as either an invention or convention, “because 
many elements lie somewhere along a continuum between the two poles” (732). Last, a 
cliché, in this sense, is a convention that has been so overused that it has lost its 
cultural meaning, resonance, affective impact, and originality, becoming what we might 
often call a tired story idea. Once an element becomes a cliché, though, it is not 
doomed to a permanent state of obsolescence and can be resurrected to cultural 
relevance through the injection of new aspects of invention.  
For example, we can see this play out in the cultural evolution of the zombie as 
an existent in the American narrative. After the popular horror films Day of the Dead 
(Romero 1985) and The Return of the Living Dead (O’Bannon 1985) brought the 
convention of the zombie to the cultural center stage for a time, the subsequent lack of 
invention to its narrative form throughout the late 80s and 90s caused the convention to 
lose its fearful resonance in popular American culture, becoming something of a cliché. 
During this period, the zombie form was instead resurrected back to cultural relevance 
by transferring it to narratives of different hybrid genres with different audiences by 
injecting the form with comedy to provide an impulse of invention. In its new 
conventional form as the comedy zombie, the creature often lost its position as a 
starring monster and tended to surface as a two-dimensional or goofy minion, such as 
in the comical undead army in the dark fantasy comedy film Army of Darkness (Raimi 
1992) or the friendly zombie character Billy Butcherson (Doug Jones) in the comedy 
horror fantasy film Hocus Pocus (Ortega 1993), the latter of whom becomes an ally that 
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actually helps the film’s protagonists. However, once the comedy zombie began to lose 
its impact and novelty, it began to slide back toward the cliché end of the spectrum until 
the form became reinvigorated once again by international influences such as the 
Japanese videogame Resident Evil (Capcom 1996), its film adaptation by English 
director Paul W. S. Anderson in 2002, and the film 28 Days Later (Boyle 2002), all of 
which added the invention of making the zombie a rapidly spreading viral outbreak with 
global implications. This formed the new convention of the viral zombie that especially 
found cultural currency after 9/11 and helped to usher in the American zombie narrative 
craze foregrounded by Bishop.  
As we see in this example, thinking of narrative elements in this way as flowing 
through processual cultural lifecycles as conventions, inventions, and clichés does not 
just stretch them into a series of imitations and the re-combinations of disparate ideas. It 
is also a theoretical construct that aligns easily with Jameson’s three horizons of 
interpretation. At the first horizon, this “lifecycle” approach foregrounds the ways that 
each work’s “invention” is its aesthetic and ideological “symbolic act” in response to the 
cultural circulation of generic formal elements and how they have evolved as imbricated, 
genealogical forms. At the second horizon, it helps us to consider the ideologies of 
narratives and how they have served various social functions at particular times within a 
given society as they “[reflect] the needs and interests of its readers” (Hoppenstand 3). 
Further, it can even highlight the political nature of narrative form, as Cawelti states, 
“Conventions help maintain a culture’s stability while inventions help it respond to 
changing circumstances and provide new information about the world” (732), illustrating 
its conservative and progressive impulses as well.  
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From the more distant, third-horizon perspective of the evolution of the genre 
form, we can extend Cawelti’s concepts to make generalizations not just about 
individual narrative elements but about the interactions of texts both within and across 
genres. We can say, then, that a narrative has a high degree of inventionality if it 
exhibits a synthesis of ideas that were formerly seen as separate within a culture, 
making it appear as a creative innovation in the context of a given genre. At times, such 
texts can be seen as so new that they either branch off to begin their own genres or 
take an existing genre in a new direction, becoming a foundational, seminal, or iconic 
text that spawns a new artistic sub-genre movement. Of course, as Jameson reminds 
us, when these genres branch off in this way, their form still retains elements of its 
ideological content: “When such forms are reappropriated and refashioned in quite 
different social and cultural contexts, this message persists and must be functionally 
reckoned into the new form” (The Political, 141). This creates new generic forms with 
sedimented layers of numerous genre ideologies that contradict and at times harmonize 
into new historically grounded expressions.  
When high-inventionality texts meet with the level of cultural success necessary 
to branch off, they tend to engender imitation from other artists who seek to perfect and 
refine its inventions in their own texts, causing its inventions to become conventional. 
These low-inventionality texts work with established, conventional elements of a given 
genre by injecting them with relatively small measures of invention, in a process that 
Jameson describes as “renewal and substitution” (The Political, 131), thereby keeping 
the text entertaining, interesting, and culturally resonant to its audience but working 
largely within the bounds established by prior high-inventionality texts. In Jamesonian 
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terms, this works within his permutational scheme of the genre in which his three terms 
of the structural norm, textual deviation, and the limiting constraints of the historical 
situation (145-8), are here seen as the conventional genre form, elements of 
inventionality, and the confines circumscribing a sense of historical resonance. It is 
worth noting here how Jameson’s notion of the historical situation combines with affect 
theory, at least in respect to the pre-cognitive or unconscious aspects of textual 
production within its historical situation: 
[T]he relationship of the ‘third term’ or historical situation to the text is not 
construed as causal (however that might be imagined) but rather as one of a 
limiting situation; the historical moment is here understood to block off or shut 
down a certain number of formal possibilities available before, and to open up 
determinate new ones, which may or may not ever be realized in artistic practice. 
(148) 
Putting these concepts together, textual production is an act of selecting among the 
affective potentialities and intensities available under the constraints of the historical 
situation, making it a symbolic act that interprets affect into a particular formal and 
narrative expression in which some narrative potentials are realized and some are left 
untouched or unrealized.  
Often, if a genre fails to reinvigorate its form through regular injections of 
invention, it begins to fall from a conventional form into a state of cliché, wherein the 
elements of its constituent texts have become so overused that they lose their cultural 
meaning and relevance. Many of these high-conventionality texts and genres can be 
rescued by adding in fresh elements of invention that explore creative directions not 
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previously exhausted, or by targeting them to new audiences who may see the cliché as 
original, as we saw in the comedy zombie example above. However, failing this effort at 
reinvigoration, a genre tends to move into a marginalized position aimed at a cult or 
subcultural audience or it will seem to simply disappear entirely—at least until its 
residual elements find new cultural resonance in other forms. As Jameson states, “The 
older generic categories do not, for all that, die out, but persist” (The Political, 107), as 
enduring formal elements that re-emerge along with their ideological content in other 
generic forms. Of course, while we can think of the genre life cycle as moving in these 
general terms in regards to an entire genre or sub-genre, as we saw above, individual 
narrative elements of a genre also go through their own cyclical changes, circulating 
through a given culture across genre and media boundaries. Such narrative elements 
as these also include primary fear themes and their re-combinations into more concrete 
secondary fear themes. 
 In this chapter, we will explore post-9/11 American fear narratives in the horror 
genre by looking at the zombie narrative sub-genre, focusing on how its use of the 
primary fear themes combine to form five prominent secondary fear themes: the 
zombie-creature, the survival space, the wall, the hypermasculine character, and the 
survivalist. In doing so, we will first analyze the morphology of the zombie-creature in 
film and its new incarnation as the millennial, or post-9/11, zombie, a term that we will 
define shortly. Second, we will delineate the symbolic structure of the survival space 
and the wall as seen from a marginalized perspective by focusing on Colson 
Whitehead’s novel Zone One (2011). Third, we will map the fear saturated terrain of the 
hypermasculine character and the survivalist by looking briefly at the novel The Road 
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(2006), by Cormac McCarthy, and peering in greater depth into David Trachtenberg’s 
film 10 Cloverfield Lane (2016), both presented here as examples of what we will call 
the post-zombie narrative. Overall, in each of these zombie narratives, the secondary 
fear themes act as nexuses of American fear that embody multiple primary fear themes, 
creating a network of cultural associations that build from its conventional generic 
antecedents while giving each a twist of invention. As a fear narrative, each zombie 
narrative, then, is a symbolic act that creates an imaginary relation to the real conditions 
of its existence in the post-9/11 political environment in order to occupy its own unique 
place in the spectrum between inventionality and conventionality through its interactions 
with and re-combinations of primary fear themes to produce secondary fear themes in 
the form of concrete narrative events or existents (characters or elements of setting). 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ZOMBIE-CREATURE 
The zombie-creature, considered in isolation as a narrative existent, is a 
consummate secondary fear theme that has littered the narratives of the past century, 
but particularly so since the attacks of 9/11. Their rotting forms embody contamination 
fears as they spread their blight, loom in massive hordes as external threats, 
personalize fear as they turn our friends and family into internal threats, incite paranoia 
as we realize anyone could become a zombie (or already is one), transgress the 
categorical boundaries between life and death, and trample contemporary society into 
the now famous zombie apocalypse. We refer to this secondary fear theme as the 
“zombie-creature” because, in practice, the zombie can either manifest in the narrative 
as a creature actually referred to as a zombie or they can take the form of another 
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creature depicted with characteristics suspiciously similar to a zombie. Essentially, 
these latter texts utilize the conventions of the zombie narrative but give its creature’s 
form a twist of invention. The term “zombie-creature” encompasses both of these 
variants in order to refer to the zombie in a larger sense that can transcend genres and 
media forms, all while still referring to a narrative existent that is culturally recognizable 
as falling under the general category of the “zombie” as American culture has come to 
know them today. 
It is something of a zombie narrative convention that the featured zombie-
creature is one that the majority of the audience will quickly recognize as a zombie, 
even if it is called by some other name. For instance, in Romero’s film Night of the 
Living Dead (1968), the zombies are never actually given a name at all and, off camera, 
even Romero refers to them as ghouls. In 28 Days Later they are called the infected. In 
Cherie Priest’s steampunk novel, Boneshaker (2010), they are called the rotters. In 
Frank Darabont’s AMC television series The Walking Dead (2010-Current), the zombies 
go by numerous names often used independently by isolated groups of human 
survivors, including walkers, biters, creepers, geeks, rotters, and skin eaters, among 
others. However, even zombies that are not exactly zombies, but behave similarly and 
are described much like zombies, go by many names. At times, this can cause the 
distinction between zombies and vampires to blur. Typically, most audiences would 
agree that zombies are undead monsters that eat human flesh and, often, brains, while 
vampires are undead monsters that drink blood to survive. However, texts such as 
Justin Cronin’s trilogy of novels—The Passage (2010), The Twelve (2012), and The City 
of Mirrors (2016) (and its one season Fox television adaptation The Passage in 2019)—
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describe zombie-creatures that function as zombies but are actually vampires called 
“virals,” a move that seemingly calls back to the seminal vampire as zombie-creature 
used in Richard Matheson’s novel I Am Legend (1954). Further, as we will discuss later 
in this chapter and those to come, at times, other creatures take the zombie’s place 
within a narrative that has all of the conventional markings of a zombie narrative, such 
as the human cannibals in The Road or the alien invaders in 10 Cloverfield Lane. In the 
next chapter, we will even argue that the zombie theme has spread across genre 
boundaries, arising anew in science fiction as Cylons in Ronald D. Moore’s Sci-Fi 
Channel series Battlestar Galactica (2004-09). In the fantasy genre, Benioff and Weiss’s 
HBO series Game of Thrones (2011-2019) features the undead Wights (and to some 
extent the White Walkers that lead them) that share many characteristics of the zombie 
form, making them consummate examples of the cross-genre spread of the zombie-
creature secondary fear theme. 
Although the zombie has changed dramatically over the years, we can, in 
general, distinguish this secondary fear theme from other horror creature types by 
noting that they display some combination of all or some of the following characteristics 
or conventions. Of course, a creature does not qualify as a zombie simply by having 
one of these characteristics. It must have all or at least play with many of these basic 
conventions to be a zombie-creature in the terminology of this study. For example, 
mummies have decayed humanoid forms, but they lack many of the other common 
traits of the zombie, making them conventionally and easily socially distinguished from 
the zombie. However, these characteristics do give us a beginning point for 
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understanding the genealogy of the zombie-creature as they are conceived in American 
culture. 
• Decaying Humanoid Form: The zombie creature has a humanoid form that 
exists in various states of decay, ranging from looking very human to corpse-like. 
Not only does this make the zombie a transgressive monster, conflating the 
boundaries between life and death, but it’s browning or blackening flesh inspires 
racial interpretations of the zombie-creature (cf. Canavan, “We Are”).  
• Dehumanized: The zombie creature is depicted as being of less value than a 
human, or the individuals who were once considered as human become less 
than human once turned into a zombie, a process akin to Aimé Césaire’s 
“thingification” (42). This plays on our fears of exclusion, as turning into a zombie 
means expulsion from one’s social in-group status of being a human and thrusts 
them into the marginalized position of being only a thing. This dehumanization 
also makes the zombie creature an excellent “bad guy” for videogames that can 
be killed indiscriminately without having to confront moral reservations or ethical 
concerns. 
• Fast or Slow Moving: The zombie is either depicted as shambling and slow, as 
in the Romero films, or fast and predatory (cf. Roche).  
• Horde Mentality: This characteristic has also been called “massification” 
(Carroll, The Philosophy 50) and the “multiple threat” (Waller 16). These 
creatures tend to form together in groups, sometimes very large ones. Often, 
they can be defeated when encountered alone or in small groups, but hold 
overwhelming and insurmountable power in large groups (Browning 44). This 
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stands in contrast to the typical portrayal of vampires or mummies who tend to be 
depicted alone or in small groups. In critical analyses, this horde characteristic 
often inspires questions of individuality versus collectivity. 
• Lack Individual Autonomy/Mindlessness: The zombie is typically shown as 
lacking individual autonomy (as in the traditional enslaved Voodoo zombie), 
and/or lacking much of their former cognitive abilities, often unable to speak or 
only to speak in a rudimentary fashion. Some zombies retain a few of their former 
cognitive skills and can manipulate objects, such as tools, door handles, or clubs. 
However, it is typically not possible to reason with a zombie, even if you can trick 
them at times. 
• Infectious: The zombie condition can be spread to others, usually by bite or 
other means that leads to contamination and eventual conversion into a zombie 
creature. Many millennial zombies emphasize this trait, spreading their condition 
in a virus-like fashion, as the zombies of this strain are often fast, aggressive, 
and spread throughout society quickly, infecting and converting at a remarkable 
rate. 
• Cannibalistic: The ghoul-like zombie creature usually hungers for human flesh, 
and, particularly in the millennial variety, are very aggressive in their pursuit and 
consumption of flesh. This characteristic often produces the “zombie as 
consumer” critical analysis. 
• Difficult to Defeat or Only-the-Head-Shot-Kills: Typically, as per convention, 
the zombie can only be killed by damaging the brain. Even when this convention 
is not followed, they are usually difficult to kill, unless done in a particular fashion. 
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• Apocalyptic: The introduction of the zombie into the fictional world, especially 
after the second stain (as described below), typically results in the collapse of 
civilization and often the death of most of the people in the world. Much as Marco 
Caracciolo states that catastrophe is “a radical instance” of Herman’s world 
disruption (223), the zombie itself works within the narrative as an agent of world 
disruption (Herman 133-36). This characteristic often allows the zombie narrative 
to either satire actual-world society or to critically posit new political 
configurations, whether in a conservative or utopian fashion. 
• Unexplained: Often the reason for the zombie outbreak or its cause is 
unexplained, since the fall of society often makes such causal links unattainable 
to the characters in the narrative. This tends to make the etiology of the zombie 
inaccessible or even irrelevant to the characters in the narrative, who are often 
more focused on simply surviving and cannot take the time to investigate the 
creatures’ origins.  
With these characteristics in mind, we can then begin to outline the morphology 
of the zombie-creature in the American narrative, and John Browning provides an 
excellent way to map out this evolution through zombie cinema. While his genealogy of 
the zombie focuses on its filmic representations, it also works well in capturing the 
morphology of the zombie-creature in general, as for some time film has been the 
dominant media of the zombie narrative. The affordances of film have historically 
worked well to capture the sheer visuality of the horror in facing the rotting flesh of the 
zombie, allowing its repulsive form an uncomfortable closeness to the viewer as an 
uncanny memento mori, inspiring the imaginations of artists across other media to 
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follow its thematic inventions. Browning divides the history of the zombie into three 
parts, each epitomized by a particular iconic film that serves as an early high 
inventionality text that inspired the subsequent conventionalization of the new zombie-
creature form. The first is the “proto-strain,” that of the supernatural zombie (Browning 
42). These narratives draw from Haitian voodoo to create the mindless zombie that is 
resurrected as a slave to a voodoo Bocor or sorcerer. In Hollywood this can be best 
captured in White Zombie (Halperin, 1932), staring Béla Lugosi. As Browning states, in 
these films the zombie is “a distant, geographically isolated and relatively surmountable 
(i.e. ‘single’) threat” (42).  
Next, Browning’s first zombie strain, per se, is “a cycle of ‘straight’ filmic 
adaptations” of Matheson’s novel I Am Legend, such as Ragona and Salkow’s The Last 
Man on Earth (1964), starring Vincent Price, and Sagal’s The Omega Man (1971), 
starring Charlton Heston (43). Browning justifiably asserts the often overlooked 
importance of Matheson’s novel in the evolution of the zombie, noting how the novel 
changed the zombie by combining the insatiable, cannibalistic hunger and infectious 
nature of the vampire with the apocalyptic and dystopian elements of narrative 
disruption that have since been hallmarks of the zombie narrative. Further, his 
“zombies” introduced the characteristics of the horde mentality, and, as Browning notes, 
relocates the spatial orientation of the horror threat: “because the central ‘threat’ in the 
story is re-centered around the Gothic edifice or enclosure (in this case, a house), rather 
than inside it, the setting depicted in Matheson’s novel is an inversion of typical Gothic 
space and geography” (43). In contrast to the proto-strain zombie, “the novel firmly de-
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orientalizes the figure of the zombie by relocating it from its previously exotic locale, to 
the western spheres of suburbia and civilization” (43).  
Building on this foundation is Browning’s second strain, that of the Living Dead 
(43). This strain, heavily influenced by Matheson’s novel, begins with George Romero’s 
high-inventionality text Night of the Living Dead. However, the movement comes into its 
conventional form in its sequel, Dawn of the Dead (1978). In these films, the dead are 
no longer slaves of an evil will, but rove in infectious hordes, driven by an insatiable 
hunger for human flesh. However, they shed some of the vampire traits of Matheson’s 
creatures, such as sun sensitivity and, for the most part, the ability to talk, becoming 
even more mindless. Among critics, Romero’s films are most popular for their infusion of 
sharp social commentary, as his zombies-as-American-consumers metaphors readily 
inspire many critics toward Marxist interpretations and radical political criticisms of late 
capitalism. 
Elsewhere, I have extended Browning’s genealogy by proposing a third strain of 
zombie films, which, borrowing the phrase from Nicole Birch-Bayley (1137), I call the 
millennial zombie. In this article, I argue that the millennial zombie is “a filmic depiction 
that largely took form after the turn of the century, and importantly, after the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11” (Cloyd 63). Displaying the zombie narrative’s “remarkable ability to 
adapt to changes in cultural anxiety over time” (Bishop 25), the millennial zombie 
changes the second strain conventions to better embody, as Birch-Bayley notes, the 
“fear of terrorism and epidemic” that gnawed at American culture in the early years of 
the twenty-first century (1137). As David Roche states, the millennial zombie finds its 
roots in “the video game Resident Evil (Capcom, 1996) and the movie 28 Days Later 
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(Boyle, 2002), which triggered today’s zombie movie craze” (77). Yet, this emerging 
form of the zombie did not really take shape until director Zack Snyder’s remake of 
Dawn of the Dead (2004) reinvents Browning’s second strain. In this film, the 
conventions of the third strain congeals as a new zombie threat displaying increased 
aggression, more-rapid virus-like levels of contamination, fast-paced movement, 
corpse-like levels of decay, almost complete dehumanization, less cognitive function 
(other than hunger and hunting), and a removal of Romero’s anti-capitalist messages 
(Cloyd 73). 
With these conventions of the millennial zombie established, numerous films and 
television shows imitated and refined the themes. In particular, the television version of 
The Walking Dead became so popular that terms like “zombie apocalypse” and “head 
shot” became household phrases. As Olney states, The Walking Dead “has become the 
most watched program in the history of cable TV, its season 5 premiere drawing a 
record 17.2 million live viewers in October of 2014 (St. John)” (2). Yet, with this kind of 
cultural attention, the conventions that felt so new and fresh in Snyder’s remake have 
slowly begun to lose their resonance, sliding the themes of the millennial zombie toward 
cliché. This has progressed to the point that in 2017-18, season eight of The Walking 
Dead averaged only 7.817 million viewers, down 31.12% from season seven (“The 
Walking Dead”). Attempts to revitalize the millennial zombie have resulted in a number 
of genre hybrids, such as the zombie romantic comedy, or, as Olney calls them, the 
“zom-rom-com” (85), a hybridity that we see in films as David Gebroe’s Zombie 
Honeymoon (2004), Ruben Fleischer’s Zombieland (2009), Jonathan Levine’s Warm 
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Bodies (2013), and Burr Steers’s Pride and Prejudice and Zombies (2016), to name a 
few. 
There has also been a more recent off-shoot of this third strain of zombie films 
that we can call the post-zombie film. The post-zombie film is a prime example 
Jameson’s generic process of “renewal and substitution” (The Political, 131), as it 
developed in response to the need for new elements of invention to culturally rejuvenate 
the now slightly decaying millennial zombie. These are films that utilize the conventions 
of the zombie narrative, but, since the idea of the zombie in the American imaginary has 
become somewhat oversaturated and cliché in its current form, have switched the 
zombie for a different creature, giving the tradition of the zombie-creature a new twist. 
This substitute creature, however, behaves remarkably like a zombie, and these 
narratives still utilize all of the other zombie narrative conventions, such as confronting 
hordes of creatures and dealing with the apocalyptic or post-apocalyptic trappings of 
survival and isolation. In the science fiction genre, we see this in Rodat’s television 
series Falling Skies (2011-15) in which an alien invasion leaves the survivors to band 
together on scavenging runs and militia strikes, and in Joss Whedon’s Firefly (2002-03), 
Serenity (2005), and Dollhouse (2009-10) in the savage Reavers or the modified human 
Dolls, respectively (cf. Canavan, “Fighting”). Other zombie-creature narratives could be 
included in this strain such as Cronin’s The Passage trilogy, Hillcoat’s film The Road 
(2009), Game of Thrones, and, as we will discuss at the end of this chapter, 10 
Cloverfield Lane and its alien invaders. Overall, the post-zombie narrative effectively 
allows these texts to continue to engage with the post-9/11 fear themes and concerns of 
the millennial zombie narrative even after the zombie itself has become so overused 
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that it has lost much of its symbolic and cultural potency. Just as the zombie-creature of 
the 1990s merged with the comedy genre to help re-build the creature’s cultural 
relevance, the post-zombie narrative follows a similar strategy to borrow elements of 
invention from science fiction and fantasy, two genres that conceptually and spatially 
distance its creatures from the “here and now.” In either case, authors and creators 
often use experiments with genre hybrids to keep secondary fear narratives such as the 
zombie-creature culturally “alive.”     
While conceiving of the zombie narrative in terms of different dominant strains is 
helpful in our understanding of the history of the sub-genre, Olney’s research insightfully 
reminds us that many of these strains survive in more marginalized texts that overlap 
and co-exist with each other as residual elements. For instance, the proto-zombie 
strain, which Olney aptly calls “colonial zombie cinema” (31), returned in films such as 
Maslansky’s blaxploitation film Sugar Hill (1974), many of the cult-famous Italian zombie 
films, and Wes Craven’s The Serpent and the Rainbow (1988), which Olney describes 
as “complicit with neocolonialism” (35-39). Further, Romero’s more recent films, such as 
Diary of the Dead (2007) and Survival of the Dead (2008) continue his exploration of the 
second-strain zombie as consumer culture, and even Lawrence’s blockbuster film I Am 
Legend (2007) continues the first-strain tradition of adapting Matheson’s novel, updating 
it to post-9/11 standards as, according to Olney, “the film’s postapocalyptic vision of 
Manhattan as ‘ground zero’ for a global pandemic deliberately evokes 9/11 and the 
bunker mentality of the Bush-Cheney years” (72). In all, Browning’s divisions of the 
zombie film and these new additions are helpful guidelines to use when understanding 
the zombie narrative and the secondary fear theme of the zombie-creature, but they 
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should not be adhered to so rigidly that we unintentionally exclude marginalized and 
outlying narratives from this sub-genre’s canon or ignore the fact that the various 
subgenres coexist historically, in keeping with Jameson’s insistence on the 
“sedimentation” of genres and their ideologies. In short, these strains should not be 
viewed as historical periods, but as cultural emphases of the zombie-creature theme 
that occurred during particular times. 
 
THE SURVIVAL SPACE, THE WALL, AND COLSON WHITEHEAD’S ZONE ONE  
 In the same article, Browning also introduces another secondary fear theme to 
academic discussion, one that is of fundamental importance to the zombie narrative: the 
survival space. Simply put, the survival space is the area that the characters, which we 
can call the survival group, flee to in order to hide from the zombie-creatures or the 
external threat. This space can often be seen as an allegorical representation of the 
home or the present conditions of society, whether cultural, political, social, or 
economic, that the survival group must defend from the external threat of the horde. 
This makes the survival space a spatial existent that conjoins numerous primary fear 
themes, such as the external threat that presses against its walls, the internal threat of 
intruders or even other survivors, and paranoia over its failure to protect the survival 
group. It also commonly engages the personalization of fear, since when the external 
hordes threaten the survival space, zombie narratives typically figure it as a surrogate 
for the domestic home and it acts as a social performance space for characters seen as 
representatives of various American types. In Michael Fiddler’s discussion of home 
invasion narratives, he notes, “a threat to home becomes a threat to selfhood and 
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individuality. The boundaries between domestic space and individuality are also blurry. 
An attack on one is an attack on both” (83). Seen this way, the threatened survival 
space becomes an allegorical threat to the home, but also to individual personality and 
one’s social performance of identity as well. From a Jamesonian perspective, threats to 
the survival space become allegories for a nation under siege by both external and 
internal threats, threats that the personalization of fear often re-articulates so that they 
seem directed toward the self and our nuclear family.   
Browning traces the first use of the survival space as a zombie narrative 
convention back to the novel I Am Legend, but Night of the Living Dead revised it from 
sheltering only a single survivor to a whole survival group (44), creating a space for 
characters to represent “a demographically diverse sampling of American society” in 
interaction (Hantke 245), which transforms it into a “more socially and politically volatile 
enclosure” (Browning 44) that symbolically and ideologically stands in for America. 
Browning asserts that the survival space has built on these foundations to function as “a 
highly porous ‘performance space’, one in which political tensioning and negotiation 
have continuously swelled and contracted” in the sequels and films that followed (57). In 
addition, life inside the survival space in the zombie narrative becomes a breeding 
ground for the paranoia of the internal threat, as Gerry Canavan states: “Even those 
inside the community have to be surveilled at all times for signs of treachery, weakness, 
or growing ‘infection’” (“‘We Are’” 445). Failure to enact this form of justified paranoia in 
many zombie narratives amounts to the collapse of the group, assorted deaths, or often 
the catastrophic failure of the survival space to protect the group entirely. 
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 Carl Swanson explains how the conventional pressure of the zombie narrative, 
which moves from a flight from the zombie, to a siege in a survival space, to a flight 
from this first shelter to, possibly, another (388), means that the survival space must 
inevitably fall (393). Canavan agrees, noting that the fallibility of the survival space is an 
essential part of the zombie narrative: 
So much of the pleasure of zombie narrative in both cinema and other forms 
originates in the audience’s knowledge that the heroes’ preparations and 
fortifications will never be sufficient, that no matter what happens in the end the 
zombies will break through and kill nearly everyone because that is what 
zombies do…The telos of the fortress, like the telos of empire, is always, in the 
end, to fall. (“‘We Are’” 445) 
Of course, there are certainly exceptions to this rule as there are for all generic 
conventions. For instance, Priest’s Boneshaker injects a moment of invention into the 
narrative use of the survival space by spatially inverting it into a wall that contains the 
zombie horde rather than the survival group, allowing it to remain standing after the 
resolution of the narrative. But most conventionally, the futility of the survival space and 
its walls in the zombie narrative is a formal technique that at Jameson’s second horizon 
often serves to transmit the ideologeme that we are never safe, a paranoid impulse that 
tells us that all of our efforts will fail to protect us from the threats surrounding us, 
whether they be external or internal to our social group.  
 The wall is an important variation on the survival space, one that symbolically 
functions as the slash that separates the us/them, human/zombie binary present in the 
zombie narrative. While the wall may imply more permanence than the survival space, 
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not all remain standing as the one found in Boneshaker, and, indeed, this narrative 
seems to act as something of an outlier. For instance, recently the wall as a secondary 
fear theme came to a central position of cultural attention in the television show Game 
of Thrones that prominently features a seven hundred foot wall of ice that separates the 
civilized human lands from the wildlings and White Walkers beyond, making a massive 
survival space out of the lands to the south. Despite its visually massive sense of 
stability, the Wall also succumbs to the narrative pressure of the survival space when a 
portion of it falls in “The Dragon and the Wolf” in season seven. Indeed, the inevitable 
fall of a wall has been a common theme in American narratives throughout its history, 
even appearing in Robert Frost’s iconic poem “Mending Wall”: “Something there is that 
doesn’t love a wall, / That wants it down” (Frost 97). Much as Chekhov asserts that a 
gun introduced in the beginning of a narrative must be fired before that narrative 
concludes, a wall, merely by its presence as an existent in the setting of a narrative, 
seems call for its own destruction by the end of the American narrative.  
Swanson also notes an important variant on the wall common in the zombie 
narrative: the barricade. The barricade functions much like the wall, if perhaps implying 
something more temporary, but Swanson states that the presence of the zombie itself 
“necessitates the construction of barricades” (383), as “[b]arricades are crucial in that 
the preservation of the narrative part of zombie narrative depends on maintaining living 
characters” (387). Due to the contagious nature of the zombie that transforms the 
individual into a member of their mindless collective, Swanson calls each zombie a 
“nonagential antisubject” that creates more antisubjects, essentially turning “agential 
subjects (characters)” into “anticharacters” (385-6). Threatening to remove all 
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characters from a narrative, the zombie is a formal threat to the continued existence of 
the narrative itself, making it necessary to create temporary barricades that allow the 
characters to live long enough to develop a narrative (386). At the first horizon, then, the 
wall and the barricade serve as formal solutions to the inherent contradiction in the 
zombie narrative between the survival of its agential subjects and the impossibility of 
overcoming the threat posed by the zombie-creatures, a solution that delays the 
inevitable end long enough to allow a narrative in the interim. At this point, we can note 
that the zombie-creature is an excellent example of the transgressive monster, as 
Swanson states that the presence of the zombie destabilizes the traditional living/dead 
categorical dichotomy, establishing a “(living/dead)/zombie” model in which the 
barricade separates the human (living/dead) binary from the zombie threat: “by 
barricading the undead out, living characters can continue to function as if they 
categories living and dead were still stable” (390). Swanson’s observations show that 
the wall and the barricade are essential to the zombie narrative, not only to evoke an 
emotional reaction of fear as a secondary fear theme (an ominous separation between 
the known and the unknown, us and them), but also to function structurally to allow the 
continuance of its narrative as more than the quick incorporation of the human into the 
zombie horde. 
 To better illustrate the operation of the survival space and the wall within the 
narrative, we will now turn to Colson Whitehead’s novel Zone One, in which the survival 
space plays a central role both structurally and affectively. Due to Whitehead’s 
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reputation as an author of high literature,4 Zone One is seldom discussed comparatively 
with other zombie narratives. However, Swanson’s reading of the novel highlights 
numerous places that the novel nods to, builds from, and works within the conventions 
established by Romero, placing Zone One “firmly within that tradition” (383). Zone One 
takes place in the near future after a zombie apocalypse has shattered civilization. Now, 
a quasi-governmental group, the American Phoenix, has formed around Buffalo, New 
York, calling its people “pheenies.” They aim to restore and rebuild the world that was 
lost. Toward this effort, they have reclaimed lower Manhattan, building a wall to 
separate off everything south of Canal Street and clearing out most of its zombies, or 
“skels,” to create the survival space of Zone One, a first attempt to re-take a city and 
create a permanent settlement since the night of the outbreak, an Event that the 
survivors call First Night. After teams of marines clear out most of the zombie threat, 
they send in three-person civilian sweeper units to clean up the few remaining skels 
from the buildings. However, there is also a second variety of zombies called stragglers 
that the sweepers must remove. Stragglers appear to be non-threatening and 
unresponsive undead that are simply stuck in a moment of their former life, such as 
making photocopies or holding a kite string in a field. In this narrative, we follow Mark 
Spitz, a survivor nicknamed after the former Olympic swimmer of the same name, and a 
member of a sweeper team, in the last three days before the fall of Zone One, learning 
about the post-apocalyptic life that has lead him here through a series of nonlinear 
flashbacks.  
 
4 Whitehead’s literary works previous to Zone One include The Intuitionist (1999), John Henry Days (2001), Apex 
Hides the Hurt (2006), and Sag Harbor (2009). For more on his literary background, see Duncan, Forsberg (132, 
141), Keehn, Kennedy, Rosenberg, Saldívar, Sorensen (559), and Swanson (380). 
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As the narrative progresses, we learn that all the survivors suffer from a 
traumatic condition called Post-Apocalyptic Stress Disorder, or PASD, which is ironically 
pronounced the same as the word “past,” a lost temporality that continually haunts the 
survivors (Whitehead 67). It becomes increasingly evident that their PASD has 
unmoored not just Mark Spitz but all the survivors’ sense of time, fragmenting and 
filtering their experiences of the present through the traumatic lens of their lost pre-
apocalyptic world. This results in their inability to comprehend their present material 
conditions and culminates near the end of the narrative when they experience a rapid 
succession of what Swanson calls “epistemological failures” (399). These include 
clinging to the false belief that a large dose of “anticiprant” will cure a zombie bite, the 
belief that racism ended after Last Night despite Mark Spitz being given a racist 
nickname by other survivors,5 and even the belief that the stragglers are harmless, only 
to have one bite a sweeper at the end (399-400). All these revelations either occur or 
are revealed shortly before the Canal Street wall falls under a flood of zombies, 
demonstrating just how illusory and fragile the traumatic view of their present reality 
actually was. Overall, Zone One centers on the secondary fear theme of the survival 
space to show how this spatial existent can be used as a temporal divide that 
symbolically separates the nostalgic reconstruction of life before a traumatic and 
apocalyptic event from life afterward, and thereby, given the narrative’s somewhat 
ambiguous ending, communicates the ideologeme that such nostalgia may be 
 
5 Late in the narrative it is revealed that Mark Spitz is black and that the other survivors had named him after the 
Olympic swimmer when he chose to single-handedly fight off a swarm of zombies rather than swim away, 
reanimating the racist stereotype that black people cannot swim and demonstrating that racism lives on even after 
the apocalypse. As Mark Spitz reflects, “There were plenty of things in the world that deserved to stay dead, yet 
they walked” (Whitehead 287-8). See Sorensen and Saldívar for more on the role of race in Zone One.  
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comforting but is ultimately a trap that prevents one’s adaptation to their political and 
material environment. 
At the first horizon, the dominant formal contradiction of Zone One is between its 
postmodern nonlinear fragmentation of temporality that manifests in Mark Spitz’s 
analeptic and interiorized memories, in which he recalls various past events of his life, 
versus the typically linear zombie narrative in which the division between the pre-
apocalyptic past and the post-apocalyptic present is temporarily maintained by the 
spatial marker of the survival space and the wall itself. As is conventional in the zombie 
narrative, this temporal divide dislocates much of the past, especially the explanation 
behind the cause of the zombie apocalypse. Additionally, Zone One’s wall spatially acts 
as the border between what the narrative calls the wastes and the Zone, or what we 
could also refer to as wilderness and progress, chaos and order, nature and civilization. 
For Mark Spitz it also creates a divide between his sense of before and after the mad 
scramble for survival, in which Zone One now offers him a comforting life after mere 
survival. In the wastes, Mark Spitz lived through a series of survival spaces, including 
the toy store (Whitehead 149) and the farmhouse (210), but these settings are relegated 
to analepses in a way that Caracciolo likens to Virginia Woolf’s use of “tunneling,” in 
which the “temporal shifts follow—or are at least inspired by—movements internal to the 
protagonist’s consciousness” (235). When something in the present seems to trigger 
Mark Spitz, the novel goes into a flashback, but these are revealed in a nonlinear 
fashion, leaving it up to the reader to put the pieces of his past together. Only life in the 
survival zone of Zone One exists in the narrative present, temporally anchored by the 
paratextual chapter titles of “Friday,” “Saturday,” and “Sunday,” which we come to learn 
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are the last three days before the fall of the Canal Street wall and the collapse of Zone 
One.  
This spatiotemporal tension is resolved in the novel by focalizing itself entirely 
through Mark Spitz and his time-shifting traumatic condition, a distorting perspective 
shared by all the survivors of First Night. As Caracciolo notes, Mark Spitz’s trauma 
affects his worldview and narration: 
Mark’s past…remains an incomplete patchwork…it becomes bound up with 
catastrophe-induced trauma…[and] the temporal structure of the novel mirrors 
the disruption brought about by catastrophe not just in the storyworld’s external 
reality but—more importantly—in the protagonist’s understanding of his life. (235) 
Focalizing through Mark Spitz’s as a traumatically analeptic survivor conflicts with the 
future-oriented aspects of Zone One, but it is simultaneously an imaginary narrative 
solution to the impossibility in the real world of living both in the past and in the present 
with a focus on surviving into the future. This connects to the real-world conservative 
push to return America to a pre-Event, pre-9/11, or pre-apocalyptic, sense of normalcy, 
with the contradictory strain of nihilistic American apocalypticism in which the only 
possible future is an impending end. Seen satirically, this move of the traumatized 
focalizer in the text questions the soundness of the reasoning processes behind the 
actions made by America during the post-9/11 haze of collective trauma, much in the 
same way that The Zero noted the inaccessibility of causation and Bleeding Edge 




Seen at the second horizon, this resolution of the formal contradiction between 
analepsis and the linear suspense narrative via focalization on the traumatically 
analeptic Mark Spitz subtly communicates the ideologeme that, after 9/11, nostalgia is 
comforting but that an effective response to the external and internal threats that we 
face must be found by adapting to our present conditions, not those found in the pre-
Event past. As Leif Sorensen states, “The return to normalcy is the promise of the 
American Phoenix” (560). This pulls the pheenies and those who adhere to their goals 
toward the belief that the pre-apocalyptic world can be rebuilt, and establishes a 
nostalgic longing to re-create the past in the present, to re-occupy and re-store lower 
Manhattan, to return to the moment before the traumatic Event, even if the material 
conditions of their pre-apocalyptic storyworld no longer exist. Clouded by their shared 
trauma, this comforting nostalgia manifests among the pheenies in the novel much like 
a collective, and ultimately illusory, repetition compulsion, which the text formally 
grounds in Mark Spitz’s analepses. This prevents the pheenies from being able to 
accept or even see the storyworld as it has truly become, leading to their ultimate 
downfall at the end.  
Under this ideologeme, the pheenies can only see the present as the past and 
the continual re-creation of this past as a form of progress, constituting their only hope 
for the future. This ideologeme prevents them from accepting that the monsters have 
already invaded and that the ideological walls that once supported the pre-apocalyptic 
sense of American exceptionalism have already fallen. As Sorensen states, “Their 
futurist optimism is not a sign of an enduring capacity for progress but a symptom of 
their inability to adapt to an inhuman world” (578), and we could argue an inability to 
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adapt to the material conditions of their present post-apocalyptic storyworld. Opposing 
this “pheenie optimism” is the belief that Mark Spitz’s advocates for most of the 
narrative, namely, that “survival is contingent on his ability to adapt to the new 
world…and eschew any hope of a return to the previous order” (560-1). As Sorensen 
states, from this position “the struggle for survival becomes the new normal” (568). 
Rather than progress as nostalgic restoration, Mark Spitz advocates adaptation as 
survival, even as his focalization continually countervails through analepses his own call 
to adapt, emphasizing that the ideologeme of nostalgia after an apocalyptic Event may 
be inevitable, but so is the failure of the wall and the survival space.  
Adaptation, for Mark Spitz, is the urge he feels, and ultimately ignores, to leave 
the comforting nostalgia that the survival space of Zone One offers. In this way, the 
repeated failures of nostalgic reconstruction, seen in the analeptic failures of each 
survival space that he flees from, authorizes a sense of survival through justified 
paranoia that we previously found as a plotting vehicle in Bleeding Edge. The focus in 
Zone One on the survival space, however, emphasizes the role that such paranoia 
plays in the continual need to police the survival space against the ever-present internal 
and external threat through heightened surveillance that Canavan notes above. As the 
survival space is an allegorical representation of its present society, this perspective 
symbolically transforms America itself into a survival space that justifies the real-world 
post-9/11 breaches of civilian privacy rights and the preemptive strikes against anyone 
America saw as an external threat, such as occurred in the occupation of Iraq. When 
living in a survival space, justifiable paranoia makes such acts appear to be necessary 
precautions. For Mark Spitz, the lived experience of being in Zone One eventually, if 
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only temporarily, overpowers his desire to leave, redirecting his sense of justified 
paranoia from individual survival to the preservation of the survival space at all costs.     
Throughout much of the narrative, this internal conflict causes Mark Spitz to feel 
excluded and marginalized from the dominance of the pheenie optimism around him. 
He sees their slogans (“‘We Make Tomorrow!’”) (Whitehead 30), Nightly News (43), 
merchandising (99), and theme songs (“‘Stop! Can You Hear the Eagle Roar?’ (Theme 
from Reconstruction)”) (240) as little more than a public relations campaign and 
marketing scheme that he has to resist “or else it would turn out bad for him” (30). He 
sees those who died on First Night as “unadaptables” (30) and notes this failing 
characteristic even among the current pheenie survivors, or as he broods, “the problem 
with progress—it made you soft” (181). Overall, Mark Spitz adopts a stance of 
posttraumatic hypervigilance through justified paranoia: “They never came when you 
were vigilant; they came for you when you had one foot in the past, recollecting a dead 
notion of safety” (108). In this way, the stragglers, whom Mark Spitz often feels a 
sympathetic connection with, represent a lure pulling him toward nostalgia, and 
threatening to get him stuck in the safety of the past, a lure that he knows will lead to 
the imminent death that the stragglers themselves represent. In one interview, 
Whitehead conceptually connects the stragglers and the pheenies, such as Gary and 
Kaitlyn, the two other members of Mark Spitz’s sweeper team: “People like Gary and 
Kaitlyn are still stragglers in their own way. They’re still tied to their pre-existing notions 
despite the apocalypse” (Rosenberg). This connects human nostalgia with a sense of 
“straggler thinking” (Whitehead 271), a nostalgic worldview sure to lead to one’s death 
by getting stuck in the past.                                                                        
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Yet, as the narrative progresses, Mark Spitz increasingly succumbs to the 
ideological pressure of the pheenies’ straggler thinking, converting to the comfort of 
nostalgia and attaching himself to the seemingly progressive promise of Zone One. 
Despite his earlier resistance, in a discussion with the Lieutenant, Mark states, “‘I’m 
here because there’s something worth bringing back,’” a nostalgic sentiment to which 
the Lieutenant, a pheenie himself, ironically warns: “‘That’s straggler thinking’” (270-1). 
However, Mark is clearly ambivalent about his conversion, his burgeoning longing to 
restore the old world, as he later considers, “If they could bring back paperwork…they 
could certainly reanimate prejudice, parking tickets, and reruns” (288). Mark Spitz 
realizes that resurrecting the pre-apocalyptic world would bring with it all of the worst 
elements of the past as well. Further, his use of the word “reanimate” functions as a 
subtle ironic metaphor for the zombies, or monsters, that we create when we 
nostalgically bringing back the past, as some things may be better off left buried. This 
realization releases him from his bout of pheenie nostalgia, and his adaptive survival 
instincts return as Mark Spitz regains his old paranoid intuition that had always allowed 
him to predict the fall of a survival space just moments before it happened. With this, he 
foresees the fall the Canal Street wall moments before the skels flood through the 
streets, but too late to save himself: “He saw the flaw…Mark Spitz saw the chink 
through now-wastelanded eyes…That’s where every fortification splintered: where the 
nail pierced the wood, the rivet penetrated the concrete” (305).  
In the somewhat ambiguous and pessimistic ending, Mark Spitz leaves the 
shelter of a shop to hopefully fight through a street full of skels to reach an escape 
route, yet his survival seems unlikely, even if his death or survival is never explicitly 
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portrayed (Whitehead 322). While Mark Spitz’s demise may be safe to assume, the 
conclusion plays on the ambiguous portrayal of his end to evoke a lingering sense of 
fear and anxiety. Where an explicit death scene would add closure and finality to his life 
story, Whitehead’s move to not portray his death leaves doubt, paranoia, and maybe 
even the hope that he lives on after the last page, as we may fear that his trials 
somehow continue, whether as a human survivor or as new a member of the zombie 
horde. In many ways, this ending modifies the conventional Romero ending that 
Browning observes as rewarding communal and collective action and punishing acts of 
individualism (51). In the Romero ending, those who survive work in groups, and those 
who die tend to work alone or are motivated by their own selfish ends. In Zone One, 
Mark Spitz’s strategy of adaptive individualistic survival is presented as a better 
alternative to the collectivity of the American Phoenix, but not because the narrative is 
privileging individualism over collectivism. Instead, the novel demonstrates that even 
collective action is hopeless if it is poisoned by the ideologeme of nostalgia rather than 
addressing the material conditions of its present. In short, at this horizon, Zone One 
asserts that collectivism may have its benefits, but only if it adapts to and fits the world 
around it, reminding us of the importance of adjusting our ideologies to the material 
conditions in which we live. 
In total, the American Phoenix’s comforting nostalgia echoes the post-9/11 desire 
to resurrect and maintain our sense of American exceptionalism through the fallen 
Virgin Land myth, as mentioned in the previous chapter on the 9/11 novel. Indeed, the 
wall in Zone One along Canal Street that separates the world of human life from zombie 
life functions as an allegorical stand-in for the ideological sense of division and 
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protection that the Virgin Land myth once granted Americans prior to the attacks. 
However, just as the Virgin Land myth proved itself illusory and insubstantial in the face 
of terrorism, the secondary fear theme of the wall in Zone One falls under the weight of 
the external threat of the zombie horde. Nostalgia, in this sense, is a traumatized call to 
bring back a familiar and comfortable worldview that fell under the intrusion of the 
apocalyptic Event, whether that is understood as Last Night or 9/11, and to reclaim 
lower Manhattan, the site of Ground Zero, from the remnants of the contamination left 
over from the intrusion of the external threat, whether zombie or terrorist. This post-
apocalyptic nostalgia survives even today in the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) 
slogan that moves to incorporate American space and culture into the hegemonic sense 
of American subjectivity, even as it attempts to fit it into an “us” identity that no longer 
exists (if it ever existed), as the Event, the trauma, History itself, has changed the 
foundational conditions which underlie American existence. Such a nostalgic desire for 
a comforting old myth proved inadequate with the Virgin Land myth after 9/11, and 
American culture instead had to resolve the tension by adapting to the material 
conditions of its time to create a new, ideological shield through the myth of the 
Homeland Security State. Yet, Zone One warns us that our traumatized view after 9/11 
has led us to the false conclusion that the familiar old wall of American exceptionalism 
will still work if we just put it into this slightly new form. Rather, as the zombies break 
through the wall, we are faced with the reality that the external world, the international 
community that American exceptionalism has tried for so long to barricade itself away 
from, still exists and that the divisions of borders and geography mean next to nothing in 
the face of contemporary communication and transportation technologies.  
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The repeated motif of the fall of the wall after 9/11 is the reminder of the fallacy of 
national separation under our current stage of multinational capitalism. Just as Bleeding 
Edge reminds us of the increasing irrelevance of traditional definitions of the sovereignty 
of national borders in our rhizomatically networked world, Zone One reminds us that we 
cannot keep isolated from the contemporary transnational world. Zone One argues that 
equating recovery with nostalgic reconstruction, rather than with adapting to the way 
things are, can only lead to our own destruction, our own obsolescence in the face of 
the Real pressing in at our walls and borders. The narrative cries out that the world has 
changed, its walls have become porous, and we must face that it has become a globally 
networked and interdependent rhizomatic structure. We must shed our American 
exceptionalism and adapt as a part of the global community in order to survive. Yet, our 
recent history of Abu Ghraib, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the fabrication of the Homeland 
Security myth, the creation of walls at the Mexican border, and the proliferation of 
MAGA caps all seem to argue that America has failed to rise to the challenge of our 
time. American exceptionalism continues, only altered by the disruption of 9/11, but not 
shattered or replaced by something new, and it appears that we have only moved 
toward a culturally regressive stance of isolationism rather than global integration. In 
this, Zone One warns us that we must adapt or fall under the weight of our own 
illusions. Indeed, in many post-9/11 American fear narratives we see this same 
unconscious echo repeatedly play out in the climactic destruction of the wall, from 
Game of Thrones to Stephen King’s Under the Dome (novel 2009, television series 
2013-15) to the fall of numerous survival spaces in The Walking Dead. Through our 
narratives we are returning over and over to the culturally traumatic moment when the 
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terrorist attacks shattered the Virgin Land myth and made us feel, perhaps for the first 
time in the lives of many, that America could be affected by external threats. 
At the third horizon we can re-interpret this contradiction between analeptic 
nostalgia and the linear narrative as a genre contradiction between the postmodern 9/11 
novel and the zombie narrative. Swanson has deftly documented this tension between 
high and low culture in both the novel’s reception and marketing, as critics repeatedly 
seem to apologize for its genre elements, and even the promotional blurbs in the first 
few pages of the 2012 paperback edition seem to persuade that, despite its genre 
leanings, the novel actually is worth reading (379-80). As Swanson states, “The 
publisher evidently feels the need to assuage any lingering doubts the discriminating 
consumer may have about purchasing a zombie novel” (380). Yet, Whitehead feels that 
such worries are unnecessary, expressing in an interview that such distinctions between 
high and low culture are outdated: “The world is a junkyard—take the parts you need to 
make the machine work the way you want it to” (Keehn). Zone One resolves this 
contradiction by making this into essentially a 9/11-zombie novel, an allegorical 
representation of life in Manhattan and America after the terrorist attacks that utilizes 
the categorical instability of the zombie as a transgressive monster in order to critique, 
satirize, and distance the reader from the actual world. This distanced perspective 
allows us symbolically to see post-9/11 American culture from the safety of a fictional 
world that cannot actually exist, but Whitehead brings us into this world and unites the 
genres by focalizing us through Mark Spitz, the traumatically analeptic survivor, merging 
the character conventions of both genres to give us access to this distanced storyworld 
that is symbolically a way to access aspects of our own world. Through its narrative, 
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Zone One calls us to adapt to the new conditions of our world and warns us that a past 
sense of identity cannot be recovered after a traumatic experience, such as America 
faced with 9/11. We cannot nostalgically make America great again—we must make 
America great by continually, processually, making it anew. Attempting to recreate the 
greatness of America in the past is analogous to reliving a high school championship 
playoff victory in your forties. It is time we move on to something different, something 
that fits our present conditions, something that could potentially, despite the zombie 
narrative nihilism of Zone One, be even better if we let it. 
Through the negative hermeneutic, the conclusion of Zone One presents the 
politically oppressive message that while comforting nostalgia is disabling and 
dangerous, it may be an unavoidable condition in the wake of a traumatic event. This is 
something of a logical leap of biological essentialism, however, as the experience of 
trauma, as we have previously established, is heavily influenced by cultural, 
psychological, and individual factors, and is not determined by a mechanistic sense of 
biological hardwiring alone. Yet, the fear theme of trauma posits that our very psyche is 
constructed so that in the face of a traumatic event we will generate repetition 
compulsions that will entrap our present in illusions of our past. Under this illusory 
traumatic haze, the narrative pull of Zone One’s nihilistic zombie conventions presents 
no viable alternative for an American future other than enveloping ourselves in the 
delusions of our own comforting nostalgia, an opiate to ease our inevitable consumption 
by the hordes of invading threats at our borders. Yet, simultaneously, through the 
positive hermeneutic, the narrative’s very insistence through its use of the survival 
space to show that all walls will inevitably fall presents us with a cautionary but utopian 
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hint toward the necessity of adaptation to historical change. From this perspective, the 
narrative utilizes the fear generated by the ambiguous elements of its ending to 
motivate action before we are too late to find our own place among the international 
community (i.e., choosing to leave Zone One) and instead become engulfed under its 
tides of change. 
Perhaps then, we can read the millennial zombie as not just a symbolic 
embodiment of American fears of survival, terrorism, and categorical transgression, but 
as our cultural fear of change after 9/11 confronted us with the obsolescence of 
American exceptionalism and suggested the slow beginnings of the world’s historical 
approach toward a post-nationalist future. As Canavan muses on the zombie narrative, 
“The really radical move…would be not to feel pity [for the zombie] but to throw open 
the gates: to erase the subject-object division altogether” (449). Of course, as Canavan 
reminds us, within logic of the zombie narrative this would mean suicide, but these are 
symbolic narratives attempting to present imaginary solutions to real world 
contradictions, not realities themselves. As Canavan states, “we don’t live inside a 
zombie narrative; we live in the real world, a zombieless world, where the only zombies 
to be found are the ones we ourselves made out of the excluded, the forgotten, the 
cast-out, and the walled-off” (450). In our post-9/11 historical context, if we were to 
follow Canavan’s suggestion of employing a “zombie embrace” (450), which in our 
terms would be to invite those in whom we have classified and excluded as external 
threats, would the nightmare illusion of their decayed flesh give way to the faces of 
allies instead? Would the bogeymen of our post-9/11 cultural imaginary really point the 
way forward to a progressive and more collective future? Often, the utopic hints found in 
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millennial zombie narratives, such as we find here in Zone One, softly but insistently say 
“yes.” 
 
HYPERMASCULINITY, THE SURVIVALIST, AND 10 CLOVERFIELD LANE 
 Another prominent secondary fear theme is the hypermasculine character and its 
embodiment as the survivalist, a symbolic act that often appears in the post-9/11 
zombie narrative as an imaginary resolution to the contradiction between the belief that 
our pre-Event sense of American hegemonic masculinity would provide us with safety 
and security and the revelation that America had become a victim of terrorism. With the 
attacks of 9/11 shattering the ideological wall of our Virgin Land myth, there was a 
sense that Americans had been “violated” by the attacks, and Julie Drew notes the 
affective impact of this feeling, as the term is a “customary euphemism for rape (being 
‘violated’)” (71). Drew shows how rhetorical constructions after 9/11, such as news 
stories, editorials, and other forms of public discourse, “[f]eminized victim status” (71). In 
reaction to this unwelcome sense of “feminine” vulnerability, she states that presidential 
rhetoric after 9/11 sought to create a particular gendered national identity, one 
“highlighting physical strength and violently punitive responses to conflict as both 
desirable and necessary, as well as paternalistic attitudes toward injury and trauma, 
both of which are assumed to be predicated on weakness, and which are read as 
feminine” (71). As she states, “post-9/11 public discourse…argues…that the U.S. is far 
too feminine, and thus must work to become more masculine in order to be safer” (71). 




The intrusions of September 11 broke the bolt on our protection myth, the illusion 
that we are masters of our security, that our might makes our homeland 
impregnable, that our families are safe in the bower of their communities and our 
women and children safe in the arms of their men. (15)  
Clearly, 9/11 not only disrupted our national myth, but it also had a profound impact on 
our enactment of gender roles. 
The American imaginary responded with the hypermasculine character, a socially 
performed role that is enacted in the narrative by both male and female characters. The 
hegemonic character exaggerates traits valued by hegemonic masculinity, including 
aggression, strength, ruggedness, capability, a relatively emotionless affective 
disposition (aside from anger), and a taciturn social style. From a cultural perspective, 
this is an existent that works to compensate for the perceived feminization of the 
American-as-victim and the correlating fear of the failure of American hegemonic 
masculinity to protect its people and its country. The hypermasculine character, then, is 
a conjunction of the fear of the external threat and a traumatic reaction to a sense of 
victimization. In science fiction, we often see this in the militarization of the storyworld, in 
which the characters are dominated during a state of emergency by some branch of the 
military. In these storyworlds, each citizen must become an embodiment of Takacs’s 
virtual imperial grunt and enact the skill sets of a soldier, including survivalism, weapons 
training, wearing combat armor, and taking lives as needed. We especially see this play 
out in post-9/11 television shows, such as Battlestar Galactica, which we will investigate 
in the next chapter, but also in Falling Skies and Eric Kripke’s Revolution (2012-14). In 
fantasy, we see this hypermasculinity embodied in the television show Game of 
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Thrones in its many massive characters such as The Mountain, The Hound, and 
(despite her female sex) Brienne of Tarth, but also in characters such as Arya, Yara, 
and Osha, or the devaluation of the effeminate boy Robin Arryn. In the horror genre, we 
see this especially take prominence in The Walking Dead, as, for instance, Stephen 
Gencarella notes that many of the female characters “are introduced as weak feminine 
figures who harden emotionally and physically and train in weapons to become effective 
slayers of ghouls and humans” (134). 
At especially popular embodiment of the hypermasculine character that we will 
focus on in this chapter is the survivalist, which in the post-9/11 narrative is an 
embodiment of hypermasculinity as filtered through commodity acquisition that typically 
takes the form of a male rescue figure. Popular culture often associates the survivalist 
with the prepper, someone who prepares for apocalyptic Events, and even the hoarder, 
someone who collects material objects compulsively. Mick Broderick notes the growth 
of the American survivalist theme even in the Cold War era:  
During the late ‘70s and early ‘80s imagery of genocidal nuclear stockpiles 
increasing year by year and converging with a renewed bellicose Christian 
fundamentalism and heightened superpower tensions encouraged a subculture 
of survivalists to prepare to emerge from the anticipated holocaust in a position of 
dominance. (379)  
In post-9/11 American fear narratives and media depictions, the survivalist, prepper, 
and hoarder are character types that are connected by a compulsion to gather material 
goods, consumables, and products in an attempt to alleviate their often apocalyptic and 
paranoid fears. Toward this effort, the fictional survivalist exerts a rugged sense of 
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capability though fetishizing the acquisition of a surplus of consumer goods in an 
attempt to ward off their own affective anxieties of becoming a disempowered and 
helpless victim in various potential or imagined future situations. However, just as the 
secondary fear theme of the zombie-creature has little connection with its actual world 
allegory of the terrorist, the version of the survivalist depicted in American fear 
narratives has at best only a loose connection with their actual world counterparts as 
well. In the real world, there can certainly be practical survivalists and preppers, or 
people who prepare for SHTF scenarios (shit hits the fan scenarios) in a way that might 
actually work in a particular apocalyptic event. However, sociologist Richard G. Mitchell 
Jr.’s ethnographic research on survivalist culture in general found it to be a 
predominately male-driven effort toward, essentially, exerting a sense of control over 
their lives: “Survivalism is neither intentional protest nor practical readiness for coming 
uncertainties…it is primarily resistance to rationalization, to fixed meanings and 
predictable process” (214).  
As the fear theme of the survivalist has many of its roots in the real-world 
survivalist, it is worth out time, briefly, to outline the survivalist that Mitchell found in his 
research. Contrary to popular perception, Mitchell states, “the practiced survivalism I 
observed was less reactive than proactive, less a retreat from or renouncement of social 
life than a novel exploration of its possibilities” (8). In the face of the dehumanization 
and the continued focus on specialization brought about in post-industrial life, the 
survivalist engages in what Mitchell calls culture crafting, a creative act of “inventing 
new narratives” and utilizing the materials at hand in creative new ways (9). Among the 
survivalists he studied, the simple material accumulation of “survivalist-oriented 
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commodities” was not sufficient: “mere wealth or control of goods, tools, or knowledge 
earns little respect” in this community, and instead “survivalism serves as a rhetorical 
means of transforming depersonalized consumer society…into an aesthetic discourse 
of valuation where survivalists are adventuresome architects of new economic orders,” 
moving survivalists from contemporary cultural margins to a central place of importance 
(37). Through creating catastrophic and apocalyptic narratives of the near future from 
strings of conspiratorial re-interpretations of current events, “Survivalism is centered on 
the continuing task of constructing ‘what if’ scenarios in which survival preparations will 
be at once necessary and sufficient” (13). In regard to the use of material goods, 
Mitchell states that the survivalist engages in bricolage, “nonstandard work, an inclusive 
process of make-do…creative problem solving” (83), in which “survivalism arises from 
the interplay of contextual restraints on the one hand and self-constituting social actions 
on the other, from the interaction between biography and circumstance, perceived 
capacities and constraints” (9). Essentially, the survivalist looks to create in themselves 
a sense of capability, of consequence and personal relevance, through bricolage, the 
ability to creatively use of the materials on hand to survive, not the stockpiling of 
material goods as a consumerist safety buffer for the unknown. They construct near-
future apocalyptic narratives through something like Hall’s oppositional code to make 
scenarios, however unlikely, that will be manageable enough to prepare for, but dire 
enough to disrupt the conditions of modern civilization so that their creativity will have a 
place of expression and importance, offering safety and security to themselves and 
those they love. These scenarios also find their exigence through the personalization of 
their fearful narratives, as the survivalist “locates himself in the center of these 
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transformations,” because “The center is a busy place…[where] survivalists want to be, 
busy among compelling challenges and consequent action” (230). According to Mitchell, 
the actual world survivalist, above all, constructs narratives where their creativity and 
ideas make them useful and provide them with opportunities for challenge and 
stimulation through action and creative bricolage. Seen from this perspective, the actual 
world survivalist creates apocalyptic narratives as imaginary solutions to the real-world 
contradiction of hegemonic masculine capability and their experience of alienation in 
late capitalist society. 
In the fear narrative, we encounter traces of the real-world survivalist as filtered 
through the protonarrative of the survivalist fantasy, an imaginary construct that often 
resembles one of their own apocalyptic narratives. In the survivalist fantasy, the 
protagonist, typically a hypermasculine male character, functions as a nexus of the 
primary American fear themes of paranoia and an impending apocalyptic Event. In 
addition, much like the survivalists described above, these fantasies often incorporate 
the personalization of fear, as the threat, whether depicted as internal or external, 
serves to isolate the survivalist to either themselves as an individual or their immediate 
family, which they must defend and teach to live after the apocalypse. In this way, the 
focus of the survivalist fantasy narrative typically articulates the threat as directed to the 
self or family rather than to society or a nation, collectives that the protagonist has often 
lost communication with or have simply collapsed in the catastrophe, thereby becoming 
irrelevant in the narrative. The survivalist is hence generally far more isolated than the 
larger communities barricaded behind the walls in zombie narratives like Zone One, 
even if they may occupy their own series of survival spaces. In reality television, 
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numerous fear narratives revolving around survivalism have emerged, including 
National Geographic’s Doomsday Preppers (2012-14), Discovery Channel’s Dual 
Survival (2010-16), and Discovery Channel’s Naked and Afraid (2013-present).  
While there is nothing inherently dysfunctional with learning survival skills, these 
shows derive much of their entertainment value from the evocation of fear, presenting 
survival fantasy situations in which people’s lives are in danger. By doing so, they 
introduce viewers to frightening situations they may have never imagined possible, 
making them look like credible and immanent threats, even if their likelihood of ever 
happening to your typical city-dwelling audience member is quite remote. The narrative 
solution to these survival situations typically comes in two forms, which outlines two 
different views on survivalism. The first resembles Mitchell’s creative survivalists 
described above, in which the survivalist utilizes the limited resources that they have 
around them in a creative way. The second is survivalism as consumerism, in which the 
survivalist uses specialized equipment that many urban viewers would normally be 
unlikely to own, such as survival knives, ropes, rations, dry food storage, homemade 
water filters, and storage jugs. A prime example is the “bug-out bag,” in which a 
survivalist keeps a set of whatever they deem to be essential survival items, which 
varies dramatically between individuals depending on what type of emergencies they 
anticipate. As one website states, “The bags’ contents project what people fear—war, 
martial law, natural disaster—and how they intend to cope” (Murrmann). This second 
strain of survivalism, as a means of ameliorating fear and anxiety through the material 
accumulation of resources to create a sense of security, can easily be read as sprouting 
from contemporary consumer culture, one that often depicts shopping as recreation and 
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raises its citizens to see spending and acquisition as therapeutic outlets. Rather than 
searching for lived alternatives to consumerism as the creative survivalist does, the 
survivalist as consumer has entirely appropriated and inverted survivalist culture so that 
it supports the economic endeavors of the modern world rather than attempting to find 
an empowering, if ultimately fictional, alternative to it. This sense of survivalism as 
consumerism momentarily came to the forefront of American culture in the days after 
9/11 when Bush called forth every American to go out and shop as a form of patriotism 
and as a defense against the terrorists’ efforts to destabilize the American economy. 
This survivalist as consumer culture also finds voice after 9/11 in the vibrant 
online prepping culture and a recent concern with hoarders. Prepping is a cultural 
practice in which individuals (known as preppers) prepare for coming apocalyptic 
events, whether military, natural, economic, or other by accumulating vast amounts of 
resources to survive independently in case of a disaster. While it could easily be argued 
that prepping is nothing new, it has gained public interest after 9/11, particularly with the 
television show Doomsday Preppers. At the same time, hoarders became linked to the 
“feminized” victim status that post-9/11 culture taught us to abhor, as hegemonic 
popular culture has transformed the hoarder into the nightmare “feminized” bogeyman 
opposite of the survivalist, a social enactment to be avoided at all costs. Hoarders came 
under a cultural spotlight with A&E’s television show Hoarders (2009-17), a series 
structured around staging numerous interventions on people deemed to uncontrollably 
accumulate material possessions to the point where it potentially presents safety and 
health risks to themselves and others. Contrary to the hypermasculinization of the 
survivalist and the prepper in popular culture, the hoarder is typically pathologized as a 
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“feminized” victim of their psychological compulsions. During the run of Hoarders, 
hoarding even literally became pathologized as it was classified in the DSM-5 in 2013 
as a mental disorder. While direct causation for this classification cannot be linked to the 
show, Hoarders helped create a new embodiment of fear in the cultural imaginary, 
pathologizing and absolutizing6 individuals as hoarders. Overall, though, while hoarders 
and preppers often enact a paranoid fear of apocalyptic events, they have not found as 
much representation in fictional American fear narratives as the survivalist. 
 One typical example of a high-inventionality post-zombie survivalist fear 
narrative would be Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road. This novel covers the journeys 
of a father and his boy in a post-apocalyptic world reduced to ash and darkness, as they 
travel south along a highway to the coast, dealing with questions of morality and 
purpose in a dying world. Though this text was published in 2006, long before the 
millennial zombie narrative began to show signs of cultural fatigue and cliché, it 
established the practice of using the conventions of the millennial zombie narrative, 
such as the world disrupting characteristic of the zombie, and transposing it into a post-
apocalyptic storyworld that substitutes the zombie, in this case, with the other human 
survivors, which are depicted as cannibalistic threats to the man and boy. As is typical 
for a high-inventionality text, The Road is hard to relegate into a particular genre as it 
draws from many: since it was produced by literary fiction author McCarthy, many tend 
see it as a postmodern novel, but others have noticed that it demonstrates conventions 
of both post-apocalyptic science fiction (cf. Pizzino) and the zombie narrative (Canavan, 
 
6 In chapter four, absolutizing is described as part of the process outlined by Takacs in which a threat, such as 
terrorism, is “personalized, pathologized, and absolutized” (Terrorism TV 59). To absolutize a threat is to simplify it 
into an immutable or unchangeable essence, a subordinating form of epistemological violence that seeks to define 
and thereby limit the potentialities available when encountering the threat and those available to the threat.   
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“We Are” 431). Overall, The Road reads much like the survivalist fantasy described 
above, one aligned with Mitchell’s sense of creative survivalism, in which the male 
survivalist hero uses their creativity to utilize the limited resources around them to 
survive. In The Road this plays out as the taciturn hypermasculine man (unnamed 
throughout the narrative) scavenges through the objects found around him to provide for 
his son, utilizing his knowledge, wits and sheer determination to keep his son alive as 
long as he can. As Arielle Zibrak has noted, the novel can easily be described as a 
conservative narrative focusing on the generational transmission of patriarchal and 
heteronormative culture, even despite the fact that the post-apocalyptic storyworld no 
longer supports these pre-apocalyptic values (105). While The Road is an excellent 
example of a post-zombie survivalist narrative, it aligns too closely with Mitchell’s 
observations of the survivalist fantasy to add much to our analysis at this point in the 
project. Further, as a canonical work by a white male author, it expresses conservative 
ideological ground that we have already described above, such as in the survivalist 
television shows, the concept of hypermasculinity filtered through commodity acquisition 
of the survivalist character, and the ideologemes of traumatic entrapment and 
comforting nostalgia already discussed in Zone One and The Zero. 
Instead, we find a more nuanced articulation of the survivalist that covers new 
conceptual ground for this study in Dan Trachtenberg’s film 10 Cloverfield Lane, a post-
zombie narrative that covers new ideological ground to better illustrate the ways that 
fear narratives can distort actual world cultures like creative survivalism into a nightmare 
reflection. This film follows Michelle (Mary Elizabeth Winstead) as she runs away from 
her presumably abusive fiancé only to get in a car accident. She awakens in a locked 
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room in an underground bunker, chained to the wall, and meets Howard (John 
Goodman). Howard is a somewhat twitchy and unnerving Navy veteran who tells her 
that there has been an attack, the air above has been contaminated, and everyone 
outside the bunker is dead. Naturally, she does not believe him until she sees proof and 
meets the only other survivor in the bunker, Emmett (John Gallagher Jr.), who tells her 
that it is all true, and that Emmett only just managed to fight his way into the bunker 
before Howard closed it. Howard says they may have to stay in the bunker for a year or 
two if there is nuclear fallout or chemical residue, and Michelle tries to make the best of 
her situation and Howard’s troubling patriarchal behavior. Yet, she soon discovers that 
after Howard’s ex-wife took his daughter Megan away from him, he abducted and killed 
a young girl named Brittany as a temporary substitute two years ago. As Howard 
repeatedly treats her like his little girl, Michelle realizes that he wants her to become the 
next substitute for his daughter, and that if she does not act soon, she will be his next 
victim, meeting the same fate as Brittany before her. Entrapped, Michelle and Emmett 
try to plan their escape, Michelle using her skills as an aspiring fashion designer to 
make a hazmat suit and respirator out of a shower curtain and some plastic bottles so 
they can survive in the air above ground. When Howard discovers their plans, he kills 
Emmett and dumps his body in a barrel of perchloric acid. He tries to stop Michelle from 
escaping, but she kicks the barrel of acid onto him, accidently starting a fire, and only 
narrowly escapes from the bunker. Outside, she finds out that the air is fine, but she is 
attacked by a crawling, worm-like alien creature and a massive alien ship, the latter of 
which she defeats through a clever use of bricolage, fashioning a Molotov cocktail out of 
items on hand. She then takes a car, speeds away, and hears a radio broadcast that 
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tells her that she could flee to the safe zone in Baton Rouge or join the fight against the 
alien invaders in Houston. Coming to a crossroads, she pauses but heads to Houston, 
making the conscious decision to fight her fears rather than succumb to her lifelong 
habit of running from danger. In doing so, she chooses to enact the hypermasculine 
post-9/11 fantasy of the capable citizen soldier rather than enacting the role of the 
“feminized” victim fleeing behind the safety of a walled survival space, such as we find 
in Zone One. 
Here, we refer to 10 Cloverfield Lane as a post-zombie narrative not because the 
aliens as zombie substitutes that it uses follow all of the conventional characteristics of 
the zombie-creature, but because their portrayal plays with each of these conventions in 
ways that remind the audience of other zombie-creatures seen in previously released 
zombie films. For instance, while the aliens may not display a decaying humanoid form 
(even if their dominant colors are brown, gray, and black), they are dehumanized as we 
are unable to communicate with them in order to understand their apparently relentless 
pursuit of human victims. This dehumanization in the film portrays the aliens as having 
less value than the humans they attack, as killing or attacking one does not confront the 
viewer or the characters with any moral or ethical concerns. Further, the 
dehumanization makes the aliens seem to lack individual autonomy, as they appear to 
all follow the relentless goal of attacking humans, but they do not display a capacity for 
individual or alternative choice in their actions. The worm alien that we encounter first 
resembles the fast moving and predatory zombie-creature tradition initiated in Snyder’s 
Dawn of the Dead, but the alien ship, while fast moving, appears ponderously slow by 
scale, a looming vast shape framed above Michelle or lurking under the cover of storm 
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clouds at the end of the film. A horde mentality is never shown in the film, but it is 
implied, as we know that while Michelle only directly encounters one worm alien and 
one ship, it would have taken many more of the aliens to overcome the cities in the film 
and to bring about the alien apocalypse through which Michelle struggles to survive. 
While the aliens are not infectious, the ship does utilize green gas as a form of chemical 
warfare, a threat that promises to contaminate and spread through the human 
population. Contrary to many zombie-creatures, the aliens do not appear to be 
cannibalistic, yet, despite their possession of futuristic technology, the worm alien’s 
primary weapon appears to be its large many-teethed mouth, with which it threatens to 
consume Michelle, and the alien ship attempts to finish off Michelle with what appears 
to be its mouth also, evoking cannibalistic connotations. The aliens prove hard to kill, as 
the ship is only narrowly defeated by Michelle’s quick and clever fabrication of the 
Molotov cocktail that she throws skillfully into its mouth, and the worm alien simply 
disappears after this, apparently undefeated. Overall, though, the aliens in the film 
qualify as zombie-creatures because their invasion brings about an apocalyptic end to 
civilization, and their attack on the planet is unexplained and not announced before the 
onslaught begins. In the typical alien invasion science fiction narrative, the beginning of 
the film is devoted to explaining how the aliens arrive at Earth and why they want to 
invade, such as in Roland Emmerich’s Independence Day (1996) or even in George 
Pal’s The War of the Worlds (1953). In 13 Cloverfield Lane, however, and in many other 
post-9/11 invasion narratives such as Steven Spielberg’s remake of War of the Worlds 
(2005), the aliens simply show up in mass and attack without explanation, just as 
commonly occurs in millennial zombie-creature invasions. Clearly, the aliens in the film 
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are not zombies, but they are portrayed in such a way that an audience of its time of 
release would likely draw clear parallels to the zombie-creature, only portrayed now with 
new twists of invention that makes this film’s monster seem more novel and original. 
As a post-zombie narrative, 10 Cloverfield Lane features the primary fear themes 
of the internal/external threat, paranoia, apocalypticism, and entrapment through all the 
secondary fear themes that we have discussed in this chapter. These include Howard 
as the survivalist as consumer and Michelle as the creative survivalist, both trapped 
together in the survival space of the bunker and facing the post-zombie threat of an 
unnamed alien invader as the apocalyptic and world disrupting zombie-creature. 
Overall, 10 Cloverfield Lane resolves the formal contradiction between the spatial 
conflict of the below ground bunker as embodied in Howard and the above ground 
representation of the aliens through utilizing Michelle’s character as an intermediary 
focalizer that can escape the narrative’s fight or flight impulse plotting to consciously 
choose to enact a hypermasculine creative survivalism. It looks at all of this through the 
protonarrative of safety through enacting the aggressive individualism of creative 
survivalism to critique the inevitable fallibility of the survival space, and it resolves its 
genre contradiction between the zombie narrative and the science fiction genre by 
escaping the psychological threat of Howard’s patriarchal entrapment to depict Michelle 
as emerging into an action-oriented science fiction space where she can attain a 
hypermasculine personal agency by actively choosing to face the external threat by 
joining with a collective resistance. 
At the first horizon, the formal contradiction of the narrative expresses itself as a 
spatial conflict between the horror elements of the below-ground bunker as associated 
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with the cinematographic representation of Howard’s character and the science fiction 
elements of the above-ground world as associated with the cinematographic 
representation of the aliens. The narrative resolves this contradiction by connecting 
these two spatial realms (i.e., above and below ground) by focalizing through the 
intermediary of Michelle’s character as she negotiates the impulses of fleeing to the 
bunker to hide from the threat versus going to the surface to fight the threat. This genre 
contradiction is especially apparent in this film because, as a review by Brian Talerico 
states, the script for 10 Cloverfield Lane was “retrofitted from its previous script, called 
The Cellar,” one that does not include the science fiction ending of alien invaders. This 
means that originally it was only supposed to be a horror film, but the science fiction 
elements, which allowed it to fit into the larger science fiction Cloverfield franchise, were 
added afterwards. The beginning clearly utilizes horror film conventions, as Harrington 
states: “When Michelle wakes up, shackled by her injured leg to the wall in a 
cinderblock room, the framing and mise-en-scène make deliberate nods towards so-
called ‘torture porn’ films such as those of the Saw franchise (2004- ).” Once above 
ground, Harrington notes how the film formally shifts: “The film’s previously 
claustrophobic framing and often long, tense shots give way to a rapid-fire, action 
oriented finale that nods more towards tent-pole blockbusters such as the Transformers 
franchise (US 2007-) and War of the Worlds (Spielberg US 2005).” As we will see, 10 
Cloverfield Lane combines the horror and science fiction film genres in a way that 
critiques the millennial zombie narratives that have come before it, both pathologizing 
the survival space and demonstrating that a consumer as survivalist masculinity would 
be insufficient in the face of an apocalyptic Event. Instead, through the character 
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development of Michelle, the film urges for a creative survivalist hypermasculinity that 
provides at least an individual sense of safety that can make-do with limited resources 
at hand to face adversity with an aggressive directness.  
The film utilizes Howard’s character as an anthropomorphic extension of the 
underground bunker setting but does so in a way that devalues the impulse to flee into 
the survival space of the bunker that we find commonly enacted in millennial zombie 
narratives such we found in Zone One. Throughout 10 Cloverfield Lane, the characters 
negotiate between the impulses of fight or flight, two automatic and affective coping 
strategies for dealing with a fearful stimulus that the film utilizes to create a sense of 
impulse plotting. Impulse plotting uses impulsive reactions to threatening stimuli to 
motivate the actions of its characters, thereby controlling and limiting them only to 
reactive moves aimed simply at survival. Thus, either the impulses of fight or flight 
asserts themselves as the guiding principle at each of the story’s kernel (major) events, 
at least up until Michelle gets to the crossroads at the end and makes a conscious 
decision between fleeing to Baton Rouge or going to Houston to fight. The film 
represents the flight impulse through the oppressive and dangerous Howard and his 
spatial association with the bunker, and it comes to represent the fight impulse once 
above ground as Michelle faces the alien threat. 
Howard’s embodiment of the flight impulse through his close association with the 
bunker turns his character into a nightmare reflection of everything that the American 
imaginary fears of the survivalist, the confining potential of the survival space, and the 
doomsday bunker. As Tim Grierson states about Howard in a review of the film, “With 
his large frame, awkward manner and unsmiling eyes, Howard embodies our collective 
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impression of child molesters, rapists and murderers…it’s a performance of unsettling 
stillness, which makes his occasional explosions all the more shocking.” Visually, the 
film makes Howard an imposing presence, as he “is as broad and heavy as Michelle is 
slender and light. He looks like he could snap her in two with his beefy bare hands, and 
he seems twitchy enough to do so at any moment” (“‘10 Cloverfield’”). Formally, the 
director and the cinematographer, Jeff Cutter, reinforce Goodman’s natural physical 
presence and chilling performance by using Michelle as the camera’s focalizer when 
filming Howard. This allows for low-angle shots that sympathetically create for the 
viewer a sense of helplessness and of being overpowered by his massive physical 
presence that fills the frame, often looming above Michelle.  
Howard’s visual depiction contrasts with his claims that he has saved Michelle 
and Emmett’s life and deserves respect for providing them with safety, resources, and 
security. Despite Howard’s outbursts, his offer for her to stay and hide in his bunker 
presents Michelle with an opportunity to flee from what he says is an external threat 
above ground. However, when Howard degenerates to greater acts of violence and we 
later learn that the alien threat is real, despite it at first only sounding like one of 
Howard’s paranoid conspiracy theories, the meaning of the bunker changes, or at least 
stabilizes as being attached to a devalued and dangerous impulse of flight. As Tasha 
Robinson states, “the presence of actual aliens means that Howard’s bunker isn’t the 
practical option, but the cowardly one. He’s effectively running away by hiding 
underground, not contributing to anyone’s safety but his own, and threatening the 
people he pretends to offer safety.” This association of the bunker with the dangerous 
and unstable Howard critiques the effectiveness of not only the survivalist as consumer 
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culture that his prepping efforts represent, but also the entire survival space theme of 
the millennial zombie narrative, asserting the illusory and diseased nature of this fear 
theme by highlighting how it no longer offers, if it ever did, the physical or psychological 
sense of safety that it once promised.  
By the end of the film, it is firmly established that Howard is impulsively reacting 
to events and steering the narrative toward fleeing from a perceived threat. For 
instance, it is later revealed that Howard had actually panicked at the in the beginning of 
the film after hearing about the attacks and accidently ran Michelle off the road. In this 
way, Howard represents a facile masculinity, which hegemonic post-9/11 culture would 
read as traumatically “feminized” into the role of the fleeing victim. As the film’s formal 
intermediary, Michelle is also, at times, directed by the impulse to run, even as she later 
leaves this stance behind. We see this happen as she runs away from her fiancé at the 
beginning, flees from Howard and the bunker, and speeds away from the ruins of the 
bunker at the end. Michelle is also presented with the option, which she cautiously but 
firmly refuses, of fleeing from reality by going along with Howard’s attempts to play 
house, in which she would have to take over the role of Howard’s deceased daughter, 
Megan, and he would solidify his fantasy role as the protective father. This momentary 
option presents Michelle with a potential way that she could have run from reality and 
bypassed having to take responsibility for caring for herself, submitting herself to 
Howard’s and, by extension, the survival space’s pathologized form of protection. 
Above ground, we see a switch to a cinematographic approach grounded in the 
science fiction convention of the sense of wonder, or the sublime, an openness that 
communicates “new possibilities and greater horizons” (Bould and Vint 78). This opens 
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Michelle up to performatives that steer her gradually toward the fight impulse, which 
eventually gives Michelle the freedom to resist living through impulse plotting in order to 
make a choice of her own at the crossroads. Contrary to the claustrophobic framing in 
the bunker, the world above ground is filmed with extreme long shots of open night sky 
and vast expanses of land in which the threat of the alien ship is depicted in an even 
more oppressively exaggerated manner than Howard, as we see the ship approach 
though a contrast of scale, a massive floating shape looming over a farm house and the 
miniscule figure of Michelle at the bottom of the frame. This creates a comparative 
vastness of scale that evokes a science fictional sense of awe, as the aliens’ 
appearance presents both Michelle and the viewer with a jarring departure from the 
aesthetics of realism that characterized the first part of the film in the bunker, and the 
sheer size of the alien ship inflates this violation of its established reality principle into 
the realm of the sublime.  
When Michelle overcomes the threat of the ship simply through her own creative 
use of the materials at her disposal, this contrastive openness of expansive spaces and 
reality-defying relations of scale resolves the formal tension of impulsive plotting through 
fight or flight by synthesizing them into a space of affective potential and agency. After 
all, when the alien ship carries her and the truck she is in up toward its mouth, her 
environment itself provides the materials she needs to overcome the threat, as what she 
needs for the Molotov cocktail just so happens to be in the truck with her in that 
moment. In this way, the above ground world is depicted as even more resource rich 
than Howard’s hoarder bunker was below ground. Repeatedly, her impulses to fight in 
the film are rewarded with resources, and her options to flee, such as staying with 
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Howard in the bunker, promise dangers potentially worse than that of the original threat 
itself.  
Overall, Michelle’s backstory of fleeing from the threats in her life and the 
practical actions she takes in the film itself make her an intermediary agent capable of 
moving between the two spatially symbolic ideologemes of the bunker and the above-
ground world. This allows her to test both of the impulses of flight and fight before finally 
choosing to embody the post-9/11 sense of hypermasculinity through creative 
survivalism. Rather than succumbing to the traumas of her past, Michelle rises above 
them to fight her way free to a future in the storyworld with the potential for freedom. 
Michelle was abused by her father, and, as Robinson states, “her childhood fear and 
helplessness from dealing with him destroyed her courage.” Michelle relates this to 
Emmett when she tells him of a child she recently saw abused by a dad in a grocery 
store, and how she did not have the courage to do anything to help. Instead, as Michelle 
states, “I did what I always do when things get hard. I just panicked and ran.” Yet, once 
Michelle awakens in the bunker, she finds herself trapped and increasingly she no 
longer has the option of running if she wants to survive, which forces her to experiment 
with the impulse to fight instead. Rather than resort to the other fear impulse of freezing, 
Michelle shapes her crutch into a spear to attack her captor, kicks the barrel of acid onto 
Howard, and uses bricolage to take out the alien ship. Her resulting impulses to fight 
shape the ultimate narrative of the film, deciding many of the kernel events until we 
reach the last scene in which she makes a conscious decision. Along the way, she 
realizes that she is “resourceful, clever, and determined, and she keeps coming up with 
creative solutions that also happen to be aggressive ones” (Robinson). In short, her 
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growing impulsivity to fight in the film steers her away from Howard’s pathologized and 
victimized masculinity, one evoking the failed pre-9/11 hegemonic masculinity, and 
instead moves her toward situations that awaken in her an aggressive post-9/11 
hypermasculinity, in which she discovers, as Robinson notes, “She’s always had the 
strength to fight.” 
At the crossroads in the end of the film, she stops and chooses to head into the 
threat by going to Houston to help others, rather than flee to the safety of Baton Rouge. 
Here, Michelle is able to make perhaps her first free action in the presence of a threat in 
the entire film, and she consciously chooses to fight. However, at this point the film ends 
and we do not see the results of her choice. On this ambiguous ending, Trachtenberg 
states in one interview, “‘In fact, things are going to be potentially worse, but she’s ready 
to face it. That is the theme of the movie for me.’” As a result, this ambiguous ending 
argues in favor of consciously fighting your fears and adopting the hypermasculine 
practice of creative survivalism that Michelle discovers in the bunker and in the truck 
above ground through her uses of bricolage. In contrast, if her actions had been steered 
by the impulse of flight throughout the entire narrative, it would have likely led to Howard 
taking her life eventually. Through the film’s ending, the narrative resolves its formal 
contradiction between its horror and science fiction elements by giving Michelle the 
space to assert her agency and consciously choose how to react to a threat, rather than 
allowing impulsive plotting to continue to control how she engages with her storyworld. 
By choosing to go to Houston rather than Baton Rouge, Michelle demonstrates a 
hypermasculine and aggressive control over her own actions after fighting her way free 
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of a pathologized sense of pre-9/11 masculinity, whether embodied as Howard, her 
father, or as the post-zombie nightmare of the alien threat. 
At the second horizon, the resolution of the formal contradiction of the spatial 
conflict of the below-ground survival space with the above-ground world by focalizing on 
Michelle as an intermediary can be re-interpreted as a dialogic conflict over the 
ideologeme of safety, in which, through Michelle, the film advocates for safety through 
individualism as governed by the protonarrative of creative survivalism. As Mitchell’s 
research into survivalist culture revealed, the creative survivalist is a protonarrative in 
which the individual attempts to exert control over their lives by inventing apocalyptic 
survivalist fantasy narratives that would allow them to utilize the materials at hand in 
creative ways in order to defend themselves and those they love. At the root of this 
survivalist fantasy is the individual or the self seeking a sense of their own creative 
relevance in order to counter the experience of alienation that they find in the post-
capitalist world. The only regard to any sense of collectivism in this fantasy is one in 
which the individual as the patriarch takes care of their isolated family unit through their 
creative use of bricolage, which usually amounts to the a narrative of generational 
transmission of this patriarchal culture that spreads its sense of isolated individualism 
along to their children. Yet, 10 Cloverfield Lane utilizes Michelle as an embodiment of 
the individualism of the creative survivalist in a dialogic effort to demonstrate the 
inefficacy the corrupted collectivism of Howard’s consumerism as survivalism.  
While Michelle mostly struggles to survive on her own in the face of the 
numerous threats she faces in her life, Howard’s consumerism as survival 
protonarrative attempts to hold together the film’s three survivors in a dysfunctional form 
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of collectivism. Just as Zone One shows that collective action is hopeless if it is 
poisoned by nostalgic reconstruction, 10 Cloverfield Lane shows that the collective 
action of the survival group is doomed if it is tainted by similar efforts to relive a lost 
domestic past. Once inside the bunker, Howard only grudgingly allows Emmett inside, 
hinting that he would have preferred if it was just him and Michelle alone, a situation 
wherein he could better relive his lost relationship with his daughter Megan. Echoing 
this desire to return to a nostalgic domesticity is the bunker’s set design, which 
Harrington describes as the “shelter’s cheery mid-century suburban American décor” 
(131), one complete with carpeted floor, worn-in family couch, television entertainment 
center, family board games, an assortment of DVDs, and stacks of teen girl magazines. 
Taken together, this “frames the awkward domesticity as a distorted ‘father knows best’ 
sitcom in which Emmett and Michelle take on the roles of wayward children and Howard 
becomes the long-suffering patriarch” (131). This retreat to the domestic in many ways 
mirrors the move that earned the post-9/11 American novel considerable criticism as the 
genre privileged the depiction of the domestic over the political. As Steffen Hantke 
notes, this move can be read as a retreat into the familiar after a traumatic event, an 
attempt to return to a personal and domestic pre-Event experience that the “moment of 
trauma renders…inaccessible” as its temporal disruption creates “a strict chronology 
that is only reversible by way of nostalgia, which provides a lens through which all 
actual flaws of this world are retrospectively erased” (251).  
Howard retreats into just this sort of domestic fantasy in his attempt to re-create 
his lost family experience before his traumatic separation from his daughter, an event 
that is re-triggered by the Event of the alien invasion and the availability of Michelle as a 
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surrogate for his daughter. Yet, not only is this domestic fantasy an impossible delusion 
that will almost certainly mean Michelle’s death when she can no longer manage to live 
up to her new role, but it is also an illusory avoidance of the traumatic intrusion of the 
external threat pressing on the present conditions of their storyworld. This is at trap that 
many Americans, perhaps directed by the very post-9/11 fear narratives that we create, 
fell into after the attacks of 9/11, which, as Hantke states, creates a stance that robs us 
of our political agency: 
 “[W]ithdrawal into privacy becomes more reactionary with every year that has 
passed since the traumatic events occurred; as time passes, it stops being a 
reflex and becomes a deliberate stance…the renewed emphasis on the purely 
subjective dimension of human suffering, and hence its proper placement within 
the realm of privacy, comes at a high price…of disavowing all forms of political 
instrumentalization… [This] retreat from the public sphere constitutes a 
significant loss of critical or oppositional potential” (251-2). 
Essentially, the retreat into a nostalgic sense of the domestic is a comforting illusion that 
the pre-Event life still exists after the trauma. Browning observes this performance also 
occurring in the survival space in Romero’s Dawn of the Dead, in which the characters 
attempt to recreate a normal, or pre-Event, domestic life in the zombie-surrounded mall 
that “proves nearly fatal” (51). Howard’s attempts lead to much the same result as his 
pseudo-family of survivors breaks down when Howard kills Emmett in a vat of acid and 
Michelle has to run from him to save her life. Overall, the film clearly shows the dangers 
of Howard’s corrupted collectivism through his patriarchal enactment of consumerism as 
a means of survival. Further, his depiction as a homicidal and mentally unstable father 
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figure cements the devaluation of this protonarrative by pathologizing his regressive and 
nostalgic masculinity, and, by contrasting it with Michelle’s successful use of 
hypermasculinity, the film subtly articulates Howard with the pre-Event hegemonic 
masculinity that American culture believes failed to defend it from the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. 
In contrast, the narrative rewards Michelle for her escape from the family 
collective when she relies only on herself to survive through hypermasculine aggression 
and creative survivalism. Michelle’s previous attempts to find safety as an individual by 
running from danger proves to be just as fallible as Howard’s nostalgically collectivist 
bunker, as her life up to the point of the narrative is shaped by her running from one 
environment of paternalistic violence and dominance to another environment that 
reveals itself to be no safer than the last. This approach to safety through flight has only 
proven to rob her of her agency in the past, casting her as a “feminized” victim of her 
circumstances. The film formally conveys this experience of victimization through 
sympathetic camera angles and claustrophobic cinematography so that the viewer 
becomes aligned with Michelle’s initial entrapment in the patriarchal traumas of her 
past. As Grierson states, “10 Cloverfield Lane leaves us feeling as trapped as Michelle, 
putting us in her corner from the start.” Importantly, much of her previous victim 
behavior is related only through analeptic stories about her history before the events of 
the film, stories that are related through dialogue only and not visual representation, 
devaluing this survival strategy by excluding it from the film’s screen-time.  
In the discourse-time of the film, if anything, Michelle is consistently portrayed as 
an individual who demonstrates courage under extreme circumstances. This inspires 
295 
 
such reviewer comments as, “Miles away from a traditional damsel in distress, 
[Michelle] is refreshingly calm, tough, quick-thinking and competent” (“10 Cloverfield”). 
In this way, the screen-time of the film devotes itself to portraying Michelle’s use of 
hypermasculine creative survivalism, a strategy that allows her to emerge as the lone 
surviving character of the film. By finding inadequacies in both the strategies of the 
consumerist as survivalist hiding in bunker preparation and the individual fleeing from 
the threat, the film dialogically endorses the aggressive hypermasculinity of the 
protonarrative of creative survivalism. Yet, as the scene of Michelle arriving at the 
crossroads by herself reinforces, this is a form of safety that isolates the subject to face 
adversity alone. Despite Trachtenberg’s assurances that she is now ready to face the 
threats of her future, it seems unlikely that one person alone could survive the fight 
ahead with the hordes of alien ships that we see lurking in the storm clouds as she 
drives toward Houston, let alone all of the other aliens we assume she will find once she 
gets there.    
 At the third horizon, we can re-interpret the ideologeme of individualist safety 
through the genre contradiction of the nihilism of the millennial zombie narrative and the 
action-oriented aggression of the science fiction film to demonstrate the failure of the 
secondary fear theme of the survival space to offer safety and protection to the survival 
group. Whereas Mark Spitz of Zone One almost leaves the survival space to abandon 
its nostalgic collectivism, Michelle in 10 Cloverfield Lane actually makes the move, 
surviving the inevitable collapse of the survival space to outlast the nihilistic urges of the 
zombie narrative in which everyone dies in the end. In this way, the film utilizes its 
science fiction elements to create a post-zombie narrative that injects the millennial 
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zombie narrative with a sense of invention, avoiding the overplayed zombie as the 
apocalyptic monster in favor of something different that functions in much the same 
way. Not only does this allow for a twist on the zombie-creature theme, but it also lends 
Michelle the blockbuster science fiction film character agency to defy the millennial 
zombie convention of often killing off all of its characters, as we saw in Zone One and 
Snyder’s Dawn of the Dead. In this post-zombie survivalist narrative, we find that there 
is a possibility for life after the zombie-creature apocalypse, even if it is cast in an 
uncertain light by the film’s ambiguous ending that does not portray the results of 
Michelle’s choice to fight the alien invaders. In this way, as we have noted, both the 
genres of horror and science fiction work together in this film to ideologically support 
hypermasculine fighting rather than the “feminized” retreat into the survival space as the 
best way to safety after the Event of 9/11. In this application, 10 Cloverfield Lane is a 
late entry into ongoing discourse between post-9/11 American fear narratives that 
furthers the inadequacy of hiding behind the ideological walls of American 
exceptionalism to urge Americans to aggressive military action in response to a threat, a 
stance that could be seen as supporting the continuance of the occupation of Iraq and 
the War on Terror. 
Yet, the generic tension created by the sudden transition from the bunker to the 
above-ground world of fighting a post-zombie alien invasion has met with some viewer 
confusion. Erin Harrington notes that this plays a large part in the film’s mixed reception 
among viewers: 
Although the film was relatively well received upon its release, a swift online 
search indicates how divisive the ending has been among viewers, even though 
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the appearance of the aliens has been quietly flagged since the film’s opening 
moments, and the film’s intertextual relationships make ample space for a 
narrative involving an alien incursion. 
However, as on viewer, “Richie,” commented in a review, this generic tension can also 
be seen as an asset to the film: “‘Half the fun while watching the movie was trying to 
figure out whether Goodman was Crazy or if Aliens have really attacked…Turns out the 
answer’s ‘yes’” (Chang). 
As Robinson argues, rather than distracting, the genre shift actually allows “the 
necessary completion” of Michelle’s story arc, in which she “comes to terms with her 
abuse,” effectively integrating her past trauma into a unified identity that can survive 
life’s threats and dangers. Robinson views the science fiction ending as “an extension of 
the abuse metaphor,” as “[f]or victims of domestic abuse, just getting out of the house 
doesn’t immediately solve all their problems.” Often the abuser pursues their victim in 
the outside world, and the alien invaders in the film function as nightmare reflections of 
patriarchal entrapment as the controlling monster of the abuser turned murderous, 
literarily attempting to consume the escaping Michelle. Effectively, the narrative 
synthesizes these two genres by substituting the typical zombie for an alien apocalypse, 
merging both under the theme of Michelle’s character arc of facing the threats in her life 
in order to become a creative survivalist, a hypermasculine stance that the film depicts 
as providing her with a much more effective form of safety than simply hiding. This 
combination turns the conventional societal threat of alien invasion into a psychological 
challenge that encourages individual character development, but ultimately leaves its 
result unstated in an ambiguous ending that manages to be simultaneously hopeful and 
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foreboding. Michelle made great strides to choose to face adversity, but what was her 
fate in the end?  
In a utopian sense, this film represents Michelle’s psychological journey from 
simply fleeing from patriarchal domination but still being trapped within a patriarchal 
social structure, to actively resisting this entrapment by making the choice to fight and 
take back her autonomy to join a collective effort to resist the external threat in Houston, 
whether we see this as alien invaders, patriarchal domination, or a symbolic 
representation of our fears. However, ideologically, the ambiguous ending urges the 
viewer to question the efficacy of her decision to fight. How effective was Michelle’s 
agency and creative survivalism once she arrived in Houston? Just because aggressive 
hypermasculinity through creative survivalism worked to get her through the events in 
the film, how do we know that fighting was really effective in this new situation in 
Houston? Would it have been smarter for her to flee from the overwhelming power of 
the alien invaders? Should Michelle have just let someone else deal with her problems 
for her once again? Essentially, the seed of doubt left by the fearful ambiguity at the end 
not only continues the zombie narrative convention of the inevitable persistence of the 
continued threat that we saw in Zone One, but it also allows lingering traces of 
Howard’s patriarchal oppression to live on after the film’s last shot, looming like the alien 
ships silhouetted across the skyline as dark shapes forever just ahead, immanent 







 Overall, this chapter analyzes how the secondary fear themes of the zombie 
narrative function as constellations of the more abstract primary fear themes, 
embedding these American fears deep into their symbolic and formal structures. 
Through the interaction of the zombie-creature and the survival spaces they mass 
around, whether in the form of a wall or barricade, these existents stimulate our actual 
world post-9/11 fears pertaining to the shattering of the Virgin Land myth of American 
exceptionalism and our consumerist desire to create a sense of safety behind the 
coping mechanism of material accumulation, as seen in the patriotic call to go out and 
shop. In both Zone One and 10 Cloverfield Lane, we find various ideological 
approaches to re-establishing our sense of safety after 9/11. In Zone One, we 
encounter the dangers of comforting nostalgia as an attempt to re-create the pre-Event 
past in the postapocalyptic present. This critiques the conservative push to Make 
America Great Again that calls upon a narrative of a Utopian past to fix the problems of 
the present day. Through 10 Cloverfield Lane, we see a similar attempt at this nostalgic 
reconstruction that the film pathologizes through Howard’s attempts to isolate himself 
from external threats by recreating an illusory domestic scene of his past. Alongside 
this, the film critiques the “feminized” victim state of hiding from threats to find a sense 
of safety, as Michelle’s impulses to run consistently send her back into the clutches of a 
new, if strikingly similar, threat. Finally, the conclusion of the film urges us toward the 
enactment of an aggressive post-9/11 hypermasculinity through an individualizing 
strategy grounded in the survivalist fantasy of creative survivalism.  
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Taken in their historical context, the concern of American safety stretches across 
the genres of the millennial zombie narrative and the post-zombie narrative to advocate 
that a nostalgic return to the same pre-9/11 hegemonic masculinity, as represented in 
the pheenies of Zone One and Howard’s bunker mentality, will not work. The consensus 
here appears to be that it failed to protect us against terrorism and 9/11 the first time, so 
we need a new approach to safety that fits the world we live in now. At the same time, 
running from our problems to adopt the status as a victim of 9/11 as Michelle tries, 
perhaps by attempting to retreat behind an isolationist sense of American 
exceptionalism once again, no longer makes sense in the international relations of a 
post-capitalistic and globally networked world, as our problems will always be right there 
waiting for us when we stop running. Instead, for better or worse, these narratives urge 
for us to face our threats aggressively, and it appears that America has listened to these 
calls with our continuation of the War on Terror to this day. 
In the next chapter, we will see how many of these secondary fear themes 
translate into the science fiction genre. As we have seen in our discussion of 10 
Cloverfield Lane, science fiction establishes a distancing effect by its often greater 
measure of minimal departure. At times, this masks its symbolic acts deeper into 
allegorical layers that allow the genre to explore manifestations of the zombie-creature, 
survival space, and the hypermasculine character in ways that would meet with greater 







POST-9/11 AMERICAN FEAR NARRATIVES IN THE SCIENCE FICTION GENRE 
 
 In the last chapter, I analyzed the post-9/11 American fear narrative as it appears 
in the zombie narrative, focusing on the secondary fear themes of the zombie-creature, 
the survival space, the wall, and the hypermasculine character as seen through two 
texts that explored the zombie from a dominant and a marginalized perspective. In this 
chapter, I will turn to the science fiction (SF) genre to see how these secondary fear 
themes transfer across the lines of both genre and media, and to introduce the 
secondary fear theme of the hybrid character, one that seems to find a welcome home 
in SF. 
 The debate over the definition of SF has a long history in science fiction studies, 
and is one often marred with spurious territory battles and lines drawn in the sand that 
often reflect particular interests more than they truly describe SF as we commonly know 
it through our social interaction with culture7. David Herman describes one way to 
distinguish between these different attempts at genre definition with the concepts “etic” 
and “emic” (Basic 3). As he states, “etic approaches create descriptive categories that 
are used by analysts to sift through patterns” and are “imposed on the data from 
without,” whereas “emic approaches seek to capture differences that language users 
themselves orient to as meaningful” (3). In this way, many of the more problematic 
definitions of SF have tended toward the etic approach, imposing a particular 
 
7 For more on this, see Darko Suvin’s limited description of SF that dismisses many texts commonly held 
as SF (4), what Andrew Milner explains as a selective tradition for SF (221), or see the following 
summaries of attempts to define the genre in Sobchack (17-20), Bould & Vint (1-19), or Wolfe 
(“Theorizing” 38-54).   
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categorization on the SF genre for the use of the analyst or critic, and I could extend this 
to include even business interests as well. For instance, Hugo Gernsback, editor, 
magazine publisher, and one of the founders of SF who is often credited with coining 
the term “science fiction” itself in 1929, described SF as “charming romance 
intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision” (Wolfe, “Theorizing” 43). While 
some SF fits this bill, such as hard science fiction that attempts to predict the future, 
most SF does not. Yet, for Gernsback, this etic attempt at drawing boundaries around 
the genre was as much an attempt to “differentiate his magazine” and “stak[e] out his 
market” as it was to create a definition (43).  
Instead, a more emic approach to the definition of SF can draw our attention to 
how people who use SF discourse more commonly think about the genre. Moving in this 
direction, it becomes apparent that much of SF treats its futuristic storyworlds more like 
what Thomas N. Scortia calls “thought experiments” (137), in which we ask, what if 
something happened, was discovered, or was created? How would that affect the future 
(or the past or present)? Further, SF often blurs the boundaries of Gernsback’s 
insistence on scientific fact, straying into pseudoscience or entirely fantastic elements 
that the story does not even attempt to explain through science at all, such as Jedi 
Knights using a mysterious power known as the Force in the Star Wars franchise. Yet, 
few would claim that Star Wars is not SF. In fact, it is commonly held as one of the 
iconic examples of the genre, so this seems to complicate Gernsback’s etic genre 
definition.  
This study can move closer into the emic by adopting a more general framework. 
Andy Sawyer and Peter Wright describe SF as the literature of change, or as a way “of 
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dramatizing our hopes and fears around change” (7), often technological change, but 
also often concerning social, political, and demographic changes as well. Perhaps in 
one of the most emic responses of all, Damon Knight, SF author/editor/critic, was once 
posed with the question “What is science fiction?” He famously answered, “What we 
point to when we say it” (3). While this at first may simply seem like a way to avoid the 
question altogether, it highlights the social construction of genres in general: in most 
cases, we know SF when we see it, and if a given text defies our social understanding 
of the genre, we discuss it and classify it in a negotiated process that includes 
consumers, producers, creators, reviewers, and critics who assign a text a given label 
and see if others agree or not. 
 Overall, though, SF works in a way that distances the reader from their everyday 
experience by often establishing their storyworlds in distant times and places, and 
through its use of things that do not currently exist, but often could potentially exist, such 
as interstellar spaceships, robots, aliens, and ray guns. In the terms of possible worlds 
theory, I draw on Lubomír Doležel to say that SF changes the alethic modality of the 
storyworld (115), thereby changing what is possible through the introduction of elements 
either scientifically rationalized or that result from new technological advances. As will 
become apparent as this chapter progresses, though, this distancing by changing the 
alethic modality serves to connect its audiences to their historical presents in more 
allegorical modes. As Jameson states, in SF’s detailed depictions of the future, “the 
apparent realism, or representationality, of SF has concealed another, far more complex 
temporal structure: not to give us ‘images’ of the future…but rather to defamiliarize and 
restructure our experience of our own present, and to do so in specific ways distinct 
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from all other forms of defamiliarization” (“Progress”). According to Jameson, SF allows 
us access to the otherwise inaccessible present, a way through the ideological and 
material complexities of life on the emergent, bleeding edge of existence:  
It is this present moment—unavailable to us for contemplation in its own right 
because the sheer quantitative immensity of objects and individual lives it 
comprises is untotalizable and hence unimaginable…that upon our return from 
the imaginary constructs of SF is offered to us in the form of some future world’s 
remote past, as if posthumous and as though collectively remembered.   
This access to the present allows us to see the world from a fresh perspective, or as 
Takacs states, “Science fiction…works through displacement. The absorption of real-
world issues into the realm of fantasy permits social problems to be examined more 
carefully and resolved in potentially unexpected ways” (“Monsters” 3). This observation 
notes how SF seems to emphasize Jameson’s observation about narratives in general 
at the first horizon: “the individual narrative, or the individual formal structure, is to be 
grasped as the imaginary resolution of a real contradiction” (The Political 77). SF is 
hence by its nature a genre anchored in using science, technology, and/or futurity to 
offer imaginary ideological resolutions to problems in the real world of its own time. 
Analyzing real world events through its defamiliarizing and distancing veil of 
allegory and metaphor also allows SF to approach controversial topics and present 
potentially subversive content in ways that audiences might not find acceptable in more 
realistic narratives. As Brian L. Ott states, all SF is allegorical in some sense (Ott 19), 
and its connection to the actual world can be established through its use of a pretext. In 
their research on allegory, Mike Milford and Robert C. Rowland state, “In many cases 
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works reference a pretext in the form of underlying audience knowledge about 
cultural/historical events but do so for purposes of commentary not simply 
reinforcement” (538). These pretexts “frame a message for a particular audience” (539), 
guiding their allegorical interpretation. SF utilizes this sense of allegory and a pretext of 
historical events, to create a sense of distance. In an interview, Jane Espenson, 
American television writer and producer known for her work in such shows as Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer (1997-2001), Battlestar Galactica (2004-09) (which I will analyze 
below), and Torchwood (2006-11), states, “Oh I think the thicker the metaphor, the more 
there are robots, or monsters, or big dinosaur puppets […] the more there is eye candy 
and clear science fiction or fantasy elements, the more you can get away with. In a way, 
sort of the more heavy handed you can be, the more overt you can be, because people 
are distracted” (Chow-White et al. 1215). In this way, through its futuristic and distant 
storyworlds, SF can discuss the present in ways that many other genres cannot, 
especially in American culture just after 9/11 when to question the Bush Administration 
often meant being labeled unpatriotic and only served to put you on the dangerous side 
of the us/them binary. Essentially, the formal logic of SF allows it the affective distance 
needed to broach sensitive topics and present controversial messages that a given 
culture would find too objectionable if approached directly through a different means 
such as realism. 
 From a theoretical perspective, this study can better understand the 
defamiliarizing poetics and the first horizon symbolic/ideological action of SF through 
Darko Suvin’s concept of cognitive estrangement, a concept that ultimately expresses 
the approach to SF that this project will use, and one that relates well to the 
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narratological principle of minimal departure. Suvin states that SF is “the literature of 
cognitive estrangement,” which means that SF allows us to recognize in it “the author’s 
empirical environment,” while simultaneously making it seem unfamiliar (4). This 
estrangement pushes us to consider this disjunction from reality, but to consider it 
cognitively through its connection to reality. This ambivalent estrangement allows critical 
reflection on our empirical environment and emphasizes the subversive quality of SF as 
it asserts alternates to our present material conditions, or our superstructural 
understanding of these conditions. Of course, this study can also extend Suvin’s 
definition to include not just literature, but all media forms that engage in this brand of 
cognitive estrangement. Next, Suvin’s second important concept is that this relationship 
between the science fictional and reality is centered on the presence of at least one 
novum, which is something new introduced into a SF narrative that makes the fictional 
world different, or estranged, from a common notion of reality. To fit Suvin’s definition, 
the novum must be a “cognitive innovation,” so it must be explained rationally or through 
scientific means (64). In this way, the novum becomes the variable responsible for the 
change in the alethic modality of the storyworld, and Suvin specifies its alethic creativity 
to this sense of scientificity. Of course, as our example of Star Wars above implies, the 
rational explanation of the novum can also be based on pseudoscience or ignored 
entirely as long as it is placed in the context of other nova that can be rationally 
explained. For instance, while the novum of the Force is not explained in the initial 
narratives of the franchise8, the early Star Wars films were readily accepted as SF 
 
8 However, in Star Wars: Episode I—The Phantom Menace (1999), creator George Lucas does attempt to 
rationally explain the Force as it is revealed that all life in the Star Wars storyworld contains a symbiotic 
race of intelligent microscopic “midi-chlorians” that can influence energy fields, allowing some beings who 
are sensitive to their power to use what has been known as the Force. However, this explanation was 
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because they also contained nova with more rational explanations, such as spaceships 
and aliens. The requirement of the novum to have a rational explanation helps to 
distinguish the SF genre from fantasy, as the latter does not normally attempt to explain 
its deviations from reality with rationality or science and instead typically uses magic or 
paranormal explanations, or it simply relies on no explanation at all. 
In SF, it is the presence of the novum that distances the reader from their 
empirical sense of reality and causes them to consider the nature of this estrangement; 
hence, its alethic creativity causes the sense of cognitive estrangement. The novum can 
then be seen as SF’s primary vehicle of minimal departure, which Marie-Laure Ryan 
describes as how readers interact with a storyworld: “We will project upon these worlds 
everything we know about reality, and we will make only the adjustments dictated by the 
text” (51). In other words, when we encounter a narrative, we begin with the initial 
assumption that the storyworld operates under the physical laws and conditions of our 
understanding of the actual world, or, as Doležel would say, that it is a “natural fictional 
world” (115). It is only when the text gives us clues that the alethic modality (or one of 
Doležel’s three other modalities of possible worlds) varies from our expectations of the 
natural fictional world that we make adjustments to our growing mental construction of 
the fictional world, what Doležel calls our “fictional encyclopedia” (177). The nova of SF, 
then, act as part of the set of clues that let the reader know that something new has 
been added beyond their understanding of the actual world, creating the known limits of 
minimal departure in the SF narrative, whether through a new location in space, a new 
time period a thousand years in the future (or millions of years in the past), the presence 
 
only presented twenty-two years after the first film of the franchise, Star Wars: Episode IV—A New Hope 
(1977), which left this novum without any attempt at a rational explanation for over two decades. 
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of aliens, and/or various advanced technologies. As Ryan states, the greater the sense 
of departure from reality, the greater the “increase of the distance between the textual 
universe and our own system of reality” (51). In these terms, the distance in SF can be 
thought of as an aesthetic affect created by the presence of nova, each of which signal 
to the audience how far and in what way the fictional world is different from their actual 
world. Of course, as a text of cognitive estrangement, this very comparison urges the 
audience to make connections between the way the fictional world is altered and the 
way they understand the real world they live in, opening interpretive channels to the 
satirical, critical, and subversive potentials of SF. 
 In its use of these distancing nova, SF utilizes all of the secondary fear themes 
that this study has discussed up to this point in the project, but it also has the symbolic, 
and therefore ideological, freedom to explore angles on fear themes that push the 
boundaries of acceptability established by hegemonic culture. Post-9/11 SF is 
especially drawn to the secondary fear theme that I will primarily focus on in this 
chapter: the hybrid character. The hybrid is a character that embodies a liminal space to 
integrate two different categorical distinctions or the two different sides of a binary 
contradiction to become something new. On the one hand, the hybrid character opens 
up new, often utopic potentialities. Homi Bhabha, from a postcolonial perspective, 
states, “This interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of 
a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” 
(5). In an interview, Bhabha adds to this notion, stating, “hybridity to me is the ‘third 
space’ which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories 
that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which 
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are inadequately understood through received wisdom” (Rutherford 211). In short, the 
destabilizing nature of the hybrid character summons all the progressive and 
deconstructive potentials of Donna Haraway’s cyborg (271), opening new possibilities of 
subversive potential, questioning and discarding the dichotomous logics of the 
hegemonic culture. Particularly important to SF, Haraway’s cyborg breaches the 
human/non-human and nature/technological borders that the genre and its nova have 
attempted to negotiate or transcend through much of its history. In this progressive 
spirit, Bhabha states that hybridity gives a sense of empowering agency to the individual 
so that they can move between both cultures (277). Of course, seen from a different, 
perhaps more conservative perspective, this sort of potential for change and 
destabilizing of difference simultaneously makes the hybrid character a subject of 
intense fear. With respect to fear themes, the hybrid character brings up the 
contamination fears of miscegenation, the transgressive horrors of categorical 
conflation, and the blurring of the line between the external and internal threat. In this 
way, the hybrid character often, simultaneously, evokes reactions of fascination and 
repulsion in the characters around them, offering in its border blurring presence both the 
perceived dangers of the unknown and the utopic potentials for new social 
configurations. In Jamesonian terms, the “ideological function” of fearing the hybrid 
character is that the “dangerous and protopolitical impulses are ‘managed’ and 
defused,” while, at the same time, “these same impulses…are initially awakened within 
the very text that seeks to still them” (The Political 287). This creates a system that 
offers utopian impulses of hybridity as “substantial incentives” for the audience 
members in exchange for their “ideological adherence” to conservative cultural binaries 
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(287). However, at times, SF has the cognitive distance to offer more than mere 
adherence, even within the constraints of the fear narrative. In SF, unlike in postcolonial 
fiction, the hybrid character’s hybridity and ideological function is mediated and indeed 
often created by nova centered around science and technology rather than national or 
cultural borders, and hence are most often indeed what Haraway calls cyborgs in one 
sense or another. 
 This fearful reaction to hybridity creates a variation on the hybrid character in the 
form of the hybrid monster, which Takacs notes was especially prevalent after 9/11 
(“Monsters” 14). Post-9/11 “transgressive, hybrid, and hybridizing monsters…question 
the symbolic boundaries between” established binary opposites (3), such as us/them, 
good/evil, inside/outside, private/public, and—in SF—human/artificial or human/alien. 
As she states, the hybrid monster embodies post-9/11 social anxieties, especially, in our 
terms, the theme of contamination: “Race, modes of dress, national origin, primary 
language, sexuality, religion and all sorts of other biological and cultural factors bleed 
together to constitute ‘suspicious populations’ as ‘those who are not like us’” (Takacs, 
Terrorism 75). In an article, Takacs notes the hybrid monsters of three SF television 
shows from 2005, including Surface, Invasion and Threshold, and it is not much of a 
logical leap to see that these are the symbolic creations of a culture disrupted in the 
wake of 9/11. The transgressive integrations that the hybrid monster embodies question 
the ontological and ideological assumptions that were relatively stable in hegemonic 
culture before the attacks, as I have charted in previous chapters through the 
destabilization of the myths of the state of exception and of hegemonic masculinity. On 
this cultural front, however, the distance established by SF allows the genre to push 
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these questions in new, productive, and, at times, progressive directions, as this study 
will show in the two example texts analyzed shortly. 
 Specifically, the remainder of this chapter will analyze the secondary fear theme 
of the hybrid character and others as they appear in two post-9/11 American SF fear 
narratives, Ronald D. Moore’s television series Battlestar Galactica (2004-09) and 
Andrea Hairston’s novel Mindscape (2006). In general terms, at the first horizon, post-
9/11 American SF fear narratives use rationally explainable alethic minimal departures 
from post-9/11 realities to create hybrid characters who’s breaching of human/non-
human borders at once repress the racial and cultural conflicts of the so-called clash of 
civilizations and imagine utopian solutions to racial, sexual, gender, and cultural 
conflicts and differences. At the second horizon, these hybrid characters created by 
SF’s unique alethic modality via a sense of distanced allegory symbolically displace but 
also call attention to the social conflicts prevalent after 9/11, such as those between 
East and West, Muslim and Christian, and colored and white, offering ideologemes that 
posit potential directions for how America should best survive these differences as it 
moves into a post-9/11 future of a continual War on Terror. At the third horizon, hybrid 
characters function to sediment and rewrite the conventions of the SF genre so that 
they allegorically struggle with the limits of American exceptionalism and isolationism, 
while simultaneously pointing toward collectivist potentials. This plays out in Battlestar 
Galactica, as, at the first horizon, the formal contradiction of its fantastic and realist 
elements resolves into the program’s morally ambivalent narratives, which explore 
issues from multiple perspectives without ever taking a side, a move that either incites 
conversation on controversial topics or negates the viewer’s individual’s responsibility to 
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act. At the second horizon, the series arc focuses on its hybrid characters in a dialogic 
conflict between biological essentialism and social construction that ultimately resolves 
through the naturalistic ideologeme that our genetic heritage is the most determinative 
aspect of identity and cultural location. At the third horizon, its generic sedimentation as 
a remake of the 1978 original series and its legacy as a SF television series works to 
simultaneously posit that we can overcome our irreconcilable differences to become a 
hybrid society, even as the conclusion works against this impulse to advocate for 
American exceptionalism and isolationism. In Mindscape, the formal contradiction of its 
separate characters and their separate worldviews is depicted in their distinct uses of 
language that are displayed at first in separate chapters. This resolves as the narratives 
continue to converge until the characters finally integrate into an alliance that preserves 
their difference without assimilating into one another. At the second horizon, the social 
conflict between the characters working for integration and those working for personal 
gain through isolationism resolves into the at once utopian and quasi-colonial 
ideologeme that we must confront our differences in order to integrate into a 
cooperative and diverse collective front capable of bring about social change. At the 
third horizon, this can be re-interpreted at the level of generic sedimentation as the 
romance genre is displaced into SF in the almost “magical” novum of the Barrier. Unlike 
the rationally explained novum of the SF genre, the inclusion of this magical novum of 
romance allows the imaginary resolution of social and class division to allow for the 
storyworld’s integration into a hybrid and sustainable collective, all while the narrative 
simultaneously forwards an oppressive call for competition and difference as 




BATTLESTAR GALACTICA AND THE HYBRID CHARACTER 
 The television series Battlestar Galactica (BSG) is a consummate post-9/11 SF 
American fear narrative, and an example of one authored by the dominant social group, 
as the show’s creator, Ronald D. Moore, is a white male. As I will discuss below, at one 
point or another in its four seasons, BSG features all ten of the primary fear themes 
described in chapter four, and it also utilizes versions of all the secondary fear themes 
covered in the previous chapter as well. Overall, the show has received abundant 
academic and critical attention, and many have noted how it engages in “the societal 
questions and political climate that characterized the years immediately after 9/11” 
(Chow-White et al. 1211). Much like the 9/11 novel, however, it takes a “domestic” 
approach to discussing 9/11 rather than exploring the international or political 
implications of the attacks, even if BSG approaches this in a metaphorically SF-
distanced way through its use of nova. As Barry Buzan notes on BSG, “The main 
political tension is domestic, resonating with post-9/11 America’s dilemma about how to 
balance between the demands of security hawks, and the concerns of civilians about 
democracy, representation and civil rights” (178). Even in SF, 9/11 often had the effect 
of turning American culture’s attention inward rather than outward, to a contemplation of 
the affects that the attacks produced within our nation and social groups rather than on 
its connections to other nations and social groups.  
 As BSG ran for just over six years and consists of over 76 episodes, the program 
has a complicated storyline, but, for the most part, this study will focus on the series arc 
in general. In season one, humanity lives in twelve colonies on the twelve separate 
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planets of a solar system. We learn that before the beginning of the series, humanity 
had created the Cylons, which were robots designed to do our work. In time they 
rebelled, starting the First Cylon War that lasted for twelve years until the Cylons 
mysteriously withdrew. After disappearing for forty years, the Cylons return in a carefully 
orchestrated nuclear attack that wipes out most of humanity, with a body count in the 
billions, an apocalyptic Event that in many ways echoes 9/11. The series follows what is 
believed to be the last existing battleship, called Battlestar Galactica, and the ragtag 
fleet of the last remnants of humanity as they search for a new habitable planet in the 
mysterious lost 13th Colony of Earth. However, throughout the show, the fleet is 
constantly pursued by the Cylons who are comprised of the robotic Centurions, Raiders 
that are Centurions in the form of fighter spaceships, and a series of mysterious 
humanoid Cylons that prove to be nearly indistinguishable from humans. There are 
eight models of the humanoid Cylons, and later a final five are revealed, so for much of 
the narrative, the humans are trying to figure out who is a Cylon and who is a human, 
with numerous surprises along the way. The fleet follows a series of clues hidden in 
ancient religious texts to find Kobol, an ancient human colony now occupied by the 
Cylons. A Cylon mother, a Model Eight (Grace Park) later called Athena, and a human 
father, Karl “Helo” Agathon (Tahmoh Penikett), have the first, and only, human/Cylon 
hybrid child, Hera, who becomes increasingly important as the show progresses. Also, 
two characters begin seeing what they believe to be hallucinations of each other that 
are later revealed near the end of the series to have actually been angels sent to guide 
them, angels that Van Leavenworth aptly names Virtual Six (Tricia Helfer) and Virtual 
Baltar (James Callis) after the two characters, one Cylon and one human, whose 
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appearances they share (689). By the end of season two, the fleet discovers and 
colonizes the habitable planet they call New Caprica.  
They are found and occupied by the Cylons as season three reverses the 
established human/Cylon or American/terrorist paradigm to show the humans forming 
insurgent rebellions and resorting to suicide bombings to fight their oppressors. After 
rising up and escaping Cylon occupation, the humans renew their search for Earth, and, 
by the end of the season, four of the human characters come to realize that they are 
actually four of the final five models of the humanoid Cylons (the fifth is shortly 
thereafter revealed to be Colonel Saul Tigh’s wife Ellen Tigh, played by Kate Vernon). In 
season four, the Cylons begin a civil war that splits their forces between those 
embracing their robotic nature as led by the Number One model of the humanoid 
Cylons, and those following their religious faith to join with the human fleet so that they 
can be closer to the newly discovered final five models of the humanoid cylons and 
thereby re-unite the Cylon race. The fleet finds Earth but discovers that it was destroyed 
in a nuclear war two thousand years ago. We soon discover that Earth had been 
inhabited entirely by the final five Cylon models, who escaped the nuclear war to later 
create the other eight models of humanoid Cylons, inadvertently starting the return of 
the Cylons and the destruction of the Twelve Colonies that began the series when the 
final five were betrayed by the Number Ones. Further, we learn that the humans and 
Cylons have been repeating this cycle of creating the Cylons only to lead to a war in 
which civilization destroys itself and things start all over again for some time now, and 
the fleet struggles to find a way to stop the cycle. The humans struggle with the stress 
of integrating with the Cylons, whom for so long they have seen as their enemies, but 
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successfully come together as a hybrid group that defeats the other group of Cylons led 
by the Number Ones. Guided by intuition and divine providence, the Galactica jumps by 
interstellar travel away from the battleground to arrive at a new inhabitable planet that 
they decide to call Earth. Here, the survivors decide to mix with the pre-linguistic 
humans they find there, but, in an attempt to stop the cycle, they reject their own 
technology, sending all of their ships into the sun. In a final scene, we flash forward to 
learn that Hera, the hybrid child of the humans and Cylons, turns out to be the 
Mitochondrial Eve9 of today’s actual world human race, genetically reinvigorating the 
human race we, the viewers, are a part of today. As it turns out, the whole purpose of 
the series was to get Hera, the hybrid character to a newly emerging human race to 
replenish the genetic stock of humanity, and to potentially end the cycle of war between 
the humans and the Cylons by making all humanity into hybrids. In this last scene, the 
two angels, Virtual Six and Virtual Baltar, walk our present-day streets, speculating if all 
of the effort of the series has really paid off or if we will only continue the cycle of human 
and Cylon annihilation. Muting their tentative hopefulness, the show ends ambiguously 
with images of our present day attempts to create robots to serve our needs. The 
program ends by seeming to ask, “Is the cycle really is over, or will a new Cylon War be 
in our future?” 
Of course, this is only a sketch of the narrative of BSG that focuses on the series 
arc itself, and many of the characters and episodic arcs extend beyond the limits of this 
study. Overall, though, the narrative can be seen as essentially nostalgic and 
 
9 Anne Kustritz gives a good explanation of how Hera as the Mitochondrial Eve would serve to spread her 
genetic legacy to present day humanity: “Because mitochondrial DNA passes from mother to offspring 
without recombination, scientists have attempted to track the earliest point of origin for all present human 
mitochondria…the ancestral mother to whom we all owe our mitochondria” (31). 
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regressive, as Buzan states, “BSG is a science fiction that “look[s] inward and close[s] 
themselves off” (180), as the fleet searches for its origins, abandoning its technological, 
cultural, and social developments for a return to a pre-historic past. As Buzan argues, 
this ideologically displaces America’s post-9/11 return to a state of exceptionalism and 
cultural isolationism, but there is much more going on ideologically in BSG than that, 
especially at the politically unconscious level that Jameson and this study seek to 
unpack.  
I can certainly justify this program as a fear narrative, as many of the primary and 
secondary fear themes play an important part in the narrative’s affective effect, some 
more so than others. The apocalyptic Event manifests in the destruction of the Twelve 
Colonies, not to mention the apocalyptic scarcity of material resources that the fleet 
experiences, which echoes and historically builds alongside the postapocalyptic and 
zombie narratives that I discussed in the last chapter, such as The Road and Zone One. 
As Milford and Rowland point out, “the series began with an unprovoked attack by the 
Cylons on the human worlds resulting in smoking buildings and flaming craters that 
were an instant reminder of the Twin Towers and Ground Zero” (543). Paranoia and the 
fear of the internal threat, or even the internalized threat, is a constant tension in the 
series as one never knows who is a Cylon. And Moore overtly states his desire to keep 
this sense of constant high tension, saying he aims to keep the narrative in “a state of 
perpetual crisis” (34) that allegorizes the post-9/11 invention of a never ending “war on 
terror.” Post-apocalyptic trauma motivates the characters to resort to torture as revenge 
against the dehumanized enemy, as seen in the torture of the Cylon Leoben in “Flesh 
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and Bone” (1.08)10 and of the Number Six named Gina in “Resurrection Ship, Part 1” 
(2.11) (Mulligan 59). Having the Cylons chase the fleet across space drives home a 
sense of the personalization of fear as the Cylons really are targeting the individual and 
the small group in their initial hope to eradicate the human race. For instance, in “Act of 
Contrition” (1.04), Lt. Kara “Starbuck” Thrace (Katee Sackhoff) trains a new group of 
fighter pilots who are suddenly attacked by Cylon Raiders, and back on Caprica Lt. 
Agathon is being tricked into following a Number Eight while the two are watched by a 
Number Six with a plan set out for him. In both instances and many others, the attacks 
or threats are made at the personal and individual level, rather than just at the collective 
level. In addition, characters such as Boomer, a Number Eight that truly believes she 
was human until she is activated as a Cylon sleeper agent, experience exclusion, 
entrapment, and fear of her own contamination by the enemy Other. As Matthew 
Gumpert states, this fear of discovering oneself excluded as an out-group member is a 
constant in the series: “Perhaps the most obvious symptom of the existential crisis 
provoked by the Cylon is the fear that one is a Cylon (fear of being outed, either to 
others or to oneself)” (150). And always at the core of the narrative is the fear of 
transgression, as the borders between the human and the machine are forever 
questioned.  
The program even goes as far as utilizing versions of each of the secondary fear 
themes that were discussed in the previous chapter. While the Cylons may not be 
zombie-creatures per se, they are certainly external threats that display many trace 
parallels to the zombie-creatures of other fear narratives that aired at the same time. 
 
10 1.08 means that the text in question is from season one and is the eighth episode in that season. This 
numbering convention will be used throughout this project. 
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While the Cylons are certainly not decaying, the Cylon Centurions are thoroughly 
dehumanized as they seem to exert no individual identity or agency but instead exist as 
a collective and networked entity. Even how the humanoid Cylons are pre-programmed 
with a base personality and have many copies evoke the horde mentality and the lack of 
individual autonomy of the zombie-creature. Of course, the Cylons are not infectious, 
but the condition of discovering that you are a Cylon, or even believing that you might 
be a Cylon, as Baltar often does, seems to spread as doubt in oneself and others 
throughout the fleet. Likewise, the Cylons are notoriously hard to kill as they can often 
only be defeated with explosives, and the humanoid models do not actually die (until 
later in the series) as they resurrect in new, identical bodies waiting in a nearly endless 
supply of resurrection tanks. Last, while they are certainly apocalyptic, one SF invention 
on the zombie-creature theme that the Cylons present is that they and their attack on 
humanity are explained but only in the fourth season. Typical of the zombie-creature, 
this leaves the motivations behind many of their actions, other than their implied drive 
for revenge against their creators/oppressors or the seeming inevitability of the clash of 
irreconcilable differences, unexplained throughout most of the narrative. Only in the last 
season does the program present the rational explanation for their attacks: the Number 
Ones believe that machines are superior to humanity and detest the humans for their 
difference, which causes them to set in motion the events of the attacks on the Twelve 
Colonies. In addition, there are clear examples of characters that fit the hypermasculine 
character theme. This can be seen in the militarization of the storyworld, as the state of 
emergency posed by the Cylon attack creates a scenario where the last survivors of 
humanity must rely on the military leadership of Captain/Admiral Adama (Edward James 
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Olmos) to provide them with some sense of safety. Further, there are numerous 
examples of women as hypermasculine characters, such as the robotically strong Cylon 
named Number Six (Tricia Helfer) and the soldier-maverick Kara “Starbuck” Thrace, 
especially in the climactic season-finale episode “Kobol’s Last Gleaming, Part II” (2.17), 
where the two fiercely fight for the possession of the next clue to finding Kobol. 
However, the conclusion of the series works to nullify some of the subversive cultural 
work done by what Sherrie Innes would call its many “tough girls”11. As more of a 
secondary emphasis, the show also features the survival space in the form of the ship 
itself, Battlestar Galactica, as, especially in the first two seasons, the humans hide 
within its defensive walls against the external threat of the hordes of Cylon Raiders and 
battleships called Basestars. In many ways, the Galactica, which LeiLani Nishime calls 
“the central metropolis of the series” (460), evokes Wolfe’s science fiction icons of the 
city—in that it is xenophobic, authoritarian, stable (mostly), and a relic of the past (88-
91)—while also of the icon of the spaceship in defining the inside/outside binaries of the 
wall in the narrative (59-61). 
Yet, more central to the narrative of the show is the secondary fear theme of the 
hybrid character, as the Cylons blur the lines between themselves and the humans, 
ultimately producing the truly hybrid in the form of the infant, Hera, whom we learn is the 
potential savior of both the humans and the Cylons alike, at least genetically speaking. 
The humanoid Cylon models produce an uncanny doubling in their many copies as 
multiple copies of various models often appear in the same frame and duplicate copies 
 
11 On Starbuck, see Carla Kungl on how BSG effectively balances her “strength and vulnerability” to 
“move…women characters onto new ground” (200), at least up to season three when the article is written. 
See Kustritz on Caprica Six and Laura Roslin’s domestication and essentialism in season four (11, 20-1). 
Also, see Chow-White et al. for Grace Park’s quote on the program’s “agro-masculinity” (1218). 
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reappear to the human characters after another is killed (Peirse 118-9). Overall, as 
Gumpert states, the humanoid cylons “are Haraway’s cyborgs: hybrid beings, both 
human and machine, and therefore neither human nor machine, whose very ontological 
indeterminacy represents a challenge to the old essentialist notion of identity” (146-7). 
In this way, the text turns their assumption of human form as a SF allegory for the 
postcolonial act of mimicry into a military strategy intended to achieve liberation from 
those who once oppressed them. The Cylons use this form of mimicry as the 
appropriation of the embodiment of their former masters to not only infiltrate humanity 
but to divide them by evoking the fear of the internalized threat, as the internal threat 
may actually turn out to be you—that you may have actually been a terrorist all along. At 
least within the first three seasons, the humanoid Cylons are portrayed as the hybrid 
monster, while our increasing identification with them in season four begins to turn 
many of them into hybrid characters, thereby opening up third space potentialities with 
liberatory possibilities. 
From a Jamesonian perspective, at the first horizon, the contradiction within the 
series arc of BSG focusing on the hybrid character as both us and them is narratively 
resolved through morally ambivalent narratives that present multiple sides to every 
issue they raise without overtly taking a side. This stance simultaneously allows the 
program to encourage conversations on controversial topics, while also presenting an 
ideologeme of “if you don’t know, you can’t judge” that nullifies the viewer’s individual 
responsibility to act against post-9/11 policies that they may find objectionable. At the 
second horizon, the ambivalence of the program is re-written at the level of the series 
arc the ideologeme that it may be hard to distinguish us from them in the global/hybrid 
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world, but ultimately our genetic heritage is the most important aspect of who we are. At 
the third horizon, the program builds upon its generic sedimentation as a remake of the 
1978 original series and as part of the evolution of SF television to simultaneously 
present the Utopic possibility that we can overcome our irreconcilable differences to 
become a hybrid culture, while oppressively ending the series in a way that supports 
American exceptionalism, isolationism, and reasserts the binary us/them paradigm of 
the Bush Administration and its naturalization of the eternal war on terror. 
To put the first horizon of my analysis in another way, the program’s formal move 
to capture the realism reminiscent of the genre of investigative journalism or combat 
footage that gives “objective” representation of multiple sides of any given situation 
without overt judgement resolves the contradiction inherent in its post-9/11 focus on 
hybrid/culturally ambivalent “third zone” characters. While in the 9/11 novel The 
Submission a similar use of investigative journalism pushes its narrative to represent a 
panoramic cast of characters to capture multiple perspectives, in BSG it pushes the 
narrative toward the use of ambivalent rhetoric to present two or sometimes more sides 
of an argument without privileging one as morally “better” than the others. As a result, 
the show takes a stance of moral ambiguity that Dzialo says creates a “rhetorical 
structure of ‘balance’” in which “there are two or more legitimate sides to every story” 
(171). As a study by Peter A. Chow-White et al. notes, this is largely by design, as “BSG 
creators try to write narratives that avoid offering moral claims”: 
[The] creators claim the ethos of creative openness, morally ambiguous 
storylines, and irreconcilable complexity enables the show to tackle challenging 
social issues. Showrunner Ron Moore considers social engagement and 
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problematizing notions of good and evil to be the cultural goals of the show. 
(1215) 
As a result of a series of interviews, they note that, “For BSG writers, constructing the 
story in a way that raises questions rather than imposes answers allows engagement 
with the audience and encourages dialogue about critical issues,” and that “the creators 
express resistance to a one-way reception model for their media product, preferring the 
idea that meanings are negotiated and plural” (1216). This narrative ambivalence is an 
imaginary formal solution to the necessarily real choice between the us-versus-them 
mentality of either supporting or resisting the actions of the US government after 9/11. 
On the one hand, this means that the narrative form of the episodes is constructed so 
that there are no black and white answers to problems, such as being forced to choose 
between allegorically siding with America or the terrorists. Instead, its moral 
ambivalence allows the viewer to construct their own answers that destabilize this 
us/them binary to create new alternatives that gray the limits of debates that were too 
often simplified at the time into black and white terms, opening up new potentialities for 
alternative solutions. On the other hand, this moral ambiguity also does not offer 
viewers any strategies for critically engaging with the issues that it presents, potentially 
leaving the viewer to dismiss the problem as simply unresolvable.  
 While the SF elements of the show are more readily apparent in its use of 
distancing nova such as Centurions as robots, humanoid Cylons as androids/cyborgs, 
and space travel and high technology, the realist genre elements of investigative 
journalism can be found in both its use of balanced narrative structure and visual 
stylistics as well. The balanced narrative structure can be seen in most episodes such 
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as in “Dirty Hands” (3.16), in which a labor strike breaks out on a fuel refinery ship and 
Galen Tyrol (Aaron Douglas) serves as an intermediary to negotiate between the fleet’s 
need for fuel and the worker’s need for safe working conditions. In addition, the mis-en-
scène and cinematography communicates this photojournalistic push for an “objective” 
sense of realism in the program. As Moore states in the Battlestar Galactica: Series 
Bible, a document that was made during the development of the show and distributed to 
the actors, producers, and writers of the program to establish its common themes, aims, 
and visual approach to the program, “Through the extensive use of hand-held cameras, 
practical lighting, and functional set design, the [B]attlestar Galactica will feel on every 
level like a real place” (5). Similarly, executive producer David Eick states, the goal was 
to create “something utterly real, and visceral and tactile” (“The Look”). As a result, in 
the creation of the Galactica sets, the crew was very careful to capture the details of 
military architecture so that it looked more like an aircraft carrier than a spaceship, doing 
research on World War II ships to adopt their aesthetic feel. In their cinematography, 
they strove for a shaky hand-held camera feel, like what might be found in investigative 
journalism and combat footage but in marked contrast to the smooth camera stylistics of 
SF television programs that came before BSG, and they did this not by using dolly shots 
but instead by putting a hand-held operator in the chair of a dolly to make the shots 
smoother while still shaky enough so give them that “real” feeling similar to found 
footage or documentary work (“The Look”). Even when making the CGI space battles, 
they focused on making it as if there was a real cameraman in space documenting the 
scene. This way, when a fighter ship goes by, the cameraman appears to get startled 
and must find the shot again (“The Look”). They also employ techniques such as quick 
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focuses, sudden zoom-ins, harsh lighting, and extreme close ups at odd angles to give 
the visuals that imperfect, gritty feeling reminiscent of military combat footage, but also 
to visually communicate the imperfections of the characters rather than put them in 
flattering lighting or framing that would make them seem exceptional or artificially 
perfect. This has the stylistic effect of visually decentering the characters we have come 
to follow and identify within the series so that they are not depicted as paragons of 
moral rectitude that should be emulated, but instead as imperfect human beings who do 
not have all the answers to the complex situations with which they are struggling, and 
are thus capable carrying the viewer with them as they switch between numerous sides 
of any given issue, justifying the ambivalence of the plot. In this way, the realism of the 
visuals of BSG pair with the balanced narrative structure to communicate the moral 
ambivalence of the program by showing that people are not immutable, perfected 
abstractions, but are instead allowed to grow and change their minds, and may not 
actually have all of the answers, rather than as ideologues that slavishly attend to a 
single side of an us/them binary. 
The moral ambivalence of the show, however, has resulted in many stating that 
the cultural and ideological messages of the series are also problematically ambiguous 
and difficult to pin down. As Chris Dzialo states, “Battlestar Galactica’s self-consciously 
balanced narration—while not difficult to comprehend—is sometimes maddening to 
interpret” (171). This use of morally ambivalent rhetoric in how it addresses 
controversial themes means that the program simultaneously has the potential to do 
both progressive and conservative cultural work, depending on how it is received. As 
Brian Ott states, “The ambivalent frame encourages reflexivity—an awareness of our 
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complicity and cooperation in war” (19). This call to reflection means that on the more 
progressive side, as Takacs notes, the rhetorical structure of the series serves in 
“reminding us that the terms of the public debate are social constructions subject to 
change” and that BSG and some other post-9/11 programs “invited viewers to wake up 
from ‘the terror dream’ and embrace a more active role in the deliberation of the nation’s 
values and practices” (Terrorism 200). Takacs’s interpretation of the program, however, 
assumes that the readers are engaged in an active reception mode as that theorized 
most famously by Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies reviewed 
earlier in this study. For those with more passive reception practices, such moral 
ambivalence can also be read as not presenting viable alternatives to the political 
policies and practices of the day, putting the show in a position of complicity with these 
same status-quo War-on-Terror actions while only presenting a false critical stance that 
has no actionable substance. In short, more passive viewers could easily watch an 
episode such as “Flesh and Bone” (1.10), in which Starbuck tortures a captive Cylon, 
and simply come away thinking that, yes, indeed, torture is a complex issue, but then 
defer their political agency on the matter to those in power, assuming that others with 
greater authority or knowledge on the subject will resolve the contradiction for them. In 
such instances, complacency with then-current policies like extraordinary rendition or 
Guantanamo Bay leads to complicity insofar as a lack of a call to action or an 
ambivalent ideological position taken by the narrative naturalizes the post-9/11 state of 
emergency status as an unfortunate but seemingly “necessary” state of exception in the 
face of terrorism. This stance, of course, leaves those in power to continue performing 
morally reprehensible acts without opposition or even question, and it presents an 
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ideologeme of “if you weren’t there, you don’t know, and you can’t judge,” as the viewer 
can assume that those fighting terrorism know better about what is necessary in that 
situation than they do. Yet, from a more distant series-arc perspective, BSG has a much 
more narratively complex structure that allows it to transcend what is presented in a 
single episode or even over several related episodes. 
At the second horizon, the rhetorical ambivalence is rewritten in the narrative’s 
series arc as a dialogic conflict between the primacy of the ideologies of biological 
essentialism and social construction. Yet, despite four seasons of ambivalence on this 
conflict, the final episode ultimately resolves the tension by asserting that our genetic 
heritage is the most important aspect of life, a position that Anne Kustritz calls 
evolutionary determinism (25). This stance serves to negate much of the ambivalent 
stance of the program and communicates an ideologeme that while both sides of an 
issue need to be given a fair hearing, in the end you must make a choice based on 
biological affinity. Even though the show carries out this dialogue in a number of ways 
and through numerous characters, a particularly instructive example is between two 
hybrid characters as ideologues, namely two different copies of the Cylon Model Eight, 
both initially named Sharon Valerii but who later distinguish themselves with the 
callsigns Boomer and Athena, and who struggle in a way which Julie Hawk captures 
well: 
The push and pull between an essence-based subjectivity and an active, 
process-based construction of subjectivity is precisely what is at stake in the 
narratives of both Boomer and Athena…The Eight model’s struggle, ultimately, is 
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negotiating the space between essence and conviction in order to adapt and to 
create something new, something hybrid. (5)  
This codes the dialogue about biological essentialism and social construction as an 
ontological issue over the level of one’s choice in being human, Cylon, or a hybrid of the 
two. In keeping with its rhetoric of balance, the show spends much of its screen time 
using these two hybrid characters as ideologues to weigh out both sides of the debate. 
As Margaret Rose states, “Sharon is set up as a hybrid figure, the human Cylon,” and, 
as such, “the cultural hybrid functions as a bridge between groups, either demonized as 
the source of pollution or valorized as the source of strength” (1206). This hybridization 
plays on numerous fear themes, with Sharon often embodying the fear of exclusion as 
she is continually in a position of unhomeliness, her existence an act of boundary 
transgression such that she is often not accepted by either the humans or the Cylons. 
Further, since the Model Eight is played by Canadian Korean actress Grace Park, Lisa 
Nakamura notes that the racial coding here reflects “the Asian American experience of 
always ‘having just arrived’ no matter how many generations particular communities can 
trace back their ancestry in the US.” As a result of being racially coded so as to be 
permanently seen as an out-group member, Nakamura states, “Sharon Valerii must 
constantly and repeatedly prove to the crew that she belongs.” In a comment on this, 
Avi Santo notes, “Sharon’s in-betweeness (unwanted/unclaimed by humans and cylons 
alike) [is] as meta-commentary on the Asian immigrant experience.”12 Particularly in a 
post-9/11 context, Sharon’s “Asian foreignness” can be seen as orientalist code that 
encompasses the Muslim other as well, denoting the efforts that Muslim Americans had 
to go through to counter the reactionary upsurge of Islamophobia after the terrorist 
 
12 Also see Nishime on the Model Eight and its connection to America’s history of transnational adoption. 
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attacks in order to attempt to re-integrate themselves into the American in-group, much 
like I discussed earlier concerning the 9/11 novel The Submission. Through these two 
characters, this sense of attempting to find a way toward a post-9/11 Asian American 
identity takes two different paths, the first following essentialism and the second 
following social construction. But ultimately, the equal screen time that the program 
devotes to each of these two ideologies is narratively buried in the conclusion by the 
privileging of genetic determinism in the overall plot.  
As the ideologue of biological essentialism, Boomer initially believes she is a 
human, complete with a life full of memories, but when it is revealed that she is actually 
a Cylon she embraces this biological nature as the core of her identity. At the end of the 
first season, Boomer makes a decisive victory for the human fleet, only to be activated 
as a Cylon sleeper agent who attempts to assassinate Captain Adama. In light of this 
revelation, Boomer is forced to integrate who she thought she was with her newly 
discovered nature as a Cylon. As Rose states, “The narrative of Boomer” can be seen 
as “embodying the struggle between her human culture and her Cylon nature” (1203), 
essentially a struggle between acculturated and genetic identity. After the assassination 
attempt, Boomer is killed by a human crewmember but awakens with the Cylons in a 
resurrection tank. This rejection by the humans sets her on a path to embracing her 
Cylon nature, even siding with the Model Ones during the Cylon civil war to oppose the 
human fleet, turning her character into something of a hybrid monster in the narrative. In 
this way, Boomer’s narrative is of the internalization of the threat, or as Rose states, 
“the fundamental threat the Cylons pose, apart from their aggression, lies in the 
narratives of individuals discovering that they were always Cylons, as in Boomer’s 
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experience” (1205). Boomer’s move toward accepting her biological nature as a Cylon 
as the most important aspect of her identity emphasizes the fear that hybridity instigates 
treachery, a notion that finds its post-9/11 root in the rejection of Muslim Americans as 
always already terrorists and one that has roots felt even as far back as Theodore 
Roosevelt’s 1915 speech “Americanism” that rails against “hyphenated Americans” 
(Fulford).13 This suspicious, or paranoid, affect is often utilized and transformed in the 
American imaginary into an essentialist belief that codes race and/or religion as the 
defining factor in determining who is an internal threat, as national affiliation is ignored 
in determining this border between us and them. Essentially, this belief states that 
hybrids, such as Muslim Americans, will hold true to their genetic origins and turn 
against their culture and nation, a fear that also historically gave rise to the internment 
of Japanese Americans during World War II. 
In conflict with the depiction of Boomer, Athena moves to embrace the ideology 
of social construction in order to form her own hybrid identity that aligns with the human 
fleet. Athena begins the narrative knowing that she is a Cylon, but falls in love with Helo, 
becoming pregnant with a hybrid child that we later come to know as Hera. Athena 
chooses to stay with the human fleet to raise her child and even fights for them as a 
fighter pilot. Rose sums up Athena’s ideological journey well: “Rather than her storyline 
being dictated by her blood, it seems to be dictated by the reactions of others to her 
newly perceived difference. Her narrative presents a struggle against the racism of the 
 
13 As from Roosevelt’s speech, “The man who calls himself an American citizen and who yet shows by 
his actions that he is primarily the citizen of a foreign land, plays a thoroughly mischievous part in the life 
of our body politic. He has no place here; and the sooner he returns to the land to which he feels his real 
heart-allegiance, the better it will be for every good American. There is no such thing as a hyphenated 
American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American 
and nothing else” (Fulford). For a rhetorical analysis of Roosevelt’s public discourse and how “his mythic 
framing of race and ethnicity” plays a role in “the construction of American identity,” see Dorsey (7). 
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bio-essentialist view, insisting that her identity is defined through her actions and 
choices, rather than her biological status” (1203). The difference between the two 
characters, Hawk asserts, is the conscious choice that Athena made to become a 
hybrid, as opposed to Boomer being forced into the position (11). In this sense, her 
hybrid status allows her to join the humans, but it also suggests early on in the program 
that hybridity ultimately requires a choice, echoing the ideological unconscious that 
surfaces again in the final episodes that negates the rhetorical balance overtly used 
throughout the series: as a hybrid, Athena still had to choose the humans over the 
Cylons, much as Boomer had to choose to side with the Cylons over the humans. 
Because of Athena’s choice, Hawk states, “She is a cylon, but she becomes human. 
But because she is a cylon, she becomes not-quite-yet-more-than-human” (11-12). This 
hybridity “creates a third space—a space wherein Athena (and eventually Boomer) 
enacts ‘new and hybrid agencies,’ rearticulating and revisioning what constitutes being 
human, what constitutes being cylon, and what constitutes a possible hybridized 
human-cylon ontology” (12). Yet, through it all, Athena demonstrates that we can 
choose to enact an identity that runs counter to siding with our biology, a notion that 
allegorically supports the belief that Muslim Americans, and other “foreign” out-groups 
of Americans, can defy their alleged genetic nature and align with the culture of their 
choice. 
As already noted, near the end of the narrative, the program makes a choice 
between the two ideologies that ultimately sides with biological determinism to forward 
the ideology that our genetic heritage is what matters most. After Boomer steals Hera, 
Athena takes back her child and kills Boomer. At first, this move seems a defeat of 
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Boomer’s biological determinism that valorizes Athena’s social construction. Yet, the 
revelations of the last episode upends this stance, as we learn that the ultimate destiny 
of all the characters, Athena included, has only been to bring her child, Hera, the 
biological hybrid of the humans and Cylons, to Earth to pass on her mitochondrial DNA 
to her descendants. Her descendants ultimately turn out to be all of us today in the 
actual world, and the program tells us that Hera was our Mitochondrial Eve, that we are 
all already human and Cylon hybrids ourselves. This ending does produce a sense of 
SF wonder, transgressing the dominant belief of what it means to be human, but it also 
forwards what Kustritz refers to as evolutionary determinism, which is not without its 
regressive and eugenic ideological implications for the post-9/11 discourse on survival. 
Despite Hera being Athena’s child, the actresses used to portray the child appear 
phenotypically white, which Kustritz notes as effectively “breeding [racial] difference out 
of the future” through “a matter of genetic assimilation” (13). This echoes the way that 
post-9/11 nationalism equated, and still equates, national citizenship with race (i.e. 
whiteness), as the American subjectivity was increasingly articulated with an image of 
the “white Christian heterosexual” in opposition to the colored terrorist Other. Further, 
on the message of the ending, Kustritz states that BSG argues that “[i]ndividuals—their 
histories, fears, hopes, and frailties—only matter inasmuch as they add to the number of 
human beings left alive, and individual lives only matter inasmuch as they contribute to 
the continued survival of the race” (8). “[T]his logic,” Kustritz points out “solidifies value 
as solely imparted through genetic survival” (15).  As a result, she states, “They rely on 
a purely genetic definition of survival, as though such a philosophy had no connection to 
the ideologies of social Darwinism and evolutionary psychology that deny value to 
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cultural achievements and nonreproductive lives” (17). Indeed, as the show concludes, 
the fleet sends all of their ships into the sun in an attempt to end the cycle of war, 
essentially devaluing all of the tools, developments, and advantages of their culture and 
technology, while showing that only the genetic heritage of the characters is important in 
the end.  
This assertion that genetics are more important than culture and individual 
achievements supports the biological essentialist notion that biology wins over in the 
end and that therefore hybrids are by their nature treacherous enemies within our ranks. 
This message serves to support the post-9/11 belief that Muslim Americans are 
inherently terrorists solely because of their genetic, or rather racial, composition. It also 
supports the notion that the War on Terror and its excesses like torture and human 
rights violations are necessary for the survival of the nation in order to preserve its 
“genetic” heritage. Further, this move does not just support the primacy of genetic 
heritage, but as Hawk states, it is “a problematic valorizing of sexual reproduction and, 
with it, compulsory heterosexuality” or a “problematic reification of sexual reproduction” 
(12). This means that despite the advanced technology of the storyworld, the only 
effective means of reproduction presented is heterosexual reproduction, occluding and 
silencing through omission all homosexual means of reproducing through technology, 
such as methods of artificial insemination at the very least. Yet, perhaps most 
disturbing, Kustritz states that the ending “ties the species’s survival to careful selection 
and protection of certain children with ideal genetics, thereby reimagining a hybrid 
version of eugenics for the postmodern world” (2). This stance that the important 
outcome of hybridity is genetic utility devalues technology, culture, art, and any life not 
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spent dedicated to the heterosexual biological reproduction of the human species. This 
ending serves to nullify BSG’s earlier implication in the fourth season that hybridity 
between seemingly irreconcilably different cultures, whether human and Cylon or East 
and West in the post-9/11 world, can create a harmoniously functional hybrid culture. 
Instead, it seems to sidestep this possibility at the last moment to pull the debate back 
to an evolutionary determinism that reduces human (and Cylon) value to genetic 
heritage and a quasi-Darwinian survival of the fittest. In the end, contrary to its ongoing 
support of ambivalence, BSG subtly resolves itself with the protonarrative that while we 
should hear out both sides of any given debate, in the end we still have to make a 
choice. Just as the hybrid characters of Boomer and Athena had to choose their side, 
this ideologeme subsumes the third-space potentialities of hybridity back into the terms 
of the original us/them binary debate.  
At the third horizon, BSG shows the ideological roots of its genre sedimentation 
in contradiction to its initially progressive post-9/11 impulses. Despite its initial 
progressive side as mediated through the SF genre novum of the hybrid character that 
provides and ideological answer to the post-9/11 contradiction of seemingly 
irreconcilable differences, the program’s regressive roots show the determinism of the 
genre of American naturalism that emerges in the narrative’s conclusion as residual 
ideological forces that pull the narrative into a reassertion of American exceptionalism, 
heteronormativity, and binary thinking. Moore’s makes a direct connection to the genre 
of naturalism when he states that his intention when creating BSG was to update the SF 
genre with injections of television drama and journalistic realism in order to make what 
he calls “naturalistic science fiction” (5). The genre of American naturalism, as we will 
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see, formally strives for objectivity and a sense of determinism. This study can unearth 
these regressive elements by first looking at how Moore’s BSG is a remake of the 1978 
original series of the same name that was created by Glen A. Larson, a trace 
connection that has implications on the remake’s inability to maintain its moral ambiguity 
in the conclusion. Larson is a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, and, as Iver Neumann notes, the original series “came close to being an allegory 
of Mormon theology” (228). Milford and Rowland would describe the original show’s use 
of allegory as traditional allegory, one based on a pretext of “an ideological or mythic 
system” that “restrict[s] their meaning to” the reinforcement of this same pretext (537-8). 
In their description, Moore’s remake utilizes a form of allegory capable of subversive 
connections because it works within the pretext of recent historical events rather than 
how the traditional allegory works within the pretextual authority of a particular 
ideological system, a religion in this case, in order to reinforce its messages.  
While Moore states that he knew that Larson “used Mormon influences,” he was 
“not familiar with Mormon belief or practice” himself when creating the remake 
(Neumann 227). However, Larson did stay on “as a special adviser for the reimagined 
show” (228), leaving the remake open to renewed appearances of its residual Mormon 
pretext. Essentially, much of the narrative framework of the remake comes from 
Mormon beliefs, including the “forced exit (exodus) to a place that is known from sacred 
texts” (230), the notion that human life on Earth has extraterrestrial origins (232), the 
idea of “resurrection where the flesh remains the same”  (238), the series’ end of “giving 
up on technology and tilling a new land” (238), “guidance by scripture and angels who 
are clearly of a kind with humans” (239), and similarities of names, such as the planet 
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Kobol and the Mormon planet of Kolob “that is closest to the Heavenly Throne” (232). 
However, when Moore created his remake of the series, he and much of his audience, 
as Neumann attests, encountered the narrative without being aware of its former 
religious pretext, allowing it to change to one based on a historical pretext instead. As a 
result, the remake is far from a Mormon allegory itself, often running counter to Mormon 
belief. As Neumann states, “Drinking, smoking, swearing and promiscuous sex, all of 
them anathema to the Mormon tradition, are on ample display, and the merging of good 
and evil things make for a central problematic of the show” (239). Yet, this formal 
sedimentation helps explain numerous residual aspects apparent in Moore’s remake 
that at first seem to run counter to the progressive internal logic that the series 
establishes, such as the heavy religious aspects of the last episodes, as what we 
thought were hallucinations of Virtual Six and Virtual Baltar turn out to be angels and 
Starbuck’s return from the dead is explained, apparently, as an act of God. The effect of 
this underlying religious pretext on Moore’s remake contributes to the forces within the 
narrative that ultimately drive the end of the program to run counter to many of the 
progressive elements seen at work throughout the series, such as how its quest for 
Earth echoes the Puritan notion of the “City on the Hill” that was resurrected during the 
Cold War to help found the ideology of American exceptionalism. Further, this sense of 
isolationism echoes with how the Mormons left to occupy the Utah territories in 1850, 
and how these ideologies of exceptionalism and isolationism came together for 
Mormons in a way that, at least within the context of this study, appears compatible with 




In addition to these changes, a few of the major characters of the original series 
were re-cast as female characters, such as Boomer and Starbuck, which, especially 
regarding Starbuck’s character, initially led to considerable fan backlash (Kungl 199). 
While the success of the remake and of Sackhoff’s Starbuck has quieted much of these 
protests (203), Kungl notes how it shows “that physical toughness in women makes 
society uneasy” (208), as “women displaying toughness undermines the belief that 
gender roles are fixed” (202). Moore’s expressed reason for changing Starbuck to a 
woman, however, is more practical than overtly political: “The [original] rapscallion 
Starbuck just seemed like such a cliché and I didn’t know what to do with that” (1217). 
Of course, the roguish Starbuck of the original series, as played by Dirk Benedict, 
likewise markedly contrasts with the cautious, earnest, and religious Nantucket Quaker 
named Starbuck in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (1851). The almost 
playful contrast between these two characters denotes a dose of invention that helped 
to make Benedict’s Starbuck work so well for its 1978 audience, preventing it from 
becoming an overused convention at the time. Similarly, in the BSG remake, changing 
Starbuck to a woman seems to have given Benedict’s established convention the sense 
of inventionality that allows the character a renewed sense of historical resonance with 
its contemporary post-9/11 culture, especially considering the cultural push for 
hypermasculine characters that I have noted as emerging after the attacks. 
At the same time, the remake of BSG is a reaction to the established conventions 
and growing clichés of the SF television shows that came just before it, such as Gene 
Roddenberry’s fin-de-siècle television series Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987-94) 
(STNG), on which Moore had previously worked. As Buzan states, the original concept 
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that began the Star Trek franchise itself is “an expression of America in the 1960s, 
confident in its right to own the future, blithely imperialist in a cultural way, willing but not 
eager to use force, having no interest in conquest and occupation, and with a deep 
commitment to progress, humanism, anti-racism and liberal values” (177). One trace 
connection between STNG and BSG is the Borg, a recurring alien threat in the series 
that consists of cybernetic organisms linked by a hive mind, which can be seen as a 
precursor to the depiction of the Cylons as hybrid monsters, even as the Borgs borrow 
more than the Cylons from the fear theme of the zombie-creature as a collective and 
dehumanized threat. In comparison, the element of invention that makes the Cylons 
resonant with post-9/11 culture is their depiction as being nearly indistinguishable from 
humanity, and how this blurs the line between human and machine even further than 
the shambling Borgs. Yet, perhaps due to the long run and success of the STNG series, 
the narrative structure became increasingly cliché in the final seasons, often revolving 
around exceptional scientific minds finding solutions either rationalized by scientific or 
pseudoscientific means to save the ship and its crew from seemingly certain fates. 
These plots express an overwhelming confidence that technology and science can save 
the day, representing its characters as nearly superhuman in their capabilities. Further, 
as Margaret Rose explains, STNG’s attempt at liberal anti-racism was beginning to 
show its contradictions: “Conflict between cultures is displaced onto conflict between 
species, and consequently the attempt to imagine a world without racial conflict winds 
up reproducing some of the worst assumptions of scientific racism” (1201). As Rose 
states, “in inter-species conflicts, culture is consistently conflated with species, and 
consequently ethnicity is depicted as biologically essential” (1201). In short, an alien 
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race such as Klingons act like Klingons because they are Klingons, and biological 
essentialism overrides all hopes of divergent individuality or the social construction of 
identity. These generic roots further denote the residual trace of the biological 
essentialism of the genre of American naturalism that reasserts itself in the conclusion 
of BSG. 
As previously noted, in 2004, Moore felt that the Star Trek form needed to be 
updated, and his answer was to inject greater elements of the television drama and a 
journalistic realism into the genre in order to make what he calls “naturalistic science 
fiction” (5). Rather than basing the series on the situational plots and exceptionally 
talented scientists of Star Trek, Moore pushed BSG to emphasize a gritty visual realism, 
to show people making mistakes, and to center the narrative on the actions and 
concerns of believable, relatable, and flawed characters: 
Our show is first and foremost a drama. It is about people. Real people that the 
audience can identify with and become engaged in. It is not a show about 
hardware or bizarre alien cultures. It is a show about us. It is an allegory for our 
own society, our own people and it should be immediately recognizable to any 
member of the audience. (6) 
This push for realism led the remake of BSG to its narratives of moral ambivalence, 
pushing the series toward the progressive directions discussed above. Further, by 
adding these realist elements, BSG found resonance with a post-9/11 culture wracked 
with the paranoia of the next terrorist attack. As Moore states, “Terrorist attacks, 
sabotage, and fomenting insurrection…will be a staple of their stories and keep our 
heroes off-balance and constantly having to look over their shoulder even as they battle 
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Cylon fighters” (36). Further, “the Cylons in our midst should be a constant, lurking 
threat,” which “means that anyone can be a Cylon and our characters should definitely 
experience the fear and paranoia that will become an ever-present result of this fact” 
(37). Here, Moore’s aims for the show align with many of the fear themes this study has 
identified, including paranoia and the internal threat.  
This strategy of adding elements of realism, such as flawed characters and gritty 
visuals, helped to connect the more distant feeling nova of robots and spaceships to the 
post-9/11 concerns of its audience. This way, when BSG aired and depicted wars in 
faraway solar systems with advanced, intelligent robots, it was not much of a leap to 
articulate these with post-9/11 imagery. As was already mentioned, the destruction of 
the twelve colonies in the beginning of the series visually echoes the devastation of 9/11 
and Ground Zero. Similarly, the Cylons became a threat that drew connections to 
terrorists. As Milford and Rowland point out, “Their ability to blend in with the humans 
but still maintain their sinister goals in the name of their faith made them a clear 
reference to al Qaeda and generated a discourse of fear and suspicion similar to the 
aftermath of 9/11” (543). In addition, President Laura Roslin (Mary McDonnell) had clear 
allegorical connections to George W. Bush, as the two were portrayed with many 
similarities: “She was the forty-third person in line to ascend to the office…Bush was the 
forty-third president. She was considered unqualified for the position, an accusation 
many critics lobbed at Bush…she firmly asserted that she wouldn’t negotiate with 
terrorists…and relied heavily on religion in making policy” (543). While these 
articulations with the fantastic elements of SF popularized in STNG to these more 
realistic, believable elements probably ended up drawing more from investigative 
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journalism than television drama as he had originally intended, they still opened the way 
for the series to make comments on post-9/11 culture from behind the protective veil of 
allegory necessary at a time when American official culture14 was particularly sensitive 
to such criticism.   
With these layers of generic sedimentation in mind, it can be seen how BSG 
worked within the evolution of the SF television genre in ways both Utopian and 
oppressive. The remake’s move toward greater cast diversity by changing some of the 
original roles to women paired with its use of hybrid characters in major roles that are 
central to the narrative of the series arc points us toward the text’s more liberatory 
meanings. Despite the final call for a naturalist sense of evolutionary determinism, the 
series also allegorically insists that, even if only temporarily, there is a way for 
irreconcilably different cultures to align themselves in order to become a collective, 
hybrid culture that can work together, as seen in the fourth season when the Cylons 
integrate with the human fleet to defeat the Cylon army led by the Model Ones. 
Allegorically, this theme proposes that the seemingly implacable global divisions 
between post-9/11 American and Middle Eastern cultures can be overcome and that a 
future that deconstructs the us/them binary of the Bush administration is indeed 
possible and more secure. Rose captures this Utopic possibility of a cyborg hybridity in 
its SF coding as human/Cylon: 
If, as Haraway argues, there is not ontological separation between the human 
and the machine, then there really was no difference of essence between human 
and Cylon to begin with. Rather than presupposing two initially pure categories, 
 
14 Kustritz explains that “official culture” is a term that Lauren Berlant uses to refer to “the dominant, nationalist 
position of certain mass media and certain ideological formations within those media” (29).  
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Battlestar Galactica uses the process of hybridization between human and Cylon 
to reveal that the supposedly essential difference between them, the assumed 
purity, was always a construction. (1208) 
Just as the difference between human and Cylon was always a social construction, 
BSG can point us to the conclusion that the same holds true with their allegorical 
extensions: there really is not an essential difference between America and the Middle 
East; it has always only been a construction. All that remains is to deconstruct our own 
reified codes of difference to come together in a third space as a hybrid culture. 
However, the conclusion of BSG reveals the oppressive political unconscious 
that has roots in the underlying religious pretext of the original series and the biological 
essentialism of previous SF television programs such as STNG, sediments that have 
subtly extended via the longstanding conventions of American naturalism throughout 
the entire program and emerge to dominate the conclusion of the narrative, overriding 
many of the program’s initially more progressive elements. In the final episodes, it is 
revealed that the entire series has been guided by angelic beings and a higher power, 
placing the narrative back within a religious ideological pretextual frame and negating 
much of the freedom of action that we believed the characters had been exerting 
throughout the series. It should also be noted that the angels of Virtual Baltar and 
Virtual Six are decidedly white in their representation, articulating holiness with a 
Christian, or more particularly Mormon, sense of American whiteness, as opposed to a 
colored representation that might be linked to a sense of an Islamic theology. At the 
same time, Buzan states that the inward search of the series for humanity’s origins and 
the storyworld’s ultimate rejection of all life outside of Earth have culturally regressive 
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connotations: “In today’s America such sentiments can play to the country’s isolationist 
tradition, seeing itself as the exemplary ‘city on the hill’, but eschewing external political 
engagements lest they corrupt the purity of its revolution” (180). Seen in this way, the 
series as a whole, with its absence of the traditional SF convention of aliens coded as 
international others, which instead have been displaced into robots coded in this way, 
can be seen as a step toward a reassertion of American exceptionalism, and a denial of 
the need for integration into the larger world beyond the borders of our designated in-
group, as both humans and Cylons become one and the same in the end. Further, the 
ending negates the progressive call for hybridity, instead reasserting us/them binary 
thinking as it states that while both sides of an issue deserve a fair hearing, in the end 
we must choose one, as both Boomer and Athena had to choose a side. The program 
itself takes a side in the essentialist/social construction conflict to assert the importance 
of our genetic heritage as passed on through heterosexual relations over the 
transmission of learned experience through our cultural heritage. Almost heavy-
handedly, this privileging of genetic heritage occurs when it is revealed that divine 
providence guided the fleet to Earth only to ensure that Hera would become humanity’s 
Mitochondrial Eve. In short, the conclusion reverses much of the progressive potential 
of the program by allegorically pushing for isolationism, American exceptionalism, and a 
form of quasi-Christian biological essentialism in which the heterosexual transmission of 
our genetic heritage is the most important aspect of life. 
Yet, as I have noted in previous chapters, the very last scenes of a text greatly 
influence the affective nature of the fear that the text evokes in its audience. Along 
these lines, BSG ends with what could arguably be called an ambiguous ending, in that 
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while the angels express hope that humanity will finally escape its repeating cycle of 
war, and these sentiments are followed by a montage of humans making robots to 
serve our needs once again. However, many critics seem divided on whether this 
ending forwards a fearful or hopeful message. As Kustritz states, “the very last frames 
[create] a rising doubt that genetics alone can cure social divisions without memory of 
how those divisions arose and caused such destruction” (17). On the other hand, Rose 
saw the show as “culminating in a hopeful messianic hybrid child” (1194). What can 
take away from this is that the ending, hopeful or no, utilizes fear to propose a call to 
action, to motivate humanity away from creating a technological slave race that could 
very well develop into something like the Cylons. Capturing the spirit of most of the 
show, these last scenes serve as a call to stimulate discussion on the matter, to debate 
the moral implications of technology, sentience, and the boundaries of the concept we 
call humanity. But on these debates, the show gives us no easy answer. The future is 
up to us.  
 
 MINDSCAPE AND HYBRIDITY THROUGH CONFRONATION AND INTEGRATION 
 In many ways, Andrea Hairston’s novel Mindscape (2006) is a very different form 
of SF than BSG, but at the same time they both cover many of the same post-9/11 
American fear themes, especially the concern with the hybrid character. Just in terms of 
author identity, Mindscape represents a marginalized perspective of SF, as Hairston is a 
black woman. Moreover, as Bogi Takács states in an online review of the novel, “It’s 
also a very explicitly queer book by a queer author, and its Afrofuturist approach pulls 
no punches.” Most sources agree that the term Afrofuturism was a term coined by Mark 
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Dery in 1994 to designate “Speculative fiction that treats African-American themes and 
addresses African-American concerns in the context of twentieth-century 
technoculture—and, more generally, African-American signification that appropriates 
images of technology and a prosthetically enhanced future” (180). Since that time, 
Afrofuturism has grown into an aesthetic, artistic, and philosophic movement that 
combines technology with African Diaspora culture, taking the shape of visual arts, 
music, narratives across all media, and beyond. Yet, as Mark Bould states, Afrofuturism 
and SF are two different things that can at times intersect but are not the same; as he 
argues, “SF and SF studies have much to learn from the experience of technoculture 
that Afrofuturist texts register across a wide range of media; and that…studies, if it is to 
be at all radical, must use its position of relative privilege to provide a home for excluded 
voices without forcing assimilation upon them” (182). 
 Overall, SF has historically had a problematic relationship with depicting race. As 
Bould states, “From the 1950s onwards, SF in the US magazine and paperback 
tradition postulated and presumed a color-blind future” (177). He continues, “This 
shared assumption accounts for the relative absence of people of color from much of 
SF: if race was going to prove unimportant, why even bother thinking about it” (177). 
Yet, the assumption of a color-blind future simply led to the whitewashing of the future, 
as most SF authors seemed to consistently imagine a future for humankind that 
somehow consisted almost entirely of white people. Like BSG, SF broadly tended to 
approach discussions of race and the Other only allegorically through the depiction of 
robots or alien races, and even among its human characters, blacks were the race that 
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was least represented (177). Bould is quick to identify the problem with the absence of 
the black presence in traditional SF: 
The problem with such a gesture, of course, is that rather than putting aside 
trivial and earthly things, it validates and normalizes very specific ideological and 
material perspectives, enabling discussions of race and prejudice on a level of 
abstraction while stifling a more important discussion about real, material 
conditions, both historical and contemporary. And by presenting racism as an 
insanity that burned itself out, or as the obvious folly of the ignorant and 
impoverished who would be left behind by the genre’s brave new futures, SF 
avoids confronting the structures of racism and its own complicity in them. (180) 
Afrofuturist SF, then, is an important corrective effort that has the potential to move SF 
into realms of social consciousness that it has seldom, if ever, attempted to discover. 
Also, Bould highlights how pulling the attention of SF back to overt depictions of race 
brings the genre back to analyzing and exploring the real material conditions 
surrounding the topic, which lends itself well to Marxist and Jamesonian interpretation, a 
possibility I will develop shortly. All of this, of course, is not to say that there have been 
no black SF authors over the past century. Quite to the contrary, Octavia E. Butler and 
Samuel R. Delany are two of the most famous and luminary examples, and Sheree R. 
Thomas’s anthologies Dark Matter: A Century of Speculative Fiction from the African 
Diaspora (2000) and Dark Matter: Reading the Bones (2004) have begun recovering the 
lost history of black writers not only in the SF genre but in fantasy and horror as well. 
Further, the convergence of Afrofuturism and SF has recently produced a new flush of 
creativity and invention, featuring such authors as N. K. Jemisin, Nalo Hopkinson, 
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Colson Whitehead’s novel The Intuitionist (1999), and, our focus in this section, Andrea 
Hairston. 
 Mindscape is an Afrofuturist SF fear narrative, but one that utilizes fear themes in 
a surprisingly unique and hopeful, if not naïve, fashion. However, it has garnered a 
surprisingly small amount of academic attention, which this section hopes to do its part 
to rectify, as this complex novel has deep wells of content and formal sedimentation that 
this study will only be able to explore in basic ways. As a review from Langston Hughes 
Colloquoy states, “The novel effectively represents a world forever changed by a 
mysterious force” (“Mindscape”). With this echo of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in mind, 
Mindscape is a consummate post-9/11 narrative that addresses issues stirred up by the 
attacks through science fictional metaphor and the alethic creativity of distancing nova. 
Overall, it is a novel that uses the secondary fear theme of the wall to show how the 
hybrid character can make possible a third space that opens new collective 
potentialities not available to those that create and maintain dichotomous boundaries 
between each other.  
To summarize its plot, in the twenty-first century an “extraterrestrial, epi-
dimensional entity” known as the Barrier, a “red cloud of unknown material,” engulfed 
the Earth (Hairston, Mindscape back cover, 4), breaking the world apart, re-arranging it, 
and dividing it into three inhabitable Zones, the lifeless Wastes, and the uninhabited 
Wilderness lands (4). The Barrier cut Earth off from space, stranding the astronauts 
around Mars and the Asteroid Belt, and in the chaos of this apocalyptic Event most of 
humanity died. Human contact with the Barrier means instant death. The only travel and 
trade between the Zones are by seasonal corridors that the Barrier opens and by 
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corridors made by Vermittler, mutants created by human and barrier hybridity through a 
process called symbiogenesis, which I will return to shortly. The three inhabited Zones 
have been ravaged by plagues and wars over scarce resources ever since the coming 
of the Barrier, until 111 years later when the spiritual leader Celestina Xa Irawo created 
the Interzonal Peace Treaty only to be (apparently) assassinated by Piotr Osama just 
after signing it. Piotr Osama’s last name and his disruptive terrorist act of shooting the 
Zone’s spiritual leader, of course, is a relatively explicit reference that Hairston makes to 
Osama Bin Laden’s masterminding of the attacks of 9/11 and the disruptive effect of 
these events. Much of the narrative takes place four years after the assassination, 
which is 115 years after the coming of the Barrier, or Barrier Year 115. Now, the Treaty 
seems to be falling apart as the initially unconnected actions of a small group of 
characters try desperately to hold it together against politicos hungry for power and 
ganglords looking to make a profit from human suffering. 
 The three inhabitable Zones are New Ouagadougou, Paradigma, and Los 
Santos. New Ouagadougou is the healer’s zone, an area of lush rainforests that focuses 
on spirituality, pursuing the ancient ways, and whose fertile lands serve as the 
breadbasket of the Zones. It tends to focus on aesthetic beauty, but is also fiercely 
isolationist, as it fears cultural contamination from the other zones if they learn their 
mystical healing secrets. Through partnerships with the leaders of the other Zones, their 
medicines can be used to make a profit, whereas giving out the secrets of their healing 
arts would benefit the masses but not those in power who would lose out on these 
financial gains. Further, so the reasoning goes, if the other Zones were to learn of their 
secrets, New Ouagadougou would lose their competitive bargaining chip, leaving 
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nothing to prevent others from invading or wiping out their people in order to take their 
resources. This allegorically points to the profit inflating strategies of the American 
pharmaceutical industry that charges high prices for medical cures and treatments 
rather than make their secrets public knowledge for the betterment of humanity. It also 
more remotely alludes to the promotion of capitalism as necessary after 9/11 as 
epitomized by Bush’s edict to go out and shop as a patriotic act. In both instances, the 
need to spend to keep the economy alive overrides potentialities of working together to 
negotiate peaceful relations between cultures. The next Zone is Paradigma, whose 
motto is “Civilization, Democracy, Free Market, Science,” making this Zone an allegory 
of the official American culture after the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 move to 
neoconservativism that advocates for the expansion of American democracy and the 
promotion of American interests in international affairs (e.g., preemptive war such as the 
2003 Invasion of Iraq), while also pushing for conservative economic approaches that 
promote aspects of free market capitalism and the valuation of science and technology 
over the arts and humanities to enable the further expansion of the techno-military 
apparatus15. Again, the push to enliven the economy through spending is alive and well 
in this Zone. Paradigma is also home to a marginalized group known as “ethnic 
throwbacks,” a group that Takács describes as “someone who keeps aspects of pre-
Barrier Earth cultures alive” and the narrative racializes as black through its one 
representative character, Lawanda Kitt. Last, Los Santos is the entertainment capital of 
the world, specializing in making films for the rest of the world, allegorically pointing to 
 
15 This connection between the neoconservativism of the Bush Administration and science was made 
overt when, at about the same time Mindscape was published, Bush announced the 2006 American 
Competitiveness Initiative that promoted educational reform to emphasize STEM fields (science, 
technology, engineering, and math) but not HASS fields (humanities, arts, and social sciences).  
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the current role of Los Angeles and Hollywood in the film and television industries. 
However, most of Los Santos is a wasteland, and, due to food shortages, it has 
resorted to thinning their population by using Extras (the subalterns of Los Santos) in 
snuff takes to save production costs and also to selling human body parts in an open 
organ market. Allegorically, this is a criticism of contemporary Hollywood cultural 
products being little more than ethically depraved pornography that sells filmic 
objectifications of the human body for viewer gratification rather than providing texts that 
offer a sense of artistic edification. Taken altogether, the three inhabited Zones 
symbolically represent extrapolations of three different cultural focuses in the real world 
that are set in conflict within the storyworld: indigenous spirituality that stands for the 
entire third world in current life, scientific capitalism, and the entertainment industry as 
having become an inhumane perversion of the arts, respectively. Still, interestingly, all 
three Zones contain class divisions within them and are somehow penetrated by 
capitalist logics, if to different degrees and in different ways, emphasizing the pertinence 
of a Jamesonian reading of the novel. 
 Building upon this complex SF situation and setting, the novel has a character-
centered plot that revolves around six point-of-view characters that at first appear 
divided into their own separate chapters that display their distinct voices and 
worldviews. As Monty Vierra notes, “What is significant is that all six characters have 
peace as their goal” (132). For our purposes, I will call these six point-of-view characters 
the Pro-Treaty characters that are opposed by a group of Anti-Treaty characters. The 
first of these characters, Celestina, as I have mentioned, is a diplomat and spiritual 
leader, who has been assassinated, but we soon learn that, rather than dying, she was 
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carried away through a corridor by an alien ship before she died and still lives in some 
other state of existence. Elleni Xa Celest is from New Ouagadougou and is Celestina’s 
spirit daughter, or Geistestochter, the inheritor of Celestina’s wisdom and position. Elleni 
is also a Vermittler with snakes for hair who drip colored liquid that appear to match her 
emotions. From Paradigma, Lawanda Kitt is the Vice-Ambassador to Los Santos, a self-
identified ethnic throwback, who, in a review, Chris Rohman describes “as a sister who 
talks back and talks black.” She both speaks and writes in a language similar to a 
twenty-first century African American dialect. Also, from Paradigma is The Major, who 
hails from Sagan City, the capital city of Paradigma that Hairston named after 
scientist/SF author Carl Sagan (Rohman). The Major is the Head of Sagan City’s Secret 
Services, advising the Prime Minister, but he is also romantically involved with 
Lawanda. From Los Santos, there is Aaron Dunkelbrot a major producer/director that 
we later learn was once a black woman Extra who had a gene-art transracial and 
transgender operation to become a white male. As a white male, Aaron has been able 
to climb to a position of power that he never could have before. Last, also from Los 
Santos, is Ray Valero, an entertainment star who is romantically involved with Elleni. 
Ray serves to ground Elleni and struggles to be the real-life hero he portrays in his 
films, often unsuccessfully. Together with a web of supporting characters, these six 
steer the narrative to its conclusion, as the discourse alternates between the characters 
in an irregular pattern that allows for the advancement of the plot. This occurs mostly 
through a covert third person narration that omnisciently shifts its mental access to a 
single character in each chapter, except for Lawanda and The Majors’ chapters that are 
initially presented as nonnarrated monologues through cross-barrier transmissions to 
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each other. Limiting the focalization of each chapter in the beginning of the narrative to 
a separate character allows the discourse to display their distinct voices and different 
perspectives on the world, especially since the covert narrator often uses free indirect 
discourse forms to import the characters’ distinct voices into its own still-third-person 
voice. 
 As the story progresses, we learn that a group of power mongers have released 
a devastating plague called the fire virus on the inhabited Zones in order to keep the 
them divided and keep the people paying them for a cure. Meanwhile, Elleni receives 
visions from the Barrier showing her that two Vermittler must sacrifice themselves by 
walking naked into the barrier or the Earth will be destroyed. There are very few 
Vermittler left in the world, so Elleni struggles to find someone who will join her in this 
act of Ebo Eje, or blood sacrifice. In many ways, this use of sacrifice is an allegorical re-
writing of the suicide bomber who gives their life to defend their culture and beliefs. 
Rather than giving one’s life through an act of violence, however, the willing sacrifice 
featured in Mindscape is portrayed as an act of nonviolent submission of the self for the 
betterment of the collective whole. The Pro-Treaty characters individually receive a 
series of turkey feathers as invitations from ghost dancers summoning them to a 
gathering at Wounded Knee where a Vermittler known as the Wovoka promises to raise 
the dead from the Barrier. Once gathered, the characters have a showdown with Jesus 
Perez, the ganglord known as the “soybean king.” In the end, they subdue Perez, and 
Ray and Elleni walk into the Barrier to sacrifice themselves only to be joined at the last 
minute by Elleni’s spirit sister and fellow Vermittler, Sidi Xa Aiyé, someone who up to 
this point appeared to be amongst the Anti-Treaty characters, only to have a last-minute 
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change of heart. At the end, Elleni and Ray emerge from the Barrier two months later, 
while Sidi remains within to become part of the Barrier. They soon learn that the Barrier 
has opened corridors between the Zones, even corridors to the Wilderness Zones and 
mysterious ones that seem to lead off into space. In the end, their sacrifice and struggle 
has led to a hybrid community unlike any ever known since the coming of the Barrier, 
but the characters steady themselves for the work they see coming ahead to maintain 
this fragile peace. 
I can justify Mindscape as a fear narrative because the Barrier not only serves as 
the primary novum that creates the conditions for all other novum in the narrative, but it 
also serves as the fear theme of the wall that makes possible all other secondary fear 
themes in the narrative as well. The Barrier, then, serves as the primary formal focus of 
the narrative and the nexus of the sense of fear that dominates the novel, as it divides 
the storyworld into separate and isolated Zones. The presence of the Barrier in the 
storyworld allows the creation of the hybrid characters/monsters of the Vermittler, all of 
which come together as clear but slippery allegories of post-9/11 American and global 
culture. At the thematic center of the narrative, the autonomous and inscrutable Barrier 
re-writes the theme of the wall from one that symbolically separates a single us/them 
binary to one that allegorically points to the fearful and socially constructed class and 
cultural divisions of late capitalism that form the material conditions of our society at 
present, a temporal moment that Jameson reminds us is so ideologically and materially 
complex as to be “untotalizable and hence unimaginable” (“Progress”), just as the 
Barrier is often impossible to comprehend or understand. The Barrier represents all the 
divisions that society creates but that have become reified and naturalized to the point 
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where they take shape as material, physical, and embodied consequences. In this way, 
the Barrier is symbolic of the ideologies of division that make up an integral part of the 
superstructure of not only American but global late capitalist culture, including racism, 
nationalism, classism, sexism, and other walls that make up our everyday experiences. 
In the storyworld, while the Barrier is believed to be an alien presence that is not under 
human control, we learn through the effects of the sacrifices at the end of the narrative 
that it can be affected by human interaction, allowing for an allegorical means of social 
change through interaction.  
To those in the storyworld, the Barrier appears to be something imposed upon 
humanity, and in many ways this matches the individual experience with such structures 
of social division: we often do not feel like we created and sustain these divisions but 
instead experience them as a condition that naturally exists that we simply have to live 
with. As a result, much like the structures of division in contemporary culture, the Barrier 
itself is seemingly natural and innocent unless you are aware of its existence, its impact 
on everyday life, and that it can change or be changed. As Elleni muses, “A traveler 
from the twenty-first century might have mistaken [the Barrier] for a harmless fogbank, 
rolling in from the northwest” (Hairston, Mindscape 19). Yet, to defy these seemingly 
harmless borders by transgressing its lines of distinction means instant death, much as 
such real-world violations of these walls have social consequences with often fatal 
results (e.g., crossing national borders or crossing the race line). Even all attempts to 
film or analyze the Barrier have proven nearly impossible, aside from the efforts of the 
storyworld’s leading minds that use technology gleaned from experiments with the 
Barrier itself, much as it is deceptively difficult to analyze, measure, or study the 
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ideological aspects of real world culture that divides us, and yet most would readily 
acknowledge that they exist and have real effects in our world and everyday life.  
The divisions brought about by the Barrier create the conditions that separate the 
Zones each into their own individual instantiations of the secondary fear theme of the 
survival space. As Vierra states, “In Mindscape, people are alienated from one another 
by a physical barrier that allows cultural differences to solidify into the barriers of spite 
and envy” (114). These Zones as survival spaces become breeding grounds for 
paranoia about the perceived external threats that the other Zones might pose. The 
Barrier also insulates the Zones from achieving cultural integration as well, a possibility 
that the Anti-Treaty characters see as a threat of contamination from “unwanted 
contacts” (108). Where the Zones prove to be different from the zombie narrative 
survival space is that these spaces do not collapse and fall under the threat of external 
enemies. Instead, in the conclusion of the novel the barriers separating the Zones “fall” 
in the sense that the Barrier itself opens what appear to be permanent corridors to 
connect all of the Zones together. In this way, the walls of the survival spaces do fall, 
but only so that they can allow hybridity to form between the divided Zones of the 
storyworld, not to usher in a nihilistic end of humanity typically found in the zombie 
narrative. The divisions of separate, isolated, and insulated survival spaces present 
throughout much of this narrative allegorically point to the similar cultural and ideological 
separations of the post-9/11 world, especially between America and the Middle East. 
Further, the presence of the Barrier allows for the secondary novum and 
secondary fear theme of the hybrid characters, all of whom exist solely as a result of 
technology developed from the Barrier. These are found in both in the Vermittler, such 
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as Elleni, who are mutant crossbreeds between humanity and the Barrier, but also in 
Celestina, who we later find out is actually comprised of two lesbian lovers who were 
joined into one. Celestina was once the healer Thandiwe Xa Femi from New 
Ouagadougou who murdered her lover, the scientist Robin Wolf from Paradigma, when 
Thandiwe discovered that Robin had uncovered the secrets of the healers and planned 
to release them to the world. In punishment for her murder, Barrier technology was used 
to fuse them together into one body, making Celestina a truly hybrid subject but one that 
is not always at peace with the contradictions of her two selves and must continually 
struggle to integrate herself into a functional whole. Yet, in these depictions, Mindscape 
again re-writes this secondary fear theme of the hybrid character, nullifying much of its 
fearful content. The narrative arranges the hybrid characters as two among the point of 
view characters that we follow and come to identify with in the novel, making it difficult 
to fear their hybridity. While some of the other protagonists display an alternating sense 
of fascination and repulsion with the inhuman aspects of Elleni’s body, we only see the 
Anti-Treaty characters, the narrative’s antagonists, truly fear her difference. This 
alignment of hybridity with characters to whom we have established a connection, and 
Elleni’s negative judgment at the hands of characters we have come to see as villains, 
serves to paint hybridity in a positive ethical and affective light. In short, Mindscape 
nullifies the fear surrounding the hybrid characters that it depicts, portraying it as a 
complicated yet desirable state of existence that can create positive change toward 
Utopic ends, just as Elleni and Sidi do by sacrificing themselves to the Barrier. In this 
way, while the theme of the hybrid character is central to the narrative, the sense of fear 
evoked by the novel primarily comes from the Barrier as the wall that creates divisions 
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between us. Yet, by the end of the narrative, even this fear theme is nullified as the 
Barrier becomes integrated into the community, allegorically nullifying the necessity of 
fearing and making war on Muslim culture because of the attacks of 9/11. 
 From a Jamesonian perspective, the formal registering of social contradiction at 
the first horizon is the divisions placed between the six point of view characters as each 
one is initially shown in separate chapters that display their distinct voices and 
worldviews. As the narrative progresses, however, it resolves this tension by 
increasingly bringing the characters together until in the conclusion the voices of all six 
of the characters cooperatively interact through direct speech with one another within a 
covert third person narration, illustrating their integration into a hybrid alliance through 
their increasingly hybridized dialogue. At the second horizon, this shift from separate 
narrative voices to mixed ones registers the dialogic conflict between the Anti-Treaty 
characters as the ideologues of isolationism and the Pro-Treaty characters as the 
ideologues of integrationism, a conflict that resolves into an ideologeme stating that we 
must confront our differences and divisions in order to integrate into a sustainable future 
society. At the third horizon, this ideologeme is manifest in the tension between SF and 
the injection of the “magical,” or not rationally explainable, novum of the Barrier, a 
sedimentary inclusion of the romance genre that formally resolves the question of 
irreconcilable differences in order to make integration possible. At this point, we see 
how the narrative is both oppressive in its advocacy of competition and difference as 
prerequisites of sustainable integration and Utopian in how it shows that social groups 
divided by irreconcilable differences can form into a hybrid collective. 
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At the first horizon, the primary formal contradiction of the narrative lays in the 
divisions that separate the six point of view characters, divisions that each of the 
characters express through their cultural and ideological differences as communicated 
through the subtly or quite obviously different dialects that they use in their direct 
speech in dialogue or monologues. In the terms of Mikhail Bakhtin, this separation of 
different voices into separate chapters places the “pure languages,” or “the dialogues 
and monologues of the novelistic characters” (365), in dialogic contrast with each other, 
emphasizing the novel’s overall heteroglossia, wherein each character’s unique social 
language exhibits their different belief systems and contests each other in so far as 
each “language [is seen] as a world view” (271). This creates layers of ideologies 
coming together in the novel as incarnated within the characters’ voices, each in 
contradiction and conflict. As Bakhtin states and I have established previously in this 
study, the “speaking person in the novel is always, to one degree or another, an 
ideologue, and his words are always ideologemes” (333), so we can read the narrative 
structure of the opening of Mindscape as presenting pure dialogue between conflicting 
worldviews expressed through particular dialects, which I will refer to for our purposes 
as an “ideolect,” as the characters of Mindscape demonstrate. Initially, this cultural 
division between the characters is evinced by their distinct ideolects and the fact that 
each is at first separated into different chapters that each follows seemingly 
independent narrative threads. As the narrative progresses, however, it resolves this 
tension of division by knitting these threads together so that the characters at first 
interact in pairings in which their differences struggle with one another, and then it finally 
brings them all together in the conclusion chapters at Wounded Knee that integrate their 
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differences through interactive direct dialogue presented through a covert third-person 
narration as focalized through a different single character in each chapter. Within the 
narrative, this strategy of progressive integration of divided ideolects aesthetically and 
ideologically manages not to assimilate their unique voices, and, hence, their unique 
ideologies and cultures, but instead allows them to work together while retaining their 
difference, a formal “imaginary” solution to the seemingly irreconcilable cultural 
differences between the Christian and Islamic “worlds” naturalized after 9/11. 
Illustrating these divisions, the text initially portrays each of the six point of view 
characters mostly in separate chapters, each with a slightly different ideolect that 
denotes the cultural isolation and division of the survival spaces of the Zones, as the 
Barrier has limited their interactions for the past 115 years, creating distinct worldviews 
within each of the Zones. From Los Santos, we hear the professional jargon of the film 
industry in Ray and Aaron, but each speaks it with their own subtle differences. Ray 
inflects his language with the heroism associated with his film roles so that he often 
speaks in the clichéd, clipped language of the masculine action hero and falls into 
enacting conventional roles in actual emergency situations. For instance, when trying to 
save a horribly burnt woman, he responds to her need to speak by saying, “‘Yes.’ Ray 
nodded. ‘Easy now…Just rest’” (Hairston, Mindscape 155), rather than listening to the 
important clues she is trying to give him. On the other hand, Aaron’s use of language 
conveys his position of authority as a leading director in a culture that puts film 
production as perhaps the most important aspect of life. For example, when asked 
about safety on the set, Aaron states, “The audience wants action authenticity” and “I’m 
on a tight budget and real life is dirt cheap. Nobody has an FX budget like in the glory 
360 
 
days” (100-1). His words value the making of the film over the safety of the people on 
the set and imply his position of authority as a director and his complicity with the 
tradition of violence toward Extras that he otherwise denies and decries.  
In contrast, the dialogue of Celestina and Elleni who hail from New 
Ouagadougou illustrates the value that this culture places on aesthetic beauty and how 
this urges them to incorporate and borrow from a diversity of cultures in its music, 
dance, and even the languages it brings together into everyday speech. This makes the 
culture of the Healers of New Ouagadougou distinct from the other Zones in that it is a 
polyglot culture that relishes the embodied feel, nuanced contextual/intentional 
meanings, and historical connotations of numerous languages as a means of the artistic 
expression of beauty. Paradigma, on the other hand, has outlawed some languages 
(Hairston, Mindscape 50), and Los Santos is known for their poor education and high 
illiteracy rates (51). As a result of their cultural valuation of the use of numerous 
languages, characters such as Celestina and Elleni use terms from German, Yoruba, 
Japanese, Lakota, Ojibwa, and others in their daily conversations. In fact, they use so 
many integrated languages that the novel provides a glossary of their translations at the 
end, a move itself that could be read as a formal attempt at integrating the languages 
for the reader. Celestina’s ideolect, however, is distinct as she is secretly a hybrid being 
of two different people from two different Zones, so her dialogue incorporates some of 
the scientific jargon of Paradigma into her polyglot use of language that inflects her 
position as being from New Ouagadougou and as the spiritual leader of all three 
inhabited Zones. For instance, to announce the signing of the Treaty she evokes her 
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spiritual role as a healer: “Aboru, Aboye, Aboşişe16…Our time is no worse or no better 
than other times. We are not inevitable. We didn’t have to happen this way. There are 
many threads, many Earths” (11). In contrast, her scientist voice later expresses itself 
as she discusses some of the secrets of the Healers: “In an extension of Gaia Theory, 
Wolf saw the Barrier as an emergent life form; not an organism, but like Earth, 
comprised of interconnecting ecosystems” (370). Elleni, on the other hand, 
communicates her spiritual and ritualized position as a Vermittler, an intermediary or 
griot between humanity and the Barrier who thus belongings to neither, as she 
reflexively responds with ceremonial greetings even when exhausted. When the 
Healers Council finds her naked, dazed, and wounded on the ground after attempting to 
commune with the Barrier, she promptly greets one with an expected salutation: “‘Duma 
Xa Babalawo—father of mysteries, one who greets all with open hands’” (117). 
However, her role as an intermediary with the Barrier is a position that pulls her 
attention and energy between those she is presently interacting with and the shifting 
time orientation of the Barrier with its disorienting visions, causing her to often find it 
hard to socially interact with others in her presence. Because of this, later on the same 
page she can barely seem to respond to their questions, using short phrases in a 
variety of languages, seeming to blurt out phrases like “Keine Feinde [no enemies],” 
“Mo so awon enai mi po [I tie all my people together],” and “We must be as one” (117-
18). Often, this makes her dialogue difficult for those around her to follow and increases 
her sense of unhomeliness as the demands of her hybrid identity tends to exclude her 
from common social ties with other people. 
 
16 This Yoruba phrase translates as “May the offerings be carried, may the offerings be accepted, may the offerings 
bring about change” (Hairston, Mindscape 449). 
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 In the two characters from Paradigma, Lawanda Kitt and The Major, the novel 
depicts perhaps its two most stylistically distinct ideolects. Throughout most of the 
narrative, they communicate with each other through a series of cross-barrier 
transmissions, which allow Lawanda’s chapters to come across very much like long 
emails or letters and many of The Major’s chapters to be expressed through his very 
different ideolect in a form that resembles a memo or a scientific journal. In these 
sections, the narrative pulls from the conventions of the epistolary narrative genre to 
allow a dialogic epistolary narrative to unfold between the two characters, in which they 
send transmissions to each other in an ongoing conversation that creates a narrative 
thread of their own. In this way, the two characters can communicate, as Chatman 
states, in a direct, “nonnarrated” way as a form of “unmediated narrative text” (169-171). 
This means that, through these chapters, the characters are able to utilize their voice to 
narrate “reports of what has happened since the last letter” and to include other speech 
acts such as “requests, commands, laments, questions, and so on” (170), but do so in a 
way that emphasizes and showcases their distinct ideolects.  
Specifically, this form allows the novel to highlight their divergent ideological 
filters and epistemologies. Lawanda’s chapters are expressed in her unique linguistic 
style that Vierra describes as “a dialect of current English known in linguistics as AAVE, 
Black English, and Ebonics…However, Lawanda’s version isn’t completely consistent, 
suggesting that she is interlacing ‘Paradigm standard’ into her speaking” (135). One 
example of her dialect from one of her chapters expresses her frustration after enduring 
discrimination for her use of throwback language: “Why anybody wanna speak the truth, 
raise they children, know themselves with gas-chamber language? Survival be havin’ 
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words to call home, havin’ idioms and syntax to hear the Diaspora” (Hairston, 
Mindscape 51). Throughout the narrative, her dialogue filters her experiences through 
the perspective of art as her status as an ethnic throwback means that she understands 
her world through her use of “mind doodling,” which allows her to find her thoughts 
through the creation of art, a method that echoes Hairston’s own creative process of 
performing or writing narratives first in order to find her ideas about a given subject 
(“New” 1, 4). Lawanda has learned this worldview from being raised in the marginalized 
ethnic throwback culture of Paradigma. In contrast, The Major responds with his own 
transmissions that allow him to voice his more empiricist, militaristic, and scientific 
personality in transmissions that the ever-organized soldier divides into clearly labeled 
sections, such as Question, Assumption, Observation, Note, and Recommend. The 
following example in response to one of Lawanda’s transmissions captures not only his 
voice, but also his sense of organization evident in his choice of page layout:  
Assumption: You don’t mean you got lost; you believe forces disrupted 
spacetime and infected your will, resulting in an unintended 
Barrier confrontation. 
Observation: You should consider stress and your mental state as well as 
fantastic possibilities. Memory lapses aren’t as uncommon 
as you might think. (Hairston, Mindscape 76)  
As this sample implies, his perspective of events is filtered through the analytic action of 
a more scientific or empirical approach to understanding life, an approach he has 
learned from being raised in the dominant scientific culture of Paradigma. 
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Once the stylistic divisions between all six of the characters are established, the 
novel formally begins to integrate the narratives together. This move from division to 
struggle to integration of ideolects outlines Lynn Margulis’s concept of symbiogenesis, 
the central SF premise of the story that Hairston claims “was an invaluable inspiration” 
for the novel (Hairston, “Heretical” 1753), even as it is not explicitly explained in the 
novel itself. As Hairston states, “Margulis holds that all life, all novel species developed 
from bacterial symbiosis rather than through the accumulation of random mutations in 
DNA” (1770). From this premise, “Margulis challenges the standard way of knowing the 
universe and proposes symbiogenesis, evolutionary change by the inheritance of 
acquired gene sets, as the creative engine of evolution” (1753). She continues, 
“Margulis also supports James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis, the controversial idea that 
the Earth’s biosphere—life, water, air, and land—form a complex, self-regulating 
ecosystem. Powered by the Sun, Gaia is an emergent, self-sustaining entity” (1770). To 
Margulis, “Gaia is symbiosis as seen from space” (1770). However, this notion of 
integration does not mesh with official culture’s interpretation of Darwinian evolution that 
advocates for the elimination of the competition (or threat) in order to survive, and that 
BSG, as we have seen, ultimately recurs to: “Symbiosis—from bacteria combining to 
form novel species, to ecosystems combining to constitute Gaia, a living planet—
doesn’t jibe with mainstream rugged individualist, Great-Chain-of-Being notions of the 
cosmos and human progress” (1800-1814). Overall, the sort of symbiogenesis 
portrayed in Mindscape formally and ideologically imagines that by confronting our initial 
state of division and struggling with each other, rather than ignoring or perpetuating 
these divisions, we can come together to integrate into a sustainable system in order to 
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grow and change. In such a system, no individual constituent is more important than the 
other, which destabilizes the dominant perspective that humanity is of central 
importance over nature. Instead, by becoming symbiotically integrated together, we 
come to realize that all the parts of the biosphere are interdependent upon the proper 
functioning of each for the rest to survive.  
In this light, the Barrier can be read as an entity that has come into a symbiotic 
relation with the biosphere of our solar system by merging with Earth and the life found 
upon it. Rather than this making the Barrier an enemy that must be defeated through an 
us/them binary, Margulis’s concepts—and the narrative structure of the novel—urge us 
to think of the Barrier as an entity that we must struggle with (not without) in order to 
integrate it into a sustainable version of our extended biosphere, but not an entity with 
which we are supposed to assimilate in order to create a new uniform sense of 
existence. In this spirit, as Vierra states, “Instead of aiming at a bogus universality, 
Hairston makes the all-too-human barriers of race, class, and gender an integral part of 
her storytelling by showing how people must confront them to overcome them” (105). 
From the clues in the narrative, it can be inferred that the Barrier must survive if the 
planet is to survive, as its act of re-arranging the Earth upon its arrival has made it so 
that the planet now requires the Barrier to hold itself together. From this perspective, all 
of the pieces of the biosphere are interdependent parts of an integrated whole, and to 
remove one would mean the destruction of the rest, just as is seen in Elleni’s vision of 




 Formally, the narrative enacts this sense of cultural symbiogenesis by initially 
establishing each character separately before putting them together in chapters in which 
they confront and struggle with their differences. This struggle through interaction also 
serves to change the characters, chipping away at their previously well-defined 
personalities and worldviews. One example is an interaction between Lawanda and 
Aaron as captured in one of Lawanda’s cross-barrier transmissions, whom she has 
come to call “7-Stories” after he expresses his rather hegemonic belief that all stories 
and all lives come down to seven universal stories and no others. In this conversation 
that is narrated through Lawanda’s ideolect, Aaron reveals the fate of his family to the 
organ market in an attempt to get Lawanda to talk Ray into playing a particular role: 
“Didn’t know ‘em.” He shrug. “My whole family went for organs. I got a 
reprieve because Paradigma middlemen didn’t want to glut the market and have 
prices drop.” 
I ain’t going to let him guilt me. Throwbacks never could afford the organ 
market no how. “You lucky,” I say. 
“LUCKY? I was an Extra five years. I’ve seen everybody die, every kind of 
way.” 
“So you should be pissed at these lyin’, murderin’ smugglers and do 
somethin’…” 
“What? Join the rebel Extras? No way, lying and cheating gives you a 
survival edge.” (Hairston, Mindscape 62) 
In this initial display of vulnerability, Lawanda recounts how Aaron opens up to her in a 
way that allows her to peer through his veneer of directorial authority to show a different 
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side of himself as a former Extra, the dispensable subalterns of Los Santos, and in 
doing so his voice becomes noticeably more vernacular, i.e., more like Lawanda’s. As 
their interactions continue, Lawanda reacts to his cynical callousness. While she initially 
just wanted to go back home to Paradigma and leave all the gangsters of Los Santos 
alone, she grows increasingly involved in trying to make a change, a change of 
character that puts her steadily deeper into danger.  
In the later chapters at Wounded Knee, even before the Barrier has opened the 
corridors to connect everyone, the ideolects of the point of view characters come 
together in one location as the six Pro-Treaty characters finally meet each other. By 
presenting their direct dialogue through a covert third person narration, these chapters 
formally integrate their ideolects through their interaction and struggle together often 
foremost through their dialogue, a possibility previously made exceedingly unlikely to 
occur due to the isolation imposed by the Barrier up to this point. In one example, 
Lawanda, Elleni, and Ray converge their perspectives to come to an understanding of 
what all the newly opened Barrier corridors might mean for the storyworld: 
 “Look Around,” Lawanda said. “Newfangled Barrier openings in all the 
Zones—like expressways to everywhere. Inside you almost hear somebody 
scattin’ astral blues to Kora riffs.” 
 “Sidi, sculpt-singing,” Elleni whispered as Lawanda was talking. “Or 
Mahalia.” 
 “These corridors don’t wink out, you understand what I’m sayin’, so folk be 




 “Revolution solution,” Elleni said. 
 “A new world,” Ray said. 
 “When the walls come tumblin’ down,” Lawanda said. (433) 
While this sample bears signs of the character’s ideologies integrating, they are not 
assimilated by their interactions as formally registered by their using different ideolects 
to agree on the same thing. For instance, there is a switch of concepts typically 
associated with other characters as Lawanda borrows from Elleni’s cultural connections 
to West Africa when she talks of an instrument called a Kora, and Elleni pulls from 
Lawanda’s characteristic use of “mind doodling” in the connection she makes to “sculpt-
singing,” which in this sense is a metaphoric literalization of doodling, or using art, in 
order to create something new. Ray, on the other hand, re-asserts his clichéd, taciturn, 
action-hero dialogue by turning Elleni’s poetic consonance of “Revolution solution” into 
something as banal as “A new world.” To be fair to Ray’s character, though, he does 
change through his interactions in these last chapters as he becomes both more 
sensitive and more brave, serving Elleni as her ground to the material world and even 
taking the heroic action of offering himself as a sacrifice in the end, something he would 
never have done at the beginning of the novel. Overall, while the struggle of the point of 
view characters with each other’s differences brings about some degree of character 
change in each, these chapters also show how integration as seen in Hairston’s 
symbiogenesis is not assimilation, as the unique voices of each ideolect remains intact 
in the end. Instead, the changes in their dialogue denote a metaphoric inheritance of 
each other’s acquired “gene sets,” so to speak, as the characters’ ideolects inherit sets 
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of each other’s language use, pulling with it the ideological freight that language 
inevitably carries. 
In a post-9/11 world, this formally increasingly heteroglossic move to use the 
concepts of symbiogenesis to integrate their voices runs counter to the unilateral 
actions of the Bush Administration and the silencing of political dissent in the first years 
after the terrorist attacks, as well as to the us/them binary created by the War on Terror. 
By valuing the integration of these distinct voices to work together rather than silencing 
the different worldviews, the introduction of the Barrier and the concept of 
symbiogenesis into the storyworld serve as imaginary and almost magical solutions to 
the real world divisions between what were seen as seemingly irreconcilable cultures 
after 9/11, such as the East and West. In this way, Hairston points allegorically to an 
alternative way to solve our cultural and political disputes by working with each other to 
confront our differences in order to become something new and hybrid that still retains 
each constituent’s unique cultural outlook. The future, for Hairston is not that America 
and the Middle East should merge as one, but that they should learn from each other so 
that they can work together for a sustainable future. 
At the second horizon, the formal contradiction of the novel can be re-interpreted 
as a dialogic conflict between the post-9/11 ideologies of isolationism typified by the 
War on Terror and an integrationism that calls for outreach to the Middle East and non-
terrorist Islam, each embodied in the Anti-Treaty characters and the Pro-Treaty 
characters, respectively. Present among both groups is a constant state of paranoia that 
often divides their efforts, or as Vierra states:  
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On both sides of the treaty fence, the characters are looking over their shoulders, 
not knowing who to trust, who they can work with. Mindscape’s protagonists 
succeed because they ultimately accept each other’s differences and find ways 
to build on each other’s strengths; their human antagonists remain divided, 
precisely because disdain for difference keeps them in power. (132) 
In the terms of this project, for both groups of characters, a paranoid fear of both 
internal and external threats dilutes their efforts by fracturing their collective action. The 
Pro-Treaty characters only succeed when they form a hybrid collective front against the 
Anti-Treaty characters whose fragile alliances based on individual benefit fall apart 
under pressure. Further, these two ideologies add to the discourse on post-9/11 survival 
that I began to see emerging in the texts of the previous chapters. By survival, I do not 
simply mean practical survival, such as stockpiling barrels of water, but survival as the 
route to whatever would be deemed the most desirable future for America as a utopian 
project. In the previous chapter, we saw through Zone One that nostalgic reconstruction 
is a dead end (pun partially intended), and through 10 Cloverfield Lane we learned that 
better results occurred through creative survivalism rather than survival as 
consumerism. BSG, on the other hand, ultimately advocates for genetic survival by the 
passing of our genes to the next generation as the most important way to continue on 
(even if the ambiguous ending seems to undercut this very assertion). Mindscape, 
advocates for survival in a different form, one based on the concept of symbiogenesis 
through the ideologeme that we must confront our differences in order to integrate into a 
cooperative but diverse collective that expands our considerations of society to include 
its place in the biosphere as a whole.   
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 The ideology of isolationism is voiced by the ideologues of the Anti-Treaty 
characters. As we continue through the story, we learn that this is a seemingly 
dispersed group of characters that are working for their own prosperity and power 
above all others, driven by individual gains rather than collective goals. As Vierra states, 
“[T]he opponents of peace are mainly politicos who have climbed the hierarchical 
ladders of their respective societies and who rely on their power to determine others’ 
fates” (132). These characters include Jesus Perez, the Los Santos ganglord looking to 
climb to the top of the underworld hierarchy. Sidi Xa Aiyé is a Vermittler and spirit sister 
to Elleni who is at first a fierce isolationist driven by her fear that integrating with the 
other Zones will result in the cultural contamination of New Ouagadougou. Yet, in a 
heated discussion near the narrative’s conclusion, Elleni seems to finally inspire Sidi to 
be a better version of herself and side with the Treaty (Hairston, Mindscape 424). Femi 
Xa Olunde is a now deceased leader of New Ouagadougou who began a xenophobic 
campaign advocating for the genocide of the Vermittler as abominations that must be 
exterminated, and who oversaw the killing of most of these Barrier mutants. Duma Xa 
Babalawo, is Femi’s present day protégé who seeks to continue Femi’s work as long as 
it puts him in a place of power. The Major initially works with Prime Minister Jocelyn 
Williams to undermine the Treaty in order to turn a profit for Paradigma. The Major only 
later changes sides when he starts to see visions from the Barrier that make his hand 
glow blood red, Elleni’s healing abilities disable the brain bombs that hold him loyal to 
the Prime Minister, and his love for Lawanda pushes him to disobey Jocelyn’s order to 
have her killed. Moses Johnson is Aaron’s assistant director who is just another person 
in Los Santos struggling to make it to the top. Similarly, Daniel Ford is a middle-tier 
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gangster who allies with Jocelyn to get his ticket to the top. Last, Piotr Osama is the Los 
Santos Extra and a born-again Sioux from the Ghost Dancer cult who attempts to 
assassinate Celestina in order to stop the Treaty from diminishing his individual 
sovereignty (12).  
Much like the War on Terror is a war waged against an ill-defined “evil” terrorist 
threat that must be eliminated, essentially pitting America against anyone who opposes 
America, the goal of isolationism is to destroy anyone deemed to be the enemy Other, 
which makes this destruction of the opposition and one’s continued survival the only 
signs of success. Achille Mbembe helps explain the logic of this sort of ideological 
stance: “The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a 
mortal threat or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my 
potential to life and security—this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of 
sovereignty characteristic of both early and late modernity itself” (18). As he notes, this 
is essentially a dehumanizing ideology, or “reification understood as the becoming-
object of the human being” (18). In the end, these characters oppose the Treaty but 
largely do so individually or in contentious and temporary small groups in order to 
impose and maintain the hierarchy that isolates the Zones in a state of self-destructive 
competition that only benefits those in power. This same agenda for financial gain and 
power in the real world can also be said to be the primary motivation behind the 
Invasion of Iraq, as it allowed the Bush Administration control of a key geopolitical 
location with a rich oil supply, but it failed to actually be connected to those responsible 
for the attacks of 9/11, its original justification. Simultaneously, the motivation of the 
Bush Administration could be read as a displacement of their own greed onto the 
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Islamic other who they believe only wants to take us over, requiring us to take them 
over first. This justification of preemptive attacks against a perceived threat likely 
underlies the psychological motivations of the Anti-Treaty characters as well, as the 
Treaty would integrate the Zones and destroy their hold on the economic forces that 
maintain the storyworld’s status quo. Opposing the Treaty for these characters is seen 
as a matter of survival, a means of maintaining their way of life, regardless of who else 
their actions continue to hurt. 
On the other side, the ideologues of integrationism can be found in the Pro-
Treaty characters that consist of the six point of view characters previously described in 
the summary. This use of a group of relatively marginalized characters as the 
protagonists is a common theme in Hairston’s work. As Vierra states, “Those who 
imagine a new day are the ad hoc community of misfits, of renegades and castaways, 
to whom Hairston gives voice in all of her works” (103). The success of the Pro-Treaty 
characters, however, is founded on their largely unknowing adoption of living through 
the concept of symbiogenesis. Through the ideology of symbiogenesis, the best answer 
for the survival of the human race is through integrationism that advocates for 
confronting our differences in order to learn how to become an interdependent but 
diverse biosphere, not through a sense of isolationism that would value the survival of 
the individual over the whole, nihilistically collapsing the biosphere in on itself. The 
alethic creativity of the Barrier as a distancing novum creates an imaginary situation, a 
SF thought experiment, wherein the struggle toward integration through symbiogenesis 
can be dramatically played out. Seen this way, the Barrier’s initial creation of divisions 
and restrictions of travel can be seen as an allegory of the 9/11 attacks, which had the 
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same effects, although ultimately Mindscape rewrites the Barrier—and 9/11—as an 
invitation to global cooperation on the basis of hybridity and the survival of the planet. 
Allegorically, of course, this rewriting of the Barrier within the storyworld means that the 
novel asserts that if we continue to utilize American exceptionalism, it will only lead to 
our doom, as we will be unable to integrate with our international biosphere in which all 
the nations of the world could thrive together. 
Toward this effort to create change, Hairston extends the concept of 
symbiogenesis into the struggle of the three inhabited Zones and the characters as well. 
Like Margulis, Hairston “sees science as a liberal art, a way of knowing—more 
epistemology than technology” (Hairston, “Heretical” 1753). Similarly, Daoine Bachran 
states that in Mindscape Hairston calls for the “merging of science and art” (15). If we 
extend this in light of our new understanding of symbiogenesis and the allegorical 
meaning of the three inhabited Zones, their struggle together actually calls for the 
merging of science (Paradigma), art (Los Santos), and spirituality (New Ouagadougou), 
as they all come together as a cooperative biosphere in the hopeful ending. Considering 
the stance taken by the Pro-Treaty characters, Vierra states, “Mindscape’s protagonists 
provide the means to counter dystopian despair by building cooperative social networks 
dedicated to social change” (104). This perspective dispenses of the us/them, 
ally/enemy dichotomies pushed by the Bush Administration and post-9/11 
neoconservativism to urge for the cooperation of all members of the biosphere to 
struggle together, including the Barrier seen as the divisions imposed upon us by 
society. I say “struggle” because the brand of symbiogenesis that Hairston advocates is 
not without competition. For instance, Celestina states, “‘Symbiogenesis is the creative 
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engine of evolution, not genetic drift and fierce competition between random mutations. 
Biodiversity is a result of competition and cooperation’” (Hairston, Mindscape 370). 
Earlier, too, Elleni, in her heated discussion with Sidi, implies that struggling with others 
is a means to humanize, to improve oneself, but to isolate or to destroy one’s enemies 
only leads to the destruction of all (350-1). Through the lens of symbiogenesis, the final 
sacrifice of the Vermittler to the Barrier is not a spiritual renewal as it may appear at 
first. Rather, it is a metaphorical confrontation with the divisions that separate us in 
order to produce a successful integration of the biosphere. When the three characters, 
Ray, Elleni, and Sidi, enter the Barrier, they are actually offering sets of their genes to 
the Barrier for it acquire, allowing it to function better as a piece of the self-regulating 
biosphere by better understanding the needs of humanity and opening all of the 
corridors in order to connect the biosphere together in a more productive, hybrid, and 
collective form. Rather than ignore or oppose the Barrier as the Anti-Treaty characters 
do, the Pro-Treaty characters work with it to produce a peaceful solution that creates a 
sustainable society rather than one based on a nihilistic spiral towards self-destruction. 
In this way, as Geoffrey Glover states, “the narrative uses the concept of border 
crossing as a metaphor for the creation of new hybrid communities around permeable 
borders” (155). Applying symbiogenesis to real world political and social interactions 
would eliminate the endless conflict of a War on Terror that seeks to eliminate the 
enemies on the opposite side of the us/them binary. Instead, Hairston’s symbiogenesis 
would call for America to struggle with the Middle East in order to find a hybrid means of 
co-existence that would lead to a sustainable international biosphere.  
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Seen at the third horizon, the contradiction between the divisions symbolized by 
the Barrier and the integrating ideology of symbiogenesis can be re-interpreted as a 
displacement of the romance genre into SF, wherein the very same “magical”—i.e., not 
rationally explainable—entity of the Barrier at once creates seemingly irreconcilable 
differences and ultimately by its agency as unexplainable magic fosters a universal 
Utopian community, much as Jameson states that magic became the formal solution to 
the conflict between good and evil in the romance genre (Political 118-9). In short, 
Mindscape utilizes the Barrier and the concept of symbiogenesis as “magical” 
allegorical solutions to the divisions created within society by the rupture of 9/11. In the 
narrative, these romantic elements become semi-rationalized into nova, as the Barrier is 
considered an alien entity and symbiogenesis is presented as an alternative scientific 
approach to the accepted theories of biological evolution, even as the Barrier defies 
most attempts to photograph or document it, thereby remaining magical. Of course, in 
the real world, cultural change is hard and seemingly unresolvable, even when there is 
a growing argument for its necessity. Mindscape utilizes the magical novum of the 
Barrier as taken from romance to magically naturalize symbiogenesis as an alternative 
to the biological determinism ultimately advocated by BSG. By absorbing the genes of 
the Vermittler who sacrifice themselves to it, the Barrier can better understand the 
needs of those it symbiotically interacts with in the biosphere of the Earth and our solar 
system. As a result of genetically “learning” more about the humans it must cooperate 
with, the Barrier opens its boarders at the end of the narrative, allowing the three 
inhabitable Zones easier routes of trade and eliminating the isolationism and 
exceptionalism that the divisions it had previously created were imposing. The success 
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of symbiogenesis as a means of learning about each other in order to remove the 
illusory need for divisions are evident in the end of the narrative, where everyone lives 
happily together, even if the narrative asserts that this peace is only temporary. Overall, 
this imaginary solution of symbiogenesis as enabled by the massive alien presence of 
the Barrier points to America’s real world need after 9/11 to understand and integrate 
with the nations of the world rather than revert to our isolationist stance of 
exceptionalism through the Ground Zero myth. Mindscape asserts that these ideological 
divisions of humanity only lead us to a self-inflicted annihilation, much like how releasing 
the fire virus threatens to kill many at the benefit of the few. Mindscape instead calls on 
us to remove these illusory ideologies that no longer fit the material conditions of a real 
world that already has the technology of nearly instant global communication and low-
cost international travel. Much like how the material conditions of the storyworld are 
collapsing under the divisions imposed upon it, Hairston seems to assert that we will 
too, unless we find a way to learn from each other and open our borders to the world. 
As a showpiece for the concept of progressive hybridity and symbiogenesis, 
Mindscape forwards a new take on post-9/11 survival. Rather than eliminate the enemy, 
we can struggle with and confront our differences in order to cooperate with them on the 
higher and more crucial mission of saving the planet by adopting a more sustainable 
hybrid form, essentially crossing America’s cultural genetics with the Middle East to 
work together. This formally plays out as the initially independent narratives of the six 
point of view characters increasingly converge as it draws closer to the conclusion in 
which they all manage to integrate into a collective but also diverse front that proves 
able to affect real social change. Yet, this stance of symbiogenesis is not without its 
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oppressive aspects, as it represents competition as necessary for survival, a seemingly 
capitalist interpretation of survival that almost has hints of social Darwinism lingering as 
residual elements of its form. While symbiogenesis does not aim to eliminate the 
competition, an important step in the right direction, it does impose a system of winners 
and losers that fails to maximize the pool of human potential in our midst, as this form of 
competition implies the duplication of efforts over multiple parties aiming to do the same 
thing. While this may be a step better than isolationism, it does not imply a harmonious 
collectivity that utilizes its potentials effectively or efficiently. Further, Mindscape 
naturalizes difference as the precursor to hybridity, and hence potentially naturalizes 
post-9/11 us/them wars as a necessary precursor for a multicultural and integrated 
future.  
However, the novel does offer Utopian aspects that can be especially useful 
when considering current post-9/11 issues. The novel proposes that cultures that seem 
irreconcilable, such as the three Zones and the autonomously and inscrutably alien 
Barrier, actually can unite as a hybrid collective if only we see society not through 
Darwinism but through the different scientific paradigm of symbiogenesis. From this 
perspective, it is not through the elimination of one’s competition but through integration 
that life forms become more complex and become better able to survive. As Vierra 
states, “Hairston’s characters show how it is possible to imagine a new day. But to see 
things afresh, we first have to deal with what is, as well as what was; unworkable or 
deadly conditions won’t go away by denying or erasing them” (105). Driving even closer 
to the point, she states, “One of the central arguments of Mindscape is that community 
will overcome these barriers, but that community cannot come about without a struggle. 
379 
 
Those in power will not relinquish their control quietly” (127). Perhaps most instructive, 
even as Ray and Elleni overlook the hopeful ending of the open corridors and the three 
Zones integrating into a hybrid society, Elleni asserts that Utopia is not something that is 
achieved and attained as a fixed, teleological end point (Hairston, Mindscape 431). 
Instead, echoing a commonly accepted SF understanding of Utopia17, Elleni realizes 
that Utopia is something that we must strive toward, something that requires constant 
work and effort. After all, achieving some ultimate state of perfection would likely 
foreclose innovation and adaptation, leading eventually to the stagnation of society. 
Rather than celebrate her victory as something final, as if it were a defeat of her 
enemies, Elleni reflects, “With all the open corridors, the balance of power would shift. 
She was overwhelmed by the weight of the future, the enormity of the tasks as hand” 
(434). Yet, this lack of a final victory is not depicted as a fearful glimpse into an 
uncertain the future. Instead, it offers a hopeful ending in which the future is open to 
Utopic possibilities. As Vierra states, “Mindscape does not indulge in despair. Instead, it 
offers a message of hope, hope achieved by the ‘impossibility specialists’ who not only 
have a dream of a better world but who actively work to achieve it” (103). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In the end, this chapter has found that SF works with and utilizes the same fear 
themes that this study has seen in operation across post-9/11 American culture in the 
previous chapters on the 9/11 novel and the zombie narrative. However, the distancing 
 
17 As Edward James notes, SF usually objects to the idea of a static future Utopia, as SF narratives have shown that 
this sort of final goal tends to create an endpoint to innovation and adaptation, leading to stagnation rather than 
any desirable state for society. Instead, SF tends to advocate for what he calls the technological utopia: a utopia 
that rejects perfection in favor of continued struggle and progress (222).   
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effect of the novum often allows SF to push the boundaries of accepted limits of social 
commentary. This allows television shows such as BSG to discuss sensitive subjects 
such as terrorism, torture, and the violation of human rights even while the memory of 
9/11 was only a few years old and its legacy in the War on Terror remained at its full 
cultural power. Through the allegorical veil, the alethic creativity of SF can often discuss 
alternatives that other more realistic genres tend to shy away from. Further, through the 
analysis of the two texts in this chapter, BSG and Mindscape, this study was able to 
identify the discourse on survival that actually has run through the previous chapters as 
well, though unidentified up to this point. How is America supposed to move on after 
9/11? What is the best way to pursue the future we want? What does “we” mean for that 
matter? As the chapter shows, BSG advocates for evolutionary determinism, while 
Mindscape pushes for an ideology of integrationism based on the concept of 
symbiogenesis. As implied by the multitude of propositions for America’s future survival 
that have uncovered in this project, the debate is far from over, and with it comes an 
underlying fear of doubt. After all, historical conditions continue to change, and, as we 
adapt to the way things are today, we find that new conditions arrive and nothing 
remains certain: the struggle toward the Utopic is a constant effort, even if it is one often 











 The purpose of this study has been to examine the post-9/11 American fear 
narrative across media and genre. To do this, I introduced the concepts of the fear 
narrative, the primary fear theme, and the secondary fear theme in order to trace the 
genealogy of the fear narrative across American history and, in turn, to frame a deeper 
understanding of its political, social, and historical operation after 9/11. First, I proposed 
that genre, media, and the historical context of production would affect the way that fear 
themes manifest in the text. Second, I proposed that fear is depicted, changed, or 
reinforced in texts in ways that have often unconscious political meanings. The 
ramification of this project for cultural studies is that if offers an example of how to map 
the evolution of an emotion in the narratives of particular times and places, and we now 
have a better understanding of how fear specifically circulates through American 
narratives in particular thematic forms. In particular, this study identified ten primary fear 
themes (though there certainly may be more), at least six secondary fear themes as 
they have manifested in particular genres, and noted that the fear narrative tends to 
have either an ambiguous, hopeful, or, I would now add, a pessimistic ending. The ten 
primary fear themes that I identified include apocalypticism, contamination, entrapment, 
exclusion, the external threat, the internal threat, paranoia, the personalization of fear, 
transgression, and trauma. The six secondary fear themes noted in this study include 
the survival space, zombie-creature, wall, hypermasculine character, survivalist, and 
hybrid character. By outlining the politics of fear in operation in this era of the fear 
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narrative, this study has identified the post-9/11 era as one of the major periods in 
American history when fear was deployed almost exclusively for conscious or 
unconscious political aims. 
As previously noted, this study is designed with a number of necessary 
limitations that point the way for future studies. In an effort to limit the body of texts this 
study focuses on to a manageable corpus, this study intentionally excluded young adult 
(YA) literature and their filmic adaptations, as well as other genres that are rife with fear 
narratives such as the techno-thriller, suspense fiction, mystery fiction, fantasy fiction, 
police procedural drama, supernatural drama, and texts that are primarily and 
generically hybrid in nature, a trend within speculative fiction, at the least, which is 
producing some very interesting and exciting work, but which complicate this project’s 
intent at introducing large-picture generalizations concerning the examination of the fear 
narrative in particular genres. I have also excluded numerous media, including graphic 
novels, video games, tabletop games, music, fine art (e.g., paintings, sculpture, and 
graphic design pieces), short internet-native videos (e.g., YouTube), social media, and 
nonfictional texts such as auto/biographies, true crime, journalism, reality television, and 
documentaries. All these categories of texts would likely make excellent follow-up 
studies to create a deeper understanding of the fear narrative, and each one could 
potentially become a dissertation in their own right. While they have been excluded as 
direct objects of study, often their presence in relation to the texts that I have selected 
unavoidably emerge, such as the generic influence of noir fiction in many fear narratives 
and the historical influence of journalistic broadcasts of 9/11, international events, and 
former-President Bush’s speeches following the attacks. 
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 I justified this study in the field of cultural studies because not only does it 
analyze the emotion of fear in the narrative, but it examines how fear has evolved in 
American culture throughout its history and exposes the ideological fallacies of many of 
its articulations. While many studies have analyzed fear in general, such as Massumi’s 
or Stearns’s work, or fear across a small sample of texts within a particular genre or 
media, no study, at least to my knowledge, examines the evolution of fear in the 
narrative across all of American history, so as to highlight the particular ubiquity and 
political overtones of fear in American narratives after 9/11 in a variety of genres and 
media. By raising our awareness of how the ideologies of fear have been used since 
9/11 to direct our thinking in particular ways, and analyzing the political consequences 
of narrative elements often seen as playfully innocent, such as zombies, robots, and 
aliens, this study helps to raise our critical awareness of American culture. Further, it 
opens the possibility of continued future studies on fear narratives in other eras of 
American history or in other countries. 
 In Chapter 3 I defined the terms of my object of study, including the fear 
narrative, primary fear themes, and secondary fear themes. I then introduced the ten 
primary fear themes that I have identified in this study, noting their general meaning and 
citing examples of texts that utilize each of the fear themes. In Chapter 4 I explored the 
sedimentation of the American fear narrative itself, tracing the genealogy of the fear 
narrative through seven historical periods. This chapter establishes the existence of the 
tradition of the fear narrative and notes not only the historical sedimentation of various 
eras in its history into our contemporary understanding of fear in the narrative, but the 
impact of historical forces on the fear narrative, supporting my first proposal on the 
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historical adaptability of narrative fear. Further, it demonstrates specifically how primary 
fear themes have evolved through history, allowing a better understanding of what they 
have become after 9/11. With this foundation in place, I was able to move into the next 
three chapters in which I utilized these concepts in the analysis of particular texts 
produced after 9/11. 
 In Chapter 5, I examined fear narratives among the 9/11 novel genre, 
demonstrating how these texts interact with primary fear themes to express and 
embody their political, social, and historic meanings. While I used Jameson to establish 
the overall history of the fear narrative in the preceding chapters, this chapter is the first 
of the interpretive chapters in which I focus especially on using this methodology on 
specific post-9/11 American fear narratives. Further, this chapter begins to demonstrate 
how genre and media impact the formal aspects of the fear narrative. Here, I begin with 
the monomodal medium of the novel so that I could focus on the operations of fear 
themes in the narrative as coming from a single channel of communication. At this point, 
I noticed the presence of ambiguous and hopeful endings as a formal convention of the 
fear narrative. Based on the results of this project, it appears that ambiguous endings 
tend to be used more by white male authors and creators as an often-unconscious 
reactionary impulse to a threat to hegemonic culture that helps to cement the lingering 
sense of fear that the narrative produces for at once oppressive and Utopian ends, often 
through uncertainty about the resolution of the very same threat. On the other hand, the 
hopeful ending appears to be more often employed by authors and creators of 
marginalized groups as a hopeful wish for a better future in which the objects of our fear 
can be pushed away or overcome. Interestingly, very few 9/11 novels actually depict 
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terrorists, the lingering threat that drives much of their fear, and instead focus on 
American reactions to terrorism. This perspective pulls the attention of this genre inward 
to examining not America’s place in the international community but who we are and 
how we felt after the attacks. 
 In Chapter 6, I turned our attention toward the zombie narrative to examine how 
fear narratives operate in the horror genre, and in doing so I discovered five secondary 
fear themes. These included the zombie-creature, the survival space, the wall, the 
hypermasculine character, and the survivalist. Through these secondary fear themes, I 
analyzed how two texts manifested post-9/11 American fear in how they relate to our 
fears of the shattering of the Virgin Land myth of American exceptionalism and our 
consumerist desire to hide behind the safety of our commodity acquisitions. In 
particular, I note in this chapter the beginnings of a discourse on how America can 
survive into the future, or, in other words, how it can regain its sense of safety after the 
terrorist attacks shattered our belief in our own untouchability or invulnerability. Zone 
One also highlights how the ambiguous ending can change into the pessimistic ending 
in the zombie narrative, as the very presence of the zombie urges the narrative form 
toward the complete annihilation of all human (read as American) life in the near future. 
In this way, pessimism works as a motivator, symbolically articulating fear with an 
unstoppable force already shambling among or about us today, whether this points to 
terrorism or oppressive masculinity, as in 10 Cloverfield Lane.  
 In Chapter 7 I examined the post-9/11 American science fiction fear narrative, 
noting that while it shares elements of the secondary fear themes found in the zombie 
narrative, the form of the genre tends to alter them as they move into science fiction. 
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Instead, post-9/11 science fiction often emphasizes the different secondary fear theme 
of the hybrid monster or the hybrid creature. Whether as the fearful Cylons in Battlestar 
Galactica or the Vermittler in Mindscape, hybrid characters captured the post-9/11 fears 
of transgression and the internal threat, in which what was seen as an external threat 
could easily invade our in-group and change who we believe we are. Moreover, this 
chapter demonstrates how secondary fear themes are definitely affected by 
transmission from one genre to the next, as while the Cylons share elements of the 
zombie-creature, it would be hard pressed to call them a zombie themselves. Instead, 
by filtering the zombie-creature through the iconic science fiction convention of the 
robot, the external threat becomes a hybrid monster with an often disorienting potential 
to blur our categorical boundaries between human/machine, nature/technology, and 
West/East, as the Cylon’s allegorical connection to terrorists is flipped when the human 
fleet become occupied under the Cylons in the third season of the show, creating a 
critique of the Invasion of Iraq and the neoconservative foreign policies of the Bush 
Administration. On the other hand, Mindscape notes the Utopic potentials of the hybrid 
character, stripping it of much of its fearful aspects, and instead drawing its fear from its 
depiction of the Barrier as the wall that isolates, insolates, and separates global society 
into different social groups. Through the concept of symbiogenesis, the narrative urges 
that rather than ignore or perpetuate the divisions that separate societies of both 
American and the world, we should instead confront our differences to consciously 
struggle with them in order to integrate into a sustainable hybrid culture that can enact 
real social change. In this way, the hybrid character becomes a means of overcoming 
the ideology of irreconcilable differences that presides over much of the post-9/11 
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American imaginary, especially regarding the divisions felt between the East and West. 
Rather than eliminating the perceived threat of the enemy in an us/them binary, 
Mindscape urges us to work with them in order to integrate into a hybrid culture that 
avoids assimilation by preserving our unique voices so that we can learn from each 
other to adapt to the challenges of the future.  
At this point it is worth mentioning that the format of this study might lead some to 
the misconception that literary fiction and the 9/11 novel do not have secondary fear 
themes, since these were not discussed in Chapter 5. However, if we zoom in our focus 
to individual genres within literary fiction, we see that secondary fear themes start to 
take shape in narratives by both canonical white male authors and by those by authors 
from marginalized groups. For instance, in the genre of the 9/11 novel we could point to 
secondary fear themes such as the metonymic antagonist who represents a larger 
institution, whether government, military, or corporate entity (such as Markham and the 
Boss in The Zero or Windust and Gabriel Ice in Bleeding Edge); the traumatized 
character who struggles through the symptoms of their trauma (such as Remy in The 
Zero and Darius or Xerxes in Sons); the victim who, while not necessarily being 
traumatized, is the target of attack or persecution (such as Mohammad or Asma in The 
Submission); and the witness space which is a setting where a character witnesses 
catastrophe, often 9/11 itself (such as the rooftop in Sons, Manhattan streets in The 
Zero, and the domestic television space in Bleeding Edge). Clearly, secondary fear 
themes exist in the 9/11 novel, and I believe that the genres of literary fiction should be 
treated the same as any other genre. My intent in the structure of this study was not to 
treat literary fiction as an exception, but to allow each chapter to build on the conceptual 
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foundations of those that came before it, and the foundation established in Chapter 4 
allowed us to focus on primary fear themes in the narrative first before we moved on to 
secondary fear themes in Chapter 6 and 7. 
Over the course of this study, I found that it was much easier to find American 
fear narratives by white male authors or creators than it was to find them by 
marginalized ones. One possible explanation for this may be that it reflects the 
dominance of the white male demographic within the media industry, such as the long 
bemoaned low number of women creators and directors in the television and film 
industry. However, this does not account for the low number of marginalized authors 
producing the fear narrative novel. It seems more likely that this implies that the fear 
narrative tends to be an often-unconscious, reactionary impulse to a threat to 
hegemonic culture, and that these works often function to nullify such marginal and 
emergent threats through personification, pathologization, ontologization, and 
absolutization. Yet, as this study has shown, other authors coming from outside of 
hegemonic culture have been able to re-appropriate this narrative form to critique this 
conservative use, utilizing the hopeful ending as a motivating push away from the 
objects of fear that it depicts. After all, it is often only a matter of perspective, and one’s 
relation to power, that determines whether one more fears the massing hordes of the 
poor, culturally other, and unclean come to invade and pillage or the hyper-rationalized 
capitalist bourgeoisie who sees humanity as disposable commodities to be utilized for 
financial gain. In both strains of the fear narrative, though, fear seems to urge the 
narratives toward the dehumanization of the object of fear, casting them as monsters or 
stereotypes rather than fully developed and complex characters. Overall, while the fear 
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narrative can certainly be a tool of conservatism, it can also be a powerful critique of 
stagnant and regressive political forces in order to present progressive impulses as 
alternatives.    
 In very general terms, that span my organizational division by genre and media, 
post-9/11 American fear narratives appear to center on the redefinition of the us/them 
binary after an apocalyptic Event, much as America attempted to redefine itself by 
recreating its binary oppositions after 9/11. The 9/11 novel tends to focus on who “we” 
are after the Event, largely in opposition to the absent terrorist “them.” Zombie 
narratives allow a metaphoric attack of “them” in the form of the zombie, allowing us to 
explore the fearful and pessimistic possibility that we will be no more. Science fiction 
explores what happens when the line between us and them becomes blurred into hybrid 
forms, questioning our definition of who “we” are and opening up possibilities for new, 
Utopic potentials. In all these narratives, we see the discourse on survival that 
intertextually debates how America as a Utopian project should approach its survival 
into the future after the Event. Zone One proposed nostalgic reconstruction as ending in 
disaster, 10 Cloverfield Lane advocated for creative survivalism over survival as 
consumerism, Battlestar Galactica pushes for survival through our genetic heritage as 
primary, and Mindscape sees our future survival as dependent on the principles of 
symbiogenesis in which integration through our struggle with difference is the key to a 
sustainable future. Likewise, the 9/11 novels in this study also engage in this discourse 
on survival to argue for our active efforts toward integration as well. The Zero urges 
America to shed the passive identity of the post-9/11 virtual imperial grunt for political 
action before it is too late, Bleeding Edge argues that living through justified paranoia 
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only depletes human agency, Sons and Other Flammable Objects avers that the 
solution to irreconcilable difference is to just get both sides to talk to each other, and 
The Submission points to time as bringing acceptance and reconciliation to our 
irresolvable differences. Whether any of these proposals are effective options for the 
future survival of America is open for debate, but it is certain that this fear of what the 
future may bring and how we should best approach it is a major theme in the post-9/11 
American fear narrative in general.  
Overall, the fear narrative that we have examined in this project is not just about 
fear in general, such as confronting various phobias, but appears to be a reaction to 
change, especially change in the form of a quasi-apocalyptic Event such as 9/11. While 
it is tempting to consider this sort of fear as a contradiction between the known and the 
unknown, this binary paints the second term as the fearful intruder, betraying the 
conservative ideology underlying this known/unknown binary in favor of the known, the 
status quo. Instead, we can consider this sort of narrative fear as a reaction to change, 
an interpretation of an anxious affect that arises in the tumultuous moments and years 
after a traumatic Event. Indeed, this traumatic and apocalyptic Event appears to be the 
central convention of the post-9/11 American fear narrative, as all of the narratives in 
this study depict such Events, whether in the form of 9/11 itself or as an allegorical 
traumatic rupture such as a zombie/alien apocalypse. 
In specifying the object of study for this project as “the post-9/11 American fear 
narrative,” each term used here can be interpreted as a variable that could be changed 
or excluded to form a new study. For instance, new studies could be done on the 
different historical eras of the American fear narrative that I outline in Chapter 3, or a 
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study could even argue against these distinctions, further dividing them into more 
specific eras that better capture the evolution of American fear at these historical 
moments. Other studies could be done on countries other than America, as the impact 
of 9/11 was felt across the world. Some interesting studies would be post-9/11 British or 
Japanese fear narratives, or regional studies that discard national boundaries, such as 
post-9/11 South Asian fear narratives or post-9/11 West African fear narratives. Studies 
could also be done on narratives that focus on different emotions, such as happiness 
narratives, perhaps stemming off Sara Ahmed’s chapter “Happy Objects” (29-51), or 
shame narratives to name only two possibilities. In addition, while this study uses 
Jameson’s three horizons methodology to what I would argue was productive effect, 
other methodologies are certainly available to cultural studies, such as focusing on 
reception or production studies (cf. Chow-White et al.) that could be formed into 
qualitative or quantitative projects. A “distant reading” of the American fear narrative 
following Franco Moretti’s quantitative methods of “graphs, maps, and trees” would be 
likely to generate numerous insights that this study has not foreseen (2). Clearly, there 
is much more to understand about the fear narrative, and emotion in the narrative in 
general, and it is my hope that others will join me in this study in the future. 
Yet, this study makes a definitive and novel start in the research on the fear 
narrative, especially as that tradition functioned politically in post-9/11 America. It 
synthesizes affect theory and Jameson’s three horizons of interpretation into a way to 
use points of fear in the narrative in order to identify aspects of political, social, and 
historical contradiction, illuminating the affective bleeding edge of cultural formation in 
process. It notes the tradition of the fear narrative across American history and justifies 
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the importance of studying this narrative form. By becoming aware of the historical 
permutations of fear and its articulations to political ends, we become more aware of the 
unconscious functions of the narrative and the role that fear has always played in our 
everyday interactions, whether motivating us toward or away from things depicted as 
threats, especially from the Utopian potentialities formulating continuously and 
processually as affective impulses. By exploring Takacs’s notion of the politics of fear 
occurring in the narrative (“Monsters” 1), this study allows us to better understand and 
respond to the fallacies and manipulations, as well as to the Utopian impulses that fear 
and its narrativization attempts to nullify or clarify. Through interpretive cultural studies 
such as this, we can better know the political and historical unconscious of our time and 
unearth the Utopian in our midst, pointing the way to a future that manages, as 
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